Individual Attitudes Toward Migrants: A Cross-Country Comparison. Yu Jin Woo. University of Virginia, Charlottesville VA, United States

Transcription

1 China-USA Business Review, March 2016, Vol. 15, No. 3, doi: / / D DAVID PUBLISHING Individual Attitudes Toward Migrants: A Cross-Country Comparison Yu Jin Woo University of Virginia, Charlottesville VA, United States One of the most widely examined topics within recent migration study has been the root cause to anti-migration sentiment. This paper tackles this puzzle by connecting public attitude to citizenship law. Based on a dichotomous classification of the citizenship law into jus soli (by birthplace) and jus sanguinis (by blood), it argues that citizenship law has a fundamental effect in shaping people s perception toward migrants. Extending Allport s (1954) contact hypothesis, this research poses two specific hypotheses. First, natives in jus soli principle reveal more favorable attitudes toward migrants. Second, natives in jus soli countries tend to become more threatened by a new inflow of migrants while those in jus sanguinis countries will be hostile against overall stock of migrants. Statistical analyses, using Eurobarometer (2011), strongly support the first claim while results on the second hypothesis are mixed. This paper concludes with potential ways to more accurately test the second contention. Keywords: anti-migration sentiment, citizenship law, contact hypothesis, democratic destination countries, inflow versus stock, survey data Introduction This paper attempts to answer a puzzle: why do consolidated democracies reveal different levels of anti-migration sentiment? Understanding underlying factors that formulate people s perception toward migrants is particularly an important task in democracies, because politicians are constrained by the general public due to its institutional setting. In answering this inquiry, scholars, especially in the field of sociology and psychology, have paid a great attention on the effect of citizenship law (principle by birthplace or blood) since the 1980s due to a growing number of migrants (Brubaker, 1992). Particularly, contact hypothesis has been frequently applied in analyzing public view toward migrants (Benhabib, 2002; Brubaker, 1992; Crepaz, 2008). Extending this logic, this paper poses two hypotheses. First, natives in jus soli law (citizenship by birthplace) reveal more favorable attitude toward migrants compared to those in jus sanguinis rule (citizenship by blood). Second, natives in jus soli rule feel threatened by a new inflow of migrants while those in jus sanguinis rule are hostile against overall stock of migrants. The ordered logit regressions with country fixed effects, using Eurobarometer (2011) dataset, are applied. This research contributes to migration study in two important ways. First, not many scholars in international political economy have attempted to connect citizenship law with public perception toward migrants. Instead, they have mainly approached public perception from economic standpoint, such as a threat for income level or fiscal burden. By shedding light on non-materialistic concerns arising from the Yu Jin Woo, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville VA, United States. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Yu Jin Woo, 1540 Jefferson Park Avenue, Charlottesville VA 22904, United States.

