AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OCTOBER Report by Heidi Sødergren

Transcription

1 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OCTOBER 2003 Report by Heidi Sødergren NORDEM Report 06/2004

2 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and (author(s)). NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments, which promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment, reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Gry Kval Series consultants: Hege Mørk, Ingrid K. Ekker, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher(s). ISSN: ISBN: NORDEM Report is available online at:

3 Preface OSCE/ODIHR was invited by the Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan to observe the presidential elections that were to take place on 15 October The International Election Observation Missions (IEOM) was a joint undertaking of the OSCE s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Mr Peter Eicher headed the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission (EOM). 20 long-term observers (LTOs) were deployed in the field five weeks before election day. Some 500 short-term observers (STOs) were in charge of observing on election day throughout the country. There was a total of 5,000 polling stations in 125 constituencies. The international observers visited about 50 % of the polling stations. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights recruited the Norwegian observers to the mission through their NORDEM stand-by-force and on the request of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Three STOs - Ingebjørg Tønnesen, Berit Lindemann and Torbjørn Hustoft and one LTO Heidi Sødergren (deployed to Baku) were sent to Azerbaijan to observe the 2003 Presidential Elections. Upon the request of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, this report evaluates the presidential election in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The information in the report is mainly based on observations done by the Norwegian short-term and long-term observers who observed the election under the auspices of the OSCE/ODIHR. The OSCE/ODIHR s Preliminary Statement of Findings and Conclusions is included in the appendices. NORDEM/ the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo June 2004

4 Contents Introduction...1 Political background...2 The Legislative Framework...4 The Electoral Administration...9 Voter Registration Candidate Registration The Election Campaign The Media Observation on Polling Day The Review of Complaints Process Conclusions and Recommendations Appendices... 22

5 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Introduction Since Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, seven elections, including the presidential elections on 15 October 2003 and three referenda, have been held. OSCE/ODIHR has observed all elections and referenda since 1993, 1 apart from the Constitutional referendum in Although the election administration has considerably improved the electoral preparatory phase, generally none of the elections arranged have been in compliance with international standards for democratic elections. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM s final report from the parliamentary elections in 2000 concluded that: The elections marked some progress over previous occasions, in particular in the preparatory phase and enhanced political pluralism, although the overall process fell short of international standards for democratic elections. The OSCE/ODIHR final report from the presidential elections in 2003 concluded that: The 15 October 2003 presidential election in the Republic of Azerbaijan failed to meet OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. The overall process reflected a lack of sufficient political commitment to implement a genuine election process. Overall, the presidential election was a missed opportunity for a credible democratic process. Progress toward democratic elections in Azerbaijan will now depend first and foremost on the political will of the authorities. The Norwegian long-term observer (LTO) and short-term observers (STOs) who observed the presidential elections on 15 October to a great extent support the critical view of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM). The ODIHR EOM and the Council of Europe were the main international actors that were involved in the elections. They concluded on 16 October that the legislative framework served as a sufficient framework for holding the elections, but unfortunately the Azerbaijani election administration fell short in implementing the electoral code. 2 The voter lists were not accurate and created immense problems on election day, as many citizens were not on the final list. The inaccuracy of the voter lists also opened up for manipulation. Although eight presidential candidates ran in the elections, thereby giving the voters a genuine choice, the registration of candidates also fell short of international standards. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) opposition candidate Rasul Guliyev was refused registration based on unclear charges on economic misconduct. Incumbent President Heydar Aliyev and his son Ilham Alyiev dominated the pre-election campaign, both in terms of media coverage and number of meetings. The opposition was discriminated against as the authorities often turned down requests for meetings. Especially outdoor public meetings were frequently refused. As most of the media is controlled by the ruling regime, Heydar Aliyev and his son were given considerably more campaigning time. 1 The year Heydar Aliyev came to power. 2 Statement on 16 October, Baku.

