ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MALAWI. Paper presented to the workshop Democracy in the Third World: What Should be

Transcription

1 ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MALAWI John A. Wiseman University of Newcastle upon Tyne Paper presented to the workshop Democracy in the Third World: What Should be Done? ECPR, Mannheim, March 1999.

2 Introduction The May 1994 elections marked the very first genuinely competitive electoral contest ever to take place in Malawi. The democratic transition which had occurred over the previous two years cannot be seen as a restoration of democracy because Malawi had never experienced anything approaching democratic rule. Whereas most other African states had enjoyed an, often brief, period of relatively democratic government in the terminal colonial period and for a short time afterwards before moving towards single-party and/or military rule the particular circumstances of Malawian independence had precluded such a democratic interlude. The nationalist movement, organised through the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) later the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), enjoyed a high level of popular support in its campaign against the territory s membership of the Central African Federation (CAF) but was always fairly intolerant of any dissent 1. Pre-independence elections failed to produce any significant opposition to the MCP and the country entered independence as a de facto single-party state. Within a few months of independence the MCP leader, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, ousted all potential opponents from within the party and went on to construct the most tightly controlled and highly personalised single-party state in Africa in which he was President for Life of both the party and the country. For nearly thirty years the highly authoritarian and repressive Malawian political system was amongst the most stable in Africa 2. There was no significant challenge to Banda s classically neopatrimonial style of rule. Anything less than the most extravagant praise for the wisdom of the Ngwazi was deemed to be deeply subversive and was met with imprisonment, torture and, sometimes, murder. Even those who attempted to sustain an exiled opposition movement abroad were vulnerable to the long-arm of the Banda state and several such figures were assassinated in, or 2

3 kidnapped from, neighbouring states 3. Until the 1990s significant political change in Malawi appeared most unlikely. Although Banda was nearing one hundred years of age it appeared that he would remain in office until he died of natural causes: speculation as to what might happen after that expressed fears of political collapse into instability once the determining force of the system was removed. Set against this historical backdrop the changes that occurred between 1992 and 1994 appear all the more remarkable. In March 1992 the culture of political silence was broken by a pastoral letter from Malawi s Roman Catholic bishops which provided a savage critique of the political status quo 4. The letter was the starting point for a rapid growth of pressure, both internal and external, for political reform which led to Malawi s democratic transition 5. Dismantling the Authoritarian State: The Nature of the Malawian Democratic Transition In October 1992 Banda suddenly announced that he would hold a referendum to allow Malawians to decide if they wanted to change to a multi-party system. The evidence suggests that he firmly believed his own rhetoric that, apart from a few foreign-inspired malcontents, Malawians were firmly in support of the existing system and that, by demonstrating this in a referendum, he could undermine the prodemocracy movement permanently. From then until the referendum was held in June 1993 the authoritarian state continued to exist in an attenuated form. Opposition parties remained banned but four designated special interest groups (which subsequently became political parties) were permitted to promote the multi-party argument. In a rather ad hoc way some opposition newspapers were permitted whilst some remained banned. The Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) remained 3

4 firmly under Banda's control with the result that national radio (so important in the rural areas) unashamedly promulgated the case for the retention of single-partyism. Many regime opponents remained in jail during this period. The trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana, for example, who had been arrested when he returned from exile to join the campaign for democracy in March 1992 was only released the day before the referendum was held. Long-term detainee Orton Chirwa died in detention during this period and his wife Vera Chirwa, who was also detained was not allowed even to attend his funeral. Regime opponents continued to suffer harassment at the hands of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), the para-military wing of the ruling MCP. The system of traditional rulers and traditional courts which had been such an important and powerful component of the authoritarian state in the rural areas continued to function as an effective form of political control loyal to Banda 6. In spite of the above obstacles the supporters of political reform continued to organise and campaign. The Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), based mainly in the Northern Region, and the United Democratic Front (UDF), based mainly in the Southern Region, had gained recognition as two of the designated interest groups and their public meetings drew increasingly large and enthusiastic crowds. They also became involved in numerous disputes with the government over the procedures to be followed in the conduct of the referendum and the question of its timing. With support from the UN the opposition managed to win several concessions from the regime over these matters. To many Malawians the sight of people not only publicly disagreeing with Banda but actually influencing him to change his mind was a remarkable novelty. On several occasions AFORD and UDF threatened to boycott the referendum if their procedural demands were not met. Still believing that the referendum would support 4

