Chapter II. Foreign Policy Issues in Political. Party Manifestos

Transcription

1 Chapter II Foreign Policy Issues in Political Party Manifestos India gained its independence in 1947 after a protracted freedom struggle from the British. Independent India's ethos is basically ingrained in the national movement for independence which inherited the elements of 'India's hoary tradition' composite culture (in contrast to the two nation theory of Muslim League of Jinnah and Pakistan) and the British Parliamentary system. It is this political tradition that consisted of diverse beliefs and ideologies. For instance, the Swaraj Party of Chittaranjan Das, the Socialist Party and for a long time the Communist Party were with the Congress. After independence, Nehru, while encouraging opposition parties of diverse ideological orientations,. sought to build up democracy, political institutions and framed both domestic and foreign policies. Explaining this tradition, Rasheeduddin Khan writes, "Non-alignment, in the sense of independence from alignments, has been dominant ethos of India's foreign policy. As a term signifying a 'value' and a 'norm', non-alignment is an integral part of India's political culture in international affairs, even as the term 'secular nationalism', 'Participatory Democracy', 'composite culture', egalitarian society', remain the guiding objectives of new India's emerging federal polity." 1 It is this tradition of the Congress Party as a norm and value of freedom movement that stood strong, both domestically and internationally, in the divided world from the 1 Rasheeduddin Khan, "Nehru's Vision of Asia and the World", in P.N. Haksar (ed.), Nehru's Vision(}( Peace and Security in Nuclear Age (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1987), p

2 1950s to the 1980s. Nehru while rejecting the US capitalist economy and the Soviet Communist Model, had formulated a coherent domestic and foreign policy in the garb of "Fabian Economic Model", "Social Justice" and "Non-alignment." 2 This Fabian economic model is a policy device of the post war European social democracy which impressed Nehru to adopt it as a State policy for the industrialisation, constitutional democracy, redistribution of economic resources in society at domestic front. Discussing the same, Sunil Khilnani writes that "the bright arc of the West's history illuminated for Nehru a silhouette of India's future economic possibilities. It encouraged him to believe that an independent India could follow three ends simultaneously: industrialization directed by a State, constitutional democracy, and economic and social redistribution. This project was rather distant from Soviet practice and US economic model and much closer to post-war Euuropean social democracy." 3 By adopting this policy at the domestic front Nehru evolved the foreign policy of non alignment at the international level. The policy of non-alignment helped India in taking a balanced stand vis-a-vis both the super powers: United States of America led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), Israel-Palestine stand-off, third world countries solidarity and later South-South Co-operation, South Asian neighbours and on nuclear disarmament. This policy served the country's national interest during the Cold War era. According to A.P. Rana, "The framework of policy which Nehru had 2 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1991), p Sunil Khilnani, The Idea C?llndia (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1997), p

3 evolved and the tradition he left behind appeared to have served India and the world well in the years after his demise and the final conclusion of the cold war." 4 This policy of Congress governments was bitterly opposed by the Right wing and Left parties who chalked out their independent policies and programmes vis-a-vis domestic and foreign policies. The Communist Party of India had initially opposed the Parliamentary system of government, Fabian Economic model because it wanted total state control over resources, and the policy of non-alignment on the ground of its ideological affinity with the former Soviet Union. Explaining this policy stand of CPI, T.A. Nizami writes, "Bitterly condemning India's foreign policy, the CPI pointed out that the driving forces behind many of the government's actions was the need of the Indian bourgeoisie to establish a firm alliance with the British imperialists for the crumbling order in India, in Asia and in the world. Further, the CPI added that India's foreign policy was in the interest of British and American imperialisms, which were securing strategic positions in India by having "agreement" with the "national government." This government, in turn, had agreed not to discriminate against the foreign capital, but to encourage it. It was further alleged to have agreed to have no nationalisation and no tariff... It urged Nehru to keep away from imperialist camp led by America and take the side of the socialist camp instead of posing neutrality." 5 It implies that the CPI preferred the nationalisation ~f resources instead of mixed economic model at domestic front and sided with the socialist ~ A.P. Rana, 'The Nehruvian Tradition in World Affairs: Its Evolution and Relevance to Post- Cold War International Relations", in Surj it Mansingh (ed.), Nehru's Foreign Policy, Fijiy. Years on (New Delhi: Mosaic Books, 1998), p. 55. 'T.A. Nizami, The Communist Party and India's Foreign Poli9' (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1971 ), pp

4 camp led by the Soviet Union at international level instead of neutral policy of non-alignment. But the Communist Party of India later supported the Congress government and its foreign policy because it was somewhat favourable to them in the 1950s to 1980s. At this juncture in 1950s, the USA's misadventure in North Korea in 1954 and its ambitious policy of having military pact with the South-East Asian countries by concluding South East Asian Treaty Organisations (SEATO) with them made Nehru to criticise USA for dragging the poor third world countries into the Cold War politics. Besides this, Nehru government had Indo- Soviet trade pact with the Soviet Union in 1954 and Panchsheel Principle pact with China in These developments in India's foreign policy had their effect on the attitudes of the CPI towards the foreign policy of India. Moreover, they welcomed the foreign policy stand of Nehru government. Describing these developments and changed attitude of Communists vis-a-vis foreign policy of India K. Raman Pillai writes, "The greater impact on the CPI, however, was the further advance of the foreign policy of the government in 1954 India's role in India-China for a negotiated settlement, Chou-Nehru Declaration and enunciation of the five principles and India's opposition to South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)... The Communists welcomed Nehru's speeches stressing the need for Sino-Indian Unity." 6 _ Similarly, the Right-wing Jana Sangh (predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) started articulating its policy stand vis-a-vis domestic 6 K. Raman Pillai, India's Foreign Policy: Basic Issues and Political Attitudes (Meerut : Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), p

