The Siege of Wukan: The Dilemma of Local Governance in China s Economic Reform Weiping Huang, Xiucheng Feng, Wen Chen Shenzhen University Contemporary Chinese Politics Research Institute Susan S. Xu University of Maryland School of Public Policy July 4, 2014 Abstract The protests in Wukan suddenly put this small fishing village of South China in the international media spotlight of 2011. After party-appointed village chiefs sold land to real estate developers for economic growth, web savvy villagers demanded the return of illegally seized land and organized protests under siege and Internet censorship. Villagers claimed that local election had been formality, questioned the legitimacy of village chiefs, and argued that contracts signed by these village chiefs on behalf of the whole village should lack of legality. Unlike most of protests suppressed under China s communism regime, Wukan attained permission to hold a local election in the real sense. Many protest leaders were elected to village s new chiefs. Since the disputed land has been legally transferred from hand to hand, the new chiefs are caught in the dilemma between radical villagers and government. Is Wukan the hope for political reform for China or a symbol of the limits of bottom-up democracy in China? Based on interviews and documents collected on numerous field trips, this paper investigates the different positions between local government, provincial government, and central government in crisis management and reveals: (1) Under the collective ownership of rural land, protests of this kind will not disappear. (2) Provincial government tactically smothered the protests by allowing Wukan s democratic election. This resolution, which is under debate in China, has not been popularized in other protests. (3) The land disputes transform the newly elected village chiefs into a firewall between some radical villagers and higher-level government. 1
Much of our attention has focused on the scale and frequency of social unrest that break out in China in the recent years. Chinese citizens who stage resistance are in a weak legal position when they request for economic welfare, addressing civil disputes, the correction of officials malfeasance or corruption, or even village elections, etc. It takes various forms, from small-scale peaceful sitins to student demonstrations, petitions to higher-level authorities, labor strikes and marches to Beijing, and even armed fighting. A term, mass group incidents (qunti xing shijian), coined to define the public protests, suggests powerful sympathetic overtones. When recent studies in China downplayed enemy forces, reliance on social science is increasingly supplant paranoia. The focus of current studies is primarily on social and economic forces. This paper will study the protest and siege in Wukan Village, aiming to investigate the institutional, political factors, and explore deeper shifts of the political culture during China s economic development. In September 2011, protests broke out in Wukan Village, a small fishing village in South China. The ensuing siege and confrontation immediately caught international media spotlight. After party-appointed village chiefs sold land to real estate developers for economic growth, web savvy villagers demanded the return of illegally seized land and organized protests under siege and Internet censorship. Villagers claimed that village election had been simply formality, questioned the legitimacy of village chiefs, and argued that contracts signed by these village chiefs on behalf of the whole village lacked of legality. Distinguished from most of protests suppressed under China s communism regime, Wukan attained permission to hold a village election in the real sense. Protest leaders, who were on the list of most wanted criminals, were elected village s new chiefs. The distinction of Wukan siege raises a question whether it starts bottom-up democracy and symbolizes the beginning of China s political reform. Based on interviews and documents collected on numerous field trips to Wukan Village in the past two years, this paper investigates the strategies and pursuits of protest leaders, different positions between lower-level government and higher-level government (i.e. provincial government and central government) in crisis management, and reveals: (1) Under the collective ownership of rural land, protests of this kind will not disappear. (2) Provincial government tactically smothered the protests by allowing Wukan s democratic election. This resolution, which is under debate in China, was part of the concession, has not been popularized in other protests, and cannot facilitate the argument for bottom-up democracy. (3) The land disputes transform the newly elected village chiefs into a firewall between some radical villagers and higher-level government. The Siege of Wukan The villagers in Wukan had been disgruntled with the decision on land use made by their village chiefs, Xue Chang and Chen Shunyi. Between June 2009 2