5 his preferred position Banda was reluctant to provide his opponents with opportunities in advance to dispute the validity of the outcome. Polling in the referendum took place in an atmosphere of peace and calm with internal and external observers declaring themselves generally satisfied with the way it had been conducted. The results announced two days later clearly indicated two major features. Firstly, there was a very clear majority in favour of abandoning the singleparty system and changing to a multi-party system. On the basis of a national turnout of 67% Malawians voted by nearly two to one for reform with 63% in favour. Secondly the results manifested a clear regional dimension. In the Northern and Southern Regions 88% and 84% respectively voted for multi-partyism whilst in the Central Region (Banda s home ethnic base and much favoured during his time in office) 66% voted to retain the single-party state 7. Both sides accepted the results and Banda committed himself to preparing for a competitive multi-party system. At this point in time many components of the authoritarian state were still in existence. Whilst the pressures for change and the referendum campaign itself had clearly opened up political space which Malawi had not exhibited before and created the possibility of a democratic transition there was still a long way to go. From June 1993 until the elections of May 1994 the process of dismantling the authoritarian state proceeded remarkably smoothly. Although the opposition were highly distrustful of Banda's acceptance of change and feared that he would try to manipulate the multi-party exercise to ensure the continuing dominance of himself and his MCP under a new democratic guise (a general pattern which did emerge in several other African states around this time) this problem did not emerge. Disagreements between government and opposition were certainly in evidence on several occasions but for the most part they were solved in a relatively consensual 5

6 fashion to the satisfaction of both sides. One must be careful not to give the impression of too neat and organised a process. Ng ong ola is correct to point to the untidy and extra-legal manner in which the one-party system was finally dismantled and a new constitutional order ushered in and how enabling legal provisions and arrangements persistently followed in the wake of agreed or implemented political decisions 8. The emphasis was on securing the changes needed for a genuinely competitive election to take place through the development of an interim constitution. Even the interim constitution did not fully become law until 16 May 1994, the day before the election, and the final version became law one year later in May In July 1993 the institution of the Life Presidency was abolished and section 4 of the existing constitution, which had established the monopoly position of the MCP, was repealed by parliament. At the same time an amnesty was declared for Malawians who had campaigned against Banda in the past so facilitating the return from exile of many opponents. Within Malawi political detainees, who had suffered up to 27 years in jail, were released. Repressive legislation, such as the Preservation of Public Security Act, a catch-all law which Banda could use at will, was repealed. In August 1993 a National Consultative Committee (NCC), which included representatives of the new opposition parties, was established to oversee the transition and the following December an independent Electoral Commission, presided over by a High Court judge Mrs. Justice Anastasia Msosa, was also established. These two bodies had a partially overlapping membership which reduced potential tensions between them. A simple plurality (first-past-the-post) system was adopted for both parliamentary and presidential elections. There was, perhaps surprisingly, no significant disagreement over the demarcation of new constituence boundaries. The total number of constituencies was increased from 141 to 177 and the old arrangements whereby the 6

7 President (ie. Banda) could nominate an unrestricted number of additional MPs entirely at his own discretion was abandoned. By late 1993 most of the changes to Malawi s legal system necessary to permit the holding of democratic elections had been made, or at least agreed to. However the continued active existence of the MYP still presented a major barrier to the possibility of conducting a meaningful competitive election. As in the past the MYP indulged in harassment of Banda s opponents, now focusing particularly on the newly legalised opposition parties. The government chose to ignore the requests of the NCC for the disbandment of the MCP s para-military wing. In the event it was the Malawi Army which moved against the MYP and ended their coercive activities 9. Since independence the army had avoided any significant involvement in politics. Although it was widely known that many junior soldiers sympathised with the reform movement the military had remained neutral during the referendum campaign. It was widely believed that senior officers had let the regime know that they would be unwilling to be used against the pro-democracy movement if called upon to use their coercive powers. The move by the military against the MYP was an unplanned and messy affair. In December 1993 a fight broke out in a bar in the northern town of Mzuzu between some off-duty soldiers and local MYP members. What began as little more than a drunken brawl rapidly escalated when three soldiers were shot dead by the MYP. Over the next few days violent attacks by, mainly junior, soldiers on MYP bases spread throughout the country. The main MYP headquarters in Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Zomba were destroyed, often with the active participation of civilians, and within the week the power of the MYP had been broken: many were killed and most of the rest fled into exile in Mozambique where it is believed they joined up with local RENAMO units. Subsequently Banda announced the 7

8 disbandment of the MYP but by that time this amounted to little more than a formal recognition of what had already taken place. The manner in which the MYP was removed from the Malawian political scene hardly represents careful negotiated change but their removal was a major step in the dismantling of the authoritarian state. Whilst the above changes were taking place the establishment and development of new opposition political parties was occurring simultaneously in response to the removal of the ban on all parties but the MCP. Although a large number of parties formed in this period only two were to prove themselves to be of real political significance. These two were UDF and AFORD which developed from the earlier pro-democracy pressure groups of the same name. The leaders of the pressure groups, Bakili Muluzi (UDF) and Chakufwa Chihana (AFORD), remained in place to lead the new parties. Expectations that these parties would unite to oppose the MCP in the upcoming elections did not materialise. From the start both parties exhibited marked regional dimensions in relation to leadership, organisation and support with the UDF securely establishing itself in the Southern Region whilst AFORD became equally securely established in the Northern Region. Opponents of the UDF gave it the soubriquet MCP B-team on account of the very prominent role its top leaders had previously played within the MCP. Muluzi had earlier been Secretary-General of the MCP as had his important lieutenant Aleke Banda (who had also spent ten years as Commander of the MYP). Other ex-mcp heavyweights within the UDF leadership included Justin Malewezi and Edward Bwanali. All were men who had incurred the displeasure of the Ngwazi and been sacked and/or jailed (Aleke Banda had been imprisoned from 1980 to 1992). This feature was very much less apparent within the AFORD leadership where only Rodwell Munyenyembe had previously held a top MCP position, as Secretary-General, and Burnett Mtonga had 8

