Post-truth and Religious Sentiments that Change the Political Landscape and Its Outcome in 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

Transcription

1 Post-truth and Religious Sentiments that Change the Political Landscape and Its Outcome in 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election RikeElviera 1, Eriyanto 2 Faculty of Political and Science, Communication Management, University of Indonesia 1 (rike.amru@gmail.com) Faculty of Political and Science, Communication Management, University of Indonesia 2 (eriyanto09@ui.ac.id) Abstract Of the many direct regional head elections in Indonesia, the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election is one of the most interesting elections to observe. In this party of democracy, Jakarta citizens are split and polarized between rational voters and emotional / primordial voters. In the election, religious sentiments become one of the decisive factors for voters. Throughout the campaign period leading up to the election day, post-truth has also become a phenomenon found in this boisterous event. The phenomenon of post-truth, hoax, negative campaign-black campaign, and also religious sentiments are used in this paper to examine the paradox of democratization and the change of political landscape and the outcome as well. By taking the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Electionas a case study, this paper also intends to identify the level of rationality of Jakarta voters in determining the choice based on the study of a number of survey agencies. How can an electoral political anomaly occur in the final result of the election compared with the result of each candidates electability? Various survey agencies mentioned that in the second round,the difference of electability between two candidates Basuki Tjahaja Purnama-Djarot Saiful Hidayat (Ahok-Djarot) and Anies Rasyid Baswedan- Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno (Anies-Sandi) would only range from 1-5 percent (1 digit). Meanwhile, based on the quick count results of a number of survey agencies as well as the real count of KPUD Jakarta (Regional Election Comission, Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah), the difference between two pairs of candidate ranged in the number of 15 percent (2 digits), far exceeding the predictions of the survey agencies before the second round of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Electionheld on April 19, Keywords: black campaign, emotional, fake news, hoax, negative campaign, non-rational, post-truth, primordialism, religious sentiments, voting behavior Introduction In the so-called Reform era post-suharto, starting in 2005 Indonesia has commenced the process of decentralized democratization, where election is not only in the presidential election but also in the election of regional heads (pemilihan kepala daerah, pilkada). While it is considered more democratic than the previous New Order era, excesses of such decentralized democracy through negative campaigns black campaigns and hoaxes using ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-group sentiments (known in Indonesian as SARA, which stands for suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan) are mounting. The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was special. Not only did it attract the attention of the citizens in Jakarta, but also those in other parts of the country. As the capital city of the country, Jakarta is indeed under the spotlight. Jakarta has always been the center of attention. Moreover, the 2017 election could be regarded as the most frenzied election in which voters were sharply split. Rational voters have also been markedly discernible from emotional or primordial ones. It was also seen as a test for the levels of rationality of the voters who were ethnically relatively heterogenous. The religious composition, meanwhile, was dominated by Muslim voters by about

2 percent. This could mean that candidates could not win without the support from Muslim voters (Muhtadi, Efek SARA dalam Pilkada DKI Jakarta, 2016). The first round of election began in February 15, 2017, with three pairs of candidates for governor and vice governor: BasukiTjahayaPurnama and Djarot Saiful Hidayat (Ahok-Djarot) as incumbents were challenged by Agus Yudhoyono Sylvia Murni (Agus-Sylvi) and Anies Baswedan Sandiaga Uno (Anies-Sandi). Agus-Sylvi had to leave the race in the second and final round, leaving only the incumbents being challenged by Anies-Sandi. With approval rating as high as 73.4 percent, Ahok-Djarot s thin victory in the first round and their landslide defeat in the final round gave rise to an interesting study. In summary, the results of the election cannot be explained solely by rationality alone (Muhtadi in Kompas, February 21, 2017). According to Muhtadi, the significant predictors in explaining voters behavior here are just ethnic and religious factors. These variables are independent of other factors, including whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with Ahok s performance. Muhtadi further asserts that these primordial factors are also independent, regardless of whether they are highly educated or not. It proves that the voters acknowledged the performance of the incumbent, but their hearts were difficult to accept and choose Ahok (Muhtadi, Efek SARA dalam Pilkada DKI Jakarta, 2016). The shift in political landscape in Jakarta towards the election reached its peak when Ahok became a suspect of a case of blasphemy through his speech in Pramuka Island in Thousand Islands district on September 27, His speech citing Al Maidah 51, a Quranic verse, was considered to be an insult to Islam and many Muslim were offended by it. After the speech was made public (notably by Buni Yani who allegedly posted a slightly edited transcript of the speech in his Facebook page), his electability was slowly falling. It rebounded slightly but never reached its original level. Ahok-Djarot, who was originally predicted to win easily from their challengers, eventually had to surrender. Primordial sentiments were massive ever since the beginning of the first round of campaigns in Negative campaign and black campaign with various hoaxes can be found easily and even massively in Whatsapp Group and in various social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, among others. It appears that we have entered the so-called post-truth era, where information can be very biased and often distanced from objective facts, mainly distributed through the internet and social media. Post-truth is an adjective that means a state that makes emotional attractiveness is more influential in shaping public opinion than actual fact (Iman, Post-truth dan Medsos di Indonesia, 2016). The result of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Electionbecame an interesting study because it showed anomaly compared to other regional head elections in which the level of voters satisfaction is usually directly proportional to the level of electability. Non-rational aspects apparently played a strong role in voters in Jakarta. A number of surveys indicate, Anies-Sandi won because of benefits by religious factors, among others (Tempo, 2017). Then the question is: how does this non-rational (emotional/primordial) aspect be asignificant factor in voting? How can religious sentiments be a powerful and 1437

