A Neighborhood Rediscovered Turkey s transatlantic value in the Middle East., Nathalie Tocci, and Joshua Walker Transatlantic Academy

Transcription

1 p a p e r s e r i e s A Neighborhood Rediscovered By Kemal, Nathalie Tocci, and Joshua Walker Transatlantic Academy

2 2010 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC T F E info@gmfus.org This publication can be downloaded for free at Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an to info@gmfus.org. GMF Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the view of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by to info@gmfus.org. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grant-making institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. About Brussels Forum Brussels Forum is an annual high-level meeting of the most influential American and European political, corporate, and intellectual leaders to address pressing challenges currently facing both sides of the Atlantic. Participants include heads of state, senior officials from the European Union institutions and the members states, U.S. Cabinet officials, Congressional representatives, Parliamentarians, academics, and media. For more information, please visit

3 A Neighborhood Rediscovered Brussels Forum Paper Series March 2010 By Kemal Kirişci, Nathalie Tocci, and Joshua Walker* Transatlantic Academy Introduction 3 The Sea Change in Turkey s Middle Eastern Policies 4 Conflicting Interpretations of the Sea Change 11 Realizing Turkey s Middle Eastern Potential 24 Conclusion 29 * Kemal Kirişci is a fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. He is a professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul and holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration. Nathalie Tocci is a fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. She is a senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome; associate fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; and associate editor of The International Spectator. Joshua Walker is a fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. He is a Ph.D. doctoral candidate in politics and public policy at Princeton University focusing on international relations and security studies. Mr. Walker is also a fellow of the Pacific Council on International Policy, a former fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a graduate fellow at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination and Bradley Foundation. The Transatlantic Academy is an initiative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius of Germany, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. In addition, the Academy has received funding from the Transatlantic Program of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through funds of the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Additional support from the Compagnia di San Paolo is gratefully acknowledged.

4 1 Introduction The recent activism in Turkish foreign policy has caused political waves throughout Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. In attempting to decipher Turkey s foreign policy trajectory, many have focused on Turkey s activism in the Middle East. Yet this is not new. At different points in time, Turkey opted to engage the Middle East. However its interventions in the past played into the balance of power logic of the Arab/Soviet versus Israeli/American conflict, oscillating between one side and the other, albeit more frequently on the side of the latter. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey s activism translated into assertiveness and confrontation. While Turkey s military relationship with Israel rallied favor in the West, Turkey made the Middle East an even more unstable and crisisprone region through confrontational relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria. 1 More widely, Turkey believed it was besieged by a veritable ring of evil, 2 fueling counter-alliances between Syria, Iran, Iraq, Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Armenia. 3 Şükrü Elekdağ, a retired ambassador and former deputy undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry, advocated in the mid 1990s that Turkey should prepare to fight two-and-a-half wars simultaneously against Greece, Syria, and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 4 In sharp contrast, Turkey s activism in the Middle East in the 21st century has a distinctly different 1 Makovsky, Alan (1999). The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy. SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No.1, pp Former Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ in 1996 quoted in Mufti, Malik (1998). Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy. Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp , p In the mid-1990s, Greece, Armenia, and Iran held annual foreign ministers meetings, and Greece and Syria signed an agreement in 1995 regarding Greek use of Syrian airbases. 4 Elekdağ, Şükrü (1996). 2 1/2 War Strategy. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs (Ankara), Vol. 1, No. 1, pp nature. Turkish foreign policy, particularly under the influence of current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, conceptualizes Turkey as a central country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia, which attempts to pursue what it calls zero problems with its neighbors. It encourages bilateral and multilateral external relations, and it uses the country s Ottoman heritage as a foreign policy asset. The stated goal of Turkish foreign policy is to transform Turkey into a strong regional, and even global, actor through the exercise of soft power. To what extent is this truly occurring? How can we interpret the transformation of Turkey s policy toward the Middle East? Most importantly, under what conditions does Turkey s new role represent an asset for Turkey, the Middle East, the United States, and the European Union? The traditional manner to study current developments in Turkish foreign policy is to assess the areas in which Turkey converges and also where it diverges from the policies pursued by the European Union and the United States. Adopting an alternative and innovative approach this paper does not view Turkey s distinctiveness in the Middle East as necessarily detrimental to the West, but rather argues that it could represent an important asset to its European and American partners. Yet Turkey s potential in the Middle East does not automatically translate into practice. Turkey s promise in the region hinges on its consistent pursuit of democratization at home and a norm-based foreign policy abroad. In addition, can only be fulfilled if the EU proceeds with Turkey s accession process in good faith and the United States partners with Turkey in the region to encourage Turkey s EU prospects and reforms. Turkey s promise in the region hinges on its consistent pursuit of democratization at home and a norm-based foreign policy abroad. A Neighborhood Rediscovered 3