9 been an MCP District Secretary. Within the AFORD leadership a significant number combined high educational standards with long periods as political exiles outside of the country. In terms of financial backing the UDF enjoyed significant advantages over AFORD because of its ability to gain the support of business leaders, especially from the Asian community who had suffered severe discrimination under the Banda regime. Leaving aside the plethora of minor parties the only other significant party was the MCP itself which, despite its lack of success in the referendum campaign, clearly remained an important player. Evidence that the MCP was facing up to the reality of multi-party competition came in October 1993 when it was announced that Gwanda Chakuamba had been appointed as its new Secretary-General. Chakuamba s career is, in many ways, emblematic of Malawian politics. From the 1950s to the 1980s he had been a very senior figure within the MCP serving as Secretary-General and cooperating closely with Banda. In 1980 his career took a downturn when he was charged, on the basis of no significant evidence, with subversion and planning to assassinate Banda and was sentenced to twenty two years imprisonment with hard labour. He remained in jail until after the referendum. Following a brief flirtation with the UDF immediately following his release he rejoined the MCP, so linking up with those who had been responsible for his thirteen year detention. Chakuamba was viewed as a valuable asset to the MCP because his political base lies in Nsanje District in the Southern Region, so enabling the party to extend its regional appeal into the perceived UDF heartland in the extreme south of the country 10. Although the conditions for the May 1994 elections did not quite constitute a level playing field they were closer to that than most observers would have predicted even a few months earlier. The use of national radio was still biased towards the MCP 9

10 and the latter did manipulate state patronage to enhance its campaign. However, with its strong support from the business sector the UDF had adequate finance available and only AFORD, and the minor parties, were forced to rely on low budget campaigns. Although there were isolated instances of political violence all parties enjoyed the freedom to campaign as they wished within the limits of their budgets. Opposition leaders accused the MCP of intimidating voters through the participation of Nyau cult masked dancers at their rallies which carried threats of witchcraft and sorcery against opposition supporters. It is not possible to determine the effects, if any, of Nyau on voting behaviour but its use appears to have been most widespread in Chewa areas in Central Region where support for the MCP was high anyway for reasons of ethnicity and political economy. Apart from isolated administrative hitches the casting of votes in the presidential and parliamentary elections on 17 th May 1994 took place without any significant instances of violence or malpractice. The Commonwealth Observer Group concluded that the election was conducted in a manner which provided the people of Malawi with the opportunity to vote freely for the candidates of their choice 11, a view which was supported by the United Nations Joint Observer Group and internal election monitors. The election results, which were accepted by all participants, exhibited similar regional characteristics to those of the earlier referendum 12. The presidency was won by Bakili Muluzi (UDF) with 47% of the national vote who defeated Hastings Kamuzu Banda (MCP) who gained 33.5% and Chakufwa Chihana (AFORD) with 18% (one minor party candidate won 0.5%). Muluzi s success was based on very strong support in the Southern Region where he gained 78% of the votes (being the most populous region it also has more voters than either Northern or Central) but he gained only just over a quarter of the votes in Central Region and less 10

11 than 5% in Northern Region. Banda won just under two thirds of the votes in Central Region but did poorly in Southern Region (16%) and worse in Northern Region (7.3%). Chihana swept Northern Region (88%) but was weak in Central and Southern Regions (7.5% and 5.2% respectively). Ironically Muluzi had been the only presidential candidate to also stand at constituency level so both Banda and Chihana were excluded from participation as elected MPs in the National Assembly. Parliamentary results broadly reflected the same patterns both in terms of proportion of votes won and in regional concentrations although local considerations produced minor variations. Overall the UDF won 85 seats, with 56 going to MCP and 36 to AFORD. Although the parliamentary elections were contested on a first-past-the-post simple plurality system the regional concentrations of support for the three major parties meant that the parties shares of seats won were entirely consistent with proportional representation. UDF gained 48% of seats with 46.43% of the popular vote, MCP 31.6% with 33.6%, and AFORD 20% with 19%: with minor parties making minimal impact a non-pr system actually produced a PR result. Overall the UDF won the elections, gaining the presidency and the largest number of seats in the National Assembly, but falling narrowly short of an overall majority in the latter. The MCP clearly lost the monopolistic position it had held until 1993 and Banda lost the presidency but the party survived the elections to become the main opposition party in a parliament in which there was no natural majority party and remained the dominant force in most of the Central Region. AFORD hopes that Chihana s leading role in the pro-democracy struggle might enable him to win the presidency proved groundless but the party emerged with strong third party representation in parliament and a dominant position in the north of the country. Thus, each of the three main parties, 11