5 economic policies, foreign policy, the nuclear issue and on Jammu and Kashmir. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh and its successor BJP advocated India acquiring the nuclear bomb since 1950s. 7 This was in contrast to the policies of Gandhi and his able political heir Nehru who advocated total disarmament, internationalism and world peace. Besides this, the Jana Sangh opposed good neighbourly policy of Nehru Government vis-a-vis Pakistan. The Swatantra Party wanted to build up good relations with the US and other Western countries. 8 The Praja Socialist Party wanted to build up third world solidarity by forming an alliance with the Asian countries, which would act as a "third force" against both the power blocs in international level. Ram Manohar Lohia addressing his party men in this context said: "Let us pitch our tents everywhere and strengthen this third force. We must sign treaties of permanent friendship with Burma, Nepal, Ceylon and other independent countries of South-East Asia. Such treaties should lead us into a permanent federation. Once such a federation comes into being to strengthen the third camp, the world can be made safe for democracy and permanent peace." 9 But, their impact on policy was minimal. Nevertheless, the ideological differences are obvious as observed by K.D. Mathur and P.M. Kamath, "Some differences are obvious: the Communist Parties advocated the line of world Communism. The Jana Sangh opposed appeasement of Pakistan 7 Stuart Corbridge, "The Militarisation of all Hindudom? The Bharatiya Janata Party, the Bomb, and the Political Space of Hindu Nationalism", Economy and Society, Vol. 28, No.2, May 1999,p.241. S. Bhaskaran, "Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy: Indo-US Relations Between 1947 and 1965", In A.P. Rana (ed.), Four Decades t!llndo-us Relations: A Commemorative Perspectives (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994), pp S. Bhaskaran. "Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy: Indo-US Relations Between 1947 and 1965", In A.P. Rana (ed.), Four Decades t?llndo-us Relations: A Commemorative Penpectives (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994), pp Quoted in K. Raman Pi llai, op. cit. no. 6, p

6 and Swatantra Party recommended that India should have firmer ties with the Western countries." 10 Though the ideological differences of political parties on various issues was obvious but their influence on foreign policy making of the government was insignificant, because they influenced policy only in their capacity as opposition parties. Theoretically, in the parliamentary systemthe party in power formulates the foreign policy. The opposition in Parliament influences the government by adopting various methods such as criticising government policies and advising the government through the standing and consultative committees of Parliament. This is well explained by J. Bandyopadhyaya: "Although foreign policy decisions are made in a parliamentary system of government by the party or parties in power, the foreign policy outlook of the opposition parties inevitably affects such decision making, not only because of the role the latter play in Parliament, but also because of their influence over the political system as a whole." 11 But in the Indian Parliamentary System the Cabinet assumes a vital power vis-a-vis Parliament (obviously vis-a-vis opposition parties) and Cabinet formulates the foreign policy. So did the Congress Party's governments upto 1989 because of their thumping majority in Parliament. Besides this, the Cabinet made Parliament subservient and less effective in influencing foreign policy of the governments. Naheed Murtaza examining this trend in the Indian Parliamentary System writes, "In India, the Parliamentary System in practice has 1 K.D. Mathur and P.M. Kamath, Conductqf'lndia '.1 Foreign Polic~v (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1996), p J. Bandyopadhyaya, op.cit. no. 2, p

7 established the cabinet as an institution, wielding more power than Parliament. It is not Parliament, which controls the Cabinet, but is the latter which is more influential. For the Congress Cabinet, it was easier to overpower the Parliament, due to its thumping majority... The Cabinet in India is relatively strong in position... Parliament can be more effective, if there is strong opposition with multi-party system. In India, despite the multi-party system, a single party dominated the political scene and cabinet made the Parliament subservient to its policies. The Parliament is less emphatic in affecting the foreign policy." 12 Moreover, in India the foreign policy-making and execution, as a rule, is regarded as the prerogative of the executive Parliament merely approves it after discussing it. Further, Naheed Murtaza explains, "The task of making and implementing foreign policy is left to the executive and Parliament approves of the proposed policy as a rubber stamp, after discussing it at length." 13 This is due to secrecy attached to the role of diplomacy and foreign policy. Thus, the role and influence of opposition parties vis-a-vis foreign policy of India is minimal and insignificant in spite of the fact that the opposition parties are ideologically divided vis-a-vis foreign policy. Despite this, the Congress governments, the Left parties, and Rightwing parties had different orientations vis-a-vis foreign policy of India during the Cold War era but maintained a consensus on the broader issues of foreign policy evolved by the people of India since 1947 to As S.K. Singh points out, 1 ~ Naheed Murtaza, Parliament and Foreign Policy: Reflections on /ndiu-china Relations (New Delhi: Cadplan Publishers, 1998), p. 70.!. 1 Ibid p

