Nations in Transit 2004 Azerbaijan *

Transcription

1 Nations in Transit 2004 Azerbaijan * NIT Ratings Electoral Process Civil Society Independent Media Governance Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework Corruption NA NA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Following independence in 1991, Azerbaijan passed through stages of war and chaos before stabilizing under the authoritarian rule of President Heydar Aliyev. The country has become increasingly integrated with the world economy, primarily but not exclusively through large investments in the economy s energy sector. Azerbaijan also stands out as having an independent and balanced foreign policy course, although the country continues to suffer from the frozen armed conflict with Armenia over Nagorno- Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian-populated region of Azerbaijan. The conflict has led to enormous social problems among refugees and internally displaced persons. The * Svante E. Cornell is executive director of Cornell Caspian Consulting, LLC. He is also deputy director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and research director of the Silk Road Studies Program of Uppsala University. Fariz Ismailzade is Azerbaijan bureau director of Cornell Caspian Consulting, LLC, and a freelance writer on Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus who observed the November 2003 presidential elections. NOTE: Nations in Transit ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic development. The 2004 ratings reflect the period January 1 through December 31, The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisors, and the author of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author.

2 country remains marred by poverty and has yet to conduct an election that meets international standards or to experience a democratic transfer of power. The year 2003 was dominated by the actualization of the much-dreaded succession problem, as President Aliyev s public collapse in April and subsequent health problems ended his rule. The political spectrum radicalized as the October 15 presidential elections approached. Internal fissures in the government were muted as President Aliyev s son Ilham was appointed prime minister and became the ruling party s candidate. Cracks within the opposition could not be similarly bridged, as the personal ambitions of several opposition leaders prevented a unified candidate from emerging. The opposition s claims of electoral fraud and its refusal to accept the official election results resulted in violent clashes between opposition members and the police and army. Close to 600 opposition activists were detained and harassed by the authorities, causing a serious blow to the organizational capacity and spirit of the opposition parties. Although the majority of the detainees were later released, the dominance of the ruling party over the country s domestic politics remained obvious. Electoral Process. The international community and local observers placed much hope on the free and fair conduct of the 2003 presidential elections, but the voting process once again fell short of democratic standards. Although administration of the elections was orderly and a number of improvements were made in the organization of the voting, irregularities in the counting and tabulation process as well as the intimidation of opposition observers created unequal conditions for candidates. The campaign period was biased toward the ruling party, with all TV stations and the majority of the print media overwhelmingly giving coverage to the governing party s candidates. Official figures showed Ilham Aliyev receiving 76 percent of the vote and his main rival, Isa Gambar, only 13 percent. Azerbaijan s rating for electoral process falls from 5.75 to to 6.00 owing to the government s dominance of the election campaign and irregularities on election day, as well as the government s decision to use excessive force in the aftermath of the election. Civil Society. Little progress was made in 2003 in Azerbaijan s civil society sector, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) still facing registration, tax, and funding problems. A 29 percent tax on grants created much unease in the NGO sector, while problems with the registration of NGOs did not improve. On the other hand, the NGO community became better known in the country, and its activity increased in the period leading up to the elections. Azerbaijan s rating for civil society declines from 4.25 to 4.50 owing to the 29 percent tax and new grant registration procedures that were viewed as government efforts to exert greater control over the civil society sector prior to the presidential elections. Independent Media. Although print media continued to be free and independent in many ways, the government made use of its monopoly over the printing presses to pressure opposition outlets prior to the presidential election. Thus, media continued to operate under governmental pressure. Print media remained divided into either progovernment or pro-opposition camps, while the television channels remained unwilling to NIT 2004: Page 2

