Mosul City, Humanitarian Situation Overview

Transcription

1 Mosul City, Humanitarian Situation Overview Iraq, February 2015 SITUATION OVERVIEW SUMMARY Armed Groups (AGs) shocked observers with the rapid takeover of Mosul between 6 and 10 June 2014, which marked the beginning of a rapid advancement and consolidation of control in other parts of Ninewa and the central band of Iraq. 1 In the days following the takeover by AGs in June 2014, an estimated 500,000 people fled their homes in Mosul and surrounding areas, 2 leaving an estimated 1.5 million individuals in the city including up to 500,000 additional IDPs from elsewhere in Iraq, 3 with limited humanitarian access into the city since June. REACH Initiative undertook an assessment of the current humanitarian situation in Mosul city in order to address information gaps on living conditions and humanitarian needs in the city, and to help inform ongoing humanitarian contingency planning for displacement from 1 New York Times, Tears, and Anger, as Militants Destroy Iraq City s Relics, 30 July International Organization for Migration, Humanitarian Compendium, 5 March The highest estimate according to several Focus Group Discussions hosted by the REACH Initiative in February Mosul in the event of an offensive to force out armed groups. Specifically this report examines current damage and accessibility, displacement trends, access to services and livelihoods. Assessment findings indicate that up until now, estimates of the number of IDPs currently taking refuge in Mosul city are likely to be too low; key informants interviewed in the framework of this assessment report that perhaps as many as 500,000 IDPs have arrived in the city since January 2014, who have received minimal assistance and are particularly vulnerable. In the event of an offensive against the city, two key challenges were found for the humanitarian community. First is the possibility of significant IDP movement from Mosul towards areas where humanitarian actors have limited access, especially south towards Anbar and Salah al-din governorates, Sinjar Al-Ba'aj Telafar Hatra CONTENTS Tilkaif Mosul Dahuk Al-Shikhan Mosul Al-Hamdaniya Akre Map 1: Location map of Mosul City. Erbil Methodology p2; Damage and Access p4; Displacement Trends p5; Access to Services p7; Conclusion p12.

2 METHODOLOGY REACH collected in-depth information from purposefully sampled focus group discussions (FGDs) held in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). 11 FGDs were held between 8th and 17th January. Each group consisted of 5 to 7 members, and were separated by gender. FGD participants were internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Mosul city engaging in regular communication with friends and relatives currently in the city. Participants originated from various neighbourhoods, providing coverage of most of the city. FGDs were centred around a participatory mapping exercise based on high resolution imagery in order to provide geographic references. Findings were triangulated with secondary data review and social media analysis (in both Arabic and English). LIMITATIONS As the data gathered was based on nonprobability qualitative methodology, findings cannot be statistically generalised to the whole population of Mosul city but instead provide an indication of the overall situation. Importantly, any figures provided from this data are provided estimations where little variance was found between the respondents. and even towards Syria. Second, because of the significant restrictions that have been placed on the movement of people leaving Mosul, there is a possibility that some of the current Mosul population, both IDPs and host community, will not be able to leave the city before an eventual armed confrontation. In this case, significant numbers of people may also be displaced to less affected areas of the city or satellite villages, but unable to move further. With regard to current conditions inside the city, as hostilities grow market supplies have been severely disrupted, with only one remaining supply route namely to AG-controlled territory in northern Syria. Thus prices of key food items have reportedly increased slightly and, although cheaper fuel supplied from northern Syria is available, this is of poor and dangerous quality. This has disrupted the local economy, with a negative impact on livelihoods and employment. Moreover, agricultural production in nearby rural areas has decreased and wheat and barley stores have been emptied. In turn, municipal water and electrical household supply is limited to a few hours every week. Health services have suffered the most, with medicines and medical equipment either depleted or diverted for other use by armed forces. Lack of obstetric care and surgery is particularly problematic. The limited supply of clean drinking water has especially led to an increase in health problems amongst infants and children. With these findings in mind, more sector-specific information will be needed for contingency planning in order to better prioritise and target assistance in a scenario of future displacement. CONTEXT Mosul is now Iraq s second-largest city 4 and was a commercial hub in northern Iraq, with oilfields nearby to the north and east. It is a centre of cement, textile and sugar industries, and a marketplace for agricultural products. Ninewa governorate is historically the breadbasket of Iraq, producing grain (wheat and barley) 5 and also hosts the second-largest university in Iraq. AGs took over Mosul between 6 and 10 June 2014 and continue to control the city. Since the fall of the Ba ath regime in 2003, AGs had 2 4 Time, Iraq s second largest city falls to extremists, 10 June Encyclopaedia Britannica, Mosul, accessed 19 February 2015.