12 two of which had not existed a year earlier, could view the May 1994 election results with a mixture of satisfaction and disappointment. The changes which occurred in Malawi between 1992 and 1994 produced a political system which was very different in character from the supremely authoritarian one which had existed throughout the post-independence period (and, indeed, the marginally less authoritarian system of colonial rule). It is reasonable to conceptualise this change as constituting a democratic transition. In a recent book Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle argue that a transition to democracy occurs with the installation of a government chosen on the basis of one competitive election, as long as that election is freely and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, and that all the contestants accept the validity of the election results 13. Clearly there is no problem in locating Malawian political change within this framework. However, in identifying the manifestation of a democratic transition one is not making any assumptions about the survival or long-term consolidation of the new democracy. Attention must now turn to the post-transition period in Malawi s political development. Beyond the Transition: Post-Election Malawian Politics In assessing post-transition politics it is not useful to operate within a simplistic dichotomous everything has changed/nothing has changed framework of alternatives. This may seem a supremely self-evident point to make but it could be suggested that a significant amount of the study of democratization in Africa has exhibited this tendency. Scholars identifying aspects of continuity from pre to posttransition political systems often appear to have difficulty in fully appreciating the changes which have taken place 14. Quite often, it would seem, such reluctance to 12

13 acknowledge the extent of change brought about by a transition is grounded in a sense of disappointment either in reference to the partial survival of locally specific characteristics which are deemed undesirable, or more broadly with the limitations implicit in the procedural form of transition which took place. The sort of democratic transition referred to in the above quotation from Bratton and van de Walle cannot be taken to imply the immediate creation of a broad-based democratic culture, the transformation of gender relationships, a marked advance towards economic equality and poverty elimination, or other, no doubt highly desirable, developments. The mirror-image of this continuity thesis is a rupture thesis which stems from an inability to recognise that, however important the nature of change which has occurred may be, it is unlikely that behavioural practices and cultural resonances of the past will completely vanish (the much cited fallacy of electoralism is an example of this). Proponents of the continuity thesis are commonly found amongst Western analysts of a left-wing persuasion 15 and Africans opposing the new regime: those arguing for the rupture thesis are more common amongst Western governments and Africans supporting the new regime. Put succinctly, in the case of Malawi the UDF would support the rupture thesis and claim a near-total transformation of the political system under the Father and Founder of Malawian Democracy, Bakili Muluzi, whilst AFORD (and most of the minor parties) would criticise the government in line with the continuity thesis. For the MCP the position is more ambiguous and they would claim that the Muluzi government had abandoned all the positive aspects of the previous period and persisted only with those negative aspects which the new MCP itself had now forsaken. The analysis here will attempt to establish the balance between change and continuity in post-transition Malawi. 13

14 Managing with a Minority: President, Parties, and Parliament Since 1994 During the long single-party period the main function of the National Assembly had been to serve as an arena for the glorification of the Ngwazi. Any notion that the purpose of the legislature was to act as a critical check on the executive branch of government was profoundly inapplicable. Parliamentary debates consisted mainly of competitions between MPs, who all owed their positions to the grace and favour of Banda, anxious to demonstrate their total loyalty to and appreciation of the unbounded wisdom of the President. On a personal level, having sat through several weeks of observing the sometimes confrontational styles of debate in the posttransition parliament it came as a dramatic contrast to read the Hansards of the 1970s and 1980s. In those years all speeches praised the Ngwazi and in many speeches every sentence did so. There are many recorded instances of MPs literally breaking into song to express their adoration of the leader. The advent of multi-partyism unsurprisingly had a marked effect on parliamentary behaviour. The other main factor affecting parliamentary activity was the fact that President Muluzi and his UDF government did not have an automatic majority in the National Assembly. With the MCP and AFORD combined holding slightly more seats than the UDF the possibility existed for them to block all government legislation. It might be noted that this situation is unique in post-transition Anglophone Africa in those cases where the change was from a single-party system: in all other cases either the incumbent ruling party retained its majority (eg. in Kenya and Tanzania) or a victorious opposition party gained an overall majority (eg. in Zambia). For President Muluzi the problem of coping with this minority situation has involved a great deal of political manoeuvring in the post-election period. 14