3 dominant factor for voters? How do religious sentiments, post-truth, hoaxes, negative campaigns-black campaigns contribute to the changing Jakarta s political constellation? Literature Review This literature reviewis based on voters behavior approach. The voters behavior is attempted to examine by linking a series of events in Jakarta throughout the campaign period in mid 2016 to election period in February and April, Voters behavior study states that voters not only base their choices on the aspect of rationality but are also determined by a number of other factors (non-rational) i.e. psychological, sociological and economical. The political condition of a country may influence the choice of individual political behavior. The choicesmade byits citizens may be different if the situation is different.george Marcus (2002) as quoted in Kristi Poerwandari(Poerwandari, 2015) in psychology rubric in Kompas, Sunday, February 8, 2015, reminds that politics is as much about feeling as it is about thinking, so that the political situation can generate strong emotions such as like, hate, sad, happy, angry, or anxious. Psychologists call this condition as hot cognitions (Harsono, 2015). Still quoted inpoerwandari, David Patrick Houghton s book entitled Political Psychology, Situations, Individuals and Cases (Houghton, 2009) also incorporates aspects of emotion that he thinks play an important role in determining political participation of the society as well as political decision-making from the authorities. Certain emotions, such as joy, sadness, anger, and vengeance are judged to lead to information processing that ultimately refers to certain political attitudes and behaviors. Political choices, therefore, are as rational as they are irrational. The religious factor and its influence in the election of the head of government--from president election to regional head election--can be observed in many places and countries. During the campaign period in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, people can see how the discourse on religion and politics is echoed and as if religion and politics are two things that can not be separated. Even in the United States,a country whose democracy history has been developed for so long,politics can not be completely separated from religious influence. One example is the 2004 Presidential Election between George W. Bush (Republican candidate) and John F. Kerry (Democratic candidate). At that time, there was no doubt that religion played an important role. Political analysts called Bush showed himself willing to use religion forcefully to sharpen partisan divisions and highlight his own qualities as a leader, while John F. Kerry and the Democrats faced obstacles in using religious rhetoric, in appealing to religion to underscore his qualities as a leader, and in benefiting from the political organization of religious groups. Religion, this analysis concluded, was at the heart of the campaign (Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, & Green, 2006). The literature shows that religion is a significant factor in the number of voters and that religious affiliation (including religion) in particular has a positive effect on the number of voters (Smith & Walker, 2013). Religion in the political dimension has long been the subject of research by theorists. From a theoretical perspective, scientists of religious and political studies in America make three dimensions in religion, namely belonging, behaving and believing. 1438

4 Belonging refers to affiliation to religious communities, denominations or traditions. Behaving signifies the practice of faith, while believing refers to acceptance on the principle or doctrine of religion (Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001). Religion frequently serves as a predictor of voters behavior. In the US, for example, religiosity, as measured by church attendance, biblical adherence, and biblical literacy, has shown itself to have far superior predictive and explanatory powers in analyzing Presidential choices in modern elections, or at least the 2008 election (Plotkin, 2014). But religiosity will raise as a predictor only when there are issues in which religious values play an important role. In the US, for example, in the issues of abortion or homosexuality, voters use their religious values to determine how these issues were brought up in an election (Gibbs, 2005). Indeed, religiosity is often over-reported. Many people claimed that they are religious to surveys out of public expectations of them being so (Leege, 1995). There are ways to improve the objectivity of surveys about religiosity, however, that may be able to reflect the facts more objectively(bader & Roger, 2014). In Indonesia, since the first election in 1955, many political researchers have argued that religious orientation (which belongs to a large umbrella of culture ) has been a major predictor of elections in Indonesia (read: party, since at that time there was no presidential and local elections directly).liddle and Mujani (Liddle & Mujani, 2007) at least noted political scientists who mentioned this, for example: Feith 1962; Lev 1967; Liddle 1970; Emmerson 1976; Crouch 1978; Effendy 2003, although this religious orientation argument got resistance from Clifford Geertz (Geertz, 1960) which precisely puts forward the aspect of the four variants of Javanese Islam: animist abang, orthodoxsantri--tend to be conservative or traditionalist and modernist, and a bit inclined to Hindu culture, priyayi. Geertz s religion category also has class elements. But the Geertzian paradigm applies only to Javanese ethnicity which amounts to half of the national population. But political scientists quickly generalize it to all parts of Indonesia (Liddle & Mujani, 2007). King (King, 2003)who examines Indonesia politics of post-suharto continues to emphasize the influence of religious orientation to compare the outcomes of the 1955 election and the 1999 election. The main conclusion: there is continuity between the 1955 and 1999 elections: the gap between the abangan party and the santri; and the inter-santrigap, the traditionalist santri and the modernist santri. Although in different elections there are different main determinants of voting behavior, religious factors have their own roles and contributions in every election in Indonesia (Liddle & Mujani, 2007). In political communication science, process and decision of a voter to make his choice in a particular candidate or party is not simple. Moreover, the world of politics is increasingly complex and media information sources have been very diverse, both mass media and social media. In addition, the level of people education is also one factor that makes the process of choosing more complex today. Increasingly higher levels of education and an adequate source of information have led to a more independent society in politics choice (Inglehart, 1990). Although the ability of the public to receive and process information becomes the basis of making choices, some academics see that 1439

