Fertile Soil: Afghanistan s Potential of Further Radicalization

Transcription

1 Fertile Soil: Afghanistan s Potential of Further Radicalization Bele Grau Goethe University Frankfurt Official Self-Designation: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Capital: Kabul Form of Government: Presidential system (rank in worldwide FFP failed state index: 7/178) Head of State: President Dr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai Head of Government: de facto CEO Abdullah Abdullah (whose precise role is still unclear) Official Languages: Pashtu and Dari Languages of inhabitants: Pashtu, Dari, Uzbek, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashai, Nuristani, Pamiri, and others Religions: 99% Muslims (ca. 80% Sunnites and 19% Shiites), few Sikhs, Hindus, Christians Surface: 652,864 km 2 Population: 27.5 million Population density: 39 inhabitants per km 2 Population growth: 2.03% Average age: 16.6 (median) Population under 25 years: 63% Introduction: Religiosity and Political Islam Afghanistan s former Mujahedin have emerged successful: criticism of holy warriors, as they now call themselves, has become synonymous with criticism of Islam, and this synonymy is highly dangerous in their country. Many a war criminal invokes Islam to place himself above state laws, and thus to act with impunity. Secular groupings, which continue to exist in the urban populations, no longer refer to themselves as such these days in public; to do so would be too risky. There is much pressure to profess one s faith in Islam in the government, the judicial system, and society. A sometimes absurd who is most Islamic competition creates tremendous pressure both on the media and civil society, particularly on women s rights groups, to position themselves within Islam and to dissociate themselves from un-islamic values. For example, in the last couple of years a heated debate has focused on a law to protect women against violence, accompanied by a media and religious campaign against women s shelters. Both the law and the shelters are basically accused of being anti-islamic. Women s rights groups have no choice but to provide legal and religious evidence to the effect that none of the law s components are in opposition to Islam. The supreme Ulema Council, which was appointed by the government in 2002 and is government-paid, constitutes the largest and most influential religious structure in Afghanistan: it is made up of 3,000 ulema and mullahs 1 (3/4 Sunnites and 1/4 Shiites), many of whom are also active as judges, political advisers, teachers, or imams. Most of them belong to one of the Mujahedin groups. On the national level, the Council advises the government in religious issues, usually supports its decisions, and thus lends the government religious legitimization; on the local level, however, the ulema and mullahs often take a stance that is critical of the government and anti-western. In the social debate on women s rights they took an extremely conservative position in 2012, declaring that women are worth less than men, should not travel without a mahram (male relative), and ought to avoid contact with men in work, education, and leisure time. Their monthly statements on the national level, as well as their sermons in local mosques, have much influence on the social negotiation of 1 Ulema are scholars who have received higher religious education, for example at a university. Ulema have a lower level of religious training, e.g., at a mosque. 1

2 norms. 2 Saudi Arabia, too, tries to exert increasing influence on religious education in Afghanistan, for example by building and running a religious training center in Kabul. 3 Pakistani religious scholars view the Taliban s battle against western intervention as justified and lay the sole responsibility for all civilian casualties on the U.S. and the NATO. Development of Jihadism A basically spiritual and traditional version of Islam, which was not much prone to violence, prevailed in Afghanistan for a long time: the founder of one of the most important Sufi orders, Maulana Dschalaluddin Rumi, was born in northern Afghanistan in the 12 th century, and Sufism has still many followers among those who adhere to folk religion. Mullahs, the majority of whom were Sunnites, wanted to keep their power and allied themselves with tribal leaders to offer fierce resistance to the modernization efforts of various governments in the 20 th century. The resistance was mainly about women s rights, and was supported by the majority of the predominantly religiousconservative population. From the 1950s onward small Islamist groups emerged; however, they met with little resonance in the population and were oppressed by the government. Since 1975 there have been religious conflicts in Afghanistan, all of which were legitimized in religious terms. The Mujahedin The 1960s/1970s witnessed an increasing polarization between leftist and conservative-religious groups; the seizure of power by the communist government in 1978 and the subsequent Soviet occupation sparked the mobilization of Islamist resistance groups which were supported by a large majority of the population due to their nationalist agenda. While these Mujahedin groups had various religious