and March 2011, villagers pulled efforts on numerous petitions, all of which turned out to be fruitless. On September 21, 2011, villagers found construction work on the village s land again. Out of furiousness, around 200 villagers, 1 led by Yang Semao, Sun Hanchang, Zhuang Liehong, went to protest in front of relevant companies, village committee and Lufeng City Government. As Piven and Cloward discuss, riots do not require much organization when the number of potential participants is large enough and communication is possible. 2 The villagers demonstration quickly became a riot when they destroyed the company s properties and attempted to enter into the village committee s office building and local public security office with violence. The next day, the conflict escalated. When the villagers tried to rally again on September 22, more than one hundred armed police showed up to maintain the order. Villagers attacked the police with bricks, and the police reacted with baton, shield, and fire nozzle. More than ten police officers were injured; six police vehicles were attacked and overturned; a few villagers were detained due to the violence. 3 The mass group incident in Wukan started from the protests on September 21 and 22 without much mobilization. The turning point appeared on September 23. Lin Zuluan, an elder military veteran, appealed to the villagers to stop violent actions and to demonstrate with rationality. He also asked villagers to donate for the injured villagers. On September 29, 117 villagers were elected to form Interim Village Council of Wukan; on October 22, women organized United Woman Representative of Wukan. Through much more organized petitions, villagers revealed Xue Chang s malpractice at the election of People s Representatives and requested the followings: (1) Clarify the sale of the village land which was collectively owned; (2) Increase the transparency of the village s public finance record; (3) Investigate the village committee election on February 2011; (4) Village committee should be elected according to Organizational Law of Village Committee. In the following two months, villagers became more and more discontented with how local government handled the issue. The acting village chief, dispatched by local government, got involved in the land disputes and was distrusted by villagers. Villagers were more disappointed when local government staff distributed flyers, persuading them to give up their pursuits. Lin Zuluan mobilized hopeless villagers and organized near 4000 people for a peaceful petition in front of Lufeng City Government on November 21. When they were 1 See news report on Shanwei government s website on September 22, 2011. In Lufeng Donghai Town Wukan Villager, Few Villagers Rallied and Intentionally Damaged Properties. <http://www.shanwei.gov.cn/160506.html>. The media in Hong Kong reported that close to 3000 villagers participated. From the tape provided by the villagers, we estimate that at least 1000 people collected. 2 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, "Collective protest: a critique of resource- mobilization theory," in Stanford Lyman (ed.), Social Movements: Critique, Concepts, Case- Studies (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 137-67. 3 See news report on Shanwei government s website on September 22, 2011. 3
informed that official media reported that only 400 people petitioned, 4 villagers felt that they were ignored by the government over and over again. A towering rage fermented. While the local government filed the case to investigate the village chiefs, Xue Chang and Chen Shunyi, it announced on December 10 that Interim Village Council of Wukan and United Woman Representative of Wukan were illegal organizations. It published a list of wanted criminals and arrested five activists, Xue Jinbo (who later died in police custody), Zhuang Honglie, Hong Ruichao, Zhang Jiancheng, and Zeng Shaoliang. It also tried to define the incident as conflicts between the people and their enemies (anatagonistic contradictions) and the disagreement as the contention between different social classes. Coupled with the way the local government handled villagers pursuits, the death of Xue Jinbo during the confinement ignited the storm of protests. In order to prevent villagers from getting assistance from outside and the protests from escalating, the police sealed off the village. In contrast, the villagers set up fences and blocked the entrances on every route into the village, preventing the police from arresting the protest leaders. In the daytime, women and children stood at the entrances; at night, young villagers were in charge of the entrances. In addition to the original requests, villagers asked the police to return the remains of Xue Jinbo, openly examine it for the cause of his death, and release other detainees. At this critical time of severe confrontation, provincial government sent a task force to Lufeng City. On December 20, Zhu Mingguo, the associate party leader of Guangdong Province delivered a speech. He stated that most of villagers pursuits were reasonable, and their radical actions were understandable. If the villagers stopped confrontation, the armed police would not enter into the village or arrest people. After the speech was released on the media, villagers dismantled the roadblocks and canceled the protest plan for the next day. 5 On December 21, protest leader Lin Zuluan met provincial leader Zhu Mingguo at Lufeng Petition Office. The provincial government officially received villagers petitions, agreed to the return of Xue Jinbo s remains, and acknowledged the representative status of Interim Village Council of Wukan. The task force, headed by Zhu Mingguo, the associate party leader of Guangdong Province and Lin Musheng, the associate governor of Guangdong Province, collected officials from relevant offices to investigate on villagers petitions. The arrested villagers were released for further investigation and legal proceedings. 4 See the official news report on the following websites, http://news.southcn.com/dishi/shanwei/swyc/content/2011-11/21/content_33593015.htm; http://www.shanwei.gov.cn/162786.html 5 See the news report, Wukan Villagers Welcome Provincial Task Force. Villagers Removed Roadblocks. Provincial Task Force Entered into the Village on December 21 st. Shanwei Government Website, December 22, 2012. <http://www.shanwei.gov.cn/164011.html> 4