3 criticize the government significantly. An important development was the formation of an independent press council, designed to support the media s relations with the government and the public. In spite of this, the professionalism of the media left much to be desired. Azerbaijan s rating for independent media falls from 5.50 to 5.75 owing to the government s treatment of opposition media outlets prior to the presidential election, as well as to the ongoing weakness of media professionalism. Governance. The widely expected split of the ruling party and collapse of the governance system built by former president Aliyev did not materialize in 2003, despite the absence of a primary decision maker in the country for more than four months. Likewise, the postelection violence failed to shake up the stability and unity of the ruling elite and may in fact have helped the government, as the ruling elite united more tightly around the newly elected president, Ilham Aliyev. Although on this basis Azerbaijan can be characterized as a stable country, this stability rests with strong centralized power, rather than democratic institutions and the rule of law, and relies on the use of force to be maintained. The ruling elite remains closed to the influence and input of the general public. Azerbaijan s rating for governance remains Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework. Although the Azerbaijani Constitution provides for a wide range of human rights for Azerbaijan s citizens, these rights are often violated in practice. For instance, prior to the 2003 presidential elections, the right to assembly was violated on many occasions, as the local police and local executive committees prohibited, hindered, or broke up opposition rallies. Religious freedom is generally respected, but the State Committee on Religious Affairs has warned several small religious sects against undermining the national security of Azerbaijan. Public trust in judicial and law enforcement bodies is low. In 2003, the Constitutional Court showed its dependence on the executive branch when it recognized the validity of the presidential elections despite widespread irregularities. However, the Parliament did approve a legislative initiative of the newly elected president allowing individuals to appeal to the Constitutional Court. Azerbaijan s rating for constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework declines from 5.25 to 5.50 owing to the judiciary s continued lack of independence and to violations of political rights and civil liberties associated with the 2003 presidential election. Corruption. Corruption remained one of the most problematic areas in the country in 2003, permeating society from top to bottom and creating a major impediment to economic development. Given the agreement on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum gas pipeline and the expected flow of oil revenues into the country, the transparent use of these funds will be a priority issue for the government and the public in the coming years. On the positive side, however, the administration of the State Oil Fund has been relatively transparent. In addition, the cutting of red tape in 2002 for the licensing of small and medium companies appeared to lessen corruption in this sector in Azerbaijan adopted a Law on Fighting Corruption and joined the International Convention on the Fight Against Corruption in December In spite of these improvements, the government still does far too little to combat corruption. Azerbaijan s rating for corruption remains unchanged at NIT 2004: Page 3

4 Outlook for The year 2004 is likely to be characterized by the consolidation of power by Ilham Aliyev s administration and a likely reorganization of the opposition parties. The ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party will have the difficult task of choosing a new chairman, as several competing factions within the party are aiming at that position. In this sense, 2004 may define the structure of Azerbaijani politics for the coming years. Little progress was made in 2003 toward a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since both Armenia and Azerbaijan were engaged in domestic presidential elections. The conflict is likely to regain its place at the center of Azerbaijan s political debate in 2004, with peace talks expected to resume. MAIN REPORT I. Electoral Process Elections in Azerbaijan have been marred by fraud and government control over the voting process. Both the parliamentary elections in 2000 and the constitutional referendum in 2002 were characterized as not free and fair and falling short of international standards by international and local observers. For these reasons, the 2003 presidential elections were considered an opportunity to improve the electoral process and advance democracy to the next level. Unfortunately, these improvements did not materialize. Although 80 years old and in poor health, President Heydar Aliyev planned to seek reelection, but his public collapse in April 2003 and subsequent decline made it impossible. In June, he was flown for medical treatment to Turkey and then to the United States and has not appeared publicly since. The physical well-being of the president became a much debated topic in the country, as the lack of credible information on his status led many to speculate about his possible death. The departure of Aliyev from the political scene actualized the long-anticipated issue of his succession in In a political environment where democratic institutions are weak and the country s recovery from the conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave is unfinished, succession of power became a vital and unpredictable turning point for the future of the country. Heydar Aliyev s son Ilham, long groomed to succeed his father, has served in numerous posts, including first vice chairman of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP), first vice president of the State Oil Company, chairman of the National Olympic Committee, member of Parliament, and head of the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Although considered less charismatic and not as politically skilled as his father, Ilham Aliyev managed to establish good working relations with Western companies and democratic institutions in his various positions. On August 4, 2003, President Aliyev appointed Ilham Aliyev as prime minister, the second most important position in the country. This effectively paved the NIT 2004: Page 4

