The Rt Hon Clare Short MP. Vi'fL'/un of State for International Development

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1 s successful. The crisis which threatened the massive develpment gains in East Asia and the perfrmance f the wrld ecnmy shwed that such systems were unsustainable and I am pleased t say the arguments f the cynics are nw cmpletely vertaken. But fr me, wrst f all, crruptin hurts the pr. The elquence f their anger at petty crruptin wrldwide shws there is n such thing as a culture f crruptin. And if we lk at the prest cuntries and cntinents in the wrld, we find terrible pverty side by side with great riches, with crruptin in between. And we see develpment delayed and pverty' linger because massive resurces are wasted and misused fr crrupt purpses. We can and must d better. /% The Rt Hn Clare Shrt MP Vi'fL'/un f State fr Internatinal Develpment Cllective rights: the case f indigenus peples by Alexandra Xanthaki Pending agreement n a UN Declaratin n the Rights f Indigenus Peples, Alexandra Xanthaki examines the plitical theries and research supprting the need fr recgnitin f cllective identities and rights, which she claims have hithert been vershadwed by the fcus n rights f the individual. Indigenus expectatins fr a 'Declaratin n the Rights f Indigenus Peples' that wuld include a wide range t cllective rights have sparked lively debates between states, indigenus representatives and experts in the United Natins Wrking Grup n Indigenus Peples. Indigenus representatives insist that the individualistic view f the wrld is ttally alien t the indigenus ideas f the wrld, their traditins, their past and their present. An exclusive emphasis n individual rights has nt and cannt give effective guarantees fr indigenus peples, wh require the simultaneus prtectin as cllectivities in rder t survive and flurish as distinct peples and cultures. Cllective rights emphasise the value f prtecting indigenus cultures and existence per se and reject assimilatin and integratin as valid mdes f relating t indigenus peples. Indigenus peples have stated: 'The cncept jindigenus peples' cllective rights is j paramunt imprtance. It is the establishment f rights f peples as grups, and nt merely the recgnitin f individual rights, which is ne f the mst imprtant purpses f this Declaratin. Withut this, the Declaratin cannt adequately prtect ur mst basic interests. This must nt be cmprmised.' (emphasis added) (UN Sub-Cmmissin, Indigenus Peples Preparatry Meeting: Cmments n the First Revised Text f the Draft Declaratin n Rights f Indigenus Peples, July 1989.) In cntrast, sme states use liberal thery in rder t reject the ntin f cllective rights. The French delegate, fr example, stated in the 1996 Wrking Grup n Indigenus Peples that cllective rights did nt exist in internatinal human rights law, and therefre his gvernment had reservatins with regard t thse articles that aimed t establish cllective rights. In similar fashin, the US explained its rejectin f indigenus cllective rights (in its delegatin's cmments n s. 1 f the Draft Declaratin in the 1995 Wrking Grup) n the basis that: 'Internatinal instruments generally speak f individual nt cllective rights.... Making clear that the rights guaranteed are thse f individuals prevents gvernments r grups f (sic) vilating r interfering with them in the name f the greater gd f a grup r a state... In certain cases, it is entirely apprpriate r necessary t refer t indigenus cmmunities r grups, in rder t reinfrce their individual civil and plitical rights n the basis jfull equality and nn- discriminatin. But characterising a right as belnging t a cmmunity, r cllective, rather than an individual, can be and ften is cnstrued t limit the exercise f that right (since nly a grup can invke it), and thus may pen the dr t the denial f the right t the individual. This apprach is cnsistent with the general view f the US, as develped by its dmestic experience, that the rights f all peple are best assured when the rights f each persn are effectively prtected.' The traditinal apprach t liberal rights thery recgnises nly tw categries f rights hlders: the individual and the