5 the influence of politicians who direct the political goals of society still greatly influences voter behavior (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993). Perspective and political behavior of a person is not innate but how he learns and processes in understanding the political point of view. Political experts call this a political socialization, a process of development in which a person accepts his or her political orientation and behavioral pattern. For some people, political socialization begins as a child and continues into adulthood. In every process of learning, political socialization is a process of interaction between learners and a number of elements within their environments called socialization agencies: family, school, peer group and mass media (consecutively from the most powerful and strongest to the weakest). For two socialization agencies, schools and mass media, it is generally more controlled by the government in terms of how the state wants to educate and shape the young generation and the general public. As for the peer group and family, generally more freely transmitted political perspectives to each member of the group. But whatever the source of its socialization agent, the beliefs and values of the constitution in each country or region are referred to as political culture --which will differentiate each social-psychological climate of the political system of each country or region (Ranney, 1987). Political culture develops in accordance with how political and governmental views are implemented in a country and how public policy is made. This is usually seen in two components: factual beliefs and political preference.the two together form a political culture within a country that can be unique and different from other countries. In more advanced countries, logic is usually put forward. But this statement is not always true. There are a number of anomalies in the political culture of each country, which are sometimes inconsistent and illogical, even in the developed world (Ranney, 1987). To predict and describe human behavior in that unique culture-- in this case is to determine political preferences-- can also be seen from the Theory of Reasoned Action introduced by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen. This theory links the concepts of attitude and behavior in one s actions. This theory is used to predict how a person behaves based on his previous attitudes and intentions. Intention or volition is the best predictor of human behavior. This means that if we want to predict what a person will do, the best way is to know the intentions of the person, even when interfering with environmental conditions also play a role, and sometimes even more influential. The important concept in this theory is the focus of attention (salience), which is to consider something that is considered important.intention is determined by attitudes and subjective norms. Attitudes influence behavior through a careful and reasoned decision-making process and the impact is limited to three things: First, behavior is not determined much by general attitude but by a specific attitude toward something. Second, behavior is influenced not only by attitudes but also by subjective norms of our beliefs about what others want us to do. Third, attitudes toward a shared behavior of subjective norms constitute a certain behavioral intention (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Ajzen and Fishbein expanded and modified the Theory of Reasoned Action into the Theory of Planned Behavior which was later revised to the Reasoned-Action Approach. The bottom line includes three things: the concept of beliefs about the likely outcomes and beliefs of behavior, beliefs about expected norms and normative beliefs, and beliefs about factors that can support or impede behavior and awareness of power 1440

6 (trust of control).so based on this theory, voters behavior in elections can be seen in three concepts: beliefs of behavior, normative beliefs and trust control. This normative beliefs and beliefs include also belief in religion. Then, what if the behavioral beliefs are based on the abundance of information that some tends to be biased even slander(hoax)? Globally, we have entered the post-truth era that was launched since 2016 (d Ancona, 2017), in which information can be very biased from objective facts with an abundance of information from the internet, including social media. The current internet dynamics have shifted over the past five or ten years when the internet is still textual, decentralized, full of rich information and knowledge with diverse materials and backgrounds. Today, the internet has been dominated by social media. The popularity of social media like Facebook, Twitter and Youtube seems to dampen objective journalism. Social media sometimes makes users say more emotion than reason. As a result, society is increasingly fragmented, more emotionally aroused, and easily radicalized by the lack of contact and challenges from the environment outside (Iman, Post-truth dan Medsos di Indonesia, 2016). Social media has the potential to turn news into disinformation. Disinformation is false, irrelevant, fragmented, and superficial information. This type of information creates an illusion as if we know something, when we are far from reality. The process of fragmentation and radicalization driven by emotional factors become sharper. Social media has lost its function as one of the foundations of healthy democracy. This problem is further exacerbated by distrust due to our inability to sort between physical identity and digital identity. A person with a physical identity can have a variety of digital identities. This can lead to illusions of power and responsibility (Iman, Post-truth dan Medsos di Indonesia, 2016).In the post-truth era, as we may have seen, they have proliferated dramatically as their intrinsic appeal to the human mind has been enhanced by a range of pressures and transformations (d Ancona, 2017). Even though there have always been liars, lies have usually been told with hesitation, a dash of anxiety, a bit of guilt, a little shame, at least some sheepishness. Nowwe have come up with rationales for tampering with truth so we can dissemble guilt-free. This is the very definition of post-truth (Keyes, 2011), or, using d Ancona s words, the theory of bullshit (d Ancona, 2017). Hoaxes around us are defamatory in very divisive strategy, which uses otherwise peraceful differences into hate-spins, done by hate-spin professionals. The biggest issue for Indonesian democracy is not terrorism, but intolerance, which moving from the radical fringe into the mainstream. (George, 2016). Matthew d Ancona is highly specific as to the date: 2016 was the year that definitively launched the era of Post-Truth. We have inhabited this new world for not much more than a year, but its dominant characteristic is all too clear. There has been a crash in the value of truth, comparable to the collapse of a currency or a stock. It s not that politicians lie more than they did in the past. Political lies, spin and falsehood are emphatically not the same as Post-Truth. What is new is not the mendacity of politicians but the public s response to it. Lying is regarded as the norm, even in democracies. But if there is such a thing as the post-truth era, it didn t start last year with Brexit and Trump. It began with the Iraq war. More than any other single event, it was this stupendous 1441