On January 15, 2012, Guangdong provincial government announced the formation of Kuwan Party Organization. The former protest leader Lin Zhuluan acted as the head of this organ as well as the head of village committee reelection workforce. In the following month, four democratic elections were held: 1. On February 1, all eligible villagers elected Village Election Committee, on the basis of one-person-one-vote. Yang Semao and 10 other committee members were elected on to this committee. Later on February 29, Hong Tianbin replaced Yang because he registered to vie for membership of the Village Committee 2. On February 11, under the leadership of Kuwan Party Organization and Village Election Committee, villagers voted without name registration. 109 villager s representative and 7 village small group leaders were elected. 3. On March 3, all eligible villagers elected Wukan Fifth Village Committee. Out of 23 candidates, 7 were elected to form this committee. Lin Zuluan won a landslide victory to be the new director of Village Committee by over 90% votes. In the competition with Xue Jianwan, Chen Shaoling, Hong Ruichao, and Zhang Dejia, etc., Yang Semao had a majority of votes and became the associate director. Other candidates gained less than half of the votes and needed to run the election again on the next day, according to the laws. 4. On March 4, no one gained a majority of votes in the first round. Between the two candidates who got the most votes, one associate director was elected. Between the two female candidates who got the most votes in the first round was elected one female committee member. Among three candidates who had got relatively more votes were elected two members of the Village Committee. listed: Rebels were elected into the new village committee. The results are 1. Lin Zhuluan, director of Wukan Party Organ. He served the counsel of Interim Village Council of Wukan, and he was the first most wanted criminal listed by Lufeng police. 2. Yang Semao, associate director of Wukan Party Organ. He was the director-general of Interim Village Council of Wukan, and the second most wanted criminal listed by Lufeng police. 3. Hong Ruichao, associate director of Wukan Party Organ. He acted as the director of Interim Village Council of Wukan, and he was detained by Lufeng police for radical actions for petition and later released for further legal proceedings. 4. Chen Suzhuan, female member of the Village Committee. She was an active member of United Woman Representative of Wukan. 5. Zhang Jiancheng, member of the Village Committee. He acted as the director of Interim Village Council of Wukan. He was detained by 5
Lufeng police for radical actions for petition and later released for further legal proceedings. 6. Zhuang Honglie, member of the Village Committee. He initiated the first petition to Guangdong Provincial Government in 2009 and acted as a key player of Wukan Hot Blood Youth Group, a mass public group on the Internet. He was also the fourth most wanted criminal listed by Lufeng police, detained for radical actions during petition, and later released for further legal proceedings. 7. Sun Wenliang, accountant of the Village Committee. He was an activist in organizing petitions. 6 This democratic election successfully ended the confrontation and siege, which was highly spoken by the media. After the siege and election, the new village committee set out to resolve the land disputes. Under the governance of former village chiefs, 12000 mu (1821.9 acre) of land transferred was under dispute, among which 7000 mu (1062.8 acre) of land had the title legally recorded after the transfer. 7 The inspection and definition of Wukan village s land progressed efficiently. Against the backdrop of land development, which is part of economic development program, most of the land was sold to developers with consideration in 1990s and had title legally recorded. This portion of land cannot be transferred back to the village. Although some land was transferred under invalid contracts, construction work had already started on the sites, and government compensation would be the only available judicial remedy. The only land that can be returned was a small portion, which was transferred under invalid contract and had not been developed yet. On September 21, 2012, Lin, the new head of the village announced that 3853.41 mu (585 acre) illegally transferred land had been returned to Wukan village. On the other side, provincial government and governments of different levels underneath it (Shanwei City and Lufeng government) employed administrative authority and financial tools to construct public facilities in order to compensate the village. Those include road construction, water pipes, school amenities, etc., the total of which cost RMB 60 million (USD 9.6 million). On April 18, 2012, Zhu Mingguo visited Wukan village and made promises to resolve some problems that troubled villagers living. Two days later, the task force displayed a plan of construction projects to be executed, including road construction, urban planning, the improvement of water supply, construction of teachers residential buildings and school library, cleaning of the harbor and sea lanes, and so on. Among these items, the cost of school library would be RMB 1,330K (USD 212.8K); road construction, RMB 10,040K (USD 1,606.4K); water supply, RMB 20M (USD 3.2M); the harbor, RMB 6M (USD 0.96M); teachers 6 Please see the table in the Appendix. 7 See the news report on Phoenix TV website. Dialogue with Lin Zuluan. <http://news.ifeng.com/exclusive/fangtan/special/linzu/#pagetop > 6