5 way for the younger Aliyev, who was nominated as a presidential candidate alongside his father, generating much speculation on the government s intentions. The ruling YAP has long been known for its lack of unity. Challenged by the opposition parties, however, members of the ruling elite had no better choice but to unite behind Ilham Aliyev to preserve the existing political and economic status quo. President Aliyev withdrew his candidacy from the ballot 13 days prior to election day, making Ilham the only candidate of the ruling party. Prior to the election, the government of Azerbaijan agreed to work with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) on improving the legislative basis for the electoral process. Since previous elections had been guided by separate laws, the president s office developed a draft for the first unified election code in the country. The code was adopted in April 2003, six months before the election, allowing the parties a sufficient amount of time to adapt to the new elements of the law. The election code introduced several improvements over the previous electoral law. Foremost, the government of Azerbaijan agreed to use transparent boxes at polling stations. These boxes were later prepared by IFES with funding from the German embassy in Baku and served as a tool for making the voting process itself more transparent. In addition, the new code introduced numbered ballots (to prevent duplications), the use of three-copy tabulation protocols, and the right of individuals to observe voting and tabulation procedures. Nevertheless, these improvements were of limited importance, as several key elements of the electoral process remained under the government s tight control. Most important, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving foreign funding were not granted the right to monitor the elections, and the composition of the election commission was dominated by the regime. The Central Election Commission (CEC) comprised 15 members, 6 from the ruling YAP, 3 independents, 3 from opposition parties in the Parliament (the Popular Front Party, Civil Solidarity, and the Communist Party), and 3 from opposition parties outside Parliament (Musavat, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party [ADP], and the National Independence Party [ANIP]). Since independent deputies and the opposition Communist Party are under government influence, the authorities were guaranteed a two-thirds majority in the CEC. Thus, the government of Azerbaijan was able to present to Western observers and institutions the semblance of a multiparty election commission while at the same time managing to keep a monopoly over its decision making. Mazahir Panahov, the previous chairman of the CEC, was reelected to this post. The lower-level commissions were similarly formed on a multiparty system yet were kept under the control of the authorities. The electoral process was problematic from the beginning. First, more than 20 presidential candidates attempted to register with the CEC, but of these only 12 were accepted. Among those denied registration were former Parliament Speaker and ADP NIT 2004: Page 5

6 chairman Rasul Guliyev, who is in exile in the United States, and Ayaz Mutalibov, Azerbaijan s Communist-era leader, who is in exile in Russia. Many international and domestic analysts described these decisions as political. Other opposition candidates, although allowed to register, encountered many difficulties when collecting the 40,000 signatures required for registration. While there are more than 40 political parties in Azerbaijan, only 4 pose a serious threat to the regime: the ANIP, the Popular Front Party, Musavat, and the ADP. From the beginning of the campaign for president, developing a unified candidate from the opposition became the priority issue. Each of the four opposition parties has either a limited financial base or limited membership, owing partly to government pressure over the past decade. Also, the lack of unity among the opposition parties has generated a public perception of internal bickering that seriously damages their credibility as an alternative to the Aliyev regime. It was clear that without a unified candidate, the opposition would be unlikely to win the election. In the end, personal ambitions and competition among the opposition leaders greatly reduced the possibility for a single candidate. The opposition's chances of winning the election decreased even further as Ilham Aliyev proved to be a unifying factor in the ruling party, something the opposition parties had not anticipated. In addition, the opposition underestimated Ilham Aliyev s popularity, having assumed that its negative assessment of the candidate was shared by the population at large. In summer 2003, Ali Kerimli, chairman of the Popular Front, proposed to resume talks on a unified opposition candidate, offering to step down in favor of a consensus candidate. The four party leaders subsequently traveled to London to negotiate but failed to come to an agreement. Bilateral consultations then followed. With Kerimli stepping down in favor of Etibar Mamedov, leader of the ANIP, intensive discussions followed between Mamedov and Isa Gambar, the most popular opposition leader. A deal was virtually clinched that would have Mamedov step back in favor of Gambar in return for the prime ministership should Gambar be elected. However, at the last minute, Gambar reneged on the deal and instead chose to make the same arrangement with exiled ADP leader Guliyev. This move was greeted with consternation across the country, given that Musavat s anticorruption platform seemed to contrast strongly with Guliyev s well-known and widespread irregularities in the early 1990s. In the end, the opposition entered the election with two major candidates: Mamedov and Gambar. The remaining candidates, with the exception of Liberal Party leader Lala Shovkat Haciyeva, were weak and in loyal opposition to the pro-aliyev political establishment. The campaign, which started on August 16, was very active yet biased. The authorities, especially at the local level, created many obstacles to the opposition's outreach efforts to voters. These tactics included tearing down posters or not allowing them to be posted at all, breaking up rallies, intimidating local party branches, barring the use of venues for rallies, preventing travel, and detaining members. NIT 2004: Page 6