7 exercise in disinformation and denial that convinced the public that indifference to truth had become the norm in politics (Gray, 2017). Research Methodology The research used in this paper is a qualitative research method using secondary data in the form of survey results and exit poll of survey agenciess that are considered quite credible, such as: Indikator Politik, SMRC, Charta Politika, LSI, Polmark, Populi Center, and Indomatrik-H2Y(internal survey of Gerindra Party). Secondary data taken from the survey results include each governor candidate s electability starting from period before campaign (2016) until the second round of election (19 April 2017), public satisfaction level, also exit poll data conducted by survey agencies. In general, the surveysheld by various survey agencies used between 400-2,000 respondents, with 95 percent confidence level and margin of error between 1-5 percent. Surveys was conducted in five administrative cities in Jakarta, Central Jakarta, North Jakarta, South Jakarta, East Jakarta, West Jakarta and Kepulauan Seribu using face-to-face interview method.in addition, this paper is also included the results of Real Count KPU Jakarta. Parallel to this survey period, the authors also present a number of events such as candidate statements, candidate actions, effects arising from candidates statements, reactions and public actions relating directly or indirectly to the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election --taken and processed from various mass media coverage. Results The 2017 election of DKI Jakarta was won by Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno with 3,240,987 votes, while incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and his partner Djarot Saiful Hidayat lost after only 2,350,366 votes. Voter participation in Jakarta 2017 election is one of the highest (77.08 percent voter participation rate) (source: Real Count KPU Jakarta). The margin of vote acquisition between Ahok-Djarot and Anies-Sandi is far above predicted survey institutions. Although almost all survey agencies show Anies to be the winner of the 2017 Pilkada, the prediction is with a relatively small margin, even within the margin of error. Intertemporal tendencies indicate that this margin is getting closer and narrower, thus giving hope to Ahok s supporters that ultimately it may be that Ahok will win the 2017 election, albeit with very thin margins. Ahok Started Strong The education level of Jakarta residents is actually quite high. In the age range of 7-24 years, almost 66 percent are still in school, while almost 34 percent are no longer in school (BPS, 2016). Compare this with numbers across Indonesia (age range up to more than 45 years) where only 25 percent are still in school, and most, more than 67 percent are no longer in school. Across Indonesia, nearly 80 percent of the population aged are no longer in school (BPS, 2016). This high level of education provides the expectation that voters in Jakarta will voterationally rather than emotionally, and will not be easily affected by primordial issues. The surveys on Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017 was conducted periodically by several survey institutes. Some of the findings that can be underlined from some of these institutions are as follows.ahok-djarot started the fight very strongly. Saiful Mujani 1442

8 Research and Consulting (SMRC), from the results of its survey on June 24 to 29, 2016, even concluded that Ahok has not had any worthy opponent. Although still below 50 percent, Ahok s electability in the survey was the highest at 36.6 percent and away from his opponents. At that time the candidates for the election had not been officially announced, so there were no names that couldfor certain be compared. Therefore, it was understandable that the majority 54 percent could not mention their choices. The second option, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, was trailing at only 2.8 percent, while Sandiaga Uno gained 2.1 percent. Other candidates gained only under one percent. In the open simulation, Ahok led far ahead with 53.4 percent, compared with Yusril at 10.4 percent, Tri Rismaharini 5.7 percent, Sandiaga Uno 5.1 percent, Yusuf Mansur 4.6 percent, and other candidates under 3 percent. About 9.4 percent did not know or did not answer (Ahmad, 2016). Ahok s electabilitywas higher compared with the survey a year earlier in August In a spontaneous simulation, his electability increased by 12.2 percent, while in the open simulation upped by 16.2 percent. The improved perception of voters on Ahok s performance from 64 percent to 69.7 percent was thought to be a major cause of this electabilityincrease (Ahmad, 2016). In August 2015, the SMRC survey showed that satisfaction over Ahok s performance reached 64 percent, well above the satisfaction level of Fauzi Bowo s performance, the previous governor, which only reached 43 percent. In general, citizen s satisfaction on the quality of government services, both at the provincial, municipal and sub-district levels was also high. Similarly, citizen s satisfaction with the quality of urban infrastructure was also high (SMRC, 2015). Ahok is also perceived as a clean and non-corruptible governor. Ahok has been involved in a row with members of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) on the 2015 Regional Budget (APBD). At that time, Ahok found some irregularities in the budget proposed by the DPRD (colloquially called stealth fund by the press), among them the budget inflation of Rp12.1 trillion for Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) which, according to him, was too big and not even necessary. In addition, there was also a case in which Ahokinsisted for an additional levy rule of 15 percent for land tax from the islands reclaimed in the Jakarta Bay. In that case, Muhammad Sanusi, a member of parliament from Gerindra Party, was caught red-handed by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi, KPK) accepting bribes to retain the additional levy of a mere 5 percent. The case not only dragged Sanusi, but also the President Director of PT APL Ariesman Widjaya, the developer that paid the bribe, to prison. The implementation of e-budgeting and e-government in the administrative system of DKI Jakarta provincial government also shows its commitment in upholding clean governance. On several occasions, Ahok s commitment to cleangovernance has been in his statements. In the SMRC survey in August 2017, 74 percent of respondents claimed to know about the stealth funds rift between Ahok and the DPRD, and of those, 47 percent claimed to support Ahok, instead of only 10 percent who claimed to support the DPRD. The people who want Ahok to continue to be the governor of DKI Jakarta also increased from 49 percent in the August 2015 survey to 58 percent in July 2016 (Ahmad, 2016, SMRC, 2016). In August 2015, a 23.5 percent top of mind survey chose Ahok, well above the 3 percent who voted for RidwanKamil. Other candidates AniesBaswedan, 1443