5 The Sea Change in Turkey s Middle 2 Eastern Policies The fallout for Turkey of an Israeli nuclear attack on Iran or an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would be equally disastrous. Turkish foreign policy today is undoubtedly far more proactive and multi-dimensional than at any period in Turkey s republican history. This paper begins by cursorily mapping the transformation in Turkey s Middle Eastern policies, focusing on Turkey s ties with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Israel- Palestine and its mediation initiatives in the region. Improving relations with (almost) all neighbors Particularly since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Turkish-Iranian relations have been marked by tension over cooperation. Tension never threatened an outbreak of conflict, and the centuries-old Turkish-Iranian border is often flagged as an atypical instance of Middle Eastern stability. 5 Yet bilateral relations have been strained over the two questions lying at the heart of republican Turkey s security dilemma political Islam and the Kurdish question. On both counts, the 1990s saw a considerable aggravation of relations, 6 with growing Turkish sensitivity toward alleged Iranian attempts to export the Islamic revolution, Turkish- Iranian competition in the Caucasus, and Iranian accusations against Turkey of inciting separatism among its Azeri minority and harboring the Mujahedeen al-khalq. 7 This is not to say Turkish- Iranian relations ground to a standstill in those years. Particularly in the energy realm, through bilateral agreements in 1996 and 1997, Iran became Turkey s second largest supplier of gas after Russia. Yet on a whole in the 1990s, Iran was portrayed as Turkey s feared and loathed other. In the 21st century, this picture has visibly altered. In the energy domain, relations developed further 5 The Turkish-Iranian border dates back to the 1639 Kars-I Sirin Treaty. 6 Aras, Bülent (2001). Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iran: Ideology and Foreign Policy in Flux. Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp Mujahedeen al-khalq is a violent opponent to the Iranian regime. through agreements in 2007 and Bilateral trade has soared 8 and Turkey has attempted to penetrate the Iranian market through investments in several sectors. Social contact has also deepened, and Turkey s liberal visa regime attracts more than one million Iranian visitors per year. Yet the most significant turn relates to the security and political realms. Tensions have waned regarding political Islam to the extent that in June 2002 the then-staunchly secularist Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Iran and delivered a lecture on Kemalism and Atatürk. 9 More so, the Kurdish question now represents an area of convergent interests, triggering Turkish-Iranian security cooperation. Improving Turkish-Iranian ties explain Turkey s distinctive position regarding the Iranian nuclear question. Turkey, like European Union countries and the United States, objects to a nuclear Iran. Yet, unlike its Western allies, it does not feel as threatened by Iran s nuclear program much in the same way that it has not felt directly threatened by Israel s nuclear arsenal. This lower threat perception is shared by the public, which disapproves of coercive measures on Iran and a sizeable minority appears to accept more the prospect of a nuclear Iran (29 percent) compared to EU and U.S. publics (8 percent and 5 percent, respectively). 10 But Turkey does feel threatened by a nuclear arms race between Israel and Iran, let alone nuclear attacks, in the region. As Foreign Minister Davutoğlu argued in December 2009, the fallout for Turkey of an Israeli nuclear attack on Iran or an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would be equally disastrous. 11 Hence, Turkey s repeated 8 See Table 1 below. 9 Taşpınar, Ömer (2008). Turkey s Middle East Policies: Between Neo Ottomanism and Kemalism. Carnegie Papers, No. 10, Sep. 2008, p Transatlantic Trends (2009). Topline Data, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 11 Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu s speech, Dec. 8, 2009, SETA, Washington. 4 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

6 calls for a nuclear-free region and its objections to sanctioning Iran sanctions that would hinder burgeoning commercial relations with its neighbor without accomplishing its desiderata of a nuclearfree Middle East. There are at least three factors that shape Turkey s position on sanctions against Iran. First, Turkish officials very quickly recall the manner in which sanctions on Saddam Hussein s regime deeply hurt Turkish trade and its construction business in Iraq as well as beyond it. Second, they recall that, in the case of Iraq, sanctions failed to solve a problem and led to a military intervention, which again caused dire consequences for Turkey s southeastern economy and security. To make matters worse, this disaster occurred at a time when thanks to EU engagement the Turkish government was attempting to pursue reforms to improve the situation of Kurds who populate the region. Third, the notion of addressing and attempting to resolve longstanding conflicts through dialogue with neighbors is a conspicuous characteristic of the government in power in Turkey. This indeed is in striking contrast with the Turkey of the 1990s but very much explains Turkey s U-turns on Armenia, Cyprus, and Syria, not to mention the complete overhaul of its relations with the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Indeed, Turkey s relations with Iraq have also undergone a dramatic improvement. During the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey, under the leadership of President Turgut Özal, firmly allied with U.S.-led forces by defensively securing its southeastern border with Iraq and serving as a base from which allied attacks were launched into Iraq. As part of this conflict, the refugee crisis of April 1991 deeply marked Turkey and forced the country to play an inadvertently central role in supporting the safehaven in Northern Iraq, which eventually led to a more autonomous entity within the country. 12 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey also cut off trade and energy relations with Saddam Hussein s Iraq and, in view of its fight against the PKK, conducted frequent military incursions into Northern Iraq. Turkey s driving rationale was and remains its strong opposition to the creation of a Kurdish state in Iraq because of fears this could fuel secessionist trends in its own Kurdish-populated regions. Thus, its greatest fears came to pass in March 2003 as the United States declared war on Iraq. Largely in response to public opposition to the war in Turkey and the lack of a clear UN-mandate, the Turkish parliament refused to approve U.S. use of the country s territory to invade Iraq. Turkey s concerns with Iraq s territorial integrity and its ensuing souring of relations with the United States, while opening the way for greater cooperation with Syria and Iran, which also have sizable Kurdish populations, delayed cooperation with Iraq (and Northern Iraq in particular). In particular, Turkey objected to the inclusion of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into Northern Iraq, accused the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of not collaborating in the fight against the PKK, and used to conduct frequent military operations in Northern Iraq against the PKK, leading one commentator to write a book entitled Unwelcome Neighbor. 13 Since 2007, however, there has been a marked improvement in relations between Turkey and Iraq, and in particular the KRG. This has followed extensive intelligence sharing with the United States since 2007 that has allowed Turkish special forces to target the remnants of PKK training camps in the Kandil mountains, including a large ground operation in February The turn in Turkey s 12 Kirişci, Kemal (1993). Provide Comfort and Turkey: Decision Making for Refugee Assistance. Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp Lundgren, Asa (2007). Turkey s Unwelcome Neighbour. London, I.B. Tauris. The notion of addressing and attempting to resolve longstanding conflicts through dialogue with neighbors is a conspicuous characteristic of the government in power in Turkey. A Neighborhood Rediscovered 5