and political agendas, religion played a central role in all of these: the armed resistance against the occupiers was defined as jihad, and religious leaders assumed key political roles in a number of groups. These men made some futile attempts to unite all resistance groups under their leadership; however, other groups with non-religious commanders were more efficient in warfare and refused to accept their claim to leadership. The most important Mu- 2 Osman, Borhan (2012): jahedin were the Sunnite Peshawar-7, named after their headquarters (e.g., Ahmad Shah Massud, Rabbani, Dostum, and Ismael Khan) as well as two Shiite groups; they were provided with financial resources and arms by Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia in order to fight the Soviet troops. The Taliban The Taliban are the by far largest group of jihadists today. Their number is usually estimated to range between ca. 10,000 and 20,000 fighters; according to some estimates there are even 40,000 of them. It is likely, however, that only about 10% are active as full-time combatants. The others live in their communities and participate in battle only sporadically, either as volunteers or for money. 4 The Taliban s purely Afghan agenda includes the restoration of the Islamic emirate, and thus the return to a true Islamic order, as well as large-scale liberation from western occupation. The Taliban were originally a small group from the Kandahar region. The first fighters were recruited among Afghan refugees in Pakistani madrassas and mosques; many of them had never experienced village life the very way of life they propagated from then on. It was both a religious and social movement; and to defeat the Mujahedin groups that fought each other, the Taliban were supplied with generous material and financial support by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Taliban ideology is influenced by various Sunnite groups (particularly the Deobandi) which follow the scriptures to the letter, and by the Pashtu tribal codex called Pashtunwali. Any individual interpretation of Islam is forbidden, and pluralism is not tolerated. Their world view is strictly dualistic and profoundly misogynous. Women are completely excluded from the public sphere; in other spheres, too, the main focus is on compliance with external rules of behavior and dress codes. They view themselves as being authorized to excommunicate other Muslims particularly Shiites who do not comply with these rules, and believe that it is legitimate to annihilate all people who disagree with their ideology. Jihad, defined as armed combat, is declared the sixth duty of every Muslim. However, the Taliban have never published any political-religious manifesto, and policy statements, either by Mullah Omar or some spokesman, are rare and sometimes contradictory. 4 Ruttig, Thomas (2009): The Other Side. Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to Talks, p content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/ aan-report-ruttig- The-Other-Side.pdf 03/21/2015). 2

3 Since the rise of the Islamic State (IS) at the latest, the Taliban have had an image problem: particularly radical urban youths think that they are too retrogressive; that is why they, too, have been active on Facebook and Twitter for the last couple of years. In the core group of the Taliban, which is largely made up of members from the movement s beginnings, cohesion is guaranteed by the shared ideology and many years of close interpersonal relationship; more recent followers usually support the Taliban for other reasons to be specified below; ideological identification tends to decrease with people s distance from the inner circle. One of the most important factors in creating a sense of identity is the spiritual leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, who was proclaimed amir-ul-mohmenin (Leader of the Faithful) in The role of Mullah Omar is mainly of a strategic and ideological nature; for reasons of safety he is not in direct contact with the operational circle of leaders in Quetta. His bestknown statements are Layha, 5 which include appeals to the combatants to spare Afghan civilians an instruction that serves propagandistic purposes rather than calling for actual compliance, as it is the Taliban who are responsible for the large number of civilian casualties in the country. 6 Mullah Omar has not appeared in person for years, neither before his fighters nor before the public. This poses an increasing problem; the power struggle for his succession began when Pakistan had his designated successor arrested in The Taliban still use the name Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and regard themselves as the legitimate government. They definitely have ties to the population, even though many Afghans reject the Taliban and basically associate them with Pakistan. 7 Besides their own organizational structure they have created parallel government structures which have been implemented to varying degrees for all 34 provinces. Some of these governments are located in Afghanistan, others in Pakistan. They actual- 5 Layha are codes of behavior. Cf. Clark, Kate (2011): The Layha. Calling the Taleban to account, f 03/24/2015). 