15 President Muluzi had adopted two main broad strategies in order to cope with the problem of governing with a minority. The first has been to engineer coalition arrangements with the opposition. The second has been to entice individual opposition MPs into supporting the government, primarily through offers of patronage involving jobs and resources. Overall the second strategy has proved more reliable for most of the period. Following the elections coalition negotiations between UDF and AFORD took place but rapidly broke down, reportedly on the basis of the latter s dissatisfaction with the cabinet posts Muluzi was at that stage prepared to offer. In June Muluzi tried to generate a more supportive atmosphere in the North by issuing a presidential decree permitting the use of the Chi-tumbuka language on national radio from which it had been banned for twenty seven years due to Banda s insistence that among indigenous languages only Chi-chewa could be used in public broadcasting 16. Chihana and many other AFORD leaders are ethnically Tumbuka and Chi-Tumbuka is the most widely spoken first language (64% of the population) in the Northern Region. It was not until 1996 that Chi-yao (Muluzi is Yao), Chi-sena, and Chi-lomwe were added to the list of broadcast languages. I spite of this gesture negotiations on a UDF/AFORD coalition stalled and on 20 th June 1994, just over a week before the new parliament was due to sit for the first time, AFORD signed a memorandum of understanding with the MCP. This linkage between the two opposition parties was reflected in the decision to install Dr. D.G.S.Nkhwazi (AFORD MP for Rumphi East) as Deputy Leader of the Opposition when the MCP s Gwanda Chakuamba became Leader of the Opposition. The MCP/AFORD linkage proved weak and ephemeral and was probably intended by AFORD to pressure Muluzi into offering them a better deal. In September 1994 AFORD leader Chihana joined the government as Second Vice- President (a post which for which the constitution made no provision until May the 15

16 following year) 17. Although the MCP/AFORD agreement formally remained in force until the following January it quickly lost any meaning as Muluzi allocated several cabinet positions to AFORD MPs. It was not until July 1995 that the de facto coalition between UDF and AFORD was formally announced but after Chihana and some of his colleagues had joined the government there was no prospect of Muluzi suffering any significant parliamentary reversal. However, this thoroughly opportunistic arrangement rapidly began to unravel. In a speech at a major party rally in Karonga just before Christmas 1995 Chihana launched a fierce attack on his coalition partners accusing the UDF of smuggling maize, restricting government loans to their own supporters, and discriminating against well educated northerners in appointments to senior civil service posts 18 (of 19 Principal Secretaries appointed since Muluzi came to power only one was a northerner). Chihana s speech reflected and further provoked divisions within AFORD on the question of participation in government which had always been unpopular at grass-roots level in the party. At elite level attitudes were becoming increasingly polarized with different AFORD leaders making strongly pro and anti-coalition speeches. In May 1996 Chihana resigned from the government (the post of Second Vice-President has since remained vacant) and the following month the coalition was formally ended. Any threat that the coalition break-up might have posed to Muluzi s position vis-à-vis parliament was averted when several of the AFORD cabinet ministers announced that they would remain in government (and, by so doing, preserve the government s majority) although several others withdrew. This provoked uproar within AFORD. Chihana accused Muluzi of buying the rebel ministers and claimed to have seen a cheque for 173,000 Malawi Kwacha (then around 7,000) being paid to one of them 19. The rebels responded by accusing Chihana of dictatorial leadership and 16

17 gave him the nickname Czar Chihana. The latter then expelled the rebels from the party and demanded that they resign their seats because of the constitutional provision that MPs who cross the floor are obligated to resign. This argument is based on a misreading of the constitution. Whilst the relevant clause of the constitution (No. 65) 20 requires the Speaker to declare vacant the seat of any member who was, at the time of his or her election, a member of one political party represented in the National Assembly, other than by that member alone but who has voluntarily ceased to be a member of that party and has joined another political party represented in the National Assembly (my emphasis). The same clause goes on to specify that all members have an absolute right to vote as they wish and that their seats shall not be declared vacant because they contradict the instructions of their party. Because the opposition have often accused President Muluzi of acting in unconstitutional ways this point is important. Although the AFORD rebels continued to sit in the UDFdominated government they did not join the UDF party and, thus, were entitled to retain their seats. This view was confirmed by the Speaker who refused to declare the seats vacant. When AFORD took the matter to court the decision of the Speaker was upheld 21 thus sustaining the voting majority which Muluzi now had in the National Assembly (even though an acrimonious debate on whether they were AFORD or Independent continued 22 ). In many ways this development presented Muluzi with an easier and more economical method of preserving a voting majority than had the coalition experiment because it involved dealing with a small number of individuals rather than the whole of a rather fractious party led by a strong-willed individual. The other tactic used by Muluzi to secure his parliamentary voting majority has been to encourage individual MCP members to support his government. The numbers involved have been small and in most cases those involved have not formally 17