2 sciety. In their histrical evlutin, human rights have been perceived as the rights f individuals against state pwer. Oppnents f cllective rights base their arguments n csmplitanism, a thery which advcates fr autnmus individuals wh are free frm their cultural traditin and can therefre make autnmus decisins, in cntrast t the cmmunitarian thery accrding t which the self has attachments t the culture he/she has grwn up in. Liberals argue that the establishment f cllective rights will reflect a ttalitarian visin f the sciety and will raise tribalist r natinalistic attitudes. The extensive philsphising n the need fr cultural membership and cllective rights is generally perceived by internatinal lawyers as very engaging and very relevant t legal debates n claims fr cllective rights; yet, smetimes it appears t be lagging behind new develpments in internatinal law. If internatinal law is defined as the system f rules and principles that gvern internatinal relatins (Martin Dixn, Textbk n Internatinal Law, 3rd edn, Lndn: Blackstne Press Ltd, 1996, 2), its nrmative directin n the issue cannt be ignred. In this article, I will fcus n three elements which frm the directin internatinal law has taken in the debate n cultural membership and cllective rights: the perceptin f grups as cncentric circles; the idea f tgetherness in difference; and the mdel f critical pluralism. GROUPS AS CONCENTRIC CIRCLES The liberal emphasis n the dichtmy between the individual and the state ignres the existence f any intermediate grups. The rejectin f cllective rights derives frm a ntin f 'mntheism f the state', namely unlimited svereignty f the state and the view that the state shuld be the nly surce f authrity in each plitical system. Hwever, this mdel appears t be incnsistent with the existing nrms f internatinal law as well as the internatinal plitical realities. In the pst-natinal state, althugh sharing the state's natinal identity, citizens have in mst cases ther lyalties as well. These lyalties may lie in grups smaller than the state, such as families, lcal cmmunities, ethnic, religius and cultural grups, as well as grups bigger than the state, such as reginal rganisatins (e.g. the Eurpean Unin) r even the internatinal sciety. All these grups represent a series f multiple lyalties that the individual has and cnsequently incrprate varius cultures that influence the individual. Fr example, a Sami wh lives in Finland has been expsed t the specific culture f his family, the culture f his village (which smetimes has a different linguistic dialect), the Sami culture, the Finnish culture as well as the Eurpean culture. Internatinal law is in the prcess f recgnising varius subnatinal grups ther than the state. Internatinal nrms are in the prcess f expanding the number f entities that enjy legal persnality if nly fr sme purpses. Currently, nn-state entities such as inter-gvernmental rganisatins, reginal rganisatins, nn-self-gverning territries, liberatin mvements and insurgent cmmunities, nn-gvernmental rganisatins, crpratins and autnmus lcal administratins can act t sme extent as agents in the internatinal arena (see Martin Dixn, p cit, , and lan Brwnlie, Principles f Public Internatinal Law, 4th edn, Oxfrd: Clarendn Press, 1992, 58-70). Internatinal law ges even further and recgnises the imprtance f grups in the life f the individual. The 1989 UNESCO Recmmendatin n the Safeguarding f Traditinal Culture and Flklre prtects the culture f sub-natinal grups. Als, the Cnventin n the Rights f the Child states that educatin must develp respect fr the child's 'wn cultural identity, language and values' as well as fr 'the natinal values f the cuntry in which the child is living'. Althugh the human rights system gives the central rle t the individual, prtectin is als given t the persn as a member f grups, such as the family, ethnic, natinal, religius and linguistic grups and natins (peples). Even thugh mst f these prvisins establish individual rights r individual rights in cllective capacity, their spirit recgnises the imprtance f grups fr the. individual and prescribes that these grups shuld be prtected. By prtecting the varius sub-grups that surrund the individual, it appears that internatinal law perceives these grups as frming cncentric circles arund the persn. Apart frm having his/her wn