residential buildings, RMB 7,870K (USD 1,259.2K). From the former village chiefs was confiscated inappropriate income of RMB 1067.7K (USD 170.8K), of which 463K (USD 74.1K) was returned to Wukan village, 30K (USD 4.8K) to Wukan Harbor Corporation. However, the construction projects did not please some disgruntled villagers. The request for land return was transferred to the new village committee after the election. Regarding the land that cannot be returned, the new village committee took cooperative stances to higher-level government by accepting the construction projects. Some disgruntled villagers continued to request for land return, asked for their share of pecuniary compensation, prepared for further protests, and even threatened to hold a reelection. One year after the Wukan protest, the discontent of villagers broke out again. More than one hundred villagers rallied for protest again. Confronted with the protest of their constituency, the newly elected village committee has found themselves in a dilemma between higher-level government and displeased villagers. Some members of village committee admitted that they were in lack of experience of handling this impasse. Zhuang Honglie, in favor of villagers radical requests, resigned. At our interviews, Lin Zuluan said he did not regret to lead villagers to fight for the rights, but he did regret running for and working as the head of Wukan village. Yang Semao disclosed, they simply hoped that they could finish the last year of the tenure and leave the quandary for the next village committee. Clearly, the new village committee has been sliding into division step by step. The Problem of Collective Ownership in Economic Development Given the scale and speed of urbanization in China s economic development, the conversion of farmland for non-agricultural purposes has raised many critical issues, such as how to preserve limited farmland in China. In most of rural protests, the issue is about how to protect the villagers interests in land conversion when the land becomes more expensive during the urbanization. In the case of Wukan, the land has become valuable only after local government moved to this area and started real estate development projects. Self-serving village chiefs sold the land to private enterprises for realty development and pursued their own interests at the expense of the collective. Lives of a significant number of villagers have been influenced ever since. Villagers feel that they were under-compensated. The villagers lack of resistive power in the decisions of land conversion appears to be institutionalized in China. The legitimacy of rural land conversion lies in the ill-defined and poorly enforced Land Law of 1986. This law defines the ownership of rural farmland as the rural collective, but falls short of listing who comprises this rural collective and the procedures for the owners to exercise their property rights. In practice, administrative villages and small groups are 7
generally considered as the owners. According to The Village Organization Law, the administrative villages are entitled to sign land contracts. Therefore, village chiefs, as the legitimate representative of the rural collective, retain the most power in decisions regarding the land use, conversion and title transfer, sometimes depending upon the approval by higher-level governments. In contrast, villagers lack mechanisms to keep village cadres accountable for their decisions. The villagers are put into a weak position when self-serving village chiefs are not willing or able to protect the villagers interests. In reality, village chiefs occupied stronger position in decision-making on land use. Their position in the village community gave them the control over land, the most important resources of the village. With the power, they excluded villagers from participation in the process of decision-making or the management of land. The head of the village and other members of the village committee (i.e. Xue Zuchuang, Sun Laiyin) formed a collective and cooperated together for personal gain. With the control over resources, they enjoyed personal connections with officials in Donghai Township for protection. Protesters claimed that the village chief elections in the past were simply a formality. The village committee, which is the village s party organization, was de facto appointed by higher-level party organization. After the land was conveyed, villagers were in a weaker position and could take only ex post action, instead of ex ante action. As a result, it was difficult to reverse the situation. The protest in Wukan reveals that the vague collective ownership cannot protect villagers interests. The village chiefs hold the representative position and actual control of the land use and conversion, which have been institutionalized. Unable to constrain the village chiefs or keep them in check, villagers are in a weak position to prevent the encroachment from occurring. The formality of village election further weakens their position and excludes them from the decision making over land. Under the collective ownership of rural land, protests of this kind will not disappear. Protest Leadership Protest leaders in the case of Wukan can be divided into two categories. First group of leaders, such as Zhuang Honglie, initiated group petition, mass demonstration, and other types of collective actions that targeted political power holders. They attributed villagers woes to the rural officials violation of their rights on the land and placed the blame squarely on the original village chiefs. They framed the issue and converted a broad, inchoate sense of being wronged into a specific claim against named officials. With the assistance of modern technology, it fostered a feeling of empowerment by highlighting the vulnerabilities of one s targets. According to our interviews with villagers, flyers, titled as We Are Not Slaves Without A Village, were widely distributed in the village on April 4, 2009. 8