6 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS However, election day proceeded with only minor problems during opening and voting. Unfortunately, the counting and tabulation was characterised by massive fraud, and protocols from some 600 polling stations (out of about 5200) were deemed invalid. All this seriously challenged the official results. Moreover, the elections were held in a political context where the Soviet legacy and Soviet practices are still evident. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a possible result of Soviet (and Russian) manipulation of internal ethnic division, has left a very visible mark on the politics of the past decade. In the beginning of the 1990s, two presidents had to resign when the tide of the war against Armenia turned against Azerbaijan. The issue of Nagorno-Karbakh was also a hot topic during these elections, and citizens and foreign actors will now look to president Ilham Aliyev to see how he will handle the conflict in the future. Furthermore, Azerbaijan s geopolitical position and vast reserves of oil and gas have caught the attention of western powers and the Russian Federation, who to a lesser or greater extent have an interest in influencing the political course of Azerbaijan. It was in the above framework the 2003 elections were held. This report will elaborate in further detail on the observations and findings of the Norwegian observers and uses as its basis the ODIHR EOM s Final Report. The EOM findings will be supplemented by comments and facts based on the observations of the author of this report, who was deployed to Baku as an LTO. The following aspects of the election will be covered: the political context; the legislative framework; voter registration; candidate registration; and the election campaign and observation on election day (by the Norwegian STOs). In addition, the report will present concluding remarks, as well as recommendations provided by Berit Lindeman, who as a legal expert has supplemented the report with her analysis of the election legislation. Political background Post-Soviet Azerbaijan went through a period of serious turmoil during the early 1990s. In 1993 Heydar Aliyev s seized power. Critics blame the current opposition for the chaos in the country during those years, as well as for the disastrous outcome of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The former KGB general Heydar Aliyev played an important role in bringing about a ceasefire, stability and slight economic improvement to the country. This has lasted until today. The takeover of power by his son Ilham Aliyev as a result of the 2003 election may represent a change to Azerbaijani politics, but is still a continuation of the Aliyev-dynasty ruling. The development of political parties and movements has been slow in Azerbaijan, but as in many other Soviet successors states a broad movement, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), emerged towards the end of the 1980s. Etibar Mammedov, a historian from the University of Baku, who was also one of the contesters in the 2003 presidential election, was one of the main founders of the APF. Moscow did not welcome the initiative, but allegedly due to Jeltsin s wish to remove the Communist Party s first secretary in

7 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Azerbaijan, Abdurraham Vezirov, he did not take any action 3. The goal of the APF was independence and to endorse closer ties with Turkey. First secretary Vezirov was removed in 1990 in connection with heavy anti-armenian clashes in Baku. Ayaz Mutalibov was duly elected as president. Two years later, in 1992, the parliament with extensive support of the APF, forced Mutalibov to resign mainly due to the losses in the conflict with Armenia. The APF took control over the government, and presidential elections were held in June The APF candidate, Abulfazl Elcibey, was elected president. The position of the APF was drastically weakened during 1992 and However, many political parties emerged in this period. Since the government to a large extent controlled the media the opposition enjoyed limited influence, 4 as the current opposition does today. President Elchiby ruled the country for two years, and as with the former president the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh triggered his removal. Armenia was in 1993 enjoying increased support from Russia, mainly as a result of Azerbaijan s refusal to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the tide of the war turned against Azerbaijan. A military commander, Surat Husseinov, who had been sacked by president Elcibey after the Azerbaijani military retreat, challenged the power of the president and turned his troops towards Baku. Allegedly, Heydar Aliyev was responsible for this move. The speaker of parliament, Isa Gambar, who is currently the chairman of the major opposition party Musavat, resigned. A few days later Heydar Aliyev was appointed as Isa Gambar s replacement. At that moment Azerbaijan was marked by the war against Armenia, a shattered economy and a deeply divided society. Heydar Aliyev was elected president in October A ceasefire with Armenia was signed in 1994 and marked a change in the tense situation, but the ceasefire did not solve the conflict. Heydar Aliyev stayed in power until a few days before the elections, when he withdrew his candidacy due to poor health. In addition to the inherited interethnic and territorial disputes and Soviet mentality among politicians, which all has upset the political development for almost two decades, Azerbaijan is facing a difficult economic and political transition to market economy and democracy. Azerbaijan has however an economic potential in its abundant gas and oil resources. However, about 600,000 refugees are prevented from returning to the occupied territories and are living under difficult conditions. A large portion of the population lives below the poverty line. Local and international human right organisations 5 report on severe violations of human rights and some are claiming that the situation has deteriorated in the realm of the presidential elections. In light of the elections held the last decade, and especially taking into account the 2003 presidential election, it might be difficult to assess democratic transition as positive. Nevertheless, taking into account that 15 years ago free and fair elections did not exist in the former Soviet Union, it is after all a step in the right direction. 3 Hunter 1997, in Taras and Bremmer New States New Politics, Cambridge University Press 4 Hunter 1997, in Taras and Bremmer New States New Politics, Cambridge University Press 5 E.g., Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