8 "Between Independence and now, the Indian people have been able to evolve a consensus on our broad foreign policy framework, though not on specific issues. This evolution is based on considerable continuity, also some change." 14 In the 1989 General Election the plethora of regional parties mushroomed in the political firmament of India, besides the Janata Dal, the BJP, CPI and CPI(M) in opposition to the Congress Party's ideology and its politics both at domestic and international level. The regional parties-asom Gana Parishad (AGP) from Assam, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) from Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desam Party (TOP) from Andhra Paradesh, National Conference from Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil Maanila Congress, the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), the Samata Party from Bihar and the Shiv Sena from Maharashtra. By the Trinamool Congress Party, a splintered group of Congress came into existence. Moreover, these parties are either ethnic-based, religious based or the region based. Parties such as the Akali Dal, Shiv Sena and IUML are purely religious based parties and have narrow religious objectives. These parties, except the BJP and the Communist parties, claim and proclaim that they are "socialists" and secular. It is difficult to distinguish and assess them on the basis of ideology because their programmes and plans are emotive and concerning to their states, besides appealing to the ethnic populism. Robert W. Bradnock points out, "Although several of the parties described themselves as 'Socialist' it is impossible to attach precise ideological 14 S.K. Singh, "Priorities forour Next Foreign Minister", Telegraph (Calcutta), 4 June

9 labels to their diverse programmes. With the exception of Communist Parties in West Bengal and Kerala, the BJP, a rightwing party, most of the Congress Party's opponents at a regional level based their programmes on the appeal of ethnic populism." 15 For instance, the Akali Dal is supported by Sikhs in Punjab, the National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah, his son Farooq and grandson Omar Abdullah is Kashmir based party that stood for "autonomy" to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the provision of Article 370 of the Constitution of India. AIADMK, DMK, MDMK and Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) parties are Tamil Nadu based and stand for decentralisation of power under the scheme of federalism in India. Telugu Desam Party from Andhra Pradesh based on Telugu Pride and decentralisation of Power. The Asom Gana Parishad from Assam based on exclusive identity of Assamese people and Shiv Sena from Maharashtra bases it programme exclusively on Maharashtrian identity, besides extreme rightwing ideology. Besides this the Samata party and the Biju Janata Dal are also regional parties that joined central coalition governments. The above mentioned regional parties fought election against each other and against the Indian National Congress, Janata Dal, the BJP and Communist Parties in all the Parliamentary elections in the 1990s and came to power in their respective states besides the central level. They campaigned and focused on regional and local issues and did not say anything vis-a-vis foreign policy. Robert W. Bradnack further says in this connection, "all (regional political parties) gained 15 Robert W. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy Since 1971 (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p

10 power through campaigning on local and regional populist issues. Political activity at the state level was a constantly shifting pattern of alliances and enmities, often regional and personal in character rather than national and ideological. Opposition to the Congress Party after 1971 came from across the ideological spectrum and from a wide range of regional and sectional interests. Nevertheless these interests were very largely concerned with domestic issues, and no consistently distinctive stance on foreign policy was taken by any of the Non-Congress Parties." 16 Despite this, the parties such as Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and MDMK from Tamil Nadu articulated their views on the issue of the Tamils and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (L TTE), a separatist organisation in Sri Lanka, which is a sensitive foreign policy issue between India and Sri Lanka. The National Conference stood for "autonom( to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the provision of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution while advocating harsh policy towards Pakistan that aided and abetted the secessionists in Kashmir. The Asom Gana Parishad consistently demanded since 1980s that the central government should deport the illegal Bangladeshi migrants staying illegally in Assam to Bangladesh. So did the Shiv Sena and the BJP. Nevertheless, the regional parties did not touch upon the foreign policy issues in their election manifestos in the General Elections held in the 1990s while the mainstream parties the Congress, the BJP, the Janata Dal and Communist Parties had different stands on the foreign policy issues. These issues are: the nuclear issue, India's relations '" Ibid., pp

11 with the South Asian neighbours and India-US relations in the 1990s. Given this background it becomes essential to look into the electoral manifestos of political parties in the 1990s so as to ascertain and locate their foreign policy from the perspective of their ideological stand. Nuclear Issues in the 1990s Elections Since 1947 the successive Congress governments from Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajiv Gandhi struggled hard towards world peace, disarmament and refused to endorse the Western approach of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on the ground of discriminatory nature of treaties. Meanwhile, India retained the nuclear option while developing nuclear infrastructure. Therefore, the international community was consistently putting pressure on the Indian government to endorse the NPT till 1995 and CTBT thereafter. It is in this context that the nuclear issue assumed vital importance in the foreign policy of India and in the agendas of the political parties that came to power. In 1989, the nuclear issue became a more sensitive issue of foreign policy of India and at the international level. This coincided with the end of Cold War. At this juncture, Pakistan and China were increasingly, overtly and covertly proliferating the nuclear weapons and posing a threat to the Indian security. For instance, China went in for nuclear test in 1995 again and Pakistan was developing nuclear bombs. People at the helm of affairs in Pakistan have.disclosed that the Pakistan possessed the nuclear bombs Vide Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures"in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and lftekharuzzaman (eds.), Nuc:lear Non-Prol!feration in india and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), pp.l Also, see Indira Gandhi, Prime 40