9 Sandiaga Uno, AgusYudhoyono, and Sylviana Murni were even absent in the top of mind survey. This top of mind survey only captured 36.8 percent of respondents, as 63.2 percent responded no / no idea. The survey was held long before the election was held, so the most important finding was the top of mind response (SMRC, 2015). In its October 2016 survey, when the campaign period of the three couples of candidates began, SMRC still found a satisfying result on Ahok to a certain extent even better than the result from the year before. Among the candidates, Ahok-Djarot s electability rate remained leading with 45.4 percent. This was higher than the rates of the two other contending couples, Agus-Sylvi (22.4 percent) and Anies-Sandi (20.7 percent), combined. Here, even Anies-Sandi, the eventual victor, came last (SMRC, 2016). The strong start of Ahok s candidacy was expected to be the result of increased approval rate and satisfactory results of Ahok s governorship. Satisfaction rates of the quality of the city s infrastructure shot to the sky beyond 70 percent except understandably that of the traffic at 49 percent. Also, 61 percent of respondents, with an upward trend, were satisfied with the conduct of the government. As a result, the overall approval rate was skyrocketing at 75 percent and trending upward. Indeed, 26.4 percent of the respondents chose Ahok because of his track record (SMRC, 2016). Personal quality appeared to be on the top of the respondents list when choosing for their governor. Honesty, trustability, clean and incorruptible were the top virtue among44.7 percent of the respondents, followed by ability to lead at 17.2 percent according to the results of SMRC s survey (SMRC, 2016), and 33.8 percent according to that of Populi Center s (Populi Center, 2017). Mannerswere considered an unimportant quality at 7.7 percent according to the results of the Populi Center s survey (Populi Center, 2017), or 1.6 percent according to that of SMRC s (SMRC, 2016). In all of the personal virtues, Ahok was considered superior except for manners, where Ahok had the least score compared with the other contenders. Ahok has indeed been considered as impolite.but that, then, apparently did not mean much to voters. His other traits were good enough to offset his bad one. Being Accused of Blasphemy On September 27, 2016, Ahok gave a speech in the occasion of his visitto the grouper fishery development in Pulau Pramuka, District of Kepulauan Seribu. A part of the speech says as follows: Kan bisa saja dalam hati kecil Bapak Ibu, nggak pilih saya karena dibohongi (orang) pakai Surat Al Maidah 51 macam-macam itu.itu hak Bapak Ibu.Kalau Bapak Ibu merasa nggak bisa pilih karena takut masuk neraka, dibodohin, begitu, oh nggak apa-apa, karena ini panggilan pribadi Bapak Ibu Program ini (pemberian modal bagi budi daya kerapu) jalan saja. Jadi Bapak Ibu nggak usah merasa nggak enak karena nuraninya nggak bisa pilih Ahok. Translated as follows. It is of course possible that deep in your hearts, ladies and gentlemen, you will not vote for me because you are lied to by using Al Maidah 51 verse and all. That s your right. If you feel that you cannot vote me be- 1444

10 cause you are afraid that you will go to hell, that s okay, because this is your call This program (capital provision for grouper fishery development) will still go on. So you will not need to feel awkward when you feel you cannot vote for me (BBC Indonesia, 2016). On October 6, 2016, Buni Yani, a communication lecturer, uploaded the portion of the speech on his Facebook account, while providing an incomplete transcript (BBC Indonesia, 2016). Specifically, Buni Yani omitted the word using so the statement read you are lied to by Al Maidah 51 verse and all. This video and the incomplete transcript were used by hardline Islamists to bring Ahok down through court through an accusation of blasphemy of Islam. Al Maidah 51 is a Qoranic verse that says, in one translation, that Muslimsare not allowed to have non-muslim as a leader. The issue went viral through all possible media, including and especially social media. Possibly when he realized the potential impact of the issue, Ahok immediately sent an apologetic statement on October 10, 2017.On October 11, 2016, however, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MajelisUlama Indonesia, MUI) issued a religion opinion and stance that considers Ahok s statement a blasphemy (reportedly without clarifications from Ahok, one step that the council usually does before any edict can be issued). Soon after, a National Movement for MUI s Edict (Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa MUI), driven by Islamist hardline organizations such as the Islam Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and others, was formed apparently to address this so-called blasphemy issue and staged a series of demonstrations demanding Ahok to be put to jail for blasphemy (BBC Indonesia, 2016). Despite the apologies offered by Ahok, on October 14, 2017, thousands of Islamic organizations staged a demonstration in front of the Jakarta City Hall. They demanded Ahok needs to be punished for the blasphemy as soon as possible. On October 24, Ahok went to visit the Police Headquarters to provide clarifications on what he said. On November 4, demonstration against Ahok was staged again, now with bigger number. This so-called the 411 Movement or the 411 demonstration was attended by approximately thousand people, participated by the Chair of the FPI Rizieq Shihab and a number of members of Parliament such as FahriHamzah (Vice Chair of the House of Representatives from the Justice and Prosperity Party or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS, a hardline Islamic party), Fadli Zon (Vice Chair of the House of Representatives from the Great Indonesia Movement Party or Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra. Both parties are the staunchest supporters of Anies-Sandi candidacy.sandi is also from Gerindra). They also demanded to meet with President Jokowi who happened to not be in the Palace. The representatives of the demonstrators were then met by Vice President Jusuf Kalla who promised to address this issue completely only within two weeks. The seemingly peaceful demonstration, however, turned into chaos towards the evening. The mass in front of the Palace caught in clash with the police. There were also chaos in several parts of the city. Fortunately they could be contained (BBC Indonesia, 2016). There are many more demonstrations by the Islamists after the 411. The second one was the 212 demonstration on December 2, It was possibly the largest of all the demonstrations before and after. It was especially interesting as it invited not only hard line Muslims, but also the moderate ones. By then, the stigma of blasphemy appeared to have spread rather widely that even the moderate Muslim shad started to 1445