8 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Regarding Azerbaijan s geopolitical position, Russia, the United States and Europe are external actors that have come to pay more attention to the Transcaucasian region (of which Azerbaijan is a part) after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kleveman (2003) 6 concluded in his book that the great powers are playing a dirty game leaving blood and tears in their tracks. What is at stake is access to the region s oil and energy resources, allegedly some of the world s largest untapped reserves of energy. 7 Thus, since the late 1980s a large number of countries have had an interest in the region s political development. The United States and Russia are apparently viewing the region as an important oil and gas supplier 8. The pipeline issue has thus become a sensitive political issue that is affecting the political agenda in all the countries in question, including Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev pursued a western-oriented policy and many lucrative oil contracts were signed during his time in power. Furthermore, the US has been pushing for a westward pipeline from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey that is now being built. Russia, on her side, is struggling to maintain influence in the region and is looking with unease at the United States increased influence in her backyard. Russia also remains reluctant to the United States increasing presence in the region as part of the fight against terrorism. Both Europe and the United States have an interest in keeping the region stable, at the moment perhaps at the cost of democratisation and human rights, some critics would claim. Violations of human rights during Aliyev s regime have been extensive and well documented. All elections have been characterised by fraud and have generally not met international standards for democratic elections. During the 2003 presidential elections the opposition frequently complained that western actors did not criticise the ruling regime enough, and claimed that oil companies and their states preferred the current regime instead of a regime change that in their view might spur further instability 9. Supporters of the ruling regime on their side claimed that the opposition, which represents the same candidates that ruled during the chaotic period in the beginning of the 1990s, is not capable of ruling the country. If the current opposition would come into power, the current improved situation would deteriorate, supporters of the ruling regime claim. The Legislative Framework By Berit Lindeman The main sources of legislation relevant to the elections are the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (adopted by referendum in 1995, and amended by referendum in 6 Kleveman (2003) The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, Atlantic Monthly Press. 7 Kleveman (2003) 8 Special Report: The Caucasus. The Economist 29 November This argument came about often in discussions the team had with NGOs and representatives of political parties.

9 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ) and the Electoral Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan (adopted on 27 May 2003). Other laws with relevance are the Law on Mass Media, the Law on Political Parties, the Law on Freedom of Assembly, the Law on Citizenship, and the Law on Public Associations. The presidential election was governed under a new unified electoral code. The government of Azerbaijan initiated the revision of the electoral legislation as part of the effort to improve the functioning of the democratic institutions of Azerbaijan as made conditional by the accession to the Council of Europe in January The new electoral code was essentially a compilation and revision of existing laws on presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections, as well as law on conduct of referenda, but many additions and amendments were made. The electoral code was drafted with the assistance of IFES/Azerbaijan, 11 Council of Europe/Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, 12 who made detailed comments to the proposals made by the Government of Azerbaijan. The electoral code, adopted on May 27, 2003 has to a large extent incorporated these recommendations. The electoral code is a detailed framework for the conduct of elections, and overall the code meets international standards for electoral legislation and could be a sufficient basis for the conduct of free and fair elections. Election commissions A substantial deficiency in the current legislation relates to the composition of electoral commissions at all levels. The electoral administration has long been an issue of controversy, and the challenge has been to agree on a system of composition of the electoral commissions that can be considered impartial, or at least politically balanced without an undue influence from the government party. Unfortunately, despite repeated demands from oppositional political parties, local NGOs and recommendations from international experts, the government refused to change the composition of the commissions. A last minute intermediate solution was found for the elections taking place before next parliamentary elections, 13 where a wider range of political parties than stated by the code were given the opportunity to propose candidates for election commissions. The solution was not sufficient to make the election commissions appear politically balanced. Bearing in mind that the intentions of the electoral code to a large 10 Opinion # 222 (2000) Azerbaijan s application for membership of the Council of Europe, followed up by Council of Europe s Resolution 1305 (2002) on Honouring the obligations and commitments by Azerbaijan Joint Final Assessment of the Electoral code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 13 A main problem of the electoral administration is that the composition of the election commission is based on previous parliamentary election results. However, as the last parliamentary elections have never been recognised by the opposition, the opposition would also not accept the list of parties eligible to propose members to the election commissions.