7 Whereas the town hall meetings of Ilham Aliyev were often co-organized by the local administration, the rallies of the opposition candidates were hindered in any way possible. In Masalli, for example, an ANIP meeting was broken up by police and several dozen people were wounded. In Ganja, a Musavat rally was authorized only for the stadium located on the outskirts of town. Travel by opposition leaders was also hindered on a number of occasions. In Lenkoran and other towns, police warned against putting up posters of the opposition candidates, and in many cases posters were simply removed. One of the biggest problems for opposition parties was limited access to TV outlets. The state television as well as five private channels devoted much of their time to promoting the image of Ilham Aliyev, while opposition candidates received only 10 minutes of coverage per week in the form of a televised address. Private commercials at $400 per minute were too costly for any of the opposition candidates. Even so, the run-up to the election turned out to be very active because of heavy campaigning by the major competing parties outside of Baku. As a result, voters were given an opportunity to listen to candidates and make their choice in spite of local government efforts to prevent opposition campaigning. The election process was monitored by nearly 1,000 international observers, including 600 from the OSCE, as well as 40,000 domestic observers. Voter turnout, as reported in the final CEC results, was unusually high at 71 percent. However, a considerable level of fraud cast doubts over the figures in the official results. According to these, Ilham Aliyev received percent of the vote, and his closest rival, Isa Gambar of Musavat, received percent. The total results were as follows: CANDIDATE % OF VOTE Ilham Aliyev Isa Gambar Lala Shovkat Haciyeva 3.62 Etibar Mamedov 2.92 Ilyas Ismaylov 1.00 Sabir Rustamkhanli 0.82 Gudrat Hassanguliyev 0.50 Hafiz Hajiyev 0.34 Heydar Aliyev (withdrew in favor of Ilham Aliyev) Abutalib Samedov (withdrew in favor of Ilham Aliyev) Yunus Oguz Aliyev (withdrew in favor of Ilham Aliyev) Ali Kerimli (withdrew in favor of Etibar Mamedov) International observers noted that the voting process was orderly and a number of safeguards were implemented to prevent election fraud. These safeguards included the use of transparent ballot boxes, envelopes for ballots, the immediate publication of precinct results on the Internet for the first time, and the posting of final protocols. Yet the general conduct of the elections was still characterized as fraudulent owing to a NIT 2004: Page 7

8 number of irregularities, including ballot stuffing, observer restrictions, and problems with the counting and tabulation of votes. Also, the ruling party apparently incorporated new methods of fraud never seen before in Azerbaijan, such as busing voters to polling stations. During the counting process, the majority of polling station chairpersons intimidated the opposition monitors and ignored the rules for counting votes adopted by the CEC. Peter Eicher, head of the OSCE s observation mission, called these elections "a missed opportunity" and noted that observers were particularly troubled by the level of intimidation and unequal conditions for candidates during the campaign. In its final election report, the OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights stated, "The 15 October 2003 presidential election in the Republic of Azerbaijan failed to meet OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. The overall process reflected a lack of sufficient political commitment to implement a genuine election process." While authorities refuted news reports of mass falsifications, the CEC nevertheless canceled the results of the voting from 694 polling stations (although refusing to make public a list of these stations or publish the names of any of the lower election commission members). Postelection violence and the ensuing massive arrests and intimidation of opposition activists further worsened the image of Azerbaijan in the international arena. As the opposition refused to recognize the legitimacy of the elections, the most radical members of Musavat, the UMUD Party, and the ADP clashed with police and the army during postelection rallies in which close to 5,000 people participated. This led to scores of injured on both sides and at least one fatality. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd, which then turned to breaking shop and car windows. Although the opposition activists were clearly disturbing the public order, the authorities used excessive force to quell them. One journalists rights group stated that nearly 80 journalists were beaten, harassed, and detained during these clashes. Authorities also used the violence to follow up with a massive crackdown on opposition parties, arresting close to 600 opposition members both in Baku and throughout the country, although most were later released. Some of the arrested were members of the election commissions who had refused to sign the final tally sheets confirming the election results. Isa Gambar was put under house arrest, and his deputies were detained. Close to 100 opposition activists still remained in custody at the end of Some of the arrested and their family members launched a week-long hunger strike to protest their detainment and the government's harassment. International organizations and the U.S. government called on the Azerbaijani government to restrain its punitive actions against the opposition parties. OSCE officials expressed concerns about the low level of mutual trust in Azerbaijani society. As a result, the postelection political environment in the country has been characterized by the low activity of political parties and little public involvement in the political process. The majority of opposition activists, especially in regions outside of Baku, have felt intimidated and fearful of participating in further political activity. NIT 2004: Page 8