3 Map 2: Neighbourhood of origin of focus group participants

4 exerted a growing influence and perpetration of violence in Mosul and surrounding villages, especially with the effective disenfranchisement of Sunni populations in the city s 2005 elections. By the end of June 2014 these AGs had advanced further into central and northern Iraq under the band of the Islamic State (IS), and announced the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate extending from Diyala in Iraq to Aleppo in Syria. The takeover of Mosul precipitated large-scale displacement from the city, particularly by minority religious and ethnic groups who had historically lived in the city, who fled predominately to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and surrounding Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)- controlled areas in northern Ninewa. At the same time Mosul has also been a destination for other displaced populations within Iraq. However, in recent months residents have been banned from leaving the city and are thus increasingly inaccessible to the humanitarian community. Those who have since managed to escape the city have predominately travelled south to Baghdad, as access to the KRI and surrounding areas has become increasingly limited. Participants indicated that the number of IDPs coming to Mosul since June has been close or equal to the number of people who fled the city. DAMAGE AND ACCESS Overall, participants consistently reported that most damage to the city was restricted to areas that saw short armed clashes in June, namely on the western side of the river, to the north-west. A few buildings in this area have been levelled, but most foundational structures remain standing. Some police stations and military buildings have been damaged by fire, and the airport terminal has suffered heavy damage. In contrast water treatment and power plants are still intact although due to improper management, municipal supply of both resources is limited to a few hours a week at random intervals. Minor damage to the central general hospital seems to not have impacted its functionality. Cultural heritage landmarks and buildings have been damaged with almost all key historical, religious and cultural sites across the city specifically targeted by AGs. Mosul contains many ancient buildings, some dating from the 13th century, which shape the identity of the city and its inhabitants. For example, the Red/George mosque in the centre of the old city has been reduced to rubble, as well as other iconic monuments. Large statues from the UNESCO World Heritage site of Hatra and other unique artefacts have been destroyed or defaced in the Mosul Museum, condemned by UNESCO as violating the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199 and for fuelling sectarianism and conflict in Iraq. 6 The psychological impact of such destruction, in particular for members of associated community groups or nearby neighbourhoods, should not be underestimated, as people often derive their sense of meaning and identify with historical landmarks. In addition, the loss of key community centres may undermine reconciliation efforts and social cohesion activities in the future. All participants clarified that cross-line and 4 6 UNESCO, Director-General requests UN Security Council meeting on destruction of heritage in Mosul, 26 February 2015.