10 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS extent are implemented by the election commissions, both on a central and local level, it is particularly regrettable that it was not possible to find a solution on the basis with a broad political consensus. Voter lists Voter lists are now permanent and updated annually, but large groups of voters are still included in the voter lists without sufficient control, e.g., internally displaced persons (IDPs), military personnel, prisoners and patients in institutions. The electoral code has not solved this problem. The fact that the voter lists proved far from accurate on election day signals that voter lists in the future need to be compiled with all possible care by independent officials. Neither has the electoral code solved the problem of constituencies for internally displaced persons. These voters are still registered in constituencies in occupied areas on an ad hoc basis, and they vote in specially designated polling stations in compact IDP areas where they actually live. The electoral districts should be clearly outlined, preferably by law, alternatively by regulations adopted in a fully transparent manner. Technical preparations A number of improvements have been made to the legislation. Candidate registration procedures have been made more transparent. 14 A number of additions have been made to increase the transparency of the election administration by keeping minutes of meetings and publishing decisions within clear deadlines. As election fraud has proved to be practised commonly in previous elections, many provisions were included as technical safeguards against fraud. Ballot papers and protocols for election result are numbered and are printed and distributed under strict control. In addition, the protocols are printed on non-carbonated paper so that irregular amendments to the official results after completion of the protocol may be traced more easily. The ballot boxes are transparent in order to prevent ballot box stuffing. Finally, the ballot paper must be put into an envelope upon voting, another technicality to avoid ballot stuffing. Domestic observers The limitations in the access of observers have been another issue of controversy. According to the new code, both domestic and international observers have now wide access to follow the procedures at all levels of the process. However, the electoral code runs counter to regulations in the NGO law, according to which domestic public associations (NGOs) cannot be accredited as observers if the NGO receives foreign funding. In practice, members of NGOs had to register individually as citizens - an unnecessary and cumbersome procedure to both observers and election administration. 14 The conditions for considering a petition signature in support of one s candidacy has been clarified, the candidate has the right to be notified of the reasons for rejections and an access to rectify minor mistakes in the registration documents has been secured. In addition, it is now possible to submit a voluntary deposit to secure registration in case the candidate fails to submit the sufficient number of signatures.

11 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS In order to secure fully transparent elections procedures, domestic NGOs should be able to provide trained observers. Campaigning Political parties and candidates have the right to hold rallies and to run a campaign both under the Constitution and under the electoral code. Moreover, the electoral code calls upon both the election commissions and the authorities to assist registered candidates and political parties in holding rallies and to create equal conditions for all candidates and political parties in their electoral campaign. However, another law, the Law on Freedom of Assembly leaves it to the ExCom 15 to decide the conditions for holding rallies. Regrettably, these conditions were not applied equally for all candidates, another example that shows that the implementation undermined the intentions of the legislation. Implementation of the legislation in the field The ODIHR EOM is of the opinion that the electoral code provides a comprehensive framework for the conduct of elections and referenda. The code meets international standards and best practices in most respects but the law s success is determined by its impartial, neutral and consistent application. The EOM noted both improvements and shortcomings concerning the content of the electoral code and the implementation of it. Major improvements include: A number of helpful safeguards against fraud: the use of transparent ballot boxes, numbered ballots and result protocols, and envelopes for ballots; mandatory posting of precinct-level protocols at constituency election commissions; and a prohibition of any persons other than voters, commission members, accredited observers and the police (if requested by the Chairman) at polling stations on election day; The code also stipulates that detailed election results by polling station be published within forty-eight hours of the election; and The expansion of the rights of observers. 16 Major shortcomings include: The composition of election commissions. Although the EOM several times tried to influence the CEC to change the composition of the election administration, 15 The Executive Authority ( ExCom ) is the Government s executive branch on a regional level. 16 However, this was undermined by the Law on Public Unions and Foundations, which prohibits domestic organizations that receive more than 30% of their budget from foreign State funding from observing elections. As a result, a number of domestic NGOs were barred from observing the election

12 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Parliament instead adopted a formula similar to the one used in the previous law, which in 2000 proved inadequate for the conduct of fair elections; 17 A provision was inserted stating that, should the President die or become incapacitated, early presidential elections should be conducted within three months. As the election campaign began, and the condition of President Heydar Aliyev s health remained shrouded in mystery for the electorate, there was confusion about the possible consequences of the provision. On 15 August, however, the Constitutional Court sensibly resolved the issue, ruling that the provision should not apply within three months of a scheduled election; The complaints and appeals process; In a presidential election, voters may sign a signature list in support of only one candidate; The electoral code is an exceptionally long, complex and repetitive document that contains internal inconsistencies; and The system for applying to hold political rallies was not adequately implemented. Despite the Constitution s guarantee of a broad freedom of assembly with a seemingly formalistic notification process, the Law on the Freedom of Assembly creates a system that gives almost unlimited authority to the local executive bodies without any requirement to apply equal conditions for candidates or political parties. The LTO team had both positive and negative experiences with the implementation of the legislation in the field, and generally goes along with the EOM s analysis outlined above. The team had day-to-day contact with the Constituency Election Commissions (ConECs) in the field and how they responded to the legal framework varied. On the technical side, most of the 17 ConECs the team was in charge of were impressively equipped with offices boasting computers, phones and proper working space for the commission members. Election-specific material arrived on time and protocols and ballots were safely guarded by the ConECs. There was, however, a substantial delay in making the voters lists 18 public as they were displayed only about a week before election day. Although most ConEcs accepted applications from domestic and political observers to be accredited on election day, the team received several complaints from citizens who claimed their applications had been turned down. The ConEcs in question on their side stated that they had not rejected any observers. These matters were never solved, but generally far too many observers were present on election day, in some cases up to 30, making the polling stations crowded and disorderly. 17 In the Law on Approval and Entry into Force of the Unified Electoral code, passed on the same day as the Code, the government put in place for all elections through 2005 a CEC composition that heavily favours the governing party and its supporters. The imbalance in membership had serious ramifications on the operation of, and confidence in, the CEC 18 Article 48.1

