BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE PRINCELY STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

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1 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE PRINCELY STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR Dr. Ali MohdPir Lecturer, History University of Kashmir, Srinagar ABSTRACT During the nineteenth century British economic interest in the overseas colonies was primarily in extending trade. They needed new sources of cheap raw materials, and market for their manufactures. Keeping this end in view, as soon as Jammu and Kashmir came under their suzerainty they started exploring various methods and ways by which they could profit from the economic activities of the state. A number of survey missions were sent to the state pretending to secure the frontiers of the state but were basically aimed at studying the various possibilities by which the trading monopolies of the state on shawl trade and the import of paschim the type of wool used in making shawls could be broken. It was in 1863 Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir was forced to enter into a trade agreement by the British regarding the payment of import and export duties on the goods exchanged with the state. In 1867 a British Officer was stationed in Ladakh to give a smooth run to the British trade with Central Asia through the territories of Kashmir. Yet another treaty was forced on the Maharaja in 1870 which provided for a survey of all routes used for trade with Central Asia. Means of transport were to be made available for the British goods passing through Jammu and Kashmir, rest houses were to be constructed, and most importantly the Maharaja was made to agree to levy no transit duties on the road that was used to carry the British goods. In this way the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was used to feed the British imperial interests in the subcontinent in the best possible way. Keeping in view, the above facts, an attempt is made in this paper to show the real or hidden motives of the British intervention in Jammu and Kashmir. It tries to demonstrate that the British were not the benevolent as they pretend us to believe but had to fulfill the best economic interests. During the nineteenth century British economic interest in the overseas colonies was primarily in extending trade. They needed new sources of cheap raw materials, and market for their manufactures. Incidentally it involved destruction of local handicrafts in the colonies and the increasing pressure on the land. It was only towards the end of the century that the main interest shifted to safe investment for superprofits, and not merely exchange of commodities. Naturally, as soon as the princely state of Jammu and 1 Kashmir came under the indirect control of the British east India Company which, basically being an 175

2 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN economic enterprise, explored and employed various means and methods to fulfill the insatiable appetite for wealth. Naturally, as soon as the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir came under the indirect control of the British East India Company which, basically being an economic enterprise, explored and employed various means and methods to fulfill its insatiable appetite for wealth. th st The treaty of Lahore signed on 9 March, 1846 brought to an end the 1 AngloSikh War. Article twelfth of the treaty made provision for the creation of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state came into existence by a separate treaty signed between Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and the 2 British East India Company at Amritsar on 16th March, Article I of the Treaty of Amritsar recognized in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs' male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the river Indus and the 3 westward of the River Ravi. It was at this point of time that Gulab Singh is reported to have stoodup, and with joined hands, expressed his gratitude to the British Viceroy, adding, however, without any 4 ironical meaning, that he was indeed his ZurKhareed, or goldboughten slave!' Taking the above statement of Gulab Singh literally, it would suggest that the British paid cash for his allegiance. However, it was quite the reverse. It was Gulab Singh who paid a huge sum of money to the British East India Company in return of the territories transferred to him. Reading the provisions of the Treaty of Amritsar between the lines it becomes clear that while signing the treaty with Gulab Singh the British took best care of their economic interests. When the Sikhs, who had been asked to pay one and a half crore rupees to the Company as indemnity for the costs of war they were held entirely responsible for having provoked by breaching the treaty of friendship that had been signed with Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1809, demonstrated their inability to pay the war indemnity, the British stripped from the Sikh kingdom 'the territories between the river Beas and Indus, including the provinces of 5 Cashmere and Hazarah'. The Company, in its turn, decided to hand over these territories to their trusty ally, Gulab Singh. However, this transfer to the Raja was not for nothing. It was not even simply a reward, as is believed by some writers, for the services rendered by Gulab Singh to the British during their rivalry 6 with the Sikhs. The basic consideration for the British in handing over Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh was in fact to secure their northwest frontiers, but even in doing so they did not lose sight of the economic benefits they could procure out of it. Explaining his decision of not including Kashmir into the British Indian Empire, Lord Hardinge, the GovernorGeneral wrote that the move to take possession of 'these largely mountainous territories would be an economic liability, because while the territories except Kashmir were deemed as unproductive which would even not pay the expenses of its 7 management'. Thus, the Company decided to 'sell' Kashmir and its adjoining territories to Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Included as article III in the treaty the British asked the Raja 'to pay the British government the sum of Rs 75 lakhs (half of the war indemnity demanded from the Sikhs)'. In the first 176