9 Despite irregularities in the electoral process, Ilham Aliyev is generally accepted domestically and internationally as Azerbaijan s legitimate president. Indeed, he seems to have gained the support of significant sections of the population that value the stability brought by his father. At the same time, he appears to be succeeding in portraying himself as a force for change. Provided the government continues its current energy development policies, which have led to some improvement in the welfare of citizens, there appears to be no major challenge to Aliyev s authority. II. Civil Society In 2003, the civil society sector in Azerbaijan experienced both improvements and setbacks. In January, the Parliament approved changes to the Law on NGOs, requiring them to pay 29 percent in taxes to the Social Protection Fund. In addition, NGOs are now required to register each grant they receive with the relevant executive bodies. Most NGO activists and local political analysts viewed this as a way for the government to pressure them and control their work prior to the presidential elections. Defending the financially weak NGO sector, the Forum of NGOs organized a rally in downtown Baku, demanding that the government postpone the implementation of these amendments or introduce a gradual taxation. The legal changes also drew criticism from international organizations, and although several meetings were held with governmental officials, the amendments have not been revised. The taxation of NGOs is most likely to weaken the financial basis of civil society and further hinder or limit its activities. At the same time, some progress was made at the end of 2003 regarding the registration process for civil society groups. Generally, throughout the year, the Ministry of Justice had refused registration to most NGOs that applied. This in turn led registered NGOs to allow nonregistered organizations to use their legal status to apply for grants in exchange for a percentage of any funds raised. At the end of the year, however, the Parliament adopted a new Law on the Registration of Legal Entities, thus liberalizing the registration process. In practice, it remains to be seen whether this will eliminate the obstacles to NGO fund-raising and activities. The presidential elections increased the level of NGO activity in Several groups united under the umbrella agency For the Sake of Fair Elections and organized a unified election-monitoring campaign throughout the country. The Election Monitoring Center, comprising 12 NGOs, also conducted election monitoring and produced campaignoriented television programs on Space TV, with the financial support of the Open Society Institute. These programs were aimed at providing nonpartisan election-related information to a broad audience and encouraging government-opposition dialogue. The Women s Rights Protection Center conducted training of observers in several regions of Azerbaijan. Another alliance of NGOs, called SOS-03, also conducted a range of activities aimed at increasing the participation of voters in the elections. Although NGOs worked aggressively to promote conditions for free and fair elections, the prohibition against their observing elections inside the polling stations was a major setback. According to the new Law on NGOs, organizations receiving foreign funding NIT 2004: Page 9

10 were not eligible to monitor the elections. This barred many organizations from conducting organized observations. Aside from activism during the presidential elections, the majority of NGOs remained outside the political process in The Parliament showed little willingness to engage NGOs in the legislative process or invite their input on draft legislation. Overall, the government remained resistant to NGOs, perceiving them as hostile forces. Some NGOs, on their own initiative, have used the media to bring political issues to the attention of the authorities. For example, the Center for the Legal Protection of Migrants raised the issue of ID cards and the inability of citizens without ID cards to vote in the elections. In general, NGOs are weak both financially and organizationally and rely mainly on foreign grants to sustain their activities. However, in the past few years some NGOs have successfully implemented projects in partnership with major business companies. The internal capacity of NGOs also remains underdeveloped, and there is little transparency in their financial management. Groups rarely conduct membership drives and fundraising, and they often fall under the influence of political parties. Most NGOs are dependent on, and run by, a single individual. Most trade unions in Azerbaijan are dependent on the executive branch and do not represent the true voices of their members. There are few attempts on the part of trade unions to engage in the political process, although prior to the 2003 presidential elections, some groups, such as the Union of Teachers, worked to support the ruling party candidate. Membership dues are automatically collected in the workplace, with members having little control over how they are spent. Women s NGOs continue to play an important role in the development of civil society. On September 16 and 17, 2003, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) together with members of Coalition 1325 a group of Azerbaijani women representing the Parliament, state agencies, the NGO community, political parties, and the mass media organized two roundtable discussions on the participation of Azerbaijani women in decision-making processes at the national and international levels. On August 5 8, as part of its regional project Women for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Southern Caucasus, UNIFEM conducted a skills-building workshop for members of the Baku Network of Internally Displaced Persons. Ethnic groups, such as the Russian community, the Jewish community, and others, also increased their public activity during the presidential elections. Azerbaijan s educational system is composed of private and public institutions, though there are many more of the latter. Students and faculty were subjected to governmental pressure during the 2003 elections, and on a number of occasions faculty belonging to opposition parties were fired from their jobs. During the election campaign, students at both universities and high schools in Baku and the regions were ordered to attend rallies of the ruling party. NIT 2004: Page 10