18 joined the UDF. Evidence from the large number of by-elections which have occurred since 1994 (mostly as a result of the deaths of sitting members) clearly indicates that in the vast majority of cases party support patterns remain little changed since the general election and that MPs defecting to a different party will find it extremely difficult to win the seat for their new party. When, for example, the elected MCP MP Chakakala Chaziya was forced to vacate his Lilongwe Noth West seat after joining the UDF the new MCP candidate Anderson Ngubani easily won the by-election with 77% of the vote. A rare example of a defecting MP retaining his seat after changing parties was the case of Simeon Khamfula who won the Nsanje Central constituency for the MCP in 1994 and retained it when standing as a UDF candidate in 1997 when he received massive financial assistance from his new party 23. Other MCP defectors, M. Maseko (Ntchisi North) and G. J. Bundaunda Phiri (Kasungu North-West), chose to remain in parliament as Independent MPs rather than formally join the UDF and be forced to face the judgement of the electorate in MCP-supporting areas. As a result of these two strategies for dealing with the problems created by the failure of the UDF to win an outright parliamentary in 1994 Muluzi s government has avoided significant defeats in votes in the National Assembly and has only suffered minor setbacks on rare occasions when UDF backbenchers have decided to vote with the opposition 24. Although these strategies have enabled the regime to get its legislation through parliament and helped avoid the dangers of government paralysis there has been a cost in terms of governance and non-developmental public expenditure. Muluzi s prebendalism in creating extra ministerial and deputy ministerial positions to reward defectors has produced a bloated and expensive executive which has been criticised by donor agencies and political opponents alike. In 1995, as a sweetener in coalition discussions with AFORD, all UDF and AFORD 18

19 MPs were each given MK 50,000 (then around 2,000) from the government s Poverty Alleviation account to assist development within their constituencies. This action, which was taken without the foreknowledge of finance minister Aleke Banda, can only be seen in terms of political patronage being used by President Muluzi to facilitate constituency-level patronage on the part of the MPs involved. MCP MPs were excluded from this arrangement 25. Since 1994 there have also been constant rumours and accusations of political patronage to Muluzi supporters involving government contracts, cars, educational scholarships and a whole range of government favours. Although it is often difficult to substantiate such claims with hard evidence, and indeed some may be spurious, it is difficult not to believe that they contain a lot of truth. Rather than preventing the politics of patronage and clientelism the specific circumstances of the Malawian parliamentary balance have meant that parliament itself has been a driving force for clientelist behaviour. Ironically the National Assembly has also been a major forum of, criticism, particularly from the MCP, over the means by which Muluzi has coped with his minority position. In a parliamentary speech in 1995 leading MCP MP Heatherwick Ntaba suggested that the other two parties were so politically promiscuous that they might have already contacted political HIV 26. Having so far concentrated on the question of how Muluzi has managed his minority status it is necessary to consider other aspects of post-transition parliamentary politics. In general terms parliamentary affairs have been well conducted 27. Although frequently conflictual relationships between government and opposition MPs have been relatively civil. This is perhaps surprising when one remembers that a significant number of these individuals 28 spent long periods in jail as a result of the past activities of an equally significant number of their (now) fellow 19

20 MPs. Although the Speaker, Rodwell Munyenyembe (elected in 1994 as the AFORD MP for Chitipa Wenya constituency), has often been accused of being too favourably disposed towards the government his handling of the day-to-day proceedings of the National Assembly have been even handed. An opposition MP has always been included among the two Deputy Speakers. Much of the business of the Assembly is devoted to the bread and butter issues of Malawian life. On most days the session begins with Questions to Ministers during which MPs, both government and opposition, make critical demands for extra resources for their constituencies. Matters which are routinely raised on these occasions include accusations of government failures over educational provision (shortage of teachers, books, desks: the poor state of school buildings, absent roofs), provision of health care (chronic shortages of medical staff, unavailability of medicines, defunct ambulances) transport problems (derelict roads and bridges, abandoned bus services), malfunctioning or non-existent public utilities (water, electricity, post and telecommunications), and the poor performance of parastatal agencies (marketing boards, agricultural assistance programmes). Supplementary questions frequently involve a more party political focus with accusations from MCP and AFORD members concerning regional bias over resource allocation. Reflecting the lack of any clear ideological or philosophical differences between the parties debate over the major directions of government policy have tended to be muted: criticisms have been more concerned with the implementation of government policies than with its overall orientations, which over many issues are to a large extent shaped by the conditionalities applied by international financial institutions (eg. over privatisation of state controlled economic enterprises). It would probably be fanciful to suggest that the absence of these constraints would produce a 20