2 138 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON citizenship law, this research aims to open a new avenue in studying migrant issues in political science. Second, sociological and psychological researches have focused on this relationship based on micro-level, but not macro-level. By focusing on aggregate effect of citizenship law, this paper further analyzes in what direction citizenship law would formulate people s threat perception toward a particular type of migrants. Literature Review In analyzing a cause to anti-migration sentiment, scholars in international political economy have mainly approached this question from economic perspective (resource threat argument), focusing on individual level factors. Specifically, they claim that natives anti-migrant sentiment is due to materialistic economic concerns, such as a fear on labor market competition (Dancygier, 2010; Kessler, 2001; Malhotra, Margalit, & Mo, 2013; Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001) or fiscal burden on public services or welfare state (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Hanson, 2005; Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2007; Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Mayda, 2008; O Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). They suggest that these economic concerns are correlated to negative attitude against migrants. Meanwhile, few others approach this issue based on identity or cultural threat arguments, referring to cultural, ethnic and linguistic differences as the most significant reason to negative sentiment against migrants, stating that material self-interest does not affect people s views on major policy issues (Zimmerman, Bauer, & Lofstrom, 2000; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citron, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008). Although individual economic concerns are vital in formulating natives attitude toward migrants; however, this line of explanation is unsatisfactory in explaining why consolidated democratic destination countries, which tend to hold similar levels of national economic achievement and inequality level, reveal varying degrees of anti-migrant sentiment across these countries. Moreover, identity or cultural threat arguments also shed light on significant factors deducing public tolerance toward migrants. Yet, it seems necessary to discover a root cause to why or how natives view migrants differently based on their identity or cultural dimensions. In order to further advance this non-materialistic approach, this paper highlights a citizenship law as a fundamental cause in formulating differing levels of anti-migration sentiment by extending a logic of contact hypothesis. The next section defines this hypothesis along with its application to the relationship between citizenship law and natives attitude toward migrants. Theory: Contact Hypothesis and Citizenship Law Allport (1954) claimed that intergroup contact will lead to a favorable attitude toward initial out-group members due to decreasing prejudice and increasing familiarity. While numerous researches theoretically and empirically support this claim (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009; Fine, 1979; Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Hewstone & Greenland, 2000; Luksyte & Avery, 2010; Paluck & Green, 2009; Voci & Hewstone, 2003), one should not mistakenly understand this hypothesis as a straightforward mechanism where a simple contact would generate a positive intergroup relationship. In other words, this hypothesis requires varying aspects necessary in realizing positive contacts. Particularly, when proposing this hypothesis, Allport (1954) has suggested four optimal conditions for this effect to be realized: 1) equal status between the groups in the situation; 2) acquisition of common goals; 3) intergroup cooperation; and 4) institutional support where the contact is legitimized. In regards to these conditions, Pettigrew and Tropp s (2006) meta-analysis confirms that contact situations that meet Allport s conditions result in greater prejudice reduction than those situations that do not. Meanwhile,

3 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 139 Pettigrew (2008) also claimed that these conditions should be seen as facilitating rather than essential since positive (though diminished) contact effects exist even when these conditions are not met. If Pettigrew and Tropp s (2006) findings are followed, it seems that a positive contact would be realized even without satisfying Allport s criteria. Yet, these conditions become particularly essential when this contact hypothesis is applied to migrant issues in relationship with citizenship law, because migrants, who have gained host country s nationality, generate another typology of migrant group. Specifically, the four criteria bring about a valuable insight in conceptualizing a role of citizenship law. A common practice of granting citizenship to foreign nationals, who most of times reveal some vital difference from natives, takes a form of either naturalization (jus domicilis) or automatic citizenship at birth (jus soli). Either way, if a migrant obtains a nationality of a destination country, he/she would earn the equal status to that of natives, approved by legal domestic institution, and hence, satisfying the first and fourth conditions suggested by Allport (1954). This would naturally let the two groups believe in the homogenous national custom or rule of law. Also, this increases a chance of natives being exposed to situations where they have to communicate and cooperate with these settled initial foreign nationals. This indicates that there would be a higher probability for realizing common goals along with engaging in cooperation, fulfilling the second and third conditions. In sum, whether natives have a higher chance to acknowledge a possibility that migrants can gain the same status as theirs becomes the central aspect in determining how they perceive these foreign aliens. This recognition provides natives a new way of categorizing migrant groups: ones with equal status and others without it. If a traditional way to classify citizenship law into a dichotomous distinction is followed, democratic destination countries can be divided into jus soli (law of birthplace) and jus sanguinis (law of blood) rules. On the one hand, if a child is born under migrant parents, he/she will automatically obtain nationality of the host country even without the parents being the nationals, if the host country s citizenship law is based on jus soli principle. On the other hand, if the host country s nationality law is based on jus sanguinis principle, he/she will not be able to acquire the country s nationality, because he/she is not connected to the country by ancestry. In this case, naturalization (jus domicilis) becomes the only option to become host country s citizen. Naturally, countries with jus soli principle tend to be more inclusive by providing a wider avenue for citizenry while ones with jus sanguinis rule tend to be more ethno-cultural and restrictive (Vink & Bauböck, 2013). When application of this dichotomous classification of citizenship law is taken into account, the first hypothesis emerges; natives in jus soli countries pose a more favorable attitude toward migrants (Hypothesis 1). Under jus soli principle, natives have a higher chance to have contacts with initial migrants, who now possess the equal nationality as the natives. This would not only induce a familiarity toward ethnically or linguistically different others, but also let them realize that migrants can actually realize the equal status. Because jus soli principal gives migrants a broader avenue to fulfill Allport s four conditions, a more positive contact would be likely. Under jus sanguinis rule, on the contrary, natives may have a chance to encounter migrants and engage in iterating contacts with them. This may generate familiarity and positive feelings toward them. However, because there are simply two few migrants, who now hold host country s nationality, it would be rarer for natives to realize a meaningful contact with them. To put it in another way, migrants in jus sanguinis rule would have a harder time to satisfy Allport s critical conditions, and more importantly, potential trust and respect that natives may have toward migrants due to repetitive contacts would not be as high as what would have been achieved in jus soli rule. Of course, the first hypothesis stated above does not guarantee that natives in jus soli rule would hold