11 Overall, the civil society sector in Azerbaijan remains weak. With the exception of NGOs that are established by members of the intelligentsia, the general public remains passive and does not show considerable initiative for getting involved in community-based projects. According to a survey by the U.S.-based Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR), only 3 percent of respondents acknowledged taking part in any type of social organization. Rather, citizens rely on a strong central government, as they did during the Soviet era, and are often unaware of their own community resources and capacity. The idea of volunteerism and public activism is still not popular among Azerbaijan s citizens. III. Independent Media Azerbaijan s Law on Mass Media was adopted by the Parliament in It guarantees freedom of speech, support for media, access to information, and protection of journalists rights. In practice, though, Azerbaijan s media sector encounters numerous obstacles to conducting its work and maintaining independence. There are two state television stations, four private stations, nine regional stations, and four foreign TV channels (two Russian and two Turkish) operating in Azerbaijan. A significant portion of the population also uses satellite antennas. State and private broadcasters, especially the nationwide channels, remain under the influence of the government, and private stations have close ties to the presidential family. According to the monitoring conducted by the journalists union Yeni Nasil and funded by the U.S.-based group Internews, 88.3 percent of the 2003 preelection airtime on the five nationwide TV channels was devoted to the two candidates of the ruling party; only 4 percent was given to Isa Gambar, the Musavat chairman and an opposition candidate. Newspapers devoted 69.9 percent of their election-related coverage to the ruling party. Yeni Nasil also noted that private TV stations agreed on rates for political commercials, which adversely affected opposition candidates who could not afford them. Under pressure from the Council of Europe, the Azerbaijani Parliament prepared and adopted a bill on public television in The opposition parties characterized the bill as "undemocratic, leaving control over the TV's management in the hands of the authorities." Internews-Azerbaijan also issued a public statement condemning the provisions of the bill. Since the formal abolishment of censorship in 1998, the print media in Azerbaijan have remained freer than television and radio outlets, although they too are generally biased in their coverage. Of the 200 newspapers that are published in Azerbaijan, only the Russian dailies Ekho (circulation 6,000) and Zerkalo (4,500) are generally considered to be neutral and bipartisan. Other popular newspapers, such as Yeni Musavat (16,000 copies), Azadlig (circulation 7,000), and Hurriyyet, serve the political agendas of certain opposition parties and are increasingly inclined toward unprofessional reporting. The progovernment, state-funded newspapers Xalg Gazeti (circulation 6,000) and Azerbaycan (5,000) cover only the ruling party's position on issues. NIT 2004: Page 11

12 The practice of bringing lawsuits against newspapers peaked in late 2002, when various governmental officials and businessmen filed 12 suits against the oppositional newspaper Yeni Musavat. This trend decreased in 2003 yet has not been eliminated entirely. In most cases, the fines imposed on newspapers by Azerbaijani courts are not paid but do serve as a tool for the authorities to put pressure on the media. The overall quality of journalism and reporting remains weak and unprofessional. Investigative journalism is underdeveloped, and most articles cover scandal-oriented political news as opposed to social or environmental developments. Most journalists are also members of NGOs or political parties and, as a result, often confuse their responsibilities or compromise their objectivity. The Open Society Institute, Internews, and the OSCE have conducted several programs to improve the quality of reporting in Azerbaijan. During the 2003 elections, the International Republican Institute and IFES broadcast get-out-the-vote public service announcements. With a media market bolstered by political commercials during the elections, the financial situation of TV stations improved somewhat in However, the opposition press continued to experience difficulties attracting advertisers who feared doing business with them. In recent years, the government has exempted media outlets from customs duties and has frozen the debts of newspapers to the state printing house. There are 10 news agencies in the country, with the Turan News Agency remaining the strongest and most popular. The newspaper distribution network is private and covers most of the country. A positive development in 2003 was the establishment of the independent Press Council. The Congress of Azerbaijani Journalists met in March, and the meeting was attended by nearly 450 journalists representing 170 local newspapers and journalists associations, as well as 200 international guests and members of the government. The Press Council has 15 members, 9 representing media and 6 representing the public. Aflatun Amashov, chairman of the Committee for Protection of the Rights of Journalists, was elected the Press Council s first chairman. The Press Council is intended to serve as a bridge between the press and the public on the one hand and between the press and governmental officials on the other, ultimately aiming to ease the legal burden on newspapers. If a governmental official's rights are violated or incorrect information is reported, the alleged injured party can bypass the court system and appeal to the Press Council, which will review the case and request that a correction be published if one is deemed necessary. The strongest organizations for the protection of journalists rights are the Committee for Protection of the Rights of Journalists, the Azerbaijan Journalists Confederation, Yeni Nasil, and the Baku Press Club. The protection of journalists rights diminished prior to the 2003 elections. In August and September, members of the Press Council and opposition editors were detained by the traffic police and threatened on a number of occasions. In the aftermath of the elections, NIT 2004: Page 12

