Civil War and Political Violence. Paul Staniland University of Chicago

Transcription

1 Civil War and Political Violence Paul Staniland University of Chicago

2 Chicago School on Politics and Violence Distinctive approach to studying the state, violence, and social control Collaborative research project with Ben Lessing and Forrest Stuart Why and how do governments control, fight, and cooperate with non-state armed groups and civilians? 2

3 Civil War and Political Violence Civil/intra-state wars the most common form of conflict in the world today Tens of millions killed in internal conflicts since 1945 My research Insurgent groups and counterinsurgency State strategies for managing armed groups Fieldwork, qualitative, and quantitative data in South and Southeast Asia 3

4 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 4

5 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 5

6 World Politics and Internal Warfare Wars cross borders Spillover : Syria/Iraq/Lebanon/Turkey International cooperation and conflict Crises over cross-border militancy Cooperation to address shared threats International intervention UN peacekeeping Humanitarian interventions Regime change 6

7 Two Core Topics How are insurgent groups organized? How does this affect their behavior and options? How do governments try to deal with armed groups? Why do they choose certain strategies? 7

8 Insurgent Groups Roughly half of post-1945 civil wars began as irregular, guerrilla conflicts Key insurgent tasks: Keep forces in the field that follow orders Control and govern local populations Generate local intelligence and coordinate policy on the basis of this information Minimize government infiltration Need to create organizations to pursue these tasks, but this is very difficult 8

9 Networks of Rebellion Theory of insurgent organization Both origins and change over time Empirical research Comparisons within Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka wars Comparisons across Malaya, Vietnam, and Philippines communist revolts 9

10 Insurgent Origins Groups build on pre-war political networks Political parties, religious associations, tribes, student and veterans networks, etc These pre-war social bases vary Horizontal ties: connections between organizers Vertical ties: connections between organizers and local communities 10

11 Social Bases of Insurgency These origins shape: Capabilities and strategies available to groups Vulnerabilities to government Likely pathways of change Social bases create similarities across otherwise different contexts Where a group starts shapes where it can go 11

12 Pre-war Politics and Wartime Groups Strong Vertical Ties Strong Horizontal Ties Integrated Robust Central Control Robust Local Control Weak Horizontal Ties Parochial Fragile Central Control Robust Local Control Weak Vertical Ties Vanguard Robust Central Control Fragile Local Control Fragmented Fragile Central Control Fragile Local Control 12

13 Integrated Groups Most cohesive and disciplined organizations Hamas, Tamil Tigers, Afghan Taliban, Viet Minh Militarily powerful, but also able to negotiate and implement peace deals/ceasefires Difficult for governments to destroy Need to target leaders while also controlling local communities very challenging Internal unrest possible, but not likely 13

14 Vanguard Groups Tight central leadership, but weak initial presence on the ground Hezb-e-Islami, early Al Qaeda in Iraq, Bolsheviks Greatest potential for change Can take advantage of rigid state policies to embed itself on ground and become integrated Can also be wiped out if leaders killed/arrested before able to establish local presence Vulnerable to revolts from below by local units 14

15 Parochial Groups Powerful factions without strong central control Pakistani Taliban, Syrian umbrella groups Often tough fighters on their own terrain, but difficult to coordinate overall strategy Vulnerable to external attacks, internal unrest Fragmented by government divide-and-rule, internal factional conflict Bolstered by unified external support and indiscriminate government violence 15

16 Fragmented Groups Many fragmented groups emerge early in wars but then are eliminated fairly quickly Most of the groups you ve heard of are integrated, vanguard, or parochial, even if they are a minority of all insurgents Lack social resources to create formal organizations; extremely fragile and vulnerable to internal fratricide 16

17 Conflict Outcomes Other dynamics can affect war outcomes One important area is international politics External support for states and insurgents can shift the battlefield having outside backers helps Contemporary Syria End of Cold War shifted nature of war outcomes: more settlements and draws, less clear-cut victory Growing difficulties in full-scale government victory 17

18 End of Cold War Effect Kreutz 2010

19 Decline in Govt victory over time Lyall and Wilson III, 2009

20 Governments and Armed Groups Many governments face a wide variety of armed actors on their soil Insurgents, militias, private armies, armed political parties, drug cartels (Lessing), etc We see various government-armed group relationships Warfare Limited cooperation Tight alliances Incorporation of groups into state 20

21 Governing Coercion Current book project Theory of: State threat perception Government strategy Long-term state-armed group relationships Empirical research on states and armed groups in Pakistan, Burma/Myanmar, and India, 1947-present Fieldwork, archives, quantitative data 21

22 Four State Strategies Suppression Collusion Containment Incorporation 22

23 Internal Threat Perception Choices about preferred strategies reflect threat perceptions Armed groups can pose radically different levels of perceived threat True of unarmed groups too Regimes need to figure out which political demands, symbols, and actions are legitimate, intolerable, or unsavory but manageable 23

24 Regime Ideology Governments try to define the political arena according to ideological goals Two kinds of categorizations Which kinds of groups and actions are criminal vs. political The threat posed by different political activities/demands/symbols Internal security forces implement this ideological vision 24

25 Political Ideas Matter The same group can be perceived in totally different ways by different governments Threat to one, ally to another, apolitical to a third Depends on underlying regime ideological project Historically embedded and hard to change Ruling parties, militaries, interior ministries socialize and institutionalize rules of the game Regime changes, major internal evolution primary ways in which projects shifts 25

26 Armed Group Political Roles Allies: ideologically aligned with regime Colluded with or incorporated into state Existence does not pose a threat Enemies: core political threat Almost always violently suppressed Unacceptable subversives Gray zone : elements of overlap and conflict Limited cooperation or containment most common, sometimes incorporation Can be business partners with governments 26

27 India & Pakistan Similar colonial legacies, state structures, and armed groups Existing theories would predict similar patterns of state strategy toward armed groups But we see distinct patterns of government strategy The same symbols and demands have different political meanings in eyes of leaders and security forces 27

28 Ideological Projects Pre-independence political mobilization and legacies of 1947 Partition create different internal threat perceptions India built on vision of democratic, secular, multilingual state Pakistan built on vision of disciplined Muslim homeland able to hold Hindu India at bay Political parties, bureaucrats, and militaries create and reproduce these ideologies 28

29 India Religious (especially Muslim/Sikh) armed groups perceived as enemies Suppression primary state strategy Ethno-linguistic, tribal, and communist demands in gray zone Violence not desired, but demands seen as manageable and tolerable Diverse strategies: some suppression, but also incorporation, containment, and collusion 29

30 Pakistan Key threat is ethno-linguistic fragmentation that will fracture Pakistan from within Ethnic armed groups usually (not always) suppressed, often with heavy violence Islam a more ambiguous political cleavage Groups deploying Sunni Muslim symbols generally treated as gray zone or ally groups: these are compatible with idea of Pakistan Some suppression, but much higher threshold of violence required 30

31 Armed Politics Not all armed groups are intrinsic threats to governments State-armed group collusion in Iraq, Pakistan, India, Congo, Syria, Burma/Myanmar Incorporation a common way for states to centralize control of violence 19 th century America, 20 th century Indonesia Need to move beyond standard focus on insurgency/counterinsurgency 31

32 Next Steps More research needed on: Internal security apparatuses Armed group involvement in normal politics: elections, patronage, day-to-day governance, corruption, etc Enduring state-armed group cooperation and spheres of influence Relevance to unarmed groups Subversives, anti-national elements, fifth columns Governments try to define political boundaries 32

33 Q&A 33