These flyers revealed that since the establishment of Wukan Harbor Corporation in 1993, village chiefs sold the land without legal proceedings. It suggested villagers to an inquisition. The anonymous author of the flyers called himself as Patriot No. 1. Later, Patriot No. 1 organized a mass public group, named as Wukan Hot Blood Youth Group, on an Internet instant messenger, QQ. The initial group petition to the Guangdong Provincial Government on June 21, 2009 was organized through the Internet. At the initial stage, the major strategy was to mobilize an enormous throng and to rely on the safety of numbers for protection. Although the authorities grant citizens the right of protest and demonstration, they prohibit popular action in the name of maintaining stability by imposing the ceiling on the number of people in each protest. The State Council s Regulation Concerning Letters and Visits (1995, revised in 2005) allows complainants to petition as a group, but it does not permit them to send more than five representatives at once (Article 12 (1995), Article 18 (2005)). If they lodge complaints strictly following the law, their voice would be slim, and their complaints, ignored. They have to orchestrate collective actions and rely on the safety of numbers for protection and effectiveness. This is the reason for an oft-quoted saying, a major ruckus leads to a major resolution; a small ruckus leads to a small resolution; no ruckus leads to no resolution (danao da jiejue, xiaonao xiao jiejue, bunao bu jiejue). Another group of leaders, such as Lin Zuluan, devised new strategies for the protest. Lin did not start the journey toward Guangdong Provincial Government or the protests in front of the former Village Committee and Lufeng City Government, but when the act of defiance collided with mistreatment by local officials, he adopted the self-restrained rightful-resistance model 8 of protests. He appealed to the villagers to stop violent actions and to demonstrate with rationality, which facilitated the occurrence of dialogue with the Provincial Government. He also asked villagers to donate for the injured villagers, which shunned the problem of free riders away from the protests. Under the leadership of this category, villagers formed Interim Village Council of Wukan and United Woman Representative of Wukan, and the protest became effectively organized. Lin shares common features with protest leaders surveyed and studied. 9 He is male, better educated, has strong personalities, has undergone transformative experiences such as serving in the army, and has been politically active earlier in life. Lin joined the People s Liberation Army at the age of 18, acted as a member of village committee in 1970s, and later worked for the government of Donghai Town. In 1983, he started his own business in trade of clothing products and retired to the village in late 1990. As a retired government official and clan elder, he is a well-established opinion leader, able to command moral authority in his community. 8 Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O Brien, Protest Leadership in Rural China, The China Quarterly, No. 193 (March 2008) p13. 9 O Brien and Li, The Politics of Lodging Complaints, p768; O Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, p13. ; Ethan Michelson, Justice from Above or Below? The China Quarterly, No. 193 (March 2008). 9
With the strategy of rightful-resistance, the protest in Wukan has become effective. This style of protest features manageably narrow demands, which presents little threat to the central authority and even offers higher-level government the chance to intervene as a savior. Taking lessons from demonstrations in late 1980s, protests have focused on local and lower-level officials; demands have focused on concrete local issues rather than broad systemic changes. 10 Protesters strategically identify a powerful potential ally in the higher-level government, sometimes even by reaffirming their support for the party s central leadership and claiming that they only want local officials to follow the law. These two categories of leaders were able to unit against repression and siege by local authority, but they divided gradually in handling the land return. As villagers requested, a democratic election was held. It replaced the original village chiefs by these protest leaders. As the new village officials, these leaders now face the dilemma, with which the former village chiefs were confronted, too. They split on the resolution for the land that cannot be return and have not come to a consensus on whether they should take cooperative stances to higher-level authority. The newly elected village chiefs became firewall, caught between villagers, in other words, their constituency, and higher