11 believe that Ahok indeed committed blasphemy. Possibly to ease the tension, President Jokowi decided to come in front of the demonstrators. Even until today, those who went to the demonstration still call themselves 212 Alumni. There is even a Presidium as the collective leadership of such alumni. 212 demonstration was followed by 313 on March 31, 2017, and 55 on May 5, At midnight on November 5, 2016, President Jokowi said that there were political actors behind the demonstration that led to chaos. He instructed that this issue needs to be addressed completely as soon as possible, in the most transparent manner. On November 7, 2016, Ahok was summoned for examination for the second time by the police for nine hours and with 22 questions.on November 8, 2016, President Jokowi visited the NahdlatulUlama, the largest Islamic organization that is also a moderate one, and visited Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization, the next day. They were followed by more visits to other Islamic organizations. He repeatedly stated that he would not protect Ahok and would not be able to intervene. He didn t respond to the suggestions to visit RizieqShihab, however. On November 10, he visited the Kopassus, the Indonesian greenberrets, Headquarters, followed by visits to other military units such as the Paskhas, the Marine, the Mobile Brigade, and the Army Strategic Reserve Commands (BBC Indonesia, 2016). On November 15, 2016, the police held a limited open gelarperkara to determine Ahok s legal status. On November 16, the Police determined Ahok as suspect of a case of blasphemy against Islam.Ahokaccepted the devision and stated that he would follow the legal process with a believe that he was innocent. He also stated that he would not back down from the gubernatorial election race (BBC Indonesia, 2016).Even since, Ahok had to attend the court proceedings every week. On May 9, 2017, the five judges of the court decided, apparently out of ordinary, that Ahok was, indeed, committing blasphemy, and sentenced him a two-year jailtime. This was higher than the demand from the atterneys.he also had to be detained immediately. Meanwhile, on November 7, 2016, BuniYani was reported to the police by the Ahok-Djarot Young Advocate Community.On November 18, BuniYani was summoned by the police for examination and by November 23, 2016, he was also determined as suspect. At present, Buni Yani is still facing a court case as a result of this action, while the Facebook post was deleted. The Two Rounds of Election As above, Ahok entered the race strongly.the blasphemy court case didn t seem to erode his strength too much. In its January 2017 survey, SMRC found that Ahok-Djarot s electability still scored 34.8 percent, followed by Anies-Sandi at 26.4 percent, and Agus-Sylvi at 22.5 percent.16.4 percent gave no answer (SMRC, 2017). Similarly, Charta Politika found that Ahok-Djarot(open) electability scored at 31 percent which was a hike from November s survey that scored 23.5 percent, second to Anies-Sandi at 24.4 percent followed by Anies-Sandi at 23.5 percent, and Agus- Sylvi at 22.5 percent. 23 percent gave no answer. The closed electability rate of Ahok- Djarot was even higher at 36.8 percent(charta Politika, 2017). By February 2017, many believed that Ahok could win through one round of election. On its February 2017 survey, Populi Center found through its survey that Ahokstill had the chance to win through only one round of election. With current trend, rough estimates of the electability after 1446