21 more philosophically grounded debate in the Malawian National Assembly. Contributions of an ideologically more critical kind tend to be limited to a relatively small number of, mainly AFORD, backbenchers. In spite of the weaknesses of political accountability evident in the workings of the post-transition legislature the situation remains very different from that which existed in the era of the Banda single-party state. Although the opposition have been weakened by President Muluzi s tactics to create a parliamentary majority they remain an openly critical voice which had been impossible in the past. Civil Society and Extra-Parliamentary Political Space Malawi s democratic transition was not solely concerned with the change to a multi-party system, the holding of competitive elections, and the creation of a legislature which included (for the first time) a strong opposition presence. Equally important was the opening up of political space in which non-party groupings were able to participate in the wider political process in a way which had not previously occurred. As has been shown such groupings played a vital role in engineering the transition through their exertion of pressure on the authoritarian regime. It is therefore important to examine whether or not the churches, trade unions, independent press and other civil society components exhibited continuing political vitality in the posttransition period and, if they did not, whether this was due to their own internal weaknesses or to attempts by the government to curtail their activities. Beginning with the March 1992 pastoral letter from Malawi s Roman Catholic bishops the Christian churches had played a crucial role in undermining Banda s authoritarian state. They played a leading role in the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), which also included representatives from the Malawi Law Society and the 21

22 Chamber of Commerce, which acted as an intermediary between the emerging political parties and the government. The PAC has continued to adopt a critical stance towards the post-transition government over issues such as the continued failure to organise local government elections (now planned to coincide with the May 1999 general elections). For the most part, however, the churches have avoided direct linkages with the political parties which have formally maintained a secular base. There is a distinct level of embarrassment amongst many church leaders over the long period prior to 1992 when they remained silent over regime abuses which has promoted an increased willingness to act as a critical voice in relation to public affairs. In public pronouncements, including especially the annual Lenten letters the churches have regularly attacked corruption and the failure of government to uplift the poorer sections of Malawian society. In some cases these criticisms have been focused on particular political activities. In May 1998, for example, the newly installed Bishop of Southern Malawi, James Tengatenga, used his enthronement speech to attack the ways in which some opposition politicians had been induced to support the government. He said that the gravy train seems to have taken the better of our politicians the defections bear witness to this the politicians are now following the flow of the gravy and all seem to want to join the ruling party where are the principles they stood for which made them different from the UDF? 29. In February 1999 the highest decision-making body of the Roman Catholic church, the Episcopal Conference of Malawi, attacked to government s use of the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) for party political purposes 30, a long standing opposition grievance. Although the churches have frequently behaved in a manner supportive of democracy since the 1994 elections they have not been immune from less positive features of Malawian public life. Peter von Doepp provides a highly critical view of 22

23 the use and abuse of clerical office for personal gain and suggests that practices in the church mirror and create the larger social logics informing the exercise of power within the state 31. In late 1998 Rev. Missanjo Kansilanga, the general secretary of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) Blantyre Synod, was suspended and the subsequently retired by his colleagues for accepting the gift of a car from President Muluzi in return for attempting to suppress a pastoral letter critical of the government 32. At times the churches have been guilty of giving support to MCP attempts to introduce religious animosity into Malawian party politics by accusing Muluzi of trying to Islamise the country. Such accusations appear to have no basis in reality and it is hard to see what Muluzi could hope to gain by introducing a religious element into politics given that only around 17% of the population share his Muslim faith. In 1998 the Nkhoma Synod of the CCAP included in its pastoral letter a call for Christians to vote in the next general elections for a party which is in accordance with Christian faith : this was interpreted by some as meaning not to vote for a Muslim presidential candidate 33. Although religious tolerance has generally prevailed in Malawi since the transition there are elements within the Christian churches who oppose Muluzi on religious grounds. Since 1994 relations between the government and the trade unions, especially those representing workers in the public sector, have frequently been very acrimonious. In April 1997 workers from the medical and educational sectors went on strike over demands for wage increases and the failure of government to pay existing wages on time. The strike was declared illegal and there were violent clashes between strikers and the police following which over thirty trade union leaders were arrested. The following month the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions (MCTU) bitterly criticised the increase in the size of the cabinet, and the resulting cost to the public 23

24 purse, to facilitate rewards for opposition defectors 34. Although no formal institutional linkages have been established between the trade unions and the opposition parties it was clear by the beginning of 1999 that the former had adopted an oppositional stance towards the government. The President of the MCTU, Ken Williams Mhango, declared that these UDF people have failed us they fooled us so they should enter government and enrich themselves and suggested that our members should vote for a party they think will help them in solving their economic ills 35. Given the dominance of the government over radio broadcasting the role of the press has been crucial in sustaining a pluralist environment in Malawi 36. Although Malawi has a great many newspapers at any given time many are ephemeral and those which are not tend to be closely linked with a particular party or political leader: there is a lack of a truly independent quality national newspaper. The best known daily newspapers are The Nation, which is owned by UDF minister Aleke Banda, and the Daily Times which is controlled by the MCP. The AFORD newspaper, the Malawi Democrat folded due to lack of finance. The ruling party has its own UDF News which is published twice weekly and is more overtly party political than The Nation. The decision of President Muluzi to ban government advertising in newspapers hostile to the regime has placed them in difficult financial circumstances. This is exacerbated by the fact that most of Malawi s business and commercial sector, which is small anyway, is located in the Southern Region whose businessmen have been amongst the strongest supporters of the UDF. Although Muluzi has frequently stated his belief in a free press (in June 1998 he said that they can write anything they want about me it all means one thing: democracy is working and I will not arrest them 37 ) there have been a series of 24