authorities. Local Governments In the Chinese bureaucracy, above Wukan Village Committee are governments at different levels. From the lower-level to the higher-level are governments of Donghai Township, Lufeng City (county-level), Shanwei City (prefectural-level), Guangdong Province, and the central government. The villagers pursuits were petitioned to governments with higher and higher ranking. They went to the petition office of Donghai Township once, the petition office of Lufeng City once, the petition office of Shanwei City once, and eventually the petition office of Guangdong Province six times. Local governments responses were passive at this stage. The mass group incidents occurred after the villagers conveyed their anger against the village chiefs and did not see any resolution after numerous petitions to local governments at various level. After the outburst of the mass group incidents, local governments had two options, concession and repression. The earliest political opportunity theorists suggested that repression often works. 11 An efficient way is to take protest leaders off the street and jail these troublemakers. It can demoralize the mass public in the demonstration and end an incident in the short term. Imprisonment of a protest leader also tests community support for further action. It claims that a tiny number of peasant heroes were up to no good and regards it as the 10 Kevin O Brien, Rightful Resistance, World Politics, 49, No. 1 (October 1996) p.31-55 11 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 114; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 10
reason that the localities were unstable. The calculation was the stability would be restored if only those individuals were arrested and jailed. In September and November 2011, Lufeng City Government opted to use armed police to repress the demonstration and imprisoned five activists, in the name of maintaining stability and safeguarding law and order. It also used the news reports by oversea media to prove the connection between villagers and foreign forces. In doing so, it tried to promote the anti-crime campaigns and drew the conclusion that the protests were conflicts between the people and their enemies (diwo maodun). Local governments perceived limited risk associated repression and high costs of making concession. The outcome is often the opposite of what they wish. 12 Repression can backfire. 13 Repression can sometimes turn the tables on a government, exposing its brutality and undermining its legitimacy while generating public sympathy for protestors. 14 Governments repression and imprisonment enhance the prestige, honor, and social recognition of protest leaders and promote the community members to offer protection to their champions. With boosted image, protest leaders perceive the increased likelihood of success in pursuing the claims and also find it hard to retreat because they are put under high expectations by their followers and the society. Harsh repression may even steel all the protesters resolve. Instead of deactivating the occasional protest leaders (the first category), Lufeng City Government s repression offered the opportunity for dedicated and committed protest leaders (the second category) to emerge. Since official corruption was widely believed, repression simply convinced onlookers that protest leaders were altruistic. When Lin Zuluan asked for donation, it consolidated the protesters and generated more sympathy and public support for Wukan protest. The whole village was motivated to set up roadblocks to protect their leaders from arrest by the armed police. In this scenario, repression and jailing protest leaders did not smother the demonstrations as local officials wished. What upset local officials the most was the threat to their performance or image. Ironically, the village chief Xue Chang, against whom the villagers persistently lodged complaints and protests, acted as the head of the Village Committee for nearly 40 years. He was selected for numerous awards, such as Excellent Party Member of 1995 in Guangdong Province, Model Worker of 1996 in Shanwei City, National Model Worker of 2005, etc. Apparently, the local governments in China and their constituency have already diverged. This 12 Ian Johnson, Wild Grass: Three Stories of Change in Modern China (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), chapter 1. 13 Jack A. Goldstone and Charles Tilly, Threats (and opportunities): popular action and state response in the dynamics of contentious action, in Aminzade et. al., Silence and Voice, pp. 80-81. David Hess and Brian Martin, Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events, Mobilization, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2006), pp. 249-67. 14 Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Clifford Bob, When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social Movements, Mobilization, Vol. 11, No. 1 (20006) p. 15 11