4 140 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON favorable attitude toward migrants all the time. When there is a domestic turmoil, for instance a macroeconomic downturn, this may surely stimulate people s threat perception toward migrants under both citizenship laws. Still, the intensity of this hostility against migrants would be stronger in jus sanguinis countries. What needs to be more studied instead is toward what kind of migrants natives would feel threatened by when they face uneasy domestic conditions. Here, it posits that toward which dimension of migrants natives feel afraid of is based on their categorization of migrants. Therefore, the second hypothesis yields; natives under jus soli rule would be more fearful of new inflows of migrants while those under jus sanguinis rule would be antagonistic against overall stock of migrants (Hypothesis 2). From a standpoint of natives under jus soli principle, permanent migrants, who already reside in the host country, would be already incorporated as in-group members. Thus, they would feel fearful of newly incoming migrants, instead of towards migrants, who already reside and work in their territory. On the contrary, natives in the latter principle are not used to include foreigners into their in-group members and thus, they are in an easier position to blame on this out-group as a cause to individual misfortunes. Thus, instead of distinguishing migrants into categories, their sense of threat would be more likely to gear toward overall migrants in general. Data, Measurement, and Model Specification To assess the two hypotheses on public attitude toward migrants, this research relies on survey data (Eurobarometer 76.4), which was conducted in December There are two questionnaires that specifically ask in regards to immigrants; (qb9_1) Immigration enriches (country s) economy and culture 1 Totally agree 2 Tend to agree 3 Tend to disagree 4 Totally disagree (qb9_2) Legal immigrants should have the same rights as (country s) citizens 1 Totally agree 2 Tend to agree 3 Tend to disagree 4 Totally disagree The first question asks respondents opinion on whether immigrants actually contribute any positive aspect to the destination country, either in economically or culturally (overall image on immigrants). The second question is on immigrant rights (degree of integration). Thus, these two variables are chosen as two dependent variables for this statistical analysis. There are three main independent variables. For the first independent variable, updated version of a dataset by Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teet (2014) is used to identify citizenship law of each country (Citizenship). This is a binary variable that marks whether a country adopts jus soli or jus sanguinis principle. Table 1 classifies how countries in Eurobarometer can be distinguished into the two citizenship laws. Moreover, two other indepdent variables capture Inflow and Stock of migrants across countries in the year of The data are taken from the United Nations (United Nations Population Division, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: 2012 Revision, 2012) and OECD (2016) datasets. Further variables along with specific details are shown in Table 2. Measures selected for the rest of independent and control variables are directly taken from Eurobarometer dataset.