25 incidents which suggest otherwise. On several occasions gangs of thugs, widely believed to associated with the UDF, have attacked journalists working for critical newspapers. In addition in January 1998 Malawian soldiers attacked the offices of the Daily Times in response to an article on the high HIV infection rates in the army 38. Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that they were acting on government instructions no action was taken against those involved. In September 1998 a newsletter called Take Part published by the German Technical Co-operation organization (GTZ) was banned when Minister of Information Sam Mpasu declared that foreign NGOs were not allowed to publish newspapers. The following month a newspaper called The National Agenda was banned on a legal technicality concerning its business licence but this ban was set aside the following day by the High Court. The evidence presented above suggests that since 1994 government-civil society relationships have been rather mixed. In some instances the attitudes and actions of the government have indicated authoritarian tendencies but, at the same time, the relative autonomy of the churches, trade unions, and independent press has been preserved in a way which stands in very marked contrast to most of the Banda period. Political space is not under the hegemonic control of the regime and extraparliamentary dissent has been common. Crime and Punishment It is an unfortunate fact that in many parts of the world where political liberalization has brought an end to authoritarian rule this process has been accompanied by a massive increase in violent crime. This can be seen in many parts of Eastern Europe and, closer to home for Malawi, in the Republic of South Africa. Although it may be true as Chimombo suggests that there was a systematic under- 25

26 reporting of crime during the Banda period 39 to preserve a public face of a peaceful contented society, it is very clearly the case that the democratic transition in Malawi has been accompanied by a phenomenal increase in violent crime, much of it involving the use of firearms. Clearly this is a very worrying development in social terms because of its negative impact on Malawian society and people but it is also problematic in relation to Malawian democracy. To the extent that violent crime is perceived by Malawians as an outcome of democratic transition the less likely it is that the transition will be popularly viewed as a positive and legitimate development which is worth preserving. In such circumstances the promise of a return to a secure existence under an authoritarian government (civilian or military), however much of an illusion this might be, could well attract mass support in Malawi. The public debate in Malawi over the explanations for the crime wave exhibit a wide range of views and much speculation much of which has a party political dimension to it. The UDF government blames the previous MCP administration arguing that it gave preference over funding to the MYP and left the police force poorly organised and underfunded and incapable of dealing with the problems of crime which have arisen. Unsurprisingly the current opposition, especially the MCP, has a rather different view of the heritage from the past and claims that it is simply the incompetence of the Muluzi administration which has failed to sustain a situation in which Malawi was commonly judged to have amongst the lowest crime rates in Africa. From a less partisan perspective the role of the MYP may provide at least a part of the explanation for current problems. During the Banda period Malawi was a very tightly controlled society in which the MYP played a very significant role in enforcing control alongside the chiefs who were given extensive powers over local populations (all under the ultimate control of the Ngwazi). Although the primary 26

27 purpose of the MYP was to root out any hint of political opposition and deal with it ruthlessly they also served as a mechanism for high levels of social control through their omnipresent network of informers. It was seen earlier how the crushing of the MYP by the army formed an important part of the dismantling of the authoritarian state but a side effect of this process was to remove a control mechanism which had kept common crime to minimal levels. A further factor related to this is that after Operation Bwezani many MYP fled to Mozambique, taking their weapons with them, and there joined up with heavily armed RENAMO groups. It is widely believed in Malawi that much of the current wave of armed crime is carried out by dissident members of these two groups following democratic political transitions in both Malawi and Mozambique 40. Wider regional factors are also relevant and there is evidence that Malawian criminal gangs have established close connections with South African criminals especially those involved in the drugs trafficking 41. A 1998 UN Development Framework report suggested that at least 156,000 hectares of land in Malawi (mainly in Central Region) was under marijuana cultivation. In February 1999 a South African drugs queen, Fannie Soko Phiri ( apparently known as Big Mummy ), who was married to a Malawian businessman was assassinated in Blantyre as part of an ongoing gangland feud 42. As in many parts of the world much crime in Malawi is now drug related both in terms of rival criminal gangs struggling to control the trade and addicts resorting to crime to finance their addiction. Rumours concerning the collusion of senior government figures are common but hard evidence has not been forthcoming. The frightening availability of guns, especially AK47s, across the Southern African region hugely exacerbates such problems. The crime wave is having serious effects on all levels of Malawian society: in 1995 army commander Manken Chigawa was murdered in Ntcheu by armed robbers 27