attributes and chices as an independent agent, the persn is als influenced by his/her immediate grup (such as the family), peer grup (such as the lcal grup), ethnic, religius and cultural grup, his/her natin" (peples), state, cntinent/regin and, finally, lsely by the main culture we all share as citizens f a cmmn wrld. The clser the circle t the persn, the mre influence it has n him/her. In rder t prtect the individual, all the varius 'circles' lyalties arund him/her need t be prtected. Thus, internatinal law includes a different set f prtectin fr the individual (by establishing individual rights), but als his/her family, ethnic, cultural r religius grup, the sciety he/she lives in, and finally the culture f his/her cntinent and the culture f the wrld itself (by establishing cllective rights) (see Rnald Caret, 'Cmmunality and Existence: The Rights f Grups', 56 (1993) Suth Califrnia Law Review, ). As Waldrn argues (in Jeremy Waldrn, 'Minrity Cultures and the Csmplitan Alternative' 25 (1995) University f Michigan Jurnal f Law Refrm, , as reprinted in Will Kymlicka (ed), The Rights f Minrity Cultures, Oxfrd University Press, 1995, , 103): 'Just as the allegedly self-made individual needs t be brught t a prper awareness f[h\s/]her dependence n scial, cmmunal and cultural structures, s t in the mdern wrld particular cultures and natinal cmmunities have an bligatin t recgnise their dependence n the wider scial, plitical, internatinal and civilisatinal structures that sustain them.' The illustratin f the self and its varius cultural memberships as cncentric circles seems t represent an accurate and viable perceptin f the link between the persn, nn-state grups and sciety. It fllws the cmmunitarian apprach n the imprtance f cultural framewrks, but it is liberated frm the trap f 'ne culture'. It recgnises that mre than ne culture can play a valuable rle in the individual's chices; it accepts that in the pst-natinal wrld individuals can have several lyalties withut them being ppsing r dangerus t natinal unity and it indicates the interplay that exists amng cultures.

3 Persnalism This apprach has als been upheld by persnalism. Persnalists cnsider the individualistic traditin and the cmmunitarian apprach t be cmplementary rather than cntrasting. Accrding t the Encyclpaedia f Philsphy, persnalism is defined as: '[a] philsphical perspective r system fr which persn is the ntlgical ultimate and Jr which persnality is thus the fundamental explanatry principle.' Persnalists regard the 'persn' as an essential part f the cmmunity, as distinct frm the 'individual', wh is regarded as an islated entity (Virginia A Leary, "Pstliberal strands in Western Human Rights Thery" in Abdullah Ahmed An-Nam (ed), Human Rights in Crss-Cultural Perspectives. A Quest Jr Cnsensus, Philadelphia: University f Pennsylvania Press, 1992, , 108). The term 'persn' r 'persnality' implies relatinships with thers in the cmmunity and a crrespnding link with the cmmunity and the relatins between persns and sciety. Persnalists believe that a persn is inseparable frm the cntext f the wrld and f thers. The persn lives in cmmunity with thers and nt as an islated individual; thus, persnalists supprt the establishment f cmmunity7 rights, particularly fr cmmunities smaller than the state. Hwever, persnalists d nt ignre the negative cnsequences f grup membership; thus, rights exist t cunteract the tyranny f the state as well as the tyranny f grups and they can be claimed against the state as well as grups. The persnalist perspective f rights ffers a western cnceptin f human rights which is nt cnstrained t individual rights. The mdel f persnalism appears t be a viable mdel fr indigenus peples and the recgnitin f their rights. The Indian Crees, fr example, share the culture f their reservatin, the culture f the verlapping American Indian cmmunity' and they als share characteristics f the Canadian culture; they als feel part f the Nrth American culture as well as members f the internatinal cmmunity'. Their lives and chices represent a mixture f characteristics f these cultures and they want t preserve and prtect all f these characteristics. Their cllective rights will prtect them frm the states and the ther grups; their individual