6 According to the U.N., about three quarters of the civilian casualties in 2014 were to be blamed on the Taliban. hts/2015/2014-annual-report-on-protection-of-civilians-final.pdf 03/26/2015). 7 Münch, Phillip and Thomas Ruttig (2014:35): Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance: The Situation of the Afghan Insurgency, in: Orient III / 2014, pp ttig_2014_situatio_of_the_afg_ins.pdf 03/22/2015). ly function mainly in the Pashtu south where there are also some Taliban courts. The population often prefers these over the slow and corrupt government courts. In places where there is not yet a Taliban court, the local ulema is sometimes called upon to administer justice. 8 Taliban ideology ranges from extreme hardliners often from the younger generation that has replaced leaders killed in the past years to those who take a more moderate stance. Under certain circumstances, the latter tolerate girls schools in their districts or are willing to discuss political solutions for the conflict. They speak out against suicide attacks, violence against the own population, and further destruction of their country; in addition, they are against dependency on al-qaeda and the Pakistani secret service ISI, and disapprove of paid or criminal combatants. However, these are not groups but individual positions within the movement. 9 The Taliban are no ethno-nationalist Pashtun movement; while most of their followers are Pashtuns, they are only supported by a small part of the Pashtun population as a whole. Ideologically, they position themselves against any type of ethnic or tribal affiliation, because Islam is supposed to be the only marker of identification; in practice, however, this is not accepted by all fighters. Various groups unite under the name of Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik Taliban-I Pakistan, TTP). While they tend to be more radical than their Afghan allies, they nevertheless accept Mullah Omar as their spiritual leader. They constitute large parts of the Taliban troops and fight jointly with the Afghan Taliban, particularly in the east of Afghanistan. They have close ties to the ISI and the Pakistani military. In the wake of 2001 they set goals of their own and began to fight the Pakistani government when the latter had joined the U.S. War on Terror. Several locally operating groups have allied themselves with the Taliban and accept Mullah Omar as their leader. However, they are very autonomous in their actions. The best known of these groups is Jalaludin Haqqani s Haqqani Network, which already existed prior to the Taliban and has its own connections to al-qaeda, the ISI, and Arab financial resources. al-qaeda Saudi Arabia and the U.S. supported the struggle of the Mujahedin financially in equal measure. In addition, Saudi Arabia sent fighters including young Osama Bin Laden 8 Ruttig 2009: Ruttig 2009: 27. 3

4 who subsequently was active from Pakistan to expand al- Qaeda. The Western perception of Taliban and al-quaida as forming a merger was a misjudgment. 10 Al-Quaeda always had structures of its own in the country which were independent of those of the Taliban; al-qaeda used these structures to carry out individual attacks for purposes of propaganda (well-covered by the media) in Afghanistan and increasingly also in Pakistan. In contrast to the Taliban, al-qaeda has an international agenda; and the Afghan Taliban distance themselves from al-qaeda, both in ideological and operational terms, whereas there are closer ties between TTP and al-qaeda. What we are dealing with is mainly cooperation for mutual benefit: al-qaeda uses the territory of the Taliban, where it accepts Mullah Omar s leadership, as a retreat; in return, the Taliban get financial support, arms, technical training, and fighters. The NATO Commander-in-Chief McChrystal stated as early as in 2009 that there were no indications of a large al-qaeda presence in Afghanistan; this has not changed after the killing of Bin Laden in Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the HIG is the militant wing of the former Mujahidin party Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan (HIA) the only party excluded from the reorganization of Afghanistan in the post-2001 period. The group still has hierarchical party structures; in contrast to the Taliban, its leading figures are often well-educated. They have an urban background and fewer traditional or tribal networks. HIG is active throughout the country and cooperates with the Taliban on the local level. In contrast to the Taliban, HIG pursues a two-pronged strategy: besides waging asymmetrical warfare it focuses on political infiltration of politics both on the national and local level. As a result, there is a major spin-off HIG fraction in the Parliament. HIG is also willing to negotiate with the government on a political solution of the conflict. 11 Apart from their goal of a complete pullout of international troops from Afghanistan, their national and Islamist agenda is similar to that of the former Mujahidin groups which are now part of the government. Hence, their conflict with the government is 10 Vgl. Strick van Linschoten, Alex and Felix Kuehn (2012): An Enemy we created: The Myth of the Taliban / Al-Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, London. 