5 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 141 Table 1 Countries by Their Citizenship Law Jus soli rule Jus sanguinis rule Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Germany, France, Ireland, UK Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia Table 2 Summary of Variables Variables Dependent variables Attitude Independent variables Citizenship Description on questionnaires and coding (qb9_1) Immigration enriches (country s) economy and culture: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4) (qb9_2) Legal immigrants should have the same rights as (country s) citizens: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4) Citizenship regime (Binary): 1 if jus soli, and 0 if jus sanguinis Stock Increased rate of immigrant stock from 2005 to 2010 (%) Inflow Increased rate of inflow of immigrants from 2005 to 2010 (%) Control variables Income Education Nationalism View on EU Unemployed Married Gender (d60) During the last 12 months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month? Most of the time (1) From time to time (2) Almost never/never (3) (d8r2: Recoded) How old were you when you stopped full-time education? No formal education (1) Up to 15 (2) 16~19 (3) above 20 (4) (qa1_1) You are happy living in [country]: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4) (qa1_2) You are happy living in the EU: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4) (d15a_r1: Recoded): 1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise (d7: Recoded) Binary: 1 if married, 0 if not (d10) Binary: 1 if male, 0 if female Age (d11r2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 75+ (6) Rural (d25) Would you say you live in a: Rural area or village (1) Small or middle sized town (2) Large town (3) Don t know (4) Notes. Original variables in parentheses. Responses, refused, don t know, or not applicable, are deleted. The values of dependent variables are ordered categorical. Thus, ordered logit regression model with country-fixed effects is applied. What also needs to be taken into account is that independent variables citizenship law, migrant inflow, and migrant stock only vary across countries while a unit of analysis of this survey dataset is an individual respondent. Thus, if these variables are directly implemented into the model, these effects will be washed away due to the country-fixed effect. Thus, the ideal solution is to include these variables as interaction terms with other control variable, which varies across observations. For the sake of convenience, a control variable on Income is selected as an interacting variable. Results and Interpretations Table 3 reports results for the effect of citizenship law. When the model includes both an independent variable and its interaction term with citizenship law, a coefficient for the independent variable shows its effect when citizenship law is 0 (jus sanguinis). Meanwhile, a summation of coefficients of the independent variable and interaction term represents the independent variable s effect when citizenship law is 1 (jus soli). While these coefficients provide insightful observations, they tend to be less reliable to deduce a firm conclusion.

6 142 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON Table 3 Ordered Logit Regressions With Country-Fixed Effects on Citizenship Law Overall images on immigrants Views on immigrant rights (1) (2) (1) (2) Citizenship x income ** # (0.051) (0.051) Education *** *** *** *** (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Income * (0.027) (0.027) Nationalism *** *** View on EU *** *** *** *** (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) Unemployed (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) Married * * * * (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) Gender (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) Age *** *** *** *** (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) Rural *** *** *** *** (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) Observation 18,304 18,304 18,483 18,483 Log likelihood -22, , , ,228.1 Notes. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, # p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Figure 1. Marginal effects by citizenship law. In order to more accurately examine the effects of citizenship law on public attitude, marginal effects, shown in Figure 1, demand more attention. The citizenship law for both dependent variables turns out to be significant. For either dependent variable, moreover, jus soli principle yields a higher probability for respondents to become pro-immigrants for both overall immigrant image and integration. These outcomes demonstrate that citizenship law carries out a significant and noticeable effect in formulating people s perception toward immigrants.