5 internal mobility of people and goods are strictly controlled by AGs. Inside the city the bridges are still reported to be in good condition, but the population fears the presence of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Other key roads leading into the city are functional but presence of mines or other exploding devices has been reported as well. Entrances to the city are strictly regulated by AGs, and the western entrance has reportedly been sealed and is therefore inaccessible. Civilian movements from Mosul are heavily restricted, with exceptions made for those in need of critical healthcare or to collect government salaries elsewhere. The presence of professional smuggling networks that facilitate movements in and out the city have been reported from multiple sources. However, civilians leaving the city usually avoid main roads in order to reduce their exposure to armed clashes. The very limited humanitarian access severely limits the provision of assistance to those in need. Due to restricted movements of goods and people, Mosul is dependent on supplies controlled by AGs. AGs are mostly blocked from officially accessing supplies beyond frontlines to the North, East and South of the city Supply routes for both food and non-food items are dependent on linkages with northern Syria, especially Raqqa governorate, and resources available in areas surrounding the city. However, some trade routes from Turkey are operational although for a very limited number and type of items. The limited supply routes as well as inability to create contingency stocks by the population, leave the residents in Mosul vulnerable to external shocks. DISPLACEMENT TRENDS Although 500,000 people are thought to have fled Mosul in June 2014, the population of the city has not declined due to the arrival of IDPs from other areas of Ninewa and Anbar governorates, with an estimated 1.5 million people currently living in the city. Within the first week of AG advances, many people were temporarily displaced within the city from the western to the eastern side of the river. Two weeks later AGs consolidated control over the city and subsequently an estimated 500,000 people fled mostly to Dahuk or Erbil governorates in the KRI. Generally richer families fled to Erbil and sometimes flew to Turkey, whereas other families sought refuge in Dahuk. However, within this first month a significant proportion of families that were refused entry into Dahuk returned to their homes in Mosul. Movement in and out of the city throughout June and up until mid-july was relatively unregulated. A further few hundred families were forced out of the city in mid-july. Since September 2014 movement out of the city has been highly restricted. The number of IDPs residing in Mosul district is difficult to estimate. The lowest estimate is that of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), whose Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) estimated the presence of 20,000 (displaced) individuals in February 2015 (see map 3). The highest estimate, according to the FGDs conducted by REACH, is that 500,000 IDPs remain in the city. As the IOM DTM accounts for identified and not definitive number of IDPs, it is likely that their estimate is lower than the actual number of IDPs. Both the DTM 5

6 Map 3: IOM DTM locations of IDPs in Mosul city

7 and FGDs clarify that most IDPs originate from elsewhere in Ninewa, especially Tel Afar, and Anbar governorates. These IDPs fled fighting in their area of origin to seek refuge in the comparatively less violent Mosul, often after having been refused entry into the KRI or unable to travel elsewhere due to pervasive insecurity or limited resources. There is currently a lack of information on the locations of IDPs within the city, although during FGDs participants responded that they were spread throughout the city in many locations including in abandoned houses rented from AGs. The conditions of these IDPs are still unknown. ACCESS TO SERVICES SHELTER AND NFIs Mosul host communities are overwhelmingly still living in their original homes, which remain largely undamaged. However, unreliable access to electricity has inhibited heating systems during low February daily temperatures of 1.4 o C. Participants confirmed IOM reports that IDPs are mostly staying in unfinished and abandoned buildings, followed by schools (according to participants this proportion has decreased due to evictions coinciding with the commencement of the academic year in September), hosted accommodation and rented houses. Average daily maximum temperatures in July and August exceed 40 C. Inadequate shelter from these summer temperatures will expose people, particularly children and elderly, to overheating. Fuel is in short supply and more expensive than before June The conflict has reduced access to oil and petroleum products from refineries in Iraq. Fuel is therefore either brought from Syria or produced in local refineries. Some of the Syrian oil is crude, which is then also refined privately using machines. Both sources of fuel are of poor quality, causing heavy pollution, respiratory problems and minor explosions. The price of fuel often fluctuates, depending on availability and surrounding insecurity. Gasoline from Syria is generally cheaper than Iraqi products, costing between 80 cents and USD 1.2 per litre. FGD participants explained that AGs are regulating prices of Syriansourced fuel in the city in order to promote its purchase by local population. With regards to Iraqi products, participants cited prices ranging from 25 cents per litre before June to between USD 1 and USD 5 per litre in December and January. The price of gas cylinders, commonly used for cooking and heating, has also increased, rendering monthly supplies of gas and kerosene largely unaffordable, particularly for those who are facing reduced incomes (see Livelihoods). Many households are resorting to burning wood for cooking and heating purposes. FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS Due to the constricted inflow of goods from other areas in Iraq into the city, participants consistently reported that food is principally imported through a supply route from northern Syria. Canned goods and frozen meat (now unavailable) orginally came from Turkey and Iran. Key staple items, though limited, are still obtainable in shops and markets. Chicken is reportedly 10,000 IQD (USD 8.5) per chicken. Other meat types are reportedly between 3000 IQD (USD 2.5) per kilo and 16,000 IQD (USD 13.5) per kilo, with cheaper varieties having 7