12 It is in this context that the views of political parties from across the political spectrum, which they articulated in the wake of elections in 1990s, are taken into account for the analysis. In the 1989 election, a loose conglomeration of non-congress opposition parties came together to form the National Front. Its views on the nuclear issue are as follows: "While committing itself to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, India cannot ignore the proximity of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear powers in the region and must take into account in evolving her security doctrine and it must keep its option open. The National Front government will work for the removal of the discriminatory clauses of NPT." 18 The Congress party reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear disarmament and world peace while retaining the nuclear option and developing nuclear infrastructure. The Congress Party under the leadership 9f Rajiv Gandhi highlighted the positive achievement of "total, universal and global nuclear disarmament" policy of Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress government and reaffirmed that it would accomplish this task while refusing NPT and PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty). 19 The Left parties rebuffed the Western move on disarmament under the scheme of NPT and PTBT on the ideological ground of Western nee-imperialism versus third world solidarity. 20 At this time the BJP was whipping up mass frenzy on the basis of religion. Moreover, true to its ideological attachment with the Jana Sangh, its successor the BJP said, "We must go for the nuclear option." 21 Minister Indira Clul1llhi: Stulements on Foreign Polity, Aprii-Septemher 1982 (N~w Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1982), p-9. IS Election Manif~sto of the National Front, General Election, 1989, pp " El~ction Manifesto of the Congress Party, General Election, " 0 Election Manifesto of the CPI(M) and CPI, General Election, " 1 Election Manifesto of the BJP, General Election, 1989, p. 30. Also, see Stuart Corbridge, 41

13 Eventually, the National Front assumed power at the Centre with outside support of the Left parties and the BJP but could not sustain its rule due to the withdrawal of support by the BJP in November 1990 on socio-economic grounds relating to domestic politics. This was followed by mid-term poll to the Lok Sabha in May By this time the US had emerged as the sole super power in the post-cold War era. The mainstream political parties' manifestos again reflected the views of their respective parties in the wake of 1991 election. By this time the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was on the verge of taking shape into Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the international level. In the 1991 election, the Janata Dal and Left parties viewed the same approach vis-a-vis nuclear issues while retaining the nuclear option for the country. 22 The Communist Party of India (CPI) 1991 Election Manifesto says, "The CPI stands firmly by the policy of peace and disarmament, anti-colonialism, solidarity with all the victims of neo-colonism and aparthied, support to the national liberation struggle of Palestinian people... and demand for vacation of Arab Territories occupied by lsrael." 23 The CPI (M) echoed the same in the 1991 General Elections while opposing the US hegemony. 24 The Indian National Congress under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi committed itself to the policy of nonalignment and disarmament in the wake of 1991 Election. Its manifesto says, "we have succeeded in persuading the world to fulfill Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of a world without competing blocs, a world of deterrent, a world moving towards op.cit. no.4. : 2 Vide Election Manifesto of Janata Dal, General Election, :.1 Election Manifesto of the CPI, General Election, 1991 p Election Manifesto ofthe CPJ(M), General Election 1991, p

14 disarmament." 25 It indicates that Congress (I) party committed to the policy of total disarmament as advocated by previous governments while retaining the nuclear option and developing nuclear infrastructure. By this time the BJP had gained ground in the electoral arena and consistently started demanding the exercise of the nuclear option. In 1991 in its election manifesto it says, "We will give our defence forces nuclear Teeth." 26 The BJP was not only ready for arming the defence forces with nuclear bombs but was also advocating extreme views on Indian state. Eventually, the Congress (I) emerged in the elections as the single largest party but was short of a majority. It somehow managed to run the government for five years under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, upto By this time three political groups emerged in the political firmament of India. They are: (1) the Congress (1), (2) the BJP and its allies in Maharashtra the Shiv Sena, and the Samata in Bihar, and (3) the Janata Dal, TOP and Le~t parties, apart from the other regional parties. As discussed in the preceding pages, the regional parties began allying with one or another national party either before the election or after the election. Moreover, they focused on regional issues concerning to their respective states. The mainstream parties the Congress (I) under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Janata Dal, the Communists (CPI and CPI(M)) and the BJP clearly started regarding the nuclear issue articulating their views on the nuclear issue, because the NPT and CTBT were hotly debated at the international level ~ 5 Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress (I), General Election 1991, p Election Manifesto ofthe BJP, General Election 1991, p