7 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 143 Next, Table 4 reports effects of migrant inflow and stock in each citizenship law. Again, variables on inflow and stock are included in the model as interaction terms with income level, which varies across cases. In order to present in a concise way, marginal effects demand more attention (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The results seem quite contradictory from the second hypothesis. It appears that an increase of overall immigrant stock negatively impacts natives attitude toward migrants (on both general image and integration) in jus soli countries while it positively affects natives pro-immigrant sentiment in jus sanguinis countries. In regards to immigrant inflow, it appears that an increase of inflow induces positive immigrant-sentiment in both citizenship regimes and for both dependent variables. These results are different from expected outcomes, because it seems that both enlarged inflow and stock are positively associated with jus sanguinis law. Table 4 Ordered Logit Regressions With Country-Fixed Effects on Immigrant Inflow and Stock Income x stock Overall images on immigrants Views on immigrant rights Jus soli Jus sanguinis Jus soli Jus sanguinis (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) # (0.001) *** (0.000) ** (0.000) (0.002) Income x inflow *** *** *** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Education *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.025) Income ** * *** ** # (0.060) (0.047) (0.026) (0.026) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) (0.026) Nationalism *** *** (0.048) (0.048) (0.027) (0.027) (0.048) (0.048) (0.027) (0.027) View on EU *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) Unemployed # # (0.062) (0.062) (0.034) (0.034) (0.061) (0.061) (0.035) (0.035) Married * * (0.059) (0.059) (0.034) (0.034) (0.059) (0.059) (0.034) (0.034) Gender *** *** (0.056) (0.056) (0.032) (0.032) (0.056) (0.056) (0.032) (0.032) Age *** *** * * *** *** (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) Rural *** *** *** *** ** ** (0.038) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037) (0.021) (0.021) Observation 4,345 4,345 13,959 13,959 4,380 4,380 14,103 14,103 Log likelihood -5, , , , , , , ,614.0 Notes. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, # p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses. There are potential explanations, first, variables on inflow and stock capture an increased rate (percentage) from the values in 2005 to those in This is because of data limitation as well as a subsequent attempt to avoid losing too many valuable observations. This still may have biased some trends. Moreover, the rate of increase, in fact, does not capture the original amount of stock of inflow. Indeed, there is a possibility that some countries already had a large size of immigrant inflow or stock, and thus, their values did not quite fluctuate between 2005 and Meanwhile, some other countries may have had a small size of inflow and stock in 2005, and thus, their overall sizes in 2010 are still much smaller compared to the former example, even if the

8 144 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON data mark a rapid increase. These plausible scenarios suggest that exploring an accurate measure for inflow and stock would be helpful while filling out missing data. Second, while this paper aims to study public attitude toward overall migrants, Eurobarometer questions on immigrants. Thus, this may carry out different connotation to each respondent. Some may refer to permanent migrants while the others may interpret the terminology as migrants in general or foreigners, who reside in the country regardless of their visa types. Although this poses a serious threat to construct validity; however, most of surveys cross-nationally conducted in regards to migrants use the word, immigrants, instead of migrants. Thus, these questions are the closest ones that allow researchers to study public attitude on migrants at this point. Still, this may be particularly problematic for testing the second hypothesis, because it fails to capture a complex interrelationship among temporary migrants, permanent immigrants and those, who have already obtained host country s nationality. Perhaps, natives do not view migrants, who have naturalized, as migrants or foreign nationals, because they are already citizens of the same country. In this sense, an attempt to measure effects of immigrant inflow and stock is a crude method. Figure 2. Marginal effects of stock.

9 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 145 Figure 3. Marginal effects of inflow. Conclusion This paper has investigated why natives in democratic destination countries reveal different levels of anti-migration sentiment. Based on contact hypothesis, it argues that citizenship law has a fundamental effect in formulating public perception toward migrants. Based on a dichotomous distinction of citizenship law into jus soli and jus sanguinis rules, two specific hypotheses have been contested. First, natives in jus soli principle hold a more favorable attitude toward migrants, because migrants have a wider avenue to become host country s citizens under this rule. This leads natives to re-categorize initial out-group migrants, and thus, this process decreases prejudice against migrants. Second, natives in jus soli principle tend to feel threatened by new inflow of migrants while those in jus sanguinis rule would be more fearful of overall stock of migrants. Statistical evidence, using Eurobarometer (2011), strongly supports the first hypothesis. However, the results for the second hypothesis are mixed and controversial. The examinations on marginal effects for the second hypothesis lead to future suggestions. The most imminent task for migration study is to generate survey data that classify respondents view toward migrants and immigrants. Moreover, scrutinizing whether natives view migrants, who have obtained host country s nationality, as the same citizens or still as migrants, and whether citizenship law has any effect on this classification would be ideal in accurately tackling this hypothesis.