8 been sourced by raiding livestock of families who left the Mosul area. Prices mostly remain the same, although not enough is available to meet demand, in particular bread. This is partly due to depleting wheat stores and harvesting capacity (estimated at 20%), and poor electricity inhibiting many bakeries. Many host community families are reportedly investing in wood ovens to bake bread at home. Vegetables are still in part grown in surrounding areas, but are also supplied from northern Syria. Consumption of meat and poultry has shifted the most, as little electricity does not allow for refrigeration. Moreover, based on traditional practices many refuse to buy meat stolen from surrounding areas, which is cheaper. In turn, many cannot afford the more expensive prices for meat from more regular sources. Sustained lack of high-nutrient food groups places the population at risk of malnutrition, particularly children. The impact of the conflict on Mosul is visible in the city s agricultural production; the two images in Figure 1 are from the autumn cultivation cycle. Mosul, with its access to irrigation from the Tigris River, displays the typical agricultural practice of the region, in 8 Figure 1: The effects of occupation on local agricultural production across time

9 which 50% of agricultural land is left fallow. Using 8 Landsat images with radiance correction, the below images allow for the identification of the agricultural areas in the northwest of Mosul and a standardised assessment of the vegetation s health. A Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) scale ranges from -1 to 1, with sparse vegetation beginning around a value of 0.2. The images show that in autumn 2014 (Fig. A) agricultural products were being produced in 13 more hectares than the in the previous autumnal production cycle (Fig. B), but with a decline in the health of the crops. The autumn production cycle of 2013 had a high NDVI value of 0.61, which is in line with healthy crop production. Conversely, the autumn production cycle of 2014 yields a high NDVI value of The difference in the health of the plants can be linked to the lack of quality fertilizer and the lack of sufficient irrigation that the Iraq dual agriculture production cycle depends on. The decreased capacity to meet daily food needs is reportedly most keenly felt by IDPs, who are overwhelmingly unable to find work. This also negatively impacts host community households affected by a sharp drop in livelihoods and reduction of income. Shops and some restaurants remain open, but few shops still sell non-food items due to lack of demand. Small businesses, private enterprises and employers of daily labourers have closed down, and many breadwinners have started to change their income sources as a coping strategy. In order to cope with the falling income, participants reported that households limit spending to food, use their emergency food stores, sell household items for cash, and eat smaller portions. Many without jobs are reportedly begging and stealing. One group estimated that 60% of the city cannot afford their basic needs, while 20% have savings or borrow money from relatives elsewhere via moneylenders. The remaining 20% are government employees that still continue working to keep civil institutions running under AG pressure. These employees still receive their salaries from Baghdad, which are collected at banks in Kirkuk and brought into the city either by money lenders or other middlemen. The large majority of IDPs have received minimal support from AGs mainly food distributions in July and now letting abandoned houses and some informal assistance from local host communities. IDPs were allowed to bring some belongings with them upon arrival into Mosul city. Participants reported observing IDPs selling belongings for cash. Taking into account their vulnerable shelter arrangements, negligible access to livelihoods, and lack of humanitarian assistance, it can be assumed that few IDP households are able to meet their basic needs and constitute the most vulnerable group in terms of food security and livelihoods. WATER AND SANITATION According to participants, municipal water supply is limited to a few hours a week at random intervals, is not cleaned, and does not pump to higher floors. Some reported slightly more supply on the eastern side of the river due to a better functioning water treatment plant. However, this is the only plant that supports the east side of the city, so if severely damaged half of the city s residents will not 9