rights will prtect them against all authrities, including the indigenus ne. In this spirit, the establishment f r ' cllective rights fr indigenus peples seems truble-free. PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE 'The cncept f indigenus peples' cllective rights is f paramunt imprtance. It is the establishment f rights f peples as grups, and nt merely the recgnitin f individual rights, which is ne f the mst imprtant purpses f this Declaratin'. Existing prvisins 'Cllective rights' des nt cnstitute a new area fr internatinal law. The existing nrms prtect varius aspects f grups. Fr example, art. 1 and 2 f the Cnventin n the Preventin and Punishment f the Crime f Gencide enumerates thse acts which cnstitute gencide 'when intended t destry, in whle r in part a natinal, ethnical, racial and religius grup'. Mrever, art. 1 (4) f the Cnventin n the Eliminatin f All Frms f Racial Discriminatin rejects the term racial discriminatin fr special measures that are adpted fr the sle purpse f securing adequate advancement f certain ethnic grups. Als, the UNESCO Declaratin n Race and Racial Prejudice establishes the respnsibility f the state t prtect human rights and fundamental freedms n an equal fting fr individuals and grups. The varius instruments n minrities, such as art. 27 f the Internatinal Cvenant n Civil and Plitical Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Declaratin n Minrities als prtect grups. Mre recently, varius cllective rights have been established per se, such as the right t self-determinatin, the right t develpment, the right t peace, the right t c-wnership f the cmmn heritage f mankind, the right t a healthy envirnment and mst relevant t ur discussin the right t preserve ne's cultural identity. (Fr example, the UNESCO Declaratin n Race and Racial Prejudice prclaims that 'all individuals and grups have the right t be different'.) Ptential cnflict? Still, even thugh grup rights cmplement individual rights, there are certain cases where there is a cnflict between cllective and individual rights. The questin is: which ne will prevail in cases f cnflict? Eiberals tried t find a way fr the adjudicatin f all these rights by giving a narrw interpretatin t cllective rights and by regarding them, as much as pssible, as individual rights cllectively pursued and whenever that was nt pssible t rank them far behind the individual rights. This line f thught is manifested in the establishment f minrity rights in internatinal law as individual rights under cllective capacity', rather than cllective rights (thus minrity- rights are recgnised as individual rights that can be exercised 'in cmmunity with thers'; see, e.g. the UN Declaratin n Ethnic, Natinal, Religius r Linguistic Minrities and art. 27 f the ICCPR). It seems that establishing a general rule f hierarchy f rights wuld be cunter-prductive. Caret (p cit) argues that any framewrk f accmmdatin f individual and cllective rights wuld vilate the principle f nn-derivatin amng the three elements f a human being, namely persnhd, cmmunality and sciality. William Pertney explicitly rejects any hierarchy between cllective and individual rights, althugh his general interpretative principles t facilitate their c-existence imply a prevalence f individual rights: firstly, 'the particular cllectivity must nt be impaired in its capacity t cntinue either by the State r by claims n behalf f individuals'; and secndly, 'a particular cllectivity must respect the maximum individual rights cnsnant with the preservatin f the grup' (W F Pertney, The Abriginal Rights Prvisins in the Cnstitutin Act, Saskatn: Native Law Centre, 1987, 52, as quted in Darlene Jhnstn (Kymlicka (ed)) Jhnstn ntes that: '... in light f the ptential diversity f grup claims, it might be premature t attempt t cnstruct a generalised framewrk fr their adjudicatin'. If cmmunity is seen as a cnstituent f individual identity, then enhancing cllective rights need nt diminish individual rights. By recgnising the imprtance f sub-natinal grups, internatinal law seems t emphasise the circumstances f mutual reinfrcement between grups. Gutmann adpts an