13 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The Electoral Administration The EOM expressed serious concerns about the composition of the various election commissions. In practice, this implied that the governing party and its supporters had a decisive, two-thirds majority, which was sufficient to pass resolutions and overrule any objections made by opposition members. 19 The team noticed this especially on lower level commissions. It became clear that representatives of the non-partisan/independent and the Communist Party consistently supported the ruling party - the New Azerbaijan Party (YAP). Due to the clear-cut division between the ruling regime and the opposition within nearly all ConECs, the atmosphere in some commissions was rather tense. The Chairman s appearance, whose party affiliation is always YAP, is somewhat decisive in this respect. In some districts in Baku, the ConECs chairmen were supposedly in entire control of the work of these constituencies. Some decisions were seemingly taken without much involvement of other (usually opposition) commission members. However, efforts to exercise democracy were visible in certain areas. Generally, the tone among commission members was often better in Baku s rural areas. Most polling stations and their boards were located in public buildings - the majority in schools and cultural houses. In the beginning of the pre-election camping, on display on Precinct Election Commisson (PEC) buildings were large number of posters of incumbent president Heydar Aliyev. After his withdrawal, his son Ilham Aliyev replaced him. Directors of schools often chaired the six-member PECs and members supporting the ruling party dominated PECs. PECs, as most of ConECs, maintained sufficient technical levels. The voter lists were displayed in most polling stations between 20 and 22 November and were thus available to the public. To the team s knowledge, few citizens had requested to be included or to be deleted from the lists within the AoR before election day. A considerable number of persons were, however, asking for de-registration cards, mainly IDPs. The team had little contact with municipal powers within the AoR since they played a minor role in the elections. Moreover, the municipalities are generally considered to have limited power at the local level. Another regional body - the Executive Authority (ExCom) - is regarded to be the most powerful local public body, whose heads are directly installed by the president of Azerbaijan. Twelve executive authorities are situated in Baku, each possessing a large administration and number of employees. According to the electoral code, the executive authorities have a minor role in the elections. The body is nevertheless visible in issues such as allocation of location for posting pre-election material 20 and in the allocation of venues suitable for political party 19 The election was administered by a three-tier election administration: the CEC, 125 Constituency Election Commissions (ConECs), and a Precinct Election Commission (PEC) for each of the 5,146 polling stations. The CEC was established on 13 June and was composed of 15 members elected by the Parliament according to a complex formula Article 87.6

14 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS meetings. 21 Representatives of the opposition and NGOs claimed that the executive authorities role in the election process is extensive in the entire country. Voter Registration The registration of voters was completed before the arrival of the EOM. Accordingly, the EOM was seriously concerned about the accuracy of the voter lists. In accordance with the election law, local authorities compile the voter lists. Citizens are included in the list for the precinct where they have resided for the last six months out of the twelve last months before the elections. The following concerns were voiced by the EOM: A confusing CEC instruction issued on 15 July provided for posting the voter lists on the PEC notice boards just 25 days prior to election day, well under the 65 days legal limit. When displayed, the voter lists did not include the addresses 22 - making it almost impossible for political parties and difficult for individuals to check the list. The CEC took a unanimous and compromise decision to allow, by PEC decision, names to be added to the voter lists until 24 hours before the opening of the polls (rather than by a court order, as required by the electoral code). 23 In accordance with Article of the electoral code, some positive steps have been made towards the creation of a central register to be maintained by the CEC s Information Centre. In the field, the team experienced widespread confusion over the procedure of registration of voters. 24 The lack of clarity regarding registration procedures and the late posting of the voter lists at the polling stations created unnecessary disturbances on election day that could have been avoided. Candidate Registration The EOM carefully reviewed the cases of several candidates refused at the nomination stage. The EOM concluded that this important element of the election process was flawed, thus limiting the right of citizens to stand for office, in contravention of OSCE 21 Article 86.2 and Article This decision had positive and negative effects. Voters could be added to the voter lists and take part in the election. On the other hand the decision could have resulted in intimidation voters in 12% and more than 100 voters in over 6% of the 1,234 polling stations visited by EOM observers. 24 Article 45, 46 and 47.