12 the third debate show the rates of 46 percent for Ahok-Djarot, 34 percent for Anies- Sandi, and 19 percent for Agus-Sylvi. Considering the margin of error, the possibility remains open for Ahok-Djarot to win with very close margin. Nona Evita of Populi Center said as quoted. (Edward, 2017). Having learned about Populi Center s findings, Eriko Sotarduga, Deputy Secretary General of PDIP, quoted as commenting that It was consistent with our prediction. We are aware that winning in only one round is not easy, but after the debate the possibility is open. (Putra, 2017).HastoKristiyanto, the Secretary General of PartaiDemokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), the strongest political supporter of Ahok-Djarot, cited technical and logistical problems with the failure of Ahok to win the Pilkada in one round, in addition to increasing aggressiveness of the contenders (Waskita, 2017). SMRC s January 2017 survey was conducted after the first Debate among the three couple of candidates, and SMRC found that 88 percent of the respondents deemed the debate being important or very important to understand and evaluate the programs of the candidates. About 44 percent of the respondents thought that Ahok-Djarot won the debate.anies-sandi obtained 27 percent, whereas Agus-Sylvi 17 percent. Eleven percent did not respond to the survey (SMRC, 2017). Overall, approval rate for Ahok as governor was still as high as 74 percent.in SMRC s February 2017, Ahok s electability increased again to 39.1 percent, whereas Anies-Sandi shot even further to 33.5 percent (the highest jump among the three).agus-sylvi s dropped even lower to 19.9 percent. By then, however, SMRC expected that the election will have to be extended to two rounds (SMRC, 2017). Support to Ahok-Djarot actually dipped for a while. SMRC found that, in their December 2016 survey, Ahok-Djarot s electability was 28.8 percent, lower than its November 2016 survey of 35.9 percent. That was lower than 30.8 percent that Agus- Sylvi received. Electability of Agus-Sylvi, however, dipped to 22.5 percent and apparently didn t get to recover ever since. However, the Ahok-Djarot s electability had not recovered well enough since the early October survey (SMRC, 2017). The first voting happened on February 15, 2017.Ahok-Djarot won the election with percent. Anies-Sandi came second with percent. Agus-Sylvi was kicked out of the race with percent.because Ahok-Djarot didn t get an absolute vote of more than 50 percent, the race had to be extended to the second round between Ahok-Djarot and Anies-Sandi. SMRC s March 2017 survey was the first survey after the first voting. This survey only considered two sets of candidates, namely Ahok-Djarot and Anies-Sandi. The finding was that support for Anies-Sandi shot to the roof at 50.7 percent, whereas that for Ahok-Djarot was 43.8 percent.in its April survey, the support for Ahok-Djarot increased to 46.9 percent, whereas Anies-Sandi s dipped to 47.9.Anies-Sandi still led, but 1447

13 within the margin of error(smrc, 2017).SMRC was not the only one that found this tie situation. A number of other survey agencies also showed the same data. The final voting was held on April 19, 2017.The result was percent for the losing incumbent Ahok-Djarot and for the contender Anies-Sandi as the governor-vice governor elect. Discussion: Religion and Ethnicity, A Way To Win The Race? Indonesia is a religious country. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Spring 2015 Spring Survey found that 95 percent of Indonesians claimed thatreligion is an important part of their lives. That put Indonesia to be the fifth on the list of countries that consider religion as important(pew Research Central Global Attitudes Springs, 2015). As a corollary, the terms murtad, or leaving Islam, and blasphemy, derogatory behavior towards Islam, are strong stigmas to Indonesian Muslims. In Islam, committing any of the two may lead to death penalty. While the abangans may not believe and behave like Muslims, they never have any willingness to leave the community of Muslims. They may never practice Islam, or practice only a little, but they will never choose to, or denounce Islam as their religion(liddle & Mujani, 2007).To them, Islam, or rather being a Muslim, is much more about identity than it is about believing or behaving(kotler-berkowitz, 2001). As such, siding with those that condemn blasphemy is obligatory in the effort to be considered as a part of the Islamic community. Indeed, taking side is a sign of belonging. Understandably, the notion of blasphemy among Indonesian Muslims is strongly value-laden. While a signatory of the International Human Rights Charter where laws regarding blasphemy is considered against human rights, Indonesia still maintains the law intact. The Law on blasphemy was actually once challenged to the Constitutional Court by then President Abdurrahman Gus Dur Wahid in 2010 for elimination from the country s legal system, for reasons that it was not constitutional, it violated human rights, and it didn t foster religious tolerance. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal. Understanding the way the Indonesians religiosity, this was almost expected. Until now, there are about 46 cases of blasphemy that have been brought to court in Indonesia in the past ten years, out of about 140 cases since the Suharto era mostly happened during the presidency of SusiloBambangYudhoyono and in every single one of the cases, the alleged blasphemous suspects never won. A couple more never reached the court as they were already resolved through mediation. When we look back to the 2007 and 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections, religious factors were not at all a significant predictor in voting. Ethnic variables still had some electoral impacts although only barely. Public satisfaction with the incumbent s performance had been strongly related to electability level. SARA had no discernible impact on the results of the 2007 and 2012 elections. It can be said, therefore, that in 2007 and 2012, Jakarta voters are more rational. The high level of education in Jakarta was deemed to be the reason for the rationality (Muhtadi, Efek SARA dalam Pilkada DKI Jakarta, 2016). The 2017 election showed a departure from the voting patterns in 2007 and In the 2017 election, the level of public satisfaction with the incumbent s performance had little effect on electability. Ahok s approval rate was high even amid the blasphemy court process. In the surveys, it was also revealed that voters also 1448