13 several dozen journalists were detained and some were beaten. The Committee for Protection of the Rights of Journalists reported that 80 journalists were denied their right to collect information on election day and during the actions conducted by the opposition on October 15 and 16. Fifty journalists were beaten by police or civilians, while 18 were detained and 7 prevented from collecting information, reported the Turan News Agency. The authorities also arrested Rauf Arifoglu, editor of the popular opposition daily Yeni Musavat, on charges of organizing mass violence in the streets of Baku on October 16. Overall, the public s trust in media is weak. According to an IFES survey, television outlets are trusted more than newspapers. An ISAR survey published in 2003 revealed that 91 percent of respondents get their information mainly from television and only 3 percent from newspapers and radio. The majority of the population does not buy newspapers, and each newspaper purchased is normally read by several people. Internet access remains free of governmental control and influence, but a mere 0.32 percent of the country which translates into just 12,000 computers is actually connected to the Internet, reports the Baku Sun. This puts Azerbaijan near the bottom for Internet use among former Soviet countries, behind regional neighbors Armenia and Georgia with 0.9 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively. While the number of Internet cafés around the country has increased, there are negative issues impacting the growth of the Internet sector, including the Communication Ministry s monopoly position, the lack of an Azeri alphabet for the Internet, and poor legislation in the information technology sector. The government announced in 2003 that it was working with the United Nations Development Program to implement a national information strategy. IV. Governance The year 2003 tested Azerbaijan s governance system. With the deteriorating health of President Aliyev, the issue of succession once again stood out as the major challenge for the country. It was widely expected that the departure of Heydar Aliyev from the political scene would lead Azerbaijan into a chaotic and unstable period and that the ruling party would collapse or that parts of it would leave the country. Although these beliefs turned out to be groundless, stability continued to be maintained by largely undemocratic means lacking in transparency and the rule of law. From July 2003 until election day, Heydar Aliyev sought medical treatment first in Turkey and then in Cleveland, Ohio, and was therefore not seen in public. Although decisions on some major issues were halted or delayed, the government continued to function and the ruling party remained united. Even in the aftermath of the elections, when tensions between the authorities and the opposition were highest, the government stayed in control, often relying on the use of force, intimidation, and the harassment of political opponents. Thus, although Azerbaijan can be characterized as a stable country, this stability still rests on strong centralized power rather than functioning democratic institutions and the practice of law. Most decisions are made from the top down, and there is little citizen and NIT 2004: Page 13

14 civil society participation in the governance of the country. Likewise, the legislative branch remains subordinate to the executive branch. The police, army, and border troops are under government control, and no major paramilitary or criminal group is beyond the regime s reach. It is important to note, however, that with the departure of Heydar Aliyev from the helm of Azerbaijani politics, the role of such powerful figures as chief of staff Ramiz Mehtiyev, Minister of Interior Ramil Usubov, and Minister of National Security Namiq Abbasov has increased. This development has the potential to weaken the currently strong political hierarchy. The Parliament generally works in a transparent manner, typically allowing journalists and television reporters to cover its sessions. On several occasions, however, journalists from opposition newspapers have been removed from parliamentary sessions. In addition, many NGOs and the public are not invited to committee hearings. Deputies and members of the government draft laws, and outside experts are seldom invited to give their input. The public also has difficulty obtaining copies of draft laws and deputies' voting records. The Parliament has not conducted any investigations of the government so far, although amendments were made in 2002 requiring the prime minister and the Cabinet of Ministers to present an annual report to the Parliament. The prime minister has adhered to this rule, although this procedure remains very formal and has revealed nothing unusual. There is little auditing of government functions. The Parliament s Chamber of Commerce has been passive in this respect, and the Ministry of Finance has initiated only a few investigations of the financial work of several Azerbaijani embassies abroad and oil industry enterprises. These investigations have revealed some problems in financial accounting, yet no major sanctions have been imposed. Overall, the public and media have little direct access to the financial operations of the government. However, laws, decrees, tenders, and calls for proposals are regularly published in the governmentcontrolled newspapers. There have been no reforms or improvements in the function and authority of local municipal councils, which continue to be heavily dependent on local executive committees (excoms). Municipalities, first elected in 1999, continue to experience financial difficulties and power-sharing problems with the local excoms, as the latter control the activities of the former. The government subsidizes a portion of municipality budgets, and the balance of revenues comes from local taxes. For the most part, municipalities are engaged in construction activities and social services. Almost all municipal councils are dominated by the members of the ruling party, and the fraudulent elections of 1999 created doubts regarding the intentions and capacity of these bodies. The next municipal elections will be held in 2004, yet there is little interest on the part of the opposition parties or the public due to the distrust of the electoral process and the insignificant role of municipalities in the governance process. NIT 2004: Page 14