7 Talking Turkish meant both credible threats but also massive engagement thereafter. battle against the PKK has facilitated Turkish rapprochement with Northern Iraq. Since there have been key developments on both the Turkish and Iraqi sides regarding the Kurdish question, including greater Turkish acceptance of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, the opening of official ties between Turkey and the KRG, and the KRG s cooperation in the fight against the PKK. 14 This has opened the space for a lively economic, social, and political relationship, with soaring trade and more than 90 percent of FDI in the construction sector coming from Turkey. 15 In September 2009, Turkey and Iraq established a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which included the signing of over 40 bilateral agreements. Even starker has been the sea change in Turkey s relations with Syria. Syria has always represented the prototypical hostile neighbor for Turkey. From its creation in the wake of the Ottoman Empire s collapse, Syria has had historical grievances against the Turkish Republic involving the Turkish province of Hatay, the former Sanjak of Alexandretta, which Syria was forced to cede to Turkey by the French in This traditional claim was compounded by Syrian alignment with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Most importantly, the Kurdish question has historically plagued Turkish-Syrian relations. Since the inception of violence in Turkey by the PKK, Turkey had consistently argued that Syria was the organization s major backer. For much of the 1990s, most of Turkey s relations with 14 This was followed by key developments in 2009, including a visit to Turkey by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, in which he publicly opposed the creation of a Kurdish state, and a visit to Baghdad by President Abdullah Gül, the first visit by a Turkish president since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, in which he also held direct talks with President of the Iraqi Kurdish region Massoud Barzani. 15 Kirişci, Kemal (2009). The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State. New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, pp , p. 47. For trade figures see Table 1 below. Syria were dominated by the issue of Damascus support for the PKK, particularly its involvement in the harboring of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Another contentious (and related) issue is the longstanding dispute over the Euphrates River. Syria, as a downstream nation, has always claimed water rights of the Euphrates, which flows from Turkey. In response, Turkey accused Syria of backing the PKK in order to leverage this water controversy, while Syria accused Turkey of violating Syria s water rights with the dam development of the Southeastern Anatolian Project. Deteriorating relations throughout the 1990s prompted Turkey to seek closer military ties with Israel in order to coerce Syria into dropping its support of the PKK. The full-scale mobilization of the Turkish military along the Syrian border in 1998 forced Damascus to change its strategy concerning the PKK and take Ankara s threats seriously. This led to the expulsion of Öcalan from Syria in October 1998 and a subsequent reduction of violence in Turkey s Kurdish regions. Syrian acquiescence to Turkish demands regarding the PKK did not simply eliminate the prospect of war between the two countries. Often overlooked is the subsequent immediate development of bilateral relations through the multifaceted Adana Process, 16 which included economic, military, and intelligence cooperation. As one observer in the region put it, Talking Turkish meant both credible threats but also massive engagement thereafter. 17 This process led to the possibility of improved bilateral relations at the political level. The breakthrough came when former Turkish President Sezer attended the funeral of former Syrian President Hafez al-assad in With this gesture, followed by friendly overtures by the 16 Aykan, Mahmut B. (1999). The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: a Turkish View. Middle East Policy, Vol. 6. No. 4, pp Interview with expert on Syria, Damascus, Oct The German Marshall Fund of the United States