15 and at the domestic level also. It is in this context that, on the eve of 1996 General Elections the BJP clearly stated that the party will "re-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons." 27 It is in the given context the Congress slightly changed its language in manifesto. It says, "the Congress favours a nuclear weapons free world and will continue efforts for total disarmament particularly nuclear disarmament." Further it says, "Our nuclear policy is geared for peaceful purposes. In case, Pakistan persists in the development and deployment of nuclear weapoqs, India will be constrained to review her policy to meet the threat." 28 Meanwhile the Janata Dal and Left parties issued their manifestos. The Janata Dal manifesto reads, "We will take steps to safeguard the security of the country against threats emanating from any source: internal or external. The principal plank of our disarmament policy will be to seek complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide within an agreed time schedule... We will continue to oppose NPT and its adjunct, CTBT." 29 The CPI(M) manifesto reads: "we will rebuff imperialist efforts to subvert our independent development and resistance to its attempts to impose its NPT and CTB"(; cancellation of the military co-operation pact with USA." 30 Finally, the United Front coalition, a loose conglomeration of regional parties allied with the Janata Dal and CPI formed the government with outside support of the Congress party. The UF also, consistent with past policies and their manifesto issued in the wake of Elections, attempted to carry on the same 27 Election Manifesto of the BJP, General Election 1996 p Election Manifesto ofthe Indian National Congress (1), General Election 1996, p. 32. ~ 9 Election Manifesto of the Janata Dal, General Election 1996, p Election Manifesto of the CPJ(M), General Election 1996, p

16 policy but could not sustain its rule because of the withdrawal of support by the Congress Party in Parliament. This was followed by the 1998 General Election to the Parliament and nuclear issue resurfaced again in the elections, besides becoming a populist issue in the electoral politics. Because, by 1996 the public mood in India was in favour of nuclear bomb 31 because Pakistan and China were constantly developing their nuclear arsenals as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Moreover, the Western pressure and threat of economic sanctions in the given context in the region made the nuclear issue highly sensitive in the electoral politics of the country in 1990s. Therefore, political parties started playing with the emotions of people while assuring in their election manifestos that they will review seriously the nuclear policy of India. It is in this context that the Congress on the eve of elections in its manifesto said that in case Pakistan persists in the development and the deployment of nuclear weapons, India will be constrained to review her policy to meet the threat. The Congress Manifesto reads: "The Congress will continue its efforts for total and complete disarmament. Our nuclear policy will continue to be for pe aceful, developmental purposes. But we will not be found wanting in case of any threat by hostile forces." 32 The Congress manifesto doesn't touch upon the NPT and CTBT categorically but slightly changed its tone and tenor vis-a-vis these nuclear issues. The BJP and its predecessor Jan Sangh stood for the bomb since the 1950s and in the 1998 elections its manifesto categorically said while refuting the NPT and CTBT: "we are committed to... re-evaluate the 31 Vide David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), India and The Bomb: Public Opinion and A'udear Option, (New Delhi: Bahrisons 1996). 3 ~ Election Manifesto of the Congress (I) Party, General Election 1998, p

17 country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons." 33 The Janata Dal manifesto while refuting the NPT and CTBT reaffirmed that the Janata Dal was committed to total nuclear disarmament. 34 The CPl. the CPI (M), the Revolutionary Socialist Party, and All India Forward Bloc jointly issued the manifesto and committed to the policy of non-alignment, while refuting the NPT and CTBT and US hegemony in the new world order. 35 Political Orientations of Political parties vis-a-vis India's South Asian Neighbours and Indo-US relations in the 1990s India emerged as a relatively strong state in South Asia after the 1971 war with Pakistan. The successive Congress governments, except Janata Government's interlude rule , maintained a pragmatic approach in dealings with the South Asian neighbours. 36 The successive governments also maintained that no third country or power should come to the region. The South Asian region is highly volatile and has a fragile socio-political system, besides ethnic problems. There are ethnic problems in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North Eastern States in India. Sri Lanka has also been facing a threat of separatism from the violent activities of the radical Tamil group L TTE. Besides this, India has been a victim of transborder narco-terrorism and separatism for the last two decades. It is these factors that prompted the governments to maintain a realist approach vis-a-vis South Asian neighbours in safeguarding the >>Election Manifesto ofthe BJP, General Election 1998, p. 31. > 4 Election Manifesto of the Janata Dal, General Election 1998, p. 18 "Election J'vlaniteslO of the Communist Parties- CPI, CPI(rvl), Forward Bloc and Revolutionary Parties: General Election, 1998, p. 7. J<> Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 46

18 unity and integrity of the country. As a result, by the 1980s the neighbours perceived India as a hegemonic state in the region 37 that had the ambition of dominating them in day-to-day activities. It is this suspicion and problems such as Kashmir dispute, North Eastern ethnic problems in India, L TTE in Sri Lanka and transborder narco-terrorism that made bitter environment in the region and soured India's relations with neighbours. Given this background it is essential to know the views of the mainstream political parties that fought elections in the 1990s and ran the governments. They not only fought elections against the Congress Party but also advocated alternative policy stand against the Congress government in the wake of elections. In this context, the newly emerged National Front (NF), consisting of the Janata Dal and other regional parties in the 1989 election said, "The National Front government will take bold and creative initiatives to weave a new pattern of co-operative relationship with the neighbours. India's friendship with her traditional friends in South Asia... The National Front will strive to secure the safety and security of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and promote lasting peace and amity amongst all section of population in that country. It shall restore our friendly relations with Sri Lanka by withdrawing the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)." Further it says vis-a-vis Nepal and Pakistan, "With Nepal, negotiations will be started on all issues of contention to find an amicable solution. The National Front will help strengthen the economy of Nepal and honour her self-respect. The National Front will grant to Pakistan mutual withdrawal of visa restrictions and 37 Padmaja l'v1urthy, Managing Suspicions: Understanding India '.1 Relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), pp