14 appreciated Ahok s performance in dealing with floods, education, health, and infrastructure. While there was some dissatisfaction in the problems of traffic congestion, voters did not turn a blind eye on the efforts and steps of the provincial government in building mass transportation infrastructure. IndikatorPolitik, for example, in its recent survey, showed that incumbent s performance was no longer significant in explaining their electability. This means that whether voters were satisfied or not with Ahok s performance did not determine them casting their votes for him. On the other hand, his alleged blasphemous speech citing Al Maidah 51 in the Pramuka Island, Thousand Islands District, raised to become a consistent predictor. Interestingly, while religious variables per se were not significant, religious issues or opinions in the case of AlMaidah were more significant. The massive Islamist mobilizations were thought to contribute to raising the blasphemy issue the main predictor. This, nevertheless, is more than a matter of religion (Muhtadi, Rasionalitas Pemilih Jakarta, 2017). In SMRC s August 2015 survey, ethnic and religious sentiments didn t show any effect on voters preference. Supports for Ahok were spread rather evenly from the Javanese (23 percent), Betawi (the original Jakartan ethnicity, 19 percent), Sundanese (17 percent), Chinese (54 percent), and other ethnic groups (23 percent). They were higher than any of Ahok s likely contender at the time, namely Ridwan Kamil, Tantowi Yahya, Tri Rismaharini, and others. Only from the Minangs did the support to Ahok was lower than that for Ridwan Kamil (27 percent) (SMRC, 2015). Charta Politika s January 2017 survey also found similar note. Ahok-Djarot gained most supports from the Bataks (59.4 percent), Javanese (37.2 percent), Sundanese (30.1 percent), and Chinese (77.1 percent). Anies-Sandi, on the other hand, gained most supports from Betawi (33.1 percent), Madurese (50 percent), and Minangkabau (37.5 percent) (Charta Politika, 2017). Religiously, SMRC also found already in 2015 that supports from the Muslims to Ahok were also the highest at 19 percent compared to Ridwan Kamil, the second highest, at 3 percent, or FauziBowo (2 percent), or Tri Rismaharini (2 percent). With these kinds of supports, SMRC concluded that to win the race, primordial sentiments wouldn t be enough. Perceptions of competence, integrity, decisiveness, and empathy were very important (SMRC, 2015). More recently, Charta Politika s survey of January 2017, Ahok-Djarot actually gained the most from all religions. While it might be expected that he gained the most from non-muslims(79.7 percent from christians and 71.4 percent from others), he also gained the most, albeit more modestly, from Muslims at 30.3 percent. Anies-Sandi gained slightly below at 29.3 percent from Muslims (Charta Politika, 2017). But in its February 2017 survey, SMRC found that Anies-Sandi gained the most from the reason that the contender had the same religion as the voters, by 12 percent, where as Agus-Sylvi gained 6.5 percent. Ahok-Djarot didn t gain any score on this matter (SMRC, 2017). But overtime, there had been a massive movement against Ahok that was arguably very strategic. The first strategy is what is now known as post-truth campaign. The second is what can be coined as message framing. And lastly through intimidation. Fake news marred the 2017 election campaign, mainly against Ahok. They were dispatched through not only regular social media such as Facebook or Twitter, but more dangerously through WhatApp and Telegram, which are more limited but influential, as they usually consist of people with similarities compared with Facebook or Twitter. Within the three months of the campaign period, there were more than 1,900 reports 1449

15 of alleged hoax, mostly on the election, and religious sentiments play a significant role (Franciska, Tentang Ahok, Anies, dan Pilkada Jakarta yang dibumbui seribu hoax, 2017). Some of the alternative facts include the claim that the photograph that shows Ahok shaking hands with King Salman of the Saudi Arabia was fake, although it was indeed taken by a Presidential photographer. The alternative facts were spinned, such as one Facebook post that says that it was haram (not allowed) for the King to shake hands with a blasphemous person. Numerous other facts were also offered as to why the photograph was fake (Franciska, Tentang Ahok, Anies, dan Pilkada Jakarta yang dibumbui seribu hoax, 2017). Numerous uncountable Twitter and Facebook posts have shown similar lies. Fake news aside, the message framing against Ahok is also massive. The classic challenge by the Islamist is that electing a non-muslim as a leader is actually against the teaching of Islam as stipulated in the Al Maidah 51 in the Quran, the Islamic holy book. The english translation of the verse, according to internationally-legitimate translation, says as follows: O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies; some of them are allies of one another. Whoever of you allies himself with them is one of them. Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people. The term allies is the direct translation of the word awliya in Arabic. An alternative translation in Indonesia for the word awliya is leader. However, as analyzed through the AsbabunNuzul (the origins) of the verse, it was to refer to an agreement specifically made by Muslims with the Jews and Christians at the time while disregarding the Islamic interests. There was no reference in the origin to any leadership. In the official Indonesian Quranic translation published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the term used is also allies or friends. This leads to a conclusion that the real meaning of the term is indeed allies (Donovan, 2016). However, the translation of awliya as leader is also quite commonly used in Indonesia. In almost all cases with electoral campaigns, this version of the translation has almost always been used to influence Muslim voters not to vote for non-muslim candidates. This has been experienced by Ahok not only in the 2017 Jakarta election, but ever since he ran to become Bupati of Belitung prior, as mentioned in Ahok s book, Merubah Indonesia. In a Muslim-majority area, being non-muslim running for elected office had indeed been a great challenge for Ahok(Purnama, 2008). While the issue was already raised prior, it gained major momentum when Ahok cited Al Maidah 51 in his Pramuka Island speech. The video of him giving the speech was then uploaded by BuniYani on his Facebook page, but slightly edited. Instead of saying lied to by using Al Maidah 51 (translation from Indonesian), BuniYani posted it as if Ahok said lied to by Al Maidah 51. The furor stemmed from this edit, which appears to depict that the verse is a lie. This was framed further as blasphemy. Ahok s apparent slip of tongue in the case of blasphemy makes the primordial issue that is considered to be relatively long sleep appears again to the surface. As if the virus that had been dormant, rise again. Plus the mobilization and media coverage that gave strong pressure so that the primordial effects that once had little effect became enlarged. Resistance to Ahok, as seen in a number of rallies called AksiBela Islam (Islamic Defense Actions) and establishing Ahok as a suspect in a blasphemy case made some 1450