4 10 integratinist apprach and cmments that it may be pssible 't find ways in which lcal cmmunities and demcracy can be vitalised withut vilating individual rights' (Amy Gutmann, 'Cmmunitarian Critics f Liberalism', 14 (1985) Philsphy and Public Affairs, ). Jhnstn argues that 'cllective and individual interests are nt... inevitably antagnistic. The suppsed antithesis seems t be based n a particular and intlerant cnceptin f the nature f grup rights.' Internatinal law als seems t ppse a pre-determined hierarchy amng rights. Cnflicts between rights is a cmmn phenmenn f the legal prfessin. Any cnflicts between rights, principles and nrms are generally slved n an ad hc basis, after taking int accunt varius cnsideratins. In pssible cnflicts between a cllective and an individual right, the same prcess wuld be used. Kymlicka ppses this prcess and accepts interference in the minrities' cultures when the individual rights f the members f the grups are vilated (Will Kymlicka, 'The Rights f Minrity Cultures, Reply t Kukathas', 20 (1992) 1 Plitical Thery, , 144). Hwever, this interference is nt clear- cut. He suggests many criteria that will determine the prevalence f the individual right, including: ' '... the severity f discriminatin within the cmmunity, the extent f divisin within the cmmunity, the existence f any treaty bligatins, the nature f the prpsed interference, and s frth. Fr example, there is a large difference between cercively impsing liberalism and ffering varius incentives fr liberal refrms. ' Kymlicka favurs a search fr agreement n fundamental principles. In any case, the tw cultures will have t find a mdus vivendi. Hence, il a minrity culture is nn-liberal: '... liberals inside the culture will seek t prmte their liberal principles thrugh reasn r example, and liberals utside wuld lend their supprt t any effrts the cmmunity makes t liberalise their culture. ' TOGETHERNESS IN DIFFERENCE The 1966 UNESCO Declaratin f the Principles f Internatinal Cultural C-peratin declares that: "... in their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprcal influences they exert n ne anther, all cultures frm part f the cmmn heritage belnging t all mankind. ' Accrding t the declaratin, cultural c-peratin is a right and a duty fr all peples and natins. All natins must respect the distinctive character l each culture, while prmting their enrichment in an atmsphere f friendship and peace. Cultural c-peratin aims at the mutual benefit f all the natins practising it and shuld be exercised in a spirit f brad reciprcity. Bth the Cuncil f Eurpe Framewrk Cnventin n Natinal Minrities and the Organisatin fr Security and C peratin in Eurpe (OSCE) Cpenhagen Dcument re-assert the spirit f tlerance and intercultural dialgue, mutual respect and understanding that shuld exist amng the minrities and the majrity. The idea f reciprcity amng cultures is emphasised in the fllwing cmment f the UN Cmmittee n Human Rights in relatin t the prtectin f cultural rights: 'The prtectin f these rights is directed t ensure the survival and cntinued develpment f the cultural, religius and scial identity j the minrities cncerned, thus enriching the fabric f sciety as a whle.' (emphasis added) Internatinal law adpts a multicultural plicy in relatin t the varius grups and their cultures, namely a plicy that leads t equality amng the grups and equal treatment. Thrugh the celebratin f difference r diversity, internatinal law has fstered a cnstructinalist apprach t culture, namely a view f culture as a relatinal cncept: there can be n act f identificatin that des nt already entail an act f differentiatin (M Schulte-Tenckhff, 'The right f persns belnging t minrities t enjy their wn culture', wrking paper fr the 1997 UN Wrking Grup n Minrities). Hwever, differentiatin is nt viewed as exclusin. All the grups understand themselves as participants in the same sciety, subject t interactin, exchange and inter-dependency. The interactin smetimes causes frictin and cnflicts that are reslved fllwing institutins and prcedures f discussin that all participants have accepted as legitimately binding. These grups are hetergeneus, and have a differentiated place in public life. Yung calls this mdel 'the hetergeneus public' (Iris Marin Yung, 'Tgether in Difference: Transfrming the Egic f Grup Plitical Cnflict' in Will Kymlicka (ed), The