pressure of image protection has been fully reflected in local governments choice of repression over concession in the siege of Wukan. The choice of repression indicates local governments pressure to maintain social stability, which comes from the top. Local officials have a strong incentive to prevent higher-level authorities, especially those at the provincial or central level, from detecting their failure to maintain social order. The bottom line for local governments tolerance is that the group petition does not threaten local officials performance, especially in maintaining social stability and local development goals. For local governments, tolerance to such protests by its concession may lead to the escalation, which will encourage greater defiance and send signals to higher-level authorities about local governments failure to maintain social stability. In the case of Wukan, this contributed to local officials preference toward repression over concession, as well as the protest leaders attempt to seek foreign media attention, which would help attract attention from higher authorities for justice and remedy. Democracy: bottom-up or top-down? Wukan siege caught the spotlight of international media not only because of the protests and siege which disrupted social order and attracted the attention from higher-level authorities, but also because the democratic election that the villagers requested and were allowed. In 2012, the Wall Street Journal described the Wukan election as it tested water on grass-roots democracy, 15 and stated that Wukan brought new thoughts to China. 16 In China, scholars compared Wukan village to Xiaogang village, the latter of which implemented the policy to fix farm output quotas for each household and set off economic reform in 1970s. Some even remarked that Wukan symbolized the start of China s political reform as Xiaogang in China s economic reform. 17 We believe that it is hard to draw this conclusion. The major pursuit of Wukan villagers was about the return of land or compensation, not their political interests or democracy. Protest leaders said they did not oppose to the Communist Party or the regime, and they just appealed to higher-level authorities to step in and help them in their land disputes. 18 Some protest leaders, especially Lin Zuluan and other leaders of the second category, made efforts to stay within the law or at least avoid breaching it. Some of the newly elected village chiefs appeared to be deferential to those they approached for redress after the provincial task force displayed a list of 15 Brian Spegele, Chinese Villager Vote Tests Waters on Reform, Online Wall Street Journal. (Feb. 2, 2012) <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/sb10001424052970204740904577196382582266146> 16 See Wukan Election Brings China New Thoughts, The Chinese version of Wall Street Journal, (March 5, 2012) <http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20120305/bch105548.asp?source=newsearch> 17 Yuan Weidong, Wukan Has Become Chinese Political Reform s Xiaogang Village, (Feb. 2, 2012), <http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/dfzl/2012/0202/52961.html> 18 Brian Spegele, Chinese Villager Vote Tests Waters on Reform, 12
construction projects. The small group of villagers, who are still dissatisfied with the redress plan and want more pecuniary compensation, have turned their anger to the new village committee without due respect to outcome of the democratic election. It was villagers strategy to take those in the higher-level authorities, provincial or central government as their potential allies. Remedies to address their grievances would require the support from higher authorities, which are far away from the influence of local officials and their network. For example, the former secretary of Donghai Township s Discipline Inspection Commission was the son of Xue Chang, former head of Wukan village. Villagers cannot hold high expectation when they lodged complaints in Donghai Township. When they attributed their woes to local violation of a central policy and placed their blame on rural officials, they needed support from higher-level government. Perhaps they still have confidence in the center s ability to deliver justice. Nevertheless, this strategy offered higher-level authorities the option to treat it as disagreements among the people (renmin neibu maodun), rather than conflicts between the people and their enemies (diwo maodun), and to choose concession over repression when they intervened. Meanwhile, sympathy for protesters from the higher-level government could gravely undermine local official s morale, and the concession could become counterproductive. Among numerous mass group incidents, land disputes are the largest source of direct appeals to higher-level authorities, which leaves local government in the demoralization. More than other types, disputes and pursuits of this type have greater chance to produce satisfaction. 19 Intervention from higher-level authorities and the lump-sum payments that come with it have motivated the villagers to win government s concession by lodging their complaints into the streets. In the case of Wukan, the former village committee sold the land with the procedures in question to implement the policy of economic development. Making concessions to villagers necessitated disciplining local officials who were responsible for villagers grievances and mass group incidents. After the Guangdong Provincial Government made the concession to buy off villagers, rural officials have felt that they were sold out and have been demoralized. This, in turn, may impair the government cadres at the bottom of the pyramid of Chinese power structure, and thus weaken the bureaucratic system. After the new village committee pulled efforts and had some land returned, few villagers are still not satisfied with the progress. They continue protesting against the new village committee, which proves the concession could be futile or counterproductive. The democratic election in Wukan did not resolve the conflicts; local governments have been left into difficulty. 19 Ethan Micheson, Justice from Above or Below? Popular Strategies for Resolving Grievances in Rural China, The China Quarterly, No. 193 (Mar. 2008), pp 43-64. 13