8 ensuing Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, the scene was set for the historical visit by Syrian President Bashar al-assad to Turkey in January 2004, which was reciprocated in December 2004 when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Damascus to sign a free trade agreement. The invasion of Iraq, Turkey s March 2003 vote, joint concerns over Iraq s territorial integrity, and Turkey s defiance of American (and EU) efforts to isolate Syria, 18 served to further foster positive relations. Since then, relations have continued to strengthen, leading to the signing of a bilateral visa-free agreement and, in October 2009, the establishment of a Strategic Cooperation Council modeled on the High-Level Cooperation Council created with Iraq. 19 Equally significant is the transformation of Turkey s relations with Israel-Palestine. After years of somewhat strained relations in the 1980s in the context of former Turkish Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal s opening to the Middle East, Turkish-Israeli relations dramatically improved in the 1990s, as epitomized by a series of bilateral agreements in the realms of tourism, education, environment, trade, communications, and above all in security and defense. In turn bilateral trade boomed. 20 Most significantly, from a Turkish perspective, the military agreements in the fields of training, intelligence, and defense-industrial cooperation were aimed at flexing the Turkish muscle vis-à-vis Syria. This raised eyebrows throughout the region and caused acute concern in Syria, Lebanon, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In addition, Turkey supported the Oslo process, participating in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Madrid process in the early 1990s and in the 1997 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). 21 In the 21st century, Turkey s relations with Israel and the Palestinians have not been marked by the sharp contrasts in Turkey s external relations highlighted above. Turkish-Israeli cooperation has continued in the fields of intelligence-sharing, defense, energy, and water. 22 In November 2007, Shimon Peres became the first Israeli president to address the Turkish Grand National Assembly. However, with the outbreak of the second intifada and the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkish-Israeli political relations have deteriorated. In 2002, then-turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit described Israel s attack on Jenin as genocide. 23 In 2004, Prime Minister Erdoğan accused Israel of state terrorism, 24 and in 2006 he described Israel s war on Lebanon as illegitimate. 25 Most notoriously at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2009, Erdoğan accused Israel (and his co-panelist Peres) of crimes against humanity in the conduct of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. After the Davos incident, attempts to restore relations in 2009 were thrown off course again with a renewed crisis in October 2009 caused by Turkey s withdrawal of an invitation to Israel to participate in the military 18 Syria appreciated Turkey s opening particularly at a time when Damascus was facing increasing isolation from the United States through the December 2003 Syria Accountability Act, followed by broader American and European (and in particular French) accusations of Syria s involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Refik Hariri in February The Strategic Cooperation Council covers culture, economics, energy, transport, tourism, education, science, customs, defence, water, and the environment. It is presided by the two heads of state and government and includes regular ministerial meetings. 20 See Table Alongside Norway, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden. 22 Bengio, Ofra (2009). Altercating Interests and Orientations between Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel. Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp Dymond, Jim (2002). Turkey accuses Israel of genocide. BBC News, Apr. 4, 24 McGreal, Chris (2004). Turkish PM accuses Israel of practising state terrorism. The Guardian, Jun Turkish Daily News (2006). Erdoğan: Unfair war in Lebanon will have no winner. Aug. 4. A Neighborhood Rediscovered 7

9 exercise Anatolian Eagle, 26 which happened at the same time as Israel s abhorrence at an episode of a Turkish TV series (Ayrılık) showing Israeli forces deliberately targeting Palestinian children. The TV series crisis continues to threaten Turkish- Israeli relations, with Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman stating that not even an enemy country would dare act this way and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Danny Ayalon publicly humiliating Turkey s Ambassador to Israel in January Once again, Turkish (and Israeli) diplomacy scrambled to avoid further escalation, and it is noteworthy that tensions did not result in a downgrading of diplomatic relations as had occurred in the past. 28 Nonetheless, the Turkish- Israeli relationship, far from being the unbreakable military alliance of the 1990s, has undergone an underlying structural turn. Consequently, Turkish-Palestinian relations have also changed. Some Turkish actions have been articulated within the broad contours of the (failed) Oslo process, including former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel s participation in the 2000 Mitchell Commission; the growing aid delivery by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) to the Occupied Territory; the meeting in November 2007 between Israeli President Peres and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas in Turkey; or the Industry for Peace (Barış için Sanayi Girişimi) project by the Turkish Chambers of Commerce (TOBB). 29 More significantly, however, Turkey has undertaken three initiatives that part from the Oslo logic and whose repercussions are arguably more important. First is the opening of Ottoman archives regarding property certificates. The opening of the archives represents a critical asset in the Palestinian and international position against Israeli house evictions and demolitions in Jerusalem, a crucial question in view of the international consensus on Jerusalem representing the shared capital of Israel and Palestine. Second is Turkey s support for the report of the Human Rights Council headed by Justice Richard Goldstone. The report condemned Israel (and Hamas) of war crimes in Gaza (and southern Israel) and recommended measures to ensure accountability. In doing so, the report can be viewed as a milestone in the arduous task of reinserting international humanitarian law back into the international community s approach to the conflict. Third, Turkey, like other European countries such as Norway and Switzerland, but unlike the EU and United States, has maintained open channels with Hamas. Upon Hamas electoral victory in January 2006, Turkey recognized the new PA government and invited Hamas s Damascus-based leader Khaled Meshal to Ankara in February Given that any Israeli-Palestinian agreement hinges, inter alia, on Hamas acceptance, and given the movement s control of the Gaza Strip and its support amongst the Palestinians, Turkey represents one of the few Western channels to engage Hamas. The added 26 The exercise was cancelled after the United States (and Italy) withdrew its participation. 27 Greenway, H.D.S. (2009). It s getting chilly between Turkey and Israel. GlobalPost, Oct In 1980, Turkey closed its Jerusalem consulate and downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of second secretary in response to Israel s declaration of Jerusalem as its undivided capital. 29 TOBB s initiative consists of inviting Turkish, Israeli, and Palestinian representatives of chambers of commerce to the Ankara Forum. The goal is to develop joint commercial projects. The Forum s pet project was the development of the Erez Industrial Zone in the aftermath of the 2005 Israeli disengagement, which was meant to create 7,000 jobs in Gaza. Yet like many of the Oslo (and Oslo-like) initiatives, the project crumbled in the wake of the political separation between the West Bank and Gaza in 2007 and Operation Cast Lead in After much controversy surrounding the Hamas visit to Ankara, Khaled Meshal met then-minister of Foreign Affairs Gül at the AKP headquarters rather than at the Foreign Ministry. 8 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