15 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS commitments and other international standards. There were twelve registered candidates at the start of the campaign, of which four withdrew before 5 October, leaving eight on the ballot for election day. 25 The following eight candidates contested on election day: Candidate Position Party affiliation Ilham Aliyev Isa Gambar Etibar Mamedov Lala Shovket Hadjiyeva Ilyaz Ismaylov Sabir Rustamhamli Gudrat Hasanguliyev Hafiz Hajiyev Son of former President Heydar Aliyev Chairman of the Musavat Party Chairman of the Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP) Former chairwoman of the Liberal Party Chairman of Adalat (Justice) Party Chairman of Civil Solidarity Party Chairman of the unregistered party Popular Front Chairman of the Modern Musavat Party New Azerbaijan Party/ initiative group of Nachichevan voters Musavat Party. Joint candidate for Musavat and Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) ANIP. Joint candidate for APFP and ANIP Nominated by National Unity - a citizens initiative group Adalat The Civil Solidarity Party Nominated by the Popular Front The Modern Musavat Party The electoral code provides for refusals of candidacies on the basis of grounded decisions. No clear and specific grounds were provided for the denials; the CEC decisions merely cited general provisions in the electoral code that incorporate many possible reasons for denial. This lack of clarity compromised the ability of the denied candidates to appeal effectively to the judiciary. It also appears that the procedure for notifying applicants of errors in their applications was not always observed, despite a clear legislative intent for candidates to be provided with an opportunity to correct technical errors in their applications. Substantive reasons for refusal put forward during 25 Thirty candidates initially applied for nomination; of these, 11 were rejected by the CEC. Of the remaining 19, one did not apply for the next stage of the process formal registration and one passed away a day after submitting his registration documents. This left 17 candidates formally nominated, of whom 8 were refused registration based on an insufficient number of valid signatures. Three of these paid a monetary registration deposit equivalent to US$33,000 in lieu of the required number of signatures.

16 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS CEC discussion of the cases were not persuasive were not always in accordance with the law. The courts did not provide an effective remedy to persons denied registration. The Election Campaign The EOM concluded that overall, the authorities failed to create equal conditions for all candidates during the pre-election campaign. Moreover, the campaign was characterized by uncertainty, due to the lengthy illness of president Heydar Aliyev. Despite his absence from the country and the lack of any public appearances, he was the official candidate of the ruling YAP. Heydar Aliyev was regarded as the leading candidate during most of the campaign. On 2 October he withdrew his candidacy in favour of his son, Ilham Aliyev. 26 Only a short time before the elections and after lengthy negotiations did the opposition manage to agree upon two candidates for the election. The Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP) leader Ali Kerimli withdrew his candidacy in favour of Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP) Etibar Mamedov. ADP leader Rasul Guliyev, who was denied registration as a candidate, endorsed Musavat Party candidate Isa Gambar. However, several other well know personalities remained on the ballot, including one woman, Lala Shovket Hadjiyeva. The field of eight candidates provided voters with the potential for a genuine choice. Nevertheless, the EOM noted the following: The political atmosphere was sharply polarized among the candidates and parties; The overall tone of the campaign tended to be negative and even insulting; Posters of Heydar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev received privileged placement and were by far the most visible; Many opposition posters were systematically vandalized early in the campaign, but in its final weeks posters were left largely in peace; Instances of violence were a serious concern during the campaign; 27 There was a pattern of low-level violence against opposition supporters by police, local authorities and pro-government groups; By presidential decree, Ilham Aliyev had been named Prime Minister in August, but he served in this capacity for less than a week before taking a leave of absence to campaign, as required by the electoral code. Yet, throughout the election period, Ilham Aliyev continued to perform many official functions as Prime Minister, participating in the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States, addressing the UN General Assembly, receiving official visitors in Baku and performing other ceremonial and substantive duties. Two minor registered candidates withdrew in favour of Ilham Aliyev. 27 Most notably, during four separate rallies in Baku, Masalli and Lenkoran on 21 September, EOM observers witnessed police and pro-government provocateurs assault opposition members. The Prosecutor opened an investigation into official misconduct, but as of election day, no charges had been filed. Later in the campaign period, the level of violence appeared to subside and police were notably more restrained. However, further violence did occur at campaign events, including in Saatli and Devechi.

