War and Peace from the Japanese perspective since 1945: From One-Nation Pacifism to a Proactive Contribution to the Peace

Transcription

1 War and Peace from the Japanese perspective since 1945: From One-Nation Pacifism to a Proactive Contribution to the Peace H.E. Mr. Kazuo Kodama Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Japan to the EU December 2017 Dr. Inese Druviete, Mr. Waleed Gumaa, Ms. Ieva Miļūna, Good afternoon, I am delighted to be here as a guest lecturer and to present to you this lecture entitled War and Peace from the Japanese perspective since 1945: From One-Nation Pacifism to a Proactive Contribution to the Peace. Before I begin, I would like to remind you that the views expressed in this lecture are my own and should not necessarily be construed as indicating the official position of the Government of Japan. (My diplomatic career history as an introduction) I joined the Japanese Foreign service in I suppose none of you were born then. Since then, I have spent nearly half my career in Tokyo and the other half outside Japan: My very first overseas posting was in the UK, where I read my second BA in PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) at Oxford University. Before coming up to Oxford, I attended a summer course on 1

2 modern English history at Cambridge University. I remember vividly the professor explaining the British political character by writing on the blackboard the famous quote Fog in the Channel, continent isolated. I have no doubt that this sentiment has doggedly endured in UK politics, culminating in the decision by the British people to leave the EU on June 23 rd I never dreamt that I would become Japanese Ambassador to the EU and that my job would be to follow the BREXIT process with my own eyes! I have one more unforgettable memory from my Oxford days: One of the then examination papers posed the following question on Japan: Discuss the following statement: Japan is an economic giant but a political dwarf. This was no doubt a widely-held perception in the late 1970s by the rest of the world. After Oxford, I had many further postings throughout my career: Abu Dhabi, London, Hong Kong, Washington, D.C., new Delhi, Los Angeles, New York (as Japan s DPR to the United nations), Paris (as Japan s PR to the OECD) and most recently in Brussels. (Japan s efforts on the external front: signing the peace treaty with former enemies) Now, let me start my lecture today. In 1945, Japan was literally reduced to ashes. Japan, being under the occupation of the Allied Powers, started to rebuild its shattered nation from scratch with generous assistance from the United States, and regained independence in 1951 when we signed the San Francisco Peace treaty. Since 1950, Japan s GDP over the next 50 years grew 127-fold, while that of the US grew 20-fold. By the 1970s, Japan had already established its economic status as the world s number two economy, second only to the US. The postwar economic reconstruction was achieved by a 2

3 talented, well-educated and socially cohesive population whose singular determination to improve themselves was channeled into the peaceful pursuit of their own economic well-being. Indeed, in the early 1960s, when the Japanese Prime Minister visited France, the French president sarcastically referred to him as the transistor salesman from Japan. But it must also be admitted that Japan has been aided by a very special factor. Namely, Japan s security and safety has been protected by the Japan- US alliance, which allowed Japan to devote its national energies and resources to the pursuit of sustained economic growth. In the late 1970s, the international community started to look at Japan with a critical eye because, in their view, Japan had been able to enjoy all the advantages of evolving into a global economic giant while playing a minuscule political role and shouldering little of the burdens of international affairs. In fact, the Oxford University examination paper question which I mentioned earlier, Is Japan an economic giant but a political dwarf? reflected precisely such critical perceptions of Japan abroad. (Article 9 of Japan s Constitution: A Conscientious Decision by Japan) Why had Japan been less assertive in international political affairs than in economic affairs? I would argue that this was mainly the result of a conscientious decision made by the Japanese people in the area of security based on the bitter memories and lessons of the mistaken war which wreaked havoc on the Japanese people. While under occupation, in April 1946, the 22nd General Election was held with full suffrage of men and women of 20 years of age and over. The new parliament deliberated and approved the new Constitution which entered into force in May, One of the most remarkable features of the new constitution is Article 9. 3

4 Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Article 9 strictly constrains the government s scope of action, prohibiting the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes, although Article 9 does not prohibit limited armament for the purpose of self-defense. This Article which renounces war as a means of settling international disputes was and remains the most idealistic commitment made by Japan in a world which is never free of armed conflicts. (Japan-US Security Alliance to make Article 9 compatible with the security of Japan) You may wonder How on earth does Japan ensure its own security from future foreign aggression with such an idealistic and defenseless constitution? Indeed, it was a controversial issue from the very beginning. In the late 1940s, closer to the end of the occupation, Japan was required to decide how to ensure its own security after regaining independence while fully protecting the integrity of Article 9 of its Constitution. The answer was the following: to ensure the safety and independence of Japan under Article 9, Japan chose the security alliance with the US. On the same day that Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September, 1951, we also concluded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States. Since that time, the Japan-US alliance has been the cornerstone of Japan s foreign and security policy. This treaty was 4

5 revised in 1960 and it remains in force today. (Japan s Security Policy under Article 9 and the Japan-US Security Alliance) Under the Japan-US security alliance structure, Japan has taken an exclusively defensive posture which was required by Article 9 of the constitution. Under the constitutional restrictions on Japan s defense policy, Japan has moderately built up its defense capability while adhering to the two fundamental principles of (1) maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and (2) not becoming a military power that possesses military capabilities strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary level of defense capabilities for self-defense. Japan has also remained under the American nuclear umbrella. Legally speaking, the Japanese Constitution does not prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons for the purpose of defense. Nevertheless, Japan as the only nation that has suffered the detonation of atomic bombs, decided not to make that policy choice. Instead, Japan has adopted the Three Non-Nuclear Principles which are not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. We have relied on US nuclear deterrence in the region, and we continue to do so today. Overall, this basic division of labor between Japan and the US worked well against the threat of the Soviet Union and contributed to the stability and economic prosperity of the East Asia-pacific region. (Japan: an economic giant but a political dwarf) Up until the 1980s, ten years or so before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan was not a key actor on the global stage; we Japanese seemed to be content with peace inside the cocoon 5