11 Osman, Borhan (2013): Adding the Ballot to the Bullet? Hezb-e Islami in transition, due to power struggles rather than ideological differences of opinion. HIG did not oppose the 2014 presidential elections; they even supported one of the candidates. In the context of the Afghan Local Police program (the highly controversial integration of local militias in the Afghan security forces) some HIG militias have even become incorporated into state structures much to the anger of their leader. 12 Due to their extreme ruthlessness towards civilians, their reputation among the population is even worse than that of the Taliban; in the past years they have mainly committed attacks against international troops, catching the attention of the media. Other Islamist groups active in Afghanistan include the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, several local Salafist groups with specific religious practices who reside mainly in the eastern part of the country, as well as further local Mujahedin groups. While the latter do not acknowledge the authority of Mullah Omar, they nevertheless cooperate with local Taliban groups and thus help them expand into regions in the north and northwest. Revitalization of the Taliban and other Islamist Groups since 2001 After 2001 the Taliban movement was as good as crushed; almost all its members were willing to return to their villages or to participate politically in the reorganization of Afghanistan. The latter option was categorically rejected by the U.S. and their allies. Due to the exclusion of the Taliban and HIG from the political process and the failure to reintegrate former Taliban combatants, many fighters gathered and reorganized in their retreat areas both in inaccessible mountain regions and in Pakistan s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In the years that followed they won new supporters; this was less due to religious motivation than to the fact that parts of the population were disenchanted with the new political order: those Mujahedin who had committed gravest war crimes prior to the Taliban era were now in power in Kabul and there was no attempt whatsoever to call them to account for their deeds. Still today, both the government and communal administrations are characterized by rampant corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency. Nor does the traditional jurisdiction of the sharias and jirgas function anymore in many communities: the despotism of 12 Ruttig, Thomas (2014): Bomb and Ballot. The many strands and tactics of Hezb-e Islami, 4

5 the local government repeatedly sparked conflict among the tribes in the Pashtun south; in addition, many tribal leaders were killed in the various phases of war. As a result, traditional jurisdiction has lost importance in many places; its decisions can now be ignored with impunity by armed parvenus both on the government and insurgent sides. In favor of short-term military successes and supposed political stability, the Western intervention forces have failed to implement a Transitional Justice Process in the face of the disastrous dimensions of human rights violations, 13 and they have tacitly approved of corruption and nepotism. By doing so, they added fuel to the Taliban s anti-western propaganda. Highlights in that context on the national level included an amnesty law for war crimes committed before 2001, 14 as well as the large-scale ballotrigging during the 2009 presidential elections whose outcome was nevertheless accepted by both the U.N. and the western alliance. 15 It was then at the latest that people in Afghanistan realized that the intervention was due to the western governments own interests rather than concerns about the rights of Afghan women or the wish to establish democracy and justice in the country. The failure of the U.S. and NATO interventions to establish safety and stability, the conduct of the international combat troops particularly the torture of Afghan prisoners in Bagram and Guantanamo and nighttime raids on homes as well as an overall contemptuous attitude towards the Afghan civil population further discredited the West and strengthened the Taliban. The last couple of years have also witnessed the emergence of a general feeling of solidarity among Afghans with Muslims in other countries, as becomes apparent, for example, in rallies on the war in Palestine. This phenomenon is comparatively recent in Afghanistan; it unites many segments of the Afghan population ranging from religiousconservative citizens, members of the government, Muja- 13 See the report of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commision: A call for Justice (2012), The report was compiled in 2005; however, permission for publication was not granted until The most recent report of Human Rights Watch has gone largely unnoticed: See, for example. Iliopulos, Katherine: and Kuovo, Sari (2010): 15 See, for example, (last accessed hedin and radical students to Taliban and other armed resistance groups. Islamic State (IS) Since the summer of 2014 there have been increasing rumors of IS presence in Afghanistan, which caused much uneasiness and contradictory coverage: for example, central Asian fighters who also wear black