10 advantage of Turkey is that unlike many other countries in the West, Turkey accepted the results of the Palestinian elections, allowing it to enjoy at least some credibility with Hamas. Turkey as a mediator in the Middle East To the extent that promoting peace and developing ties with all parties have been two pillars of current Turkish foreign policy, 31 offering to mediate in the conflict-ridden Middle East has been an important outcome of Turkey s transformation. In different conflict hubs, Turkey s supply of mediation has been matched by demand in the region. The most important case regards Turkey s mediation between Israel and Syria. 32 The Turkish initiative dates back to January 2004 in the context of Syrian President Bashar al-assad s visit to Turkey. At the time, however, not least because of the U.S. strategy of isolating Syria, Israel rejected the offer of an official re-start of negotiations. This led to the launch of a track-two process instead. By September 2004, the initiative developed into a more structured process, which lasted until July The 2006 Lebanon War (and Israel s ensuing awareness of Hezbollah s capabilities and its own relative vulnerability) raised Israel s perceived need to move forward on the Syrian track, triggering Prime Minister Ehud Olmert s call for his Turkish counterpart s mediation in September 2006 at track-one level. The process was delayed by Israel s bombing of Syria s military installation near Dayr al Zur in September 2007 (incidentally flying through Turkish airspace), and official preparations took place between March 2007 and May Between May and December 2008, four rounds of official indirect talks via Turkish shuttle diplomacy took 31 Speech by Ibrahim Kalın, Advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister, Istanbul Forum, Istanbul, Oct This account was informed by interviews with Syrian, Israeli, and Turkish negotiators in the process, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Istanbul, Oct place. According to both sides, greater progress was achieved than originally expected. The parties had entered the process for different reasons. For President Assad, a prime aim was to break Syria s international isolation and show the West that it was a serious partner for peace. For Prime Minister Olmert, 33 the aim was to negotiate with Syria in order to weaken the Iranian-Syria-Hezbollah link. Neither side expected a breakthrough. Yet more was achieved than ever before. 34 The climax came at a dinner between the Turkish Prime Minister and his Israeli counterpart on December 23, 2008, in which the launch of direct talks appeared to be in the offing. Five days later, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead and the process broke down. In yet another case, Turkey has mediated between Israel and Hamas. In view of Turkey s open political channels to Hamas (and in particular its political bureau in Damascus), Ankara has offered to mediate on two occasions. The first was in the aftermath of Hamas capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June Ahmet Davutoğlu, then-advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister, travelled to Damascus several times to broker a deal, attempting to persuade Hamas to release Shalit in return for the release of a disputed group of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Following the failure to yield a breakthrough, the potential of Turkey s efforts was recognized by UN Human Rights Rapporteur in the Occupied Territories 33 Although reportedly far less for his coalition partners and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were not fully involved in the process. 34 Syria for the first time made a written territorial offer (six reference points on the map) on the Golan Heights expecting an Israeli response. In turn Israel asked a set of security questions (related to Syria s stance vis-à-vis Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran following a deal) to which Syria responded in written form yet in a manner deemed too vague by Israel. During his visit to Turkey on Dec. 23, 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert was expected to deliver written responses to the Syrian offer, which he did not, primarily for domestic political reasons. The two prime ministers allegedly had a five-hour-long dinner in telephone conversation with Syrian President Assad. In different conflict hubs, Turkey s supply of mediation has been matched by demand in the region. A Neighborhood Rediscovered 9

