Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police. September OFFICIAL Serious and Organised Crime Profile

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1 Serious and Organised Crime Profile Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police September 2017 Agreed Refresh Date: September 2018 Version: 1.0 Reference Number: A&R/2017/240 Classification: Author This profile is produced and owned by Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police and shared with our partners under statutory provisions to effectively prevent crime and disorder. This document is protectively marked, but can be subject of disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act No disclosure or dissemination of this document should take place outside of the agreed readership without agreement of the originator. Tim Wargen, Crime Intelligence Analyst

2 Introduction Aims To describe the content and generation of a Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) profile utilising the local profile cycle. To act as a resource, contributing to the production and delivery of detailed locally focused SOC profiles. To improve understanding of the methodology behind generation of a SOC profile. To contextualise alliance SOC prevent strategy. Purpose To inform the production of local multi-agency SOC profiles which are aligned to alliance SOC strategy. To highlight the drivers and pathways into SOC. To identify the main risk elements associated with SOC. To be a keystone resource for closer partnership working and local action across the alliance area.

3 Background In the 2013 National Security strategy it was made clear that SOC were a national security threat which required an effective and co-ordinated cross government and law enforcement response. As a result, in October 2013 the Government issued a comprehensive SOC strategy utilising the Op Contest, counter terrorism framework based around the 4Ps of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Definitions There is no legal definition of SOC. For the purpose of this document it is crime which is planned, coordinated and conducted by national or local groups of people working together on a continuing basis. SOC costs the UK at least 24 billion a year. There are estimated to be over 6,000 organised criminal groups that affect people in the UK today, with more than 50,000 people are engaged in these criminal activities. The national level impact of SOC has been reinforced over the past two years by the evolution of a number of threats which have attracted significant and understandable political, public and media attention. The majority of SOC is conducted by Organised Crime Groups (OCG). An OCG can be defined as individuals, normally working with others, with the intent and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control, coordination, structure and/or group decision making.

4 SOC strategy P ursue Establish strong, effective and collaborative organisations Develop our capabilities Identify perpetrators Improve our own capabilities and our cooperation with others Use and apply legislation effectively Prosecute and disrupt people engaged in serious and organised criminality Prevent Raise awareness of the reality and consequences Intervene to stop people being drawn into serious and organised crime Deter people from continuing in serious and organised criminality Understand the pathways into serious and organised crime and the exploitation of vulnerable people Prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime Protect Increase protection against serious and organised crime Prepare Identify and protect people at risk of becoming victims Improve protective security at the local level Protect our borders Make better use of existing programmes Understand early intervention strategies and vulnerabilities Share information at earliest opportunity, take proactive stance Reduce Threat Reduce vulnerability Aim Reduce level of serious and organised crime Reduce the impact of the criminality where it takes place

5 Prevent SOC strategy. Objectives Prevent people from engaging in all forms of SOC Deter existing criminals from continuing their involvement in SOC Prevent Understand the pathways into SOC and how criminals exploit vulnerability Identification of individuals vulnerable to exploitation by SOC groups Intervention at the earliest opportunity to stop people being drawn into SOC Increase awareness of the reality and consequences of SOC focusing on key at risk groups Deter Reduce demand for the goods and services that organised criminals provide Targeted use of ancillary orders against emerging or existing offenders Effective offender management to rehabilitate and manage criminals involved in organised crime and the risks they present in the community Tailored response Tailored responses should be developed to address local problems Effectiveness Effective use and understanding of existing local intervention programmes to divert or support vulnerable individuals The underpinning principles Engagement Close engagement with relevant multi agency partners to enable a systematic and coordinated response

6 Pathways into SOC There is no one size fits all pathway into SOC with vulnerable individuals of any social or economic standing being drawn in. Financial gain is not always the principal motivation for criminality - people can be forced, coerced, debt-bound or groomed into committing offences. Some individuals are poorly educated and have been raised in an environment where criminality may be seen as the only viable option. Others may be entirely unwitting drawn in to SOC, having been seduced, groomed and then exploited. Some will also driven by a sense of belonging and identity. When present, certain individual/business attributes and vulnerabilities will catalyse or motivate criminality. These include factors such as addiction, greed or financial hardship. When encountered in particular familial, social and employment opportunity networks, the likelihood of their exploitation by OCGs can increase significantly.

7 Risk elements associated with SOC 1. Criminality. Repeat offending patterns and trends: individuals displaying certain offending patterns may be at risk of being drawn into SOC. 2. Identity. An individual s upbringing and lifestyle, local environmental and social factors can have a serious impact on their identity which can increase their vulnerability to participating in organised crime. 3. Networks. Access to criminal networks through family, friendships, intimate relationships and associates, (through business, prison or online) provide a significant opportunity to engage individuals in SOC. 4. Ability. Professionals with specialist skills or employees with access to valuable information or property access are at risk of corruption or bribery by OCGs. Further predictive factors that indicate increase risk of individuals becoming involved in SOC. 1. Links to a known OCG member, either by family or friendship groups. 2. Resident within neighbourhoods with known organised crime group activity. 3. Low educational attainment/attendance, not in mainstream education and/or numerous exclusions. 4. Exposure to violence in the home. 5. Impulsiveness or risk taking or violent behaviour.