10 have access to water in their homes. On the western side of the river some households are reportedly coping by digging their own wells or using river water. Most households purchase drinking water, or resort to rudimentary filtering such as boiling or straining through fabric. Reportedly there is a shortage of chlorine supply in the city, because supplies have been restricted due to its potential misuse beyond civilian needs. Some garbage collection and solid waste disposal is being conducted, but at a poor rate, risking environmental and health problems. All FGDs highlighted that lack of clean water is leading to a growing number of cases of diarrhoea, especially amongst children, and kidney stones. Others were worried that accumulating rubbish will lead to spread of illness. HEALTH Although all hospitals remain open, healthcare for civilians in Mosul is negligible and sanitation of hospitals has worsened. Participants consistently reported that the majority of capable doctors have fled the city, and most medical supplies and equipment, including vaccinations for infants, have been transferred outside Mosul and/or are now depleted. Individuals in need of life-saving surgery face the greatest risk, as surgery for civilians is open one day a week. Maternal health has been negatively affected by doctors leaving Mosul in June and by the prioritisation of surgical capacity for non-civilian cases. Most women reportedly continue to give birth at hospitals, but in case of complications anaesthesia is only allowed to be administered by female nurses. Across the city pharmacies are open but the availability of medicines is limited, with a small amount supplied from abroad that is largely unaffordable. As medical supplies including vaccines run out or become out of date they are reportedly not replenished, causing many clinics to close. However it was reported that some clinics receive medicine from Baghdad in a formal system allowed by the central government. COMMUNICATIONS Telephone and internet communications have been heavily restricted since December. According to FGD participants AGs destroyed many of the radio towers, or in some cases removed some of the attached generators to use elsewhere. Mobile phone signal is therefore only available in some parts of the city, such as in higher elevations and closer to the KRI. Telecommunications providers, such as AsiaCell and Korek, have also limited signal in the city since June. Within the city, participants explained that the main sources of news are mobile AGs communication units, announcements via speakerphones, and religious leaders. The population living in Mosul only has irregular access to friends and relatives living elsewhere, whereby only a trickle of information about the situation in the city is available to the humanitarian community. CONCLUSION This assessment found that living conditions in Mosul have been severely degraded since June, particularly in regards to health, water, sanitation and livelihoods. As a baseline prior to additional shocks to the city, this report shows that both hosting communities and IDPs are already particularly vulnerable. If future shocks take place, conditions would 10

11 undoubtedly deteriorate further. In the event of additional shocks, initial lifesaving assistance, (such as food, shelter, health and WASH), is likely to be required for a caseload of individuals that far exceeds any previous events. In particular declining or inferior supplies and the departure of skilled individuals have impacted the functioning of municipal services, especially electricity, water treatment and healthcare. Declining agricultural productivity and restriction of trade routes have both stymied livelihoods and restricted access to staple sources of food. In addition, many households are unable to afford a monthly supply of fuel this inhibits their ability to cope with a lack of electricity, run cooking and heating systems (and cooling systems in the summer), and clean water for drinking purposes. Rates of diarrheal diseases are reportedly spreading in the city. The lack of electricity for lighting raises protection concerns for women and children. In the medium term, the lack of financial resources for a large section of the population places larger families or those with extra medical costs at particular risk. Households without any income or significantly reduced incomes are more likely to resort to negative coping mechanisms, risking malnutrition, physical harm and social stigma. The overwhelming majority of residents are not able to afford household items, and those with even less resources will soon exhaust their household emergency food stores. The report also shows that at the time of writing infrastructure within the city is largely intact. Hospitals, housing, water treatment plants and transportation links have not currently experienced significant damage. However, further conflict-related damage, or significant mine or other exploding device contamination, could be additional obstacles in the future. In addition communications infrastructure has been significantly reduced, impeding both the flow of information to the humanitarian community of needs and intentions of those in the city, and limiting the capacity to transfer humanitarian information to communities. It is important to note that many residents in Mosul are unwilling to discuss both the details of daily suffering and their engagement in negative coping mechanisms. It can therefore be assumed that the conditions of life within Mosul remain grossly underreported. Protection will be a priority sector for humanitarian actors. A clearer picture on livelihoods and the extent of negative coping strategies needs to be drawn. REACH Initiative REACH Initiative facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidencebased decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. All REACH activities are conducted through inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. For more information, you can write to our in-country office: iraq@reach-initiative.org or to our global office: geneva@reach-initiative.org. Visit and follow REACH_info. 11