11 Turkey is geographically, historically, and strategically well-placed to play a mediation role. They are nonetheless emblematic of a Turkish role in the Arab world that would have hitherto been unthinkable. Richard Falk who argued that [i]t is tragic that this effort failed, and was at the time criticized. In retrospect, both the wellbeing of the Gazan civilian population and the security of Israel would have greatly benefited by taking advantage of the Turkish initiative. 35 The second instance of Turkish mediation was during Operation Cast Lead in December 2008-January Given the absence of official contact with Hamas, neither the United States nor the European Union could exert any influence on Hamas in order to secure a ceasefire on its side. 36 Egypt played a crucial role, yet the well-known difficulties between Hamas and the Egyptian regime also opened a space for Turkey. Davutoğlu readily used it by holding two meetings with Hamas leader Khaled Meshal and shuttling between Damascus and Cairo in order to persuade Hamas to agree to a ceasefire in return for an Israeli ceasefire and the lifting of Israel s closure of Gaza. The effort failed as Israel refused to lift its closure of Gaza without the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Turkey has also been drawn into a possible mediation between the West and Iran. Given Turkey s opposition to further sanctions on Tehran and its shared goal with the West of deterring Iranian nuclear weapons, mediating on the Iranian nuclear question in order to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem has become a major part of Turkish foreign policy. More broadly, as an important regional power that has a long history of pragmatic relations with Iran and as an important member of the West, Turkey is geographically, historically, and strategically well-placed to play a mediating role. Turkey thus sought to facilitate talks in 2006, when then-minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül conducted shuttle diplomacy between the principal actors of Condoleeza Rice, Javier Solana, Mohammed el Baradei, and Ali Larijani. Since then, Ankara has consistently offered its good offices to mediate on the question of Iran s nuclear ambitions and continues to pass messages from Washington to Tehran. However, Turkey s efforts have thus far yielded few results. A final area of Turkey s attempted mediation is within the Arab world, a role unthinkable for Turkey in any other period of its Republican history. Three examples of this are Turkey s mediation efforts within Iraq, between Syria and Iraq, and between Syria and Saudi Arabia. In the first case, Turkey in 2005 successfully persuaded Sunni leaders to participate in the national elections in Iraq, helping to draw them into a new political system led by the Shi a. In the second case, Turkey attempted to reconcile Syrians and Iraqis over the latter s accusation of the former for the August 2009 bombings in Baghdad. In the final case, Turkey mediated a micro-crisis over the quasi-cancellation of a state visit by the King of Saudi Arabia to Syria in the fall of 2009 due to tensions between Damascus and Riyadh. With the help of Turkey s last minute interventions, this visit was completed in October 2009 and Syria s rapprochement with the Arab League was further facilitated. 38 Whereas these three examples represent Turkey s role in micro-crisis management, they are nonetheless emblematic of a Turkish role in the Arab world that would have hitherto been unthinkable. 35 Falk, Richard (2009). Understanding the Gaza catastrophe. Today s Zaman, Jan While choosing not to exert any influence on Israel to ensure a ceasefire on its side. 37 The 5+1 contact group includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. 38 Interviews with Turkish diplomats, Ankara, Oct. 20, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

12 Conflicting Interpretations of the 3 Sea Change The shift in Turkey s policies toward the Middle East is stark and can be explained by a confluence of international, regional, and domestic factors. At the international and regional levels, these factors range from the vacuum left by the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War to the changing dynamics in the Kurdish question and the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. They include the considerable influence that the EU has had on Turkish foreign policy 39 and by the United States first aggravating Turkey s sensitivities on the Kurdish question in and then diffusing them by cooperating with Turkey in the fight against the PKK. Above all, however, the change in Turkish foreign policy hinges on Turkey s domestic transformation and democratization, kick-started, inter alia, by its EU accession process, and propelled by the rise of the ruling AKP under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkish foreign policy had traditionally been the exclusive domain of the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the course of the last decade, these institutions not only have been transformed but others have acquired a growing role in crafting foreign policy. These include state bodies such as the ministries of energy, environment, interior, and transportation, the under-secretariat for foreign trade, and the development agency Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). In addition, civil society, and in particular businesses associations such as the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board 39 Some of this literature includes Aydın, Mustafa and Sinem A. Açıkmese (2007). Europeanization through EU conditionality: Understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp ; Öniş, Ziya (2003). Turkey and the Middle East after September 11: The Importance of the EU Dimension. Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp ; and Akçapar, Burak (2007). Turkey s new European era: Foreign policy on the road to EU membership, Lanham, MD: Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield. (DEIK), the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen s Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB), the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen s Association (TUSIAD), and the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) constantly lobby the government on foreign policy questions. It would be hard to make sense of Turkish foreign policy toward countries such as Russia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria without taking into consideration these economic interests. 40 Similarly, economic interests played an important role in efforts to improve relations with the KRG and with Armenia. Additionally, Turkish democratization has made the government more accountable and sensitive to public opinion. Whereas past governments could easily ignore the public, the government now feels obliged for electoral as much as populist reasons to take public opinion into account. Indeed, the backdrop to the March 2003 parliamentary vote not to allow the United States to attack Iraq through Turkish territory was the massive public mobilization against the looming war. Similarly, without a more responsive public and greater freedom of expression, it would have been difficult to imagine the debates that made it possible for Turkey to reverse its policies toward Cyprus in 2004 and Armenia in With some irony, it could also be argued that without democratization it is doubtful that Erdoğan would have been as critical as he has been of Israel lately, whereby the government and especially the prime minister responds to the public outrage over civilian casualties in the region. Accounting for these domestic developments is critical in order to understand the AKP 40 Kirişci, Kemal (2009). The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state. New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, pp Without democratization it is doubtful that Erdoğan would have been as critical as he has been of Israel lately. A Neighborhood Rediscovered 11