6 provided by the Japan-US Security Alliance under which Japan s political role in the international area had been to follow the lead of the US. Indeed, the Japanese parliament and the majority of Japanese citizens were very reluctant to accept a new and bigger role for Japan s Self-Defense Forces (for example, the SDF s role in UN peacekeeping operations) whose primary role was conceived to be strictly limited to the defense of Japan. This cautious attitude was first put to a severe test when the Gulf War broke out in At that time, Japan could not dispatch the SDF to join the US-led multilateral forces to liberate Kuwait even though the UN Security Council sanctioned this US-led action. It was of course unconstitutional for Japan to send Japan s SDF to a foreign country to settle an international dispute, although Japan denounced the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and immediately imposed economic sanctions. Japan could have chosen to send civilian personnel, if not SDF personnel, in support of the efforts of the US and other participating nations. The Japanese government tried hard but in the end could not muster enough support in parliament for a new proactive role. Instead, Japan bore the brunt of financing the costs of the Gulf War efforts. Japan s financial role was ultimately greater than that of any nation outside the Gulf, totaling 13 billion USD, including 9 billion USD directly to finance the costs of the multilateral force operations in the Gulf War. To do this, the Japanese people even accepted an emergency tax levy that averaged 100 USD per person. After the successful liberation of Kuwait, the Kuwaiti government published a thank you message in major US papers such as the Washington Post and the New York Times to express its people s gratitude to the nations which helped with the liberation of Kuwait. To our astonishment and dismay, nowhere in the list was Japan acknowledged. We asked ourselves, does our financial contribution warrant no gratitude from the Kuwaiti government and its people? The Gulf War made it painfully clear to Japan that it 6

7 could continue its one-nation pacifism only at great cost to its world standing. (From One-Nation-Pacifism to Proactive Contribution to Peace ) We take this incident as a lesson that in the post- Cold War era, the international community expects Japan to do more beyond contributing financially to maintaining peace and stability. The Gulf War marked an important watershed for Japan that caused it to shed its no-longer-tenable posture of one-nation pacifism. After the liberation of Kuwait, for the first time in history since WWII, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force dispatched minesweepers abroad. They discharged their duty successfully in the Gulf from April to October In June, 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted and Japan participated in a UN Peacekeeping Operation for the very first time in Cambodia, which was the Japanese SDF s first ground operation abroad. Since then, the SDF have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Nepal, Sudan, Haiti, and South Sudan. (The enactment of two laws on national security in 2015) Fast forward to September 19, 2015: On this day, the Diet (Japanese Parliament) approved the two peace and security laws. There are three key issues. The first issue concerns the interpretation of the right to collective self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution. In international law, each nation has the right to collective self-defense. In the Japanese Constitution, it was deemed that Japan has the right to collective self-defense but cannot use it. Such was the established interpretation up until One of the most important elements embodied in these two 7

8 pieces of legislation is that a limited ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense is now permitted under the three new conditions to make seamless responses to any situations to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people. Those Three New Conditions for Use of Force as measures for self-defense including collective self-defense are; (1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and, as a result, threatens Japan s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning the people s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan s survival and the protection of its people, (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary. The second and third important elements have nothing to do with the constitution. Rather, they are to allow Japan to make a more Proactive Contribution to Peace. The first of these two elements is to expand Japan s SDF PKO s mandate to engage in the protection of civilians and to use weapons for the defense of its mandate. The third element is to allow the Japanese government to swiftly respond to calls for support from the international community including a UN Security Council resolution request to provide logistical support by mobilizing the Japanese SDF. Let me recap what I would like to say about this new legislation. In a nutshell, the new legislation allows Japan; (1) To make seamless and swift responses to any situation to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people by permitting the exercise of the right to collective self-defense under the three new conditions, (2) To contribute to the peace and stability of the international 8

9 community by expanding the mandate of Japan s SDF PKO mandate. (Conclusion) From the horizon of 2017, I truly believe that Japan has come a long way since the end of WWII. If anything has changed in Japan s diplomatic and defense policy since the 1980s, it is the readiness and resolve of the Japanese people and their government and the fact that Japan is now well prepared to make a more proactive contribution to peace and stability in the world while firmly maintaining our exclusively defensive posture as a peace-loving nation through the Japan-US security alliance. It would be remiss of me not to say a word about the Japan EU relationship. On 06 July, 2017 at the Japan-EU Summit, our leaders reached the agreement in principle of both the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Japan- EU Strategic partnership Agreement (SPA). The strategic importance of reaching these agreements cannot be overemphasized. Japan and the EU are united by our common values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law and our determination to promote together an open and fair global economy that benefits everyone. These are the foundations of our political and economic partnership for peace, prosperity and a rules-based international order. Looking from the strategic perspective, I am very pleased to acknowledge that our EPA and SPA will mark the beginning of a new chapter in the strategic partnership between Japan and the EU, elevating the relationship onto a higher terrain. Most recently, on 21 November 2017, the 13 th ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting hosted by Myanmar at Nay Pyi Taw ended with the adoption of the Chair s Statement. Japan and the EU worked very closely to produce a meaningful Chair s Statement in which we secured a strong message on the DPRK 9

10 condemning in the strongest terms the DPRK s nuclear test and its multiple ballistic missile launches (...) Ministers called for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner." This is just one good example of our cooperation and collaboration in the international arena. Today, I have tried my best to portray a historical trajectory of Japan s transformation of its most fundamental foreign and security policies. If my lecture has increased your interest in international affairs, then I consider that it has been more than worthwhile for me to have been here this afternoon. (End) 10