17 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The EOM investigated and confirmed many reports of detentions of opposition political activists; Public employees or their family members were threatened to leave their jobs if they supported opposition candidates or attended opposition political rallies; 29 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), university students, and the staff of medical institutions and government administrative structures felt pressure to support the governing party candidates. Civil society activists and journalists also faced intimidation; Numerous restrictions on political rallies compromised freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; Local executive authorities routinely denied permission to opposition parties to congregate in central outdoor locations; and The EOM verified many allegations that public sector employees, teachers, students, and others were instructed to attend pro-government events, while they were discouraged from taking part in opposition ones. The team concluded in their final report that the political campaign was not conducted in an environment that assured freedom of expression, assembly and association. Messrs Heydar dominated the pre-election campaign in Baku both in terms of an extensive poster campaign and in the media. Although opposition posters were visible within the LTOs AoR in Baku, they could never compete with the ruling regime. Moreover, in the beginning of the campaign, the team frequently observed that opposition posters were ripped down, but this took place in a lesser degree during the last two weeks before the elections. Furthermore, the activity of political branches in the districts of Baku was limited. Nevertheless, most major political parties of presidential candidates had representatives at the district level, e.g., the ruling YAP, Musavat, APFP, ANIP and DPA. ANIP had appointed representatives for each ConEC. Few of the district branches had proper office space, and if they had any at all, it was often of low standard. YAP and ANIP were apparently slightly better organised than other political parties. Generally during the team s meetings, no specific party program issues were mentioned; the opposition was mainly interested in blackmailing the ruling regime and vice versa. Political ideas, ideology or visions were rare. The opposition constantly complained about the ruling party and their alleged dominance in the pre-election campaign. Several times the team observed serious use of violence against political activists during political meetings in Baku. On several occasions the police and the forces of the riot police under the command of the Ministry of Interior heavily targeted the opposition. Opposition parties such as Musavat, ANIP and ADP were often deprived from holding political meetings and demonstrations. 30 When meetings were allowed to take place, they were mostly held indoors and rarely could more than 500 persons attend. However, 28 Periods of detention appeared to lessen substantially in the final weeks of the campaign generally to hours rather than days but the pattern of apparently politically-motivated detentions continued. 29 While difficult to verify, the EOM looked into many cases and assessed that the charges were credible and constituted a countrywide pattern of grave intimidation. Schoolteachers in particular appeared to be under pressure in many regions. Shopkeepers were often fearful of displaying opposition posters. 30 Article 86

18 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS a unified opposition arranged a huge public gathering with some 20,000 participants just a few days before the elections. A huge number of riot police fully equipped was present, but fortunately no clashes took place that day. Furthermore, the police attacked members of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party as they every week would demonstrate peacefully and publicly against the Central Election Commission and its decision to not accept Mr Rasul Guliyev candidacy for president. 31 Moreover, serious clashes between supporters of Musavat and the police, including men in civilian clothing who took orders from the police, took place on 21 September in Yasamal district, Baku. An unknown number of men were taken to a hospital with minor injuries. During the uprisings on the election night 15 October and on 16 October in Baku city, again armed forces were used to calm down the situation. Many persons were taken to hospitals and an unknown number of persons died in the clashes. 32 The LTOs could not easily judge the extent of provocations from either side during the clashes. The head of the ODIHR EOM - Mr Eicher - several times pointed out that use of such force during an election campaign is a clear violation of international standards and not acceptable. He stated also that campaigning, meetings and demonstrations are perfectly common in a democratic society. Interlocutors in the state apparatus promised to look into the matters, but improvements were scarce. Some days after the elections hundreds of members of opposition parties were arrested mainly due to the riots on 15 and 16 October. Some persons were also arrested because they refused to sign falsified election protocols. The Media The EOM concluded that the media s biased coverage of the elections demonstrated that Azerbaijan lacks a strong and independent media able to provide sufficient, balanced information to enable the electorate to make a well-informed choice. The EOM monitored five television stations and seven newspapers, using qualitative andquantitative analysis, from September 16 through October 13. The following media outlets were monitored: Azeri State TV (state owned), Lider TV, ANS TV, Space TV and ATV (all private). 33 Furthermore, four state-sponsored newspapers (Azerbaijan, Halq, Bakinskiy Rabochiy and Respublika) and three private newspapers (Zerkalo, Echo and Yeni Musavat) were monitored. Media coverage of the campaign was characterized by an overwhelming tendency of state-owned and government-oriented media to exhibit an overt bias in favour of the Prime Minister Ilham Aliyev and President Heydar Aliyev. Opposition candidates were mentioned sparingly and often in negative terms. In the last four weeks of the campaign, Azerbaijan allocated 68% of its political and election coverage to Ilham Aliyev; Halq 31 These demonstrations were not authorised. 32 According to various sources, between 1 and 4 people were killed. 33 Television is by far the most important source of news in Azerbaijan.