13 The doctrine of Strategic Depth provides a normative chapeau to the plethora of state and non-state interests that concomitantly push Turkey to develop deeper and stronger ties to its neighbors. government s foreign policy orientation, marked by the concepts of zero problems with neighbors and Strategic Depth, elaborated by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. Strategic Depth seeks to reposition Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the center as an actor sitting at the intersection of multiple regions. It does so by courting different alliances in order to maintain optimal regional and global independence and influence, 41 by taking on a larger role in its former Ottoman territories, and by prioritizing dialogue and cooperation over coercion and confrontation. 42 The appeal of this doctrine has allowed the AKP to work with many nationalists and ardent secularists in Turkey who dislike the AKP s conservative religious roots but agree on the need to make use of both Turkey s Ottoman past and former geopolitical space. It has also rallied favor with business and civil society, which are eager to develop close ties with the neighbors in the economic and social domains. In other words, the doctrine of Strategic Depth provides a normative chapeau to the plethora of state and non-state interests that concomitantly push Turkey to develop deeper and stronger ties to its neighbors. It also conceptualizes a foreign policy trend that has been in the making since the days of former Turkish Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal in the late 1980s and early 1990s and of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem in the late 1990s For further discussion on this doctrine, see Walker, Joshua (2007). Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey s new foreign policy doctrine. Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001). Startejik Derinlik Türkiye nin Uluslararası Konumu, Istanbul, Küre. For an elaboration see Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2004). Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı. Radikal, Feb. 26; and Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008). Turkey s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp Altunışık-Benli, Meliha (2009). Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, pp The upshot and irony of this increasingly democratic Turkey is a growing readiness to diverge and say no to the United States or the European Union when their policies have been perceived as countering Turkish interests. Unlike during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, when Turkish army generals and diplomats could be counted on to support the West even when policies harmed Turkey s national interest, Turkish leaders are now being held accountable for their foreign policy decisions, and at times they give in to populism. In other words, like any other democracy, Turkey today responds to the public, including its nationalist segments, as well as to powerful business interests. Toward this end, the confidence exhibited by the prime minister in his diplomatic dealings and political rhetoric has rubbed off on Turkey as a whole and stems directly from the political power accumulated by his party. Given the AKP s unrivalled position domestically, its foreign policy doctrine of Strategic Depth has also been hegemonic within the country. Turkey s new self-awareness as a regional power means that rather than simply being able to rely on Turkey as an instrument of Western power projection in the Middle East, the West is now facing a stronger and more assertive Turkey that can and will disagree on key foreign policy issues. What are the implications of this for the United States and the EU? There are two possible readings of Turkey s Middle Eastern transformation. The first and far more common explanation tends to be a cautious if not outright negative view of an increasingly Islamic Turkey inexorably drifting toward the East. The second reading is more positive, viewing Turkey s increased activism and independence in the Middle East as a potential asset to the Western alliance, provided certain conditions are met. 12 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