Rights f Minrity Cultures, Oxfrd: OUR 1995, , 157). Internatinal law seems t apprve the cnnectin between the varius grups that Yung calls 'tgetherness in difference'. Althugh Yung is primarily interested in scial grups, her apprach seems verv relevant t cultural grups. Varius grups are seen as: '... verlapping, as cnstituted in relatin t ne anther and thus, as shifting their attributes and needs in accrdance with what relatins are salient. In my view, this relatinal cnceptin f difference as cnceptual helps make mre apparent bth the necessity and pssibility f plitical tgetherness in difference.' In her mdel, Yung suggests a cnceptin f difference that better recgnises the hetergeneity- and diffusin f grups a mre fluid and explicitly relatinal cnceptin f difference: 'In this cnceptin, difference des nt mean therness, r exclusive ppsitin, but rather specificity, variatin, hetergeneity. Difference names relatins f bth similarity and dissimilarity that can be reduced neither t cextensive identity nr verlapping therness. Different grups ptentially share sme attributes, experiences r gals. Their differences will be mre r less salient depending n the grups cmpared and the purpses f the cmparisn. The characteristics that make ne grup specific and the brders that distinguish it frm ther grups are always undecidable.' Yung's apprach recgnises that multiculturalism within the state is valuable and that all cultures are imprtant fr the develpment f the individual and the sciety in general. Cultures are nt nly permitted, but even assigned t have an input in the cultural life f the state and, in turn, the state guarantees grup-related rights and plicies. Cultures are nt seen as cntrasting, but as verlapping; differences are seen as 'variatins' and are nt ignred, but celebrated. Yung's mdel indicates that apart frm the cultures that frm cncentric circles, there are ther cultures invlved in the frming and develpment f the individual in a parallel way. It is thus viable in a multinatinal sciety' t have the same amunt f lyalty t tw ethnic grups r tw cultural grups.

5 CRITICAL PLURALISM UNESCO, which includes 186 member states, is dedicated t the develpment f internatinal intellectual c-peratin. The recent UNESCO Wrld Cmmissin n Culture and Develpment reprt entitled 'Our Creative Diversity' (chap. II, p. 70) emphasises the imprtance f cultural pluralism and plitical demcracy. The reprt states that: '... the challenge tday... is t develp a setting that ensures that develpment is integrative and that there are best practice institutins built n genuine cmmitment t being inclusive'. Multiculturalism can exist nly in a pluralistic sciety, where an array f chices and pprtunities wuld maintain a marketplace f gds, ideas, cultural and plitical ptins. In this cntext, individuals that are nt hpelessly dependent n specific cultural attachments will be able t make their wn chices. This framewrk can be fund in a pluralistic sciety, that is, advcated by csmplitans (Michael McDnald, 'Shuld Cmmunities,Have Rights? Reflectins n Liberal Individualism' in 4 (1991) 2 Canadian Jurnal f Law and Jurisprudence, , 224). Pluralism is viewed by many states as the main challenge t the state's svereignty. (Michael Walzer, "Pluralism: A Plitical Perspective" in Will Kymlicka (ed)). The tw cncepts (pluralism and state svereignty) are perceived as ppsing and challenging. In the pst-natinal state, these perceptins are incnsistent with reality. In fact, the recent events in frmer Yugslavia indicate that pluralism may be the nly way f maintaining a state's svereignty. If the state denies its multicultural character, its citizens will inevitably feel dissatisfied and ppressed. As seen in the cntext f Eastern Eurpe and the frmer Sviet Unin, ppressed grups are likely t revlt and try t undermine the state's svereignty. In cntrast, if pluralism and svereignty are viewed as supplementing principles f this new rder, cllective rights will be recgnised in the cultural grups f the state (pluralism) and the state can maintain its rle as a decisin maker, the manager f the varius activities (svereignty). Aden Addis makes the distinctin between tw frms f pluralism: paternalistic pluralism and critical pluralism. In paternalistic