19 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS and Bakinskiy Rabochiy each allocated him 82%; and Respublika allocated him 80%. 34 Leading opposition candidates were largely ignored. The media situation was further aggravated by systematic harassment and intimidation of journalists, including physical and verbal attacks, detentions, life-threatening phone calls and editorial interference akin to censorship. On 8 September, police attacked several journalists outside the main Baku police station, where they were gathered to perform their duties. The team did not monitor the media situation in Baku and has thus no comments. Observation on Polling Day The following election day reports are from the Norwegian STOs. Berit Lindeman, Ingebjørg Tønnessen and Thorbjørn Hustoft were deployed to Baku, Kyurdamir and Aghbajedi respectively. Election Day Observation Report from STO Berit Lindeman General information The STO team was deployed to Baku where it conducted observation in the Sabayil district. The team visited seven polling stations, of which one was situated in the Bayil Detention Centre. Here the team observed the opening. Observation of polling The opening was generally well administered, although the commission members failed to count the ballot papers received in the presence of the observers. The voting in the detention centre Bayil (PEC # 27) was marked by the fact that all prison inmates were called out to vote cell by cell, and that without exception all inmates voted. 35 There were in general few irregularities in the voting procedure in the polling stations observed. In all polling stations there was a high number of observers, representing all candidates, and they were in most cases allowed to observe the processes without interference. Tensions rose when it became clear that many voters were not included in the voter lists and that they contrary to previous procedures could register only by appealing to the District Court. These episodes involved voters, observers from the opposition, commission members and in one case, also the police who removed protesting observers. Armed police were visible in the vicinity of several of the polling stations, except for one case where their presence had been required in the polling station. Only two cases of family voting were observed. A woman who was denied to vote because she did not have an acceptable identification card claimed she had come to vote only because her employer had demanded it. In another polling station an elderly woman was denied voting because 34 Article According to the CEC web-site, there was a 100% voter turnout at this PEC. (

20 AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS she had several passports that did not belong to her. She complained, not because she herself was denied to vote, but because she would not get paid the money she had been promised. In all ordinary polling stations visited, there were obvious inaccuracies in the voter lists, apparently more than in previous elections. The inaccuracies could be observed in two ways: The numbers of voters on the supplementary voter lists were extensive, in one case observed (PS # 23) as many as 184 names had been added in handwriting only one day prior to election day. As far as the observers were able to determine, the names added in handwriting did not fully coincide with the names in the additional lists received from the Housing Committee. Additionally, there was a printed list of 65 voters, added within the deadline. The inaccuracies could also be observed by the many complaints from voters who had not been included in the voter lists, and who claimed that they had not been aware of the new legislation prohibiting the additional registration on election day. Remarkably many of those voters not included in the voter lists the observers talked to, had been registered in the precinct for many years. Several of the plaintiffs the team talked to claimed to have been visited by individuals who apparently were carrying out a survey, mapping out voters political preferences before the elections. Those who had stated they would vote for an opposition candidate had allegedly not been included in the voter list. In order to assist the high number of voters who needed to go to the District Court for registration, PEC # 23 arranged a bus for the voters to take them there. The team visited the Sabaiyl District Court around noon on election day, and the court had already received more than 100 applications from voters not on the voter lists to be included in the lists. The voters were waiting up to three hours for the court s decisions. Only at the polling station in Bayil detention centre did the LTOs not observe any inaccuracies in the voter list. According to information received directly from the Constituency Election Commission (ConEC) # 29 the day before election day the Executive Authority (ExCom) 36 issued orders to the ConEC that video cameras should be placed in all the territory s precincts. In all but two polling stations that the team observed, the cameras were indeed in place. In some cases the cameras were stationary, and pointed in the direction of the ballot box area, in other cases a cameraman was actually walking around among the voters, recording the different steps of the voting procedure. According to the information the LTOs were given, the recordings were the property of the ExCom, and would be handed over to the ExCom office after the elections. The practice of filming the electoral procedures violates the secrecy of the vote and may be intimidating to voters. The fact that the Executive Authority would have the videos in its possession makes the filming even more questionable: According to the electoral code, the Executive Authority is explicitly prohibited from interfering in the electoral processes. Apparently, the line of command is still far from clarified among the lower level electoral commissions, and orders contradicting the electoral code and CEC instructions were issued by other authorities. 36 The Executive Authority ( ExCom ) is the Government s executive branch on regional level. There is also an elected local government, not under direct influence by the central Government.