15 There is no Law on Civil Service in Azerbaijan, nor is one expected to be passed any time soon. Most employees of public institutions, such as hospitals, schools, and government, are subjected to political pressure from the ruling regime. There have been dozens of cases in the postelection period when members of the opposition parties were fired from their jobs. Although in some cases the dismissals were reversed, the general tendency was to intimidate opposition party members and their families. However, it's important to note that a school principal who had maltreated children of opposition leaders was also fired. There has been no progress in the peace talks over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Azerbaijani government has continued to have no administrative control over the territory and the seven surrounding raions (Kelbajar, Qubatli, Fizuli, Zengilan, Lachin, Agdam, and Jebrail). This constitutes about 17 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan. The rest of the country remains under the strict control of the central government, and there is little expectation that the powers of the local excoms will decrease. After his April 2003 collapse, President Aliyev replaced the excoms of three major cities, Ganja, Sumgait, and Lenkoran. This was done with the apparent intention of bringing to power members of Ilham Aliyev s team and decreasing the power of Ramiz Mehtiyev, chief of staff of the presidential administration, who has a strong influence over other excoms. V. Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework The Azerbaijani Constitution, adopted in 1995, provides a wide range of human rights protections, yet often these rights are violated in practice. For instance, prior to the 2003 elections, the right to assemble was violated on many occasions, as the local police and excoms prohibited, hindered, or broke up opposition rallies. Religious freedom is generally respected, but the State Committee on Religious Affairs has warned several small religious sects against undermining the national security of Azerbaijan. According to the Heritage Foundation s annual Index of Economic Freedom, the legal system [in Azerbaijan] does not provide sufficient protection for private property. In 2003, the Constitutional Court showed its dependence on the executive branch when it recognized the validity of the elections despite the widespread irregularities that had occurred. On another occasion, the Constitutional Court in September gave an interpretation of Article 179 of the election code that required the government to hold new elections should a president die or become incapacitated in office. Disadvantageous to candidate Ilham Aliyev, this article threatened his chances for election should President Aliyev become incapacitated before the election. Consequently, the Constitutional Court assembled and decided that Article 179 should apply only for future elections clearly a pro-regime decision. Amendments made to the Constitution in 2002 opened opportunities for ordinary citizens to apply to the Constitutional Court, yet the majority of citizens remain passive or unaware of their rights. The court system and judges in Azerbaijan are corrupt and inefficient. A 2003 IFES survey showed that even though a majority of Azerbaijani citizens value their rights, they are not convinced that the country s judicial system operates in their best NIT 2004: Page 15

16 interest. Sixty-three percent of the respondents did not believe that Azerbaijan s judicial system is unbiased and applies the law equally for all people. Judges are appointed by the president and remain heavily dependent on the executive branch. There have been numerous reports of judges making decisions on the arrest of opposition activists under political pressure from the executive branch. The test system, applied to check the professionalism of judges, has so far failed to improve inefficiencies. According to the same IFES survey, a majority of Azerbaijanis (57 percent) tend to have little or no confidence in the police. Azerbaijanis also generally lack information on the judicial system and laws. Seventy-seven percent of Azerbaijanis do not have sufficient information about the operation of the judicial sector to meet their legal needs. Ninety percent do not have any information on the Law on Advocates or the Law on Grants, 81 percent do not have any information on the Law on Public Television, and 72 percent lack information on the Law on the Constitutional Court. The lack of knowledge of these laws implies that most Azerbaijanis are not aware of laws and institutions that may serve them in their day-to-day life, concluded the IFES survey. There is no jury system in Azerbaijan, and almost all court hearings are open for public attendance. Detainees are presumed to be innocent until found guilty, but harassment, intimidation, and evidence gathered under physical pressure are not uncommon. Access to lawyers for defendants is generally respected, but there have been cases when detained individuals were not allowed to speak to their lawyers and were detained longer than allowed or required. This was particularly true among the arrests in connection with the October postelection events in Baku. Although the issue of political prisoners continues to be a problem in Azerbaijan, the situation showed some improvement in 2003, as the government granted amnesty to over 100 prisoners, including Iskender Hamidov, former minister of the interior. However, it refused to free Aliakram Humbatov, leader of the separatist movement in the south of Azerbaijan in 1993, or Rahim Gaziyev, former defense minister, both of whom are on the Council of Europe s top list of political prisoners. The government argues adamantly that these individuals are not political prisoners but criminals. VI. Corruption Corruption remains one of the most problematic issues in Azerbaijan. Bribery and nepotism have intervened in all layers of society from the education system to the workplace to government and continue to hinder the development of the country and the eradication of poverty. More important, bribery and corruption have become the social norm and are therefore not yet widely condemned by the broader society. A growing concern for most people is the increasing gap between the rich and poor and the slow emergence of a middle class. NIT 2004: Page 16