19 promotion of bilateral commerce and trade." 38 This indicates a "healing touch" policy stand vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan. The previous Congress government was at loggerheads with Pakistan on the Jammu and Kashmir secessionist issue. On the L TTE issue in Sri Lanka, the presence of Indian the Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) led Sri Lanka to start perceiving a threat to its sovereignty. On Nepal, the Rajiv Gandhi government had terminated the Trade and Transit Treaty with Nepal. As a result, the relations with Nepal soured. The NF also articulated friendly relationship with USSR and USA 39 because the Cold War was still underway. The CPI and CPI (M) cautioned the people of India about the US imperialist conspiracy in destabilising the South Asian region by aiding and abetting the secessionists groups in India and elsewhere in South Asia. 40 The BJP adopted a harsh posture vis-a-vis Pakistan, Bangladesh and Maldives. It is reflected in its manifesto in 1989 General Elections, that these countries are against lndia. 41 The Congress casually referred to the South Asian neighbours while reaffirming its commitment to nonalignment. The Congress party's manifesto also maintained a balanced stand vis-a-vis USSR and USA on economic policy but nevertheless was committed to socialism, secularism, democracy and non-alignment. 42 But it did not come to power after the Elections and in the subsequent elections in 1991 the Congress Party accused the National Front that it could not maintain the status of India at the international level. Meanwhile, the Congress manifesto in the 1991 election.1 8 Election Manifesto of the National Front, General Election 1989, pp N Ibid., p " Election Manifesto of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), General Election Election l'vlanifesto of the BJP, General Election ~ Vide Election Manifesto ofthe Indian National Congress (1), General Election

20 says, "The Congress will pursue the objective of friendly relations with our neighbours and other Asian countries, based on well accepted principles, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs." 43 The Congress manifesto points that the National Front coalition lost the gains made by Congress government vis-a-vis Pakistan and could not contain the terrorist violence abetted by Pakistan. Its manifesto further discusses while accepting the differences with USA that the Congress party if elected to power, would enlarge the areas of co-operation vis-a-vis the USA Moreover, the Congress Party even under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi adhered to the principle of Gandhi-Nehruvian ideology of 'non-violence, nonalignment and internationalism. The CPI and CPI (M) accused the US for fomenting troubles in the region for sustaining and maintaining its supremacy in the New World Order and in South Asia. 44 The alternative policy stand they chose is that India should take a lead in the cause of third world solidarity. 45 The National Front reaffirmed in its manifesto that it would work toward building good relations with the South Asian neighbours while picking up the thread of its policy during the interlude of its rule 1989 to The BJP adopted a slightly different stand vis-a-vis the neighbours in contrast to the policy pronouncements of the above parties. Its manifesto reads: "The Pakistan establishment is hostile, and even Bangladesh establishment has been less than friendly... But the situation in Sri Lanka is as disturbed as ever." 4 J Election Manifesto of Indian National Congress (I). General Election p Vide Election Manifestos ofcpi and CPI(I'vl). General Election 1991, p. 8. vide CPI Manifesto p. IJ-14 ofcpi (M) l'v1anifesto. 45 Ibid., p

21 While pointing this, it further says, "The BJP is wedded to National interest and World Peace." 46 It indicates that the BJP had apprehensions about the activities of Pakistan and Bangladesh on the historical and politico-religious grounds because the BJP inherits the ideology from Bharatiya Jana Sangh and its parent organisation RSS, who have not accepted the fact that Pakistan, Bangladesh and. Maldives are sovereign states. They often forcefully advocated that until the integration of India and the establishment of Akhannd Bharat, i.e., re-union of the subcontinent India and Pakistan, the Jana Sangh and RSS would work constantly in this direction. In this context, D.P. Ghosh, President of the then BJS said in his presidential address at the Sixth Annual Sessio.n of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1958 that, "The Jana Sangh shall not rest nor it shall weary in the pursuit of its efforts." 47 At this juncture in early 1990s the BJP launched a powerful movement to bring change in the socio-cultural and politico-economic arenas by adopting "Hindu Rashtra" ideology in contrast to the ideology of Gandhi-Nehruvian and the socialist and secular Constitution. The BJP like its predecessor Jana Sangh was not happy with the policies and programmes adopted by the Congress government at the domestic front and vis-a-vis Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Middle East countries. Not only did the BJP want to bring change in the socio-cultural and politico-economic life of the country; it also advocated that India should possess nuclear weapons so as to gain the respect from the neighbours, Europe and US as well. The project of this ~,,Election Man!f(~sto ofthe BJP, General Election 1991, p D.P. Ghosh. Presidential Address at the Sixth Annual Session of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh at Ambala, April 4-6, Vide C.P. Bhisikar, Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya Ideology and Perception: Part V: Concept ()/the Rashtra (New Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1991 ), and Shriram Sathe, Hindu Rashtra: Interpretations-Misinterpretations (Hyderabad: ;ltihasa Sankalan Samiti, 2003). 50