pluralism, minrities are viewed as the 'thers' and their rights are prtected as a means t 'save' them frm the majrity In this mdel, the minrities themselves d nt engage in a dialgue abut their rights, because they are seen as unable t d s. It is the enlightened majrity that decides hw t 'save' them. Evident examples f this plicy have been the plicies f many gvernments twards indigenus peples (Aden Addis, 'Individualism, Cmmunitarianism and the Rights f Ethnic 7 Minrities', in 67 (1992) Ntre Dame Law Review, , 620). Unlike paternalistic pluralism, critical pluralism views minrities as partners in the creatin r recreatin f the sciety. The state actively engages in a dialgue with minrities in rder t find the best way and resurces t make minrity cultures flurish. Mrever, the state creates institutins that enable the rest f the ppulatin t pen itself up t all grups, by accepting them all as dialgue partners. Critical pluralism als believes in multiplicity: grups are seen as 'cntingent rather than essential' and their very meaning can be mulded and re shaped thrugh dialgue. The idea f critical pluralism is realised thrugh the varius prvisins n participatin f minrity grups in the decisinmaking prcess f the sciety they live in. The UN Declaratin n Minrities prclaims that members f minrities have the right t participate effectively in decisins at the natinal and, where apprpriate, reginal level. In particular, the ILO Cnventin (169) cncerning indigenus and tribal peples in independent cuntries adpts a brad cncept f participatin in relatin t indigenus peples: states shuld nt nly cnsult indigenus peples n matters which affect them directly; the cnsultatins must be undertaken with the bjective f achieving agreement r cnsent t the prpsed measures. In the dialgue prcess, grups are cnceived as equal partners rather than negtiatrs r imitatrs f the dminant grups. The critically pluralist sciety7 des nt transcend grup differences; cultures are nt surpassed but acknwledged and celebrated. Institutinal dialgue is very imprtant, because it leads t the re-evaluatin Kymlicka argues fr; grups are invlved in mutual crrective engagements. Grups are re- cnceptualised and re-cast and their differences are adjusted and recnstituted in a prcess l cnstant and genuine dialgue. Thrugh dialgue, grups are challenged t accmmdate in their wn wrld the bjective reality f the ther. They interact, exchange ideas and benefit frm the cultures f all the grups rather than just frm their wn culture exclusively. As Falk ntes (in Richard Falk, 'Cultural Fundatins fr the Internatinal Prtectin f Human Rights', A A An-Na'im (ed), Human Pjghts in Crss-Cultural Perspectives, A Quest jr Cnsensus, Philadelphia: University f Pennsylvania Press, 1992, 43-64, 48): 'One rle f the rbust sciety is t vercme bth nrmative and cultural blindness t human suffering. The raising f awareness requires deliberate effrts t cunterpart the vulnerability f previusly excluded grups; lessening mlnerability in turn depends n develping decentralised participatr}'demcracy.... Demralisatin is bth a vital precnditin and a crucial ingredient j human rights prtectin.' CONCLUSIONS The cncepts f cncentric lyalties, tgetherness in difference and critical pluralism appear t be supprted by the existing nrms f internatinal law. These cncepts frm the basis fr the equal c-existence f cllective rights with individual rights and cmbine the essence f liberalism with cllective rights. If indigenus cmmunities are accepted and recgnised as bearers f rights and duties, there is a greater chance t develp a cherent set f dctrines t accmmdate their real prblems and cncerns. The inclusin f a wide range f cllective rights in the United Natins Declaratin n the Rights f Indigenus Peples will render affirmative actin fr these cmmunities easier, and indigenus natins that have suffered discriminatin fr s lng will eventually be cmpensated. /» Alexandra Xanthaki Department j Law, Kecle University This article is based n a paper presented in an earlier versin at the Wrld Cngress n Philsphy f Law and Scial Philsphy held at Pace University, New Yrk, frm 24 t 30 June The authr is grateful t Prfessr P Thrnberry, C Stefanu and R W Race fr their cmments. 11 Amicus Curias Issue 25 March 2000