The democratic election held to correct wrongdoings may convey disillusion that this is bottom-up democracy in pursuit of Wukan villagers political interests. Actually, it is not uncommon for some higher-level authorities to show more tolerance or even sympathy to grass-roots pursuits. They do not have direct related economic interests in disputes of this kind, but they do have interests in maintaining the social order. Furthermore, democratic election at the level of administrative village was the policy direction signaled from the very top of Chinese leadership. In September 2003, the Chinese President Hu Jintao called for active but stable progress toward unspecified judicial structural reforms, village elections, and other legal and quasi-democratic reforms that could further open institutional channels for disgruntled citizens to voice their views and demands. The permission for democratic election at Wukan has its roots in the policy orientation that the Chinese leadership has decided to take. When Guangdong Provincial Government intervened, it employed tactics concession by financing public facilities and democratic election in line with the policy orientation of top leadership to strategically smother the protests and restore the social order. The conclusion cannot be drawn that Wukan is symbol of bottom-up democracy in China s political reform. Conclusion During China s economic development, land has become valuable resources in urbanization. Due to the vague collective ownership of rural land, local government, especially at the administrative village and township level, occupies great power in terms of land use, and rural officials interests are not always in line with villagers. Without check, it is hard for villagers to hold rural officials accountable for their self-serving decisions on land. The protests of this kind will not disappear in the short term. From the siege of Wukan, we learn the difference and divide between local, lower-level government and higher-level authorities in crisis management. Local governments in China are responsible for handling most of the resistance, and they have the preference for repression over concession. Villagers chance of getting attention and justice improves significantly when their claims move up from lower-level government to higher authorities. When the two variables appear in a protest the higher authorities willingness to make concession for social order and villagers employment of self-restrained rightful resistance, the chance of peaceful resolution significantly increases. However, it leaves the local, lower-level government in demoralization and dilemma. Rather than bottom-up democracy, we argue that Wukan is a symbol of limited role of grassroot election in welfare redistribution. 14
Appendix: Two Elections in Wukan First Time (March 2012) Second Time (April 2014) 原 乌坎村村民临时代表理事会 顾问, 陆丰警方通缉名单头号人物, 中共乌坎村党总支书记原村委会主任林祖銮林祖銮 Counsel of Interim Village Former director ( 主任 ) ( 主任 ) Council of Wukan; the first most of Wukan Party Lin Zuluan Lin Zuluan wanted criminal listed by Lufeng Organ (director) (director) police; director of Wukan Party Organ 杨色茂 ( 副主任 ) Yang Semao (Associate director) 原 乌坎村村民临时代表理事会 理事长, 陆丰警方通缉名单二号人物 Associate director of Wukan Party Organ, director-general of Interim Village Council of Wukan, and the second most wanted criminal listed by Lufeng police. 洪锐潮 ( 副主任 ) Hong Ruichao (Associate director) 原村委会副主任 Former associate director of Wukan Party Organ 洪锐潮 ( 副主任 ) Hong Ruichao (Associate director) 原 乌坎村村民临时代表理事会 理事, 曾因维权过激, 有 打砸行为 被警方拘捕, 取保候审 Associate director of Wukan Party Organ, former associate director of Interim Village Council of Wukan. He was detained by Lufeng police for radical actions for petition and later released for further legal proceedings. 孙文良 ( 副主任 ) Sun Wenliang (Associate director) 原村委会委员 村会计 Former accountant of the Village Committee 张建城 ( 委员 ) Zhang Jiancheng (Member of Village Committee) 原 乌坎村村民临时代表理事会 理事, 曾因维权过激, 有 打砸行为 被警方拘捕, 取保候审 Member of the Village Committee, director of Interim Village Council of Wukan. He was detained by Lufeng police for radical actions for petition and later released for further legal proceedings. 张建城 ( 委员 ) Zhang Jiancheng (member of Village Committee) 原村委会委员 former ember of the Village Committee
庄烈宏 ( 委员 ) Zhuang Honglie (member of Village Committee) 从 2009 年首次到省政府上访的发起 参与者之一, 网络 QQ 群网名 乌坎热血青年团 主要成员, 陆丰警方通缉名单四号人物, 曾因维权过激, 有 打砸行为 被警方拘捕, 取保候审 Member of the Village Committee. He initiated the first petition to Guangdong Provincial Government in 2009 and acted as a key player of Wukan Hot Blood Youth Group, a mass public group on the Internet. He was also the fourth most wanted criminal listed by Lufeng police, detained for radical actions during petition, and later released for further legal proceedings. 蔡景群 ( 委员 ) Cai Jingqun (Member of village committee) 原村监事会副主任 Former associate director of the Board of Supervision Committee 孙文良 ( 委员 会计 ) Sun Wenliang, (Accountan t of the Village Committee) 陈素转 ( 委员 妇女主任 ) Chen Suzhuan, (Female member of the Village Committee) 原乌坎村上访组织者之一 Accountant of the Village Committee. He was an activist in organizing petitions 原 乌坎村妇女代表联合会 主要代表 Female member of the Village Committee. She was an active member of United Woman Representative of Wukan. 林俊青 ( 委员 ) Lin Junqing (member of village committee) 杨小颜 ( 委员 ) Yang Xiaoyan (member of village committee) 乌坎村神事理事会会长 Head of the Commission on Religion Practice Background Unknown