8 Methodology This alliance level profile follows the established local SOC profile cycle, and all profiles are written at the appropriate government security classification to enable timely sharing with partners. Bounding polygons are used as a visual representation of what crimes predominately make up the hotspot. Any intersections where two or more polygons crossed over were noted as potential areas of increased threat, harm and risk. Data and information requirements for this profile were formulated allowing information/data requests to be submitted to external partners, whilst concurrent research was conducted on existing datasets. All data was collated and several individual queries were utilised and amalgamated to enhance the validation of the datasets used. Additionally, closed source intelligence databases were also exploited to establish context/background and where required augment understanding of any activity. In order to display the overall volume of crime across the area enabling a more focused product, hotspots were individually created utilising crime reporting from the selected datasets. All hotspots used the same grid parameters and had no weighting applied. Nominal datasets and partner data were integrated and overlaid within the polygons for further understanding and perspective to be developed. Any identified nominals of interest were also researched to establish context. All data was concurrently amalgamated, enabling individuals and areas at increased risk to be identified and the interrelationship between SOC and vulnerability to be established. Throughout this document an assessment tool, the uncertainty yardstick, has been used to ensure consistency when assessing probability. The following table provides the definitions used: Qualitative Statement Associated Probability Range Remote or Highly Unlikely <10% Improbable or Unlikely 15-20% Realistic Possibility 25-50% Probable or Likely 55-70% Highly/Very Probable/Likely 75-85% Almost Certain >90%

9 Data Sources Internal sources were used in this profile, aligned to the main threats currently posed by SOC. The date parameters were 1 May 2016 to 30 June Vulnerabilities Modern Slavery & Human Trafficking CSE offences Hate Crime Included were slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour CSE, CSA and CR markers utilised Included are all racial, religiously or gender motivated crime both violent and non violent Commodities Drugs Production, supply, importation, conspiracy, use of premises, cannabis cultivation and County Lines affiliated locations Firearms Including imitation. Offences which include air rifles and/or BB guns have been excluded from the dataset Community safety partnership team Troubled families delivery teams Education agencies Environment Protection NHS Clinical Commissioning groups Social care Alcohol and drug misuse agencies Time constraints and data protection/sharing agreements limited the sourcing of external data from partners. Where partners engaged, they enriched the intelligence picture and supported the production of this SOC profile. The following partner agencies were contacted: Organised Acquisitive crime Business and commercial robbery, car key burglary, keyless thefts of motor vehicles and metal theft Schools Safeguarding Child and Adult safeguarding boards Prosperity Fraud and Bribery Included were counterfeit and deception crimes Nominals Cyber OCG nominal and IOM locations Offences committed by Child Victims/Perpetrators Includes cyber dependent and enabled crime IOM nominals were taken from latest IOM database Co defendants and friends/associates were also included Key risk group is children aged Included are suspects and defendant/offender Gangmasters licensing authority Housing agencies Youth and community groups Additionally, a large amount of open source data, documents and articles were sourced from central government, academia and other UK police forces in order to provide context and develop wider understanding.

10 The local profile cycle 1 Commissioning Meetings with local partners to understand their requirements, encourage shared ownership and set parameters Consideration of data sets Point of contact identified within relevant policing teams and local authorities Production Identify and collate data from a range of sources and partners Assess the information/intelligence that has been gathered Make recommendations based on the assessment Consult partners on the content and seek clearance to publish data Publish the local profile Actions derived from the recommendations should feed in the local multi agency plan The local partnership should decide how the actions should be addressed Ownership of actions should be assigned The work of the local partnerships must be reflected in updated local profiles reviewed a minimum of 12 months Delivery Sharing 3 Local profile to be shard with the local partnership Content to be discussed and actions to tackle the problems threats identified to be agreed Sharing with partners beyond local partnership may be deemed necessary. If so, approval should be sought from the profile owners/partners

11 City 38,700 City 2 95,800 Areas in top 10% of deprivation index of England 93% White 5% Asian 1% Black 1% Mixed Population June 2016 Warwickshire 556,750 City 1 99,500 Overall ethnic breakdown June 2016 West Mercia 1.2 Million Estimated Total Population (217) 280,000 Key employment sectors Retail, wholesale and leisure Health Manufacturing and precision engineering and social care Total population 1.8 Million Total area 9,400km2 West Mercia Warwickshire 1,970km2 7,430km2 Several concentrated urban conurbations with areas of significant deprivation and minimal opportunities, surrounded by relatively affluent communities coupled with a dominant central location and the arterial routes that run through or near the region, present significant prospects for SOC and OCGs that operate internally and externally to the policing area.

12 Crime Overview OCGs mapped by criminal activity Recorded crime - Highest volume* 1 May 2016 to 30 June 2017 CSE Drug Supply and production Human Trafficking & Prostitution Acquisitive crime Money Laundering & Fraud Public order Drug Offences Vehicle offences Residential burglary Other sexual offences Violence with Injury *Total volume above 2.5% (% of crime) National (% of crime) Nominals - Home addresses located within alliance area as at 21 August 2017 Red IOM nominals 142 CSE suspects and offenders 605 Nominals involved in Drug Supply 311 Overall recorded crime within the alliance is below national levels with some exceptions. The majority of mapped OCG groups engage in more than one criminal activity mitigating risks, reducing operational costs and increasing profit margins. However, drug production and supply form the core of their criminal activity.

13 References Local Government Association, Tackling serious and organised crime a local response, August Home Office Publications, Serious and Organised crime local profiles: Illustrative profile, March Home Office Publications, How to identify and work with individuals vulnerable to involvement in Serious and Organised Crime, March 2017 Home Office Publications, Individuals at risk of being drawn into Serious and Organised crime A prevent guide, February NAL_270215_WEB 2_.pdf European Police force (Europol), Serious and Organised Crime threat assessment -2017, March National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime, June National Crime Agency, Intelligence Assessment-Pathways into Serious and Organised Crime, June Further reading