10 146 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON References Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc. Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Benhabib, S. (2002). Transformation of citizenship: The case of contemporary Europe. Government and Opposition, 37(4), Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. (2008). What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat. American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), Burns, P., & Gimpel, J. G. (2000). Economic insecurity, prejudicial stereotypes, and public opinion on immigration policy. Political Science Quarterly, 115(2), Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y. (2001). Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: An analysis of data from the general social survey. Social Science Journal, 38(2), Citron, J., Green, D. P., Muste, C., & Wong, C. (1997). Public opinion towards immigration reform: The role of economic motivations. Journal of Politics, 59, Cornelius, W. A., & Rosenblum, A. R. (2005). Immigration and politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 8, Crepaz, K. L. M. (2008). Trust beyond borders: Immigration, the welfare state, and identity in modern societies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Dancygier, R. (2010). Immigration and conflict in Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Davidov, E., Meuleman, B., Billiet, J., & Schmidt, P. (2008). Values and support for immigration: A cross-country comparison. European Sociological Review, 24(5), Escandell, X., & Ceobanu, A. M. (2009). When contact with immigrants matters: Threat, interethnic attitudes and foreigner exclusionism in Spain s comunidades autonomas. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32, European Commission. (2011). Eurobarometer 76.4: The future of europe, awareness of European home affairs, and e-communication in the household, december ICPSR34732-v2, Cologne, GESIS: Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Retrieved from Facchini, G., & Mayda, A. M. (2009). Does the welfare state affect individual attitudes toward immigrants? Evidence across countries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2), Fine, G. A. (1979). The Pinkston settlement: An historical and social psychological investigation of the contact hypothesis. Phylon, 40(3), Fitzgerald, J., Leblang, D., & Teets, J. C. (2014). Defying the law of gravity: The political economy of international migration. World Politics, 66(3), Retrieved from Hanson, G. H. (2005). Why does immigration divide America? Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. Hanson, G. H., Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2007). Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies. Economics and Politics, 19(1), Herek, G. M., & Capitanio, J. P. (1996). Some of my best friends : Intergroup contact, concealable stigma, and heterosexuals attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(4), Hero, R. E., & Preuhs, R. R. (2007). Immigration and the evolving American welfare state: Examining policies in the US states. American Journal of Political Science, 51(3), Hewstone, M., & Greenland, K. (2000). Intergroup conflict. International Journal of Psychology, 35, Kessler, A. (2001). Immigration, economic insecurity, and the Ambivalent American public. Working Paper. La Jolla, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. Luksyte, A., & Avery, D. R. (2010). The effects of citizenship dissimilarity and national pride on attitudes toward immigrants: Investigating mediators and moderators of intergroup contact. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 34, Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., & Mo, C. H. (2013). Economic explanations for opposition to immigration: Distinguishing between prevalence and conditional impact. American Journal of Political Science, 57(2), Mayda, A. M. (2006). Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants. Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(3), Mayda, A. M. (2008). Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration? Economics Letters, 101(3), Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(1), OECD. (2016). International migration database. Retrieved from

11 A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 147 O Rourke, K. H., & Sinnott, R. (2006). The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. European Journal of Political Economy, 22(4), Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, Pettigrew, T. F. (2008). Future directions for intergroup contact theory and research. International Journal of International Relations, 32, Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, United Nations Population Division. (2012). Trends in total migrant stock: 2012 revision. Retrieved from Vink, M. P., & Bauböck, R. (2013). Citizenship configurations: Analyzing the multiple purposes of citizenship regimes in Europe. Comparative European Politics, 11, Voci, A., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Intergroup contact and prejudice toward immigrants in Italy: The mediational role of anxiety and the moderational role of group salience. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6, Zimmerman, K. F., Bauer, T. K., & Lofstrom, M. (2000). Immigration policy, assimilation of immigrants, and natives sentiments towards immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD countries. IZA Discussion Paper No. 187, Institute for the Study of Labor.