14 Turkey s drift to the east The traditional reading of Turkey s Middle Eastern policies adopts as an interpretative key the degree to which Turkey s policies converge or diverge with those of the United States and the European Union. On the upside, commentators point to the improvement of Turkey s relations with Iraq in particular. In view of the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, the United States has been thoroughly supportive of Turkey s efforts to fill the vacuum, and both Americans and Europeans have praised Turkey s Kurdish and regional initiative. The United States and the European Union have also congratulated Turkey in its efforts to mediate conflicts in the Middle East, in particular between Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas, and the United States and Iran. Regarding Israel and Syria, U.S. President Barack Obama praised Turkey s efforts in his December 2009 meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan. Regarding Iran, then-secretary of State Rice acknowledged Turkey s efforts in July 2006, and the current U.S. administration has repeatedly mentioned Turkey s role in delivering its messages to Tehran. Regarding Israel and Hamas, in the midst of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, called for Turkey s mediation, 44 and following the end of the Israeli offensive, Turkey s efforts were openly praised by France and the European Union. 45 Yet on those questions where Turkey s policy has diverged from that of the European Union and the United States, Turkey s overtures to the Middle East, that includes its authoritarian regimes, have been interpreted as symptomatic of the country s dangerous slide to the East. The cause of this slide is 44 Turkish PM speaks Sarkozy on the phone, Time Turk English, Jan. 7, Turkey key to convincing Hamas on Gaza cease-fire, Turkey NY.com, turkey-key-to-convincing-hamas-on-gaza-cease-fire-.html unambiguously viewed as the rise of political Islam in Turkey, embodied in the AKP. The consequence is Turkey s increasing warmth toward Muslim countries of the likes of Iran and Syria, its open political channels with Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and its pro-islam double standards in denouncing genocide in Xinjiang while denying it in Darfur. 46 The implication drawn by several Turkey-watchers is that the United States and the European Union are losing Turkey and its Western orientation. 47 This debate took a particularly strident tone in the fall of 2009 as the Turkish-Israeli military alliance faltered and the Turkish Prime Minister warmed to the Iranian regime as and when Western diplomacy stepped up the pressure. This has led some to provocatively question Turkey s NATO membership tout court. 48 While voiced in a less strident manner, some European observers have also raised eyebrows at Turkey s Middle Eastern policies, voicing a growing concern that Turkey may be losing its European vocation. 49 While intuitively convincing, this argument does not stand up to close scrutiny, especially when Turkey s foreign policy in general is taken into consideration. The notion that Turkish foreign policy is currently driven by religious and identity considerations would fail to explain why the AKP government has also pursued relations with Russia 46 See Prime Minister Erdoğan reiterates no genocide in Darfur. Today s Zaman, Nov. 9, 2009; and China tells PM Erdoğan to withdraw Uighur genocide remark, in Today s Zaman, Jul. 15, Menon, R. and Winbush, S. E. (2007). Is the United States Losing Turkey?, Mar. 25, Washington, The Hudson Institute; Cagaptay, Soner (2005). Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara s Western Orientation, Washington, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 48 Schenker, David (2009). A NATO without Turkey. The Wall Street Journal, Nov Kramer, Heinz (2009). Turkey s Accession Process to the EU: The Agenda behind the Agenda. SWP Comments, Oct. 2009, Berlin, SWP, p. 4. Some have raised eyebrows at Turkey s Middle Eastern policies, voicing growing concern that Turkey may be losing its European vocation. A Neighborhood Rediscovered 13

15 and rapprochement with Greece, overturned policy on Cyprus by supporting reconciliation between its Muslim and Christian Orthodox communities, and attempted to improve relations with Christian Armenia at the expense of Muslim Azerbaijan. Moreover, and far from only improving relations with authoritarian regimes, it is also critical to bear in mind that it was during the AKP s years in office that EU-Turkey relations intensified and accession talks started. Furthermore, Islam as an explanatory parameter would fail to account for Erdoğan s close friendship with President Bashir al-assad, the symbol of secularism in Syria and otherwise belonging to a minority heterodox sect in Islam. Further facts question an Islam-centered explanation of Turkish foreign policy. As discussed below, the overwhelming majority of the millions of people that enter visa-free Turkey each year come from Christian countries, 50 a reality that stands in stark contrast to the EU s Schengen regime that forbids visa-free travel to all Muslim countries except Brunei and Malaysia. 51 An additional fact contrasting a religion-based reading of Turkish foreign policy regards development aid: the second largest recipient of Turkish development assistance after Afghanistan is Moldova, a Christian country. In other words, religion, rather than representing an overarching explanatory factor for Turkish foreign policy appears to explain, at best, some of the rhetoric of the Turkish prime minister. Erdoğan s outburst at the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum, his defense of Sudanese President Omar al-bashir, and his support for the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are examples of this, which many Turkish diplomats 50 See Table 2 below. 51 Council Regulation No 453/2003, Mar. 6, 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001. Very recently citizens of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, two partly Muslim countries, have been promised visa-facilitation Council Regulation No. 266/2009, Jul. 15, 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001. as well as the prime minister s close associates recognize as being a problem. These very people are often the ones engaging in damage repair, picking up the pieces broken by the prime minister s rhetorical outbursts. It should be noted, however, that the prime minister has the reputation of speaking brashly in domestic politics, too, on issues as diverse (and not Islam-related) as the H1N1 flu and the Kurdish question. This, of course, is not to say that religious considerations do not play any role in the AKP s foreign policy at all. It is rather to argue that religion, alongside conservatism and nationalism, while certainly playing a role in Turkey as in the United States, the European Union, and the international system more broadly cannot explain alone the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. 52 Turkey as an independent actor: Asset for the United States and Europe In view of the limitations of this first interpretation of Turkish foreign policy, others have adopted a different reading of Turkey s evolution and its foreign policy implications. Turkey is viewed as having embarked on an important path toward democratization. It is seen as having abandoned the gross human rights abuses of the 1990s and, while no longer always supporting U.S. policy in the Middle East, it no longer engages in brinkmanship in its neighborhood. In this reading, Turkey s domestic reform efforts are emphasized, including the momentous constitutional and legislative reforms in and the courageous Kurdish opening in Openness at home has spilled- 52 For studies of the impact of the rise of conservatism and nationalism in Turkey see Çarkoğlu, Ali and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (2009). The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey, New York, Palgrave/Macmillan; and Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. (2008). Trials of Europeanization. Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 53 Cook, Steven (2009). Turkey s war at home. Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, Oct.-Nov., pp The German Marshall Fund of the United States