flags and balaclavas were mistaken for IS troops. For the time being it can be assumed that no Arab IS troops have yet entered Afghanistan. Instead, some splinter groups of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have pledged allegiance to the IS. Russia has reported training and recruitment camps of the IS in the northern borderlands between Afghanistan and Tajikistan; however, that information is not verified. In January 2015, the IS for the first time proclaimed a province outside the Arab world the new province of Khorasan that is envisioned to comprise Afghanistan and Pakistan. A former Afghan Taliban was appointed head of the province. However, the newly appointed deputy province governor, Mullah Abdul Rauf Kadem, was killed by a U.S. drone in Helmand on February He was a former high-ranking Afghan Taliban commander and had good local contacts. During several years of imprisonment in Guantanamo he had converted to Wahhabism and been able to establish ties with Arab jihadists; he had, therefore, the potential of becoming a key strategic partner of the IS in Afghanistan. Another high-ranking defector, Abdul Qadir Wahidi, has meanwhile been arrested by the Afghan secret service, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for complicity in a kidnapping and supporting the IS. 17 There is rivalry and harsh competition among the Taliban: both their leaders lay claim to being head of all believers, and neither of them is willing to take a subordinate role to the other. The Taliban take military action against deserters from their own ranks, and have issued the following slogan to their commanders: IS fighters are no Mujahedin and are not active under the leadership of any Islamic emirate, and no one ought to let himself be fooled into following them, and they ought to be forbidden to carry out any activities. 18 Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi countered by 16 Afghanistan Zaghbladai: 02/23/2015). 17 Radio Free Europe: 02/20/2015). 18 Afghanistan Zaghbladai: 02/23/2015). 5

6 calling Mulla Omar a fool and illiterate warlord. 19 Besides territorial controversies there are also differences in religious issues: the Taliban, like most Afghans, are followers of the Hanafi school of law and reject the Wahhabite ideology of the IS as being unorthodox. 20 Due to the competition with the Taliban, but maybe also to the Afghans reluctance which has often become apparent in history to subordinate themselves to foreign powers, 21 it is unlikely that the IS will gain a foothold in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. The IS has sympathizers in the population, particularly among radicalized urban youth who express their solidarity via social media; however, only very few of them have so far answered the call to join the IS in Iraq or Syria. Large parts of the Afghan population have no sympathy for the IS. Some believe it is a scheme of the West, another attempt to take possession Afghanistan; that s why they rallied in support of the Kurdish town of Kobanê. 22 Outlook In Afghan society, the wars of the last decades have resulted in a disintegration of traditional social structures: a high percentage of Afghans is traumatized, and violence has become an everyday phenomenon. The misogynous attitude of many Mujahedin and Taliban becomes manifest in society. Religion, often in radical variants, plays a key role in cultural and national identification. These factors, together with the fact that the population is brutalized by war and terror, give rise to incidents such as the terrible lynching of a young woman, who had allegedly burned a copy of the Qur an, right in the heart of Kabul a crime that was condemned even by the Taliban. 23 international troops the war has increasingly become an Afghan domestic conflict. In many regions it is almost impossible to distinguish between the various militias; attacks cannot be definitely attributed to any individual group, and purely criminal gangs are active in many parts of the country as well. However, despite the pull-out of large parts of the international troops it is not likely that the Taliban will emerge victorious in the short run, as the Afghan security forces have been able to stabilize themselves; in addition, they still get support from the West. However, the economic and social situation is precarious and could play into the hands of both the Taliban and the IS, as young people in particular are suffering from the lack of perspectives. For many years the Afghan government has made futile attempts to initiate a discussion on a political solution of the conflict. Maybe the chances for such a discussion are better now than they were before, as the international troops have largely pulled out and Pakistan has promised to support such a process. Compiled in March 2015 The security situation in the country has been worsening for years. In 2014, the number of injured and killed civilians rose by 22%, and there are by now 800,000 internally displaced persons. 24 In the wake of the pull-out of the /23/2015). 20 Osman, Borham(2015): 03/23/2015) /23/2015) /23/2015). 24 UNAMA 2014 Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: hts/2015/2014-annual-report-on-protection-of-civilians-final.pdf 6