22 movement entails that turning India into a "Hindu State" which would be militarily strong and would assert itself in the comity of nations. N.M. Khilnani sketches the outline of this movement of Hindu State as, "Once the Hindu sprit is fully revived, the cultural institutions will also flourish. Politically and militarily India will emerge as a strong polity, once the latent energies of all Hindus are released to flow into fruitful channels... Once India becomes a Hindu State, the inherent strength of the Hindu Dharma will assert itself. All other nations including the Chinese and Pakistanis will respect India better. At present they seem to have taken India for granted. Both Americans and other Europeans too will behave with a greater restraints, and a constraint, once the Indian State." 48 Beside this, BJP in collusion with its sister organisations RSS and VHP propagated a hate lesson to suppress the country's minorities, which is a different lesson from that of Gandhi's and exhorted them to possess the nuclear bombs so as to gain the respect of the foreign powers. Paul R. Brass recapitulates it as, "This formidable movement promises fundamental changes in Indian political practices by changing the Hindu psyche. However, it propagates a different lesson from that taught by the greatest of all Indian mass mobilizers Mahatma Gandhi... instead of Swaraj... instead of constructive work to improve the lives of the ordinary people of the country, they propose to create a great military industrial state and to build nuclear weapons to intimidate neighbouring countries and gain the respect of foreign powers." N.l\1. Khilnani, "What is wrong with the Concept of the Hindu State?", Orguniser Vol. 39, No. 32, 24 January, 1988, p.l9. 40 Paul R. Brass, The Polilics of India Since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 I), p

23 The BJP was also quite concerned and incisive in pronouncing the policy stand vis-a-vis USA while maintaining strong posture on the issue of 'National Interest' in the given post-cold War international environment. Its manifesto visa-vis the US in the light of Iraq crisis in 1991 and international law reads: "However, recent events have shown that international relations continue to be governed by the law of the jungle. The way Iraq, occupied Kuwait and the US exceeded the UN resolutions to bring death and destruction to both Kuwait and Iraq, is a warning that we cannot afford to neglect our defence." 50 Given this major pronouncements and policy stands of various parties visa-vis South Asian neighbours and Indo-US relations in the 1991 elections in the post-cold War environment in internation::~llevels, as a background it is important to see further electoral manifestos to ascertain their stand on major foreign policy issues in the 1990s. In the 1991 elections, although a hung Parliament emerged, the Congress managed to run the government successfully for five years. It not only managed to run the government but also managed to overhaul the economic system of the country by adopting market economy under the scheme of General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) and later World Trade Organisation (WTO). The political parties opposed this policy vehemently, more particularly the Communist Parties. In the 1996 elections the CPI, CPI (M) and Forward Bloc while opposing the economic policy opposed the US grand design to re-colonise the former colonial countries by imposing their terms and conditions on economic affairs of these countries. The CPI(M) election manifesto 50 Election l'v1anifesto, op.cit. no. 38, p

24 reads: "Defence of the non-aligned foreign policy; world peace and spirit of national independence, firm resistance against US imperialist attempts to impose its New World Order; Strengthen international anti-imperialist solidarity; strengthen South-South Co-operation; rebuff imperialist efforts to subvert our independent development and resistance to its attempt to impose its NPT and CTBT; cancellation of the Military co-operation pact with USA." 51 The Left parties are silent on the South Asian neighbours and no policy stand is pronounced in the wake of election vis-a-vis them. The Janata Dal, which would head the coalition government after the elections was silent in its manifesto on USA and accorded high priority to improving relations with neighbours. The Janata Dal Manifesto reads: "We will accord high priority to improving relations with the neighbours. These relations will be marked by active partnership in all areas of co-operation and continuing dialogue at all levels. Bilateral issues with the neighbours will not be allowed to fester and active effort will be made to resolve them." 52 Further, its manifesto says vis-a-vis Pakistan, "The current tensions in relations with Pakistan will not be allowed to come in the way of people to people contacts and of pursuing long-term objective of fostering close and friendly relationship with Pakistan." 53 The BJP adopted a quite aggressive stand while advocating its policy stand vis-a-vis the South Asian neighbours and Pakistan. It was more critical of Pakistan's aid and support to separatist groups in Kashmir 51 Election Manifesto of the CPI(M), General Election 1996, p. 15. :~Election Manifesto of the Janata Dal, General Election 1996, p. 30. ' ' Ibid, p

25 and elsewhere in the country. 54 Moreover, the Janata Dal and the Communist Parties were critical of economic policies adopted by the Narasimha Rao led Congress government under the scheme of GATT and WTO. The ruling Congress in its election manifesto declared that it was committed to the nonalignment policy and the new economic policy in the changed environment. Its manifesto vis-a-vis South Asian neighbours was completely silent, but on Pakistan asserted that the Congress government was ready to discuss bilateral issues with Pakistan. 55 But the Congress manifesto very ambiguously refers to all South Asian neighbours. Meanwhile, it emphatically appreciates the relationship with USA in the changed environment in 1990s. 56 Moreover, the Indo-US relations were cemented by the Narasimha Rao government during its rule from 1991 to Eventually, the 1996 election to Parliament had thrown up once again a Hung Parliament with no political party gaining a clear-cut majority in the Lower House of Parliament. Thereafter the United Front was hurriedly cobbled up so as to prevent BJP coming to power on the ground of its extremist ideology as propagated by it in the early 1990s. Finally, the United Front, a reincarnation of National Front coalition in early 1990, formed the government in the early 1996 with outside support of the Congress Party in the Parliament. Moreover, the United Front coalition government at the outset declared that it would go by consensus on foreign policy issues. The United Front's policy agenda, a common approach to major policy matters and in the minimum programme refers it as, ;J Vide Election Manifesto ofthe BJP, General Election Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress (1), General Election 1996, p b Ibid. 54

26 "There is a large measure of consensus on foreign policy which is based on our traditional values and on the experience gained during the freedom struggle and in the post-independence era. Non-alignment is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. The United Front government will closely adhere to the consensus." 57 It implies that Centrists and Leftist parties viewed foreign policy in the 1990s consistent with past policies irrespective of their ideological orientations on the eve of elections with some slight variations. At this juncture, the Congress Party under the leadership of Sita Ram Kesri withdrew its support to the United Front coalition on the ground that the "Jain Commission Report" (a commission was set up under the chairmanship of Justice M.K. Jain in the aftermath of assassination of Rajiv Gandhi to look into the conspiracy behind the assassination) in its interim report indicated that the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party) was involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. Moreover, the DMK was a constituent of the UF coalition and the Congress party insisted that the UF coalition should drop the DMK from the coalition, but the UF did not agree to it. As a result, the government lost the majority in the House and eventually tendered its resignation. This led to 1998 Parliamentary elections in which three major groups the Congress, the BJP and the ruling United Front and Left parties entered into the fray, besides the regional parties. No political parties talked about the national agenda in their campaigns. The Congress was more interested in making apologies to the minorities about its shoddy policies and painting the BJP 57 The United Front, A Common Approach to Major Policy Mailers and a Minimum Programme (New Delhi: Janata Dal office, 1996), p

27 as communal. The Bharatiya Janata Party retorted by raking up the Bofors Scandal and the foreign origins of Sonia Gandhi. The National Front-Left Front combine castigated the personal agenda of the Congress due to which the nation had to go in for another round of elections in Despite this poor reflection on issues most concerning the nation, the mainstream political parties-the Janata Dal, the Left parties, the Congress and the BJP-articulated their views on foreign policy issues on the eve of election in The Janata Dal in its election manifesto stated its foreign policy stand as, "The Janata Dal's foreign policy is guided by enlightened national interest, good neighbourliness, and friendly relations with one and all. Retention of freedom to judge every international issue on merit and promotion of friendly relations with all countries are the hallmarks of that policy. Non-Alignment constituted the quintessence and summary description of that approach. Therefore, despite major changes in world politics non-alignment remains the right policy for India. It is also directed to the promotion of peace, freedom, disarmament and a just and equitable world order." Further, the manifesto adds, "The foreign policy perspective of the Janata Dal is anchored on a conviction that peace is an essential pre-condition for development. Without peace and stability in the neighbourhood genuine progress is an illusion. Therefore, the Janata Dal's foreign policy accords highest priority to India's friendly relationship with all its neighbours. The Gujral Doctrine embodied that approach." By this time the Janata Dal has modified its views on economic policy. The manifesto reflects the same as, "The Janata Dal will increasingly attune the country's foreign policy also 56

28 to promote India's international economic interest like trade, business, investment and mobility of the country's skilled labour." 58 But it is completely silent on policy towards US. Meanwhile, the CPI, CPI (M), the Revolutionary Socialist Party and All India Forward Bloc jointly issued a manifesto in 1998 and stated in it their policy stand as, "The United Front government took some commendable initiatives to improve relations with India's neighbours and resist pressures to sign the CTBT. In the new world situation where the United States and its Western allies seek to dominate the world, it is imperative that Indian foreign policy continues with its basic orientation embodied in the non-aligned policy. This means not succumbing to imperialist pressures which will undermine India's independent positions and harm its security interests." Further, it says vis-a-vis Pakistan, SAAR C. and US as, "Further steps are taken to strengthen and improve relations with South Asian Countries and promote SAARC co-operation. Special efforts to improve relations with Pakistan and promote people to-people ties." And, on Indo-US it says, 'The Indo-US military co-operation agreement is cancelled." 59 Meanwhile the Congress accused Pakistan for fermenting troubles in Indian states of Kashmir, Punjab and the North Eastern states and stated its policy stand in the manifesto that: "It will fight terrorism and insurgency within the country supported by Pakistan. At the same time, however, it will seek to build closer economic, trade, cultural, educational and political ties with Pakistan. The Congress government had offered the hand of peace to Pakistan in 1989 and 58 Janata Dal's Manifesto, Lok Sabha Election 1998, p Election Manifesto of the Left parties, Lok Sabha Election 1998, p. 75.