3 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN st 8 installment he was bound to pay fifty lakhs on or before 1 October Article X of the treaty stipulated that Gulab Singh 'acknowledged [and recognized] the supremacy of the British Government and [would] in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl 9 goats of approved breed and three pairs of Cashmere shawls'. It is argued that though the tribute offered by the Maharaja to the British was nominal, it was demanded keeping in view their economic interests. The British, it is believed wanted to rear the shawl goats, which were demanded as tribute, in 10 England or elsewhere in their empire. Although the argument does not have much substance, the economic value of these goats, horse and the Kashmiri shawls cannot be denied altogether. Thus, it is evident from the Treaty of Amritsar itself that it was not a treaty signed on the political bargains alone. The money transaction took place between the two parties involved in the treaty. The uniqueness of the treaty, which was at once an instrument for the creation of the princely state of Jammu 11 and Kashmir and a document governing the future relations, was in fact a 'sale deed'. A total area of 84,471 sq. miles and 2½ million people were sold to Gulab Singh. There followed a heated debate in and outside the British official circles pertaining to the wisdom of handing over of Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh. Though, the motive of the critics belonging to the British official circle seems to pave way for the British intervention in the state, the target of the attack of some of the critics was the economic transaction involved in the treaty. Pointing towards the more benefits the British would have obtained had they annexed Kashmir to their Indian Empire, W. Wakefield, an European official who visited the state in 1875, observed, '...the huckstering spirit that so often pervades our national policy, and which caused the great Napoleon to apply to us the term of a nation of shopkeepers, was dominant in this case; for, relinquishing all the advantages that accrued to us from its 12 possession, the supreme government sold this fair province to Rajah Gulab Singh. J.D. Cunningham, criticizing the business mindset of the British officialdom while signing the treaty with Gulab Singh, wrote in 1853, the arrangement was a dexterous one, if reference be only had to the policy of reducing the 13 power of Sikhs; but the transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and greatness. At the time of the creation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir the British Indian government was aware of the major features of its geopolitical and commercial importance, in great measure because of the travels of William Moorcraft in early 1820s. Technically an unofficial traveller and ostensibly concerned with the supply of horses for the East India Company, Moorcraft, who was the true pioneer of British commercial interests in Central Asia, travelled widely between 1812 and 1825 in the northwestern corner of the Indian subcontinent investigating its trade, natural resources and politics. He studied the source of pashm the raw material for manufacturing of pashmina shawls which was the basic constituent of the shawl industry of Kashmir. He also reported on the route to Chinese Turkistan from Ladakh by way of the Karakoram Pass. Moorcraft urged the British government to seize every 177

4 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN opportunity to extend the influence of the East India Company into this region which offered access to the 14 rich trade of Central Asia. The official British exploration of the territories of Jammu and Kashmir began immediately after its creation when a number of boundary commissions were appointed to define the boundaries of the state. The commissions while on a mission to demarcate the boundaries also studied the economic 15 potential of the state. Thus by 1848, the British had become officially aware of the Ladakh route which was not only contiguous to the Chinese Turkistan but offered access to the trade in the rest of Central Asia regions. The collapse of the power of Manchu dynasty of China in Chinese Turkistan and the rise of Yaqub Beg in 1861 (who consolidated most of the Chinese Turkistan into a new polity in Central Asia) 16 provided the British with an opportunity to study Central Asia with great interest. This gave rise to a policy directed both towards encouraging trade and establishing diplomatic relations with the new regime in Turkistan. Giving effect to their new policy, the British, in 1863, negotiated a commercial treaty with Maharaja Ranbir Singh which was intended in part to improve trade between British India and 17 Eastern Turkistan across Ladakh. Not satisfied with this treaty, the British decided to station a commercial agent at Ladakh in 1867 (who was designated as the Officer on Special Duty) to look after their commercial interests. Dr. Cayley, the first appointee to this post, was asked 'to enquire into the prospects of trade between Tibet and Turkistan and British India', and, 'to guard the interests of traders to 18 and from British territory.' The Maharaja vehemently protested against this appointment because he considered it a direct interference in the political affairs of his state. But the Maharaja felt himself unheard and the stationing of the officer became a permanent feature of the British policy makers till the end of the 19 British rule in the Indian subcontinent. In order to run their trade with Central Asia smoothly and uninterruptedly, the British tried to develop the road between Ladakh and Kashgar. The road, the British thought, needed to be rendered free of any administrative control of Jammu and Kashmir government. With this end in view, the Maharaja was made to enter into commercial relations with the colonial government. A treaty was negotiated with the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 1870 which was basically aimed at securing the road between Ladakh and Kashgar in order to afford greater facilities for the development of trade with 20 Eastern Turkistan. The Commercial Treaty of 1870, as it came to be known as, provided for a survey of all routes used for trade with Central Asia. After investigation, one of these routes was to be designated as 'a free highway'. According to the article II of the treaty, this new route, often referred to as the 'Treaty 21 Road' was to be 'a free highway in perpetuity and at all times for all travellers and traders'. Article III of the treaty stipulates that '[the] maintenance [of the road], and the supervision of traffic along it, [would] be the concern of a pair of Joint Commissioners, one appointed by the Maharaja and the other by the British 22 Government.' These Commissioners were to supervise the route, settle disputes and exercise 178

5 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN jurisdiction within a defined limit on each side of the chosen road. There was a provision for independent agents who could make available means of transport. Supply depots and rest houses were to be arranged by the joint Commissioners. The treaty further states that the 'the Maharaja [would] levy no transit duty whatever on the aforesaid free highway; and the Maharaja further [agreed] to abolish all transit duties levied within his territories on goods transmitted in bound through His Highness' territories from Eastern Turkistan to India, and vice versa, on which seal [would] not be broken within the territories of His Highness'. Rules were framed for the guidance of the Commissioners. So, by this treaty, the British obtained full rights to control economic and trade relations with Turkistan. It was the first step towards the subsequent British interference in Central Asian affairs. There followed a series of British political and commercial missions to the rulers of Eastern Turkistan, some official and some carried out by ostensibly private travellers. The most important of 25 these missions was that of Thomas Douglas Forsyth. Maharaja Ranbir Singh was asked to provide all the facilities to the mission and make all arrangements regarding transport, supplies and 26 accommodation. Thus the Kashmir Darbar was forced to spend a huge sum of money in order to fulfill the insatiable colonial thirst for wealth. The immediate outcome of the mission was the establishment of a temporary British trade mission at Kashgar, the capital of Yaqub Beg's kingdom. The mission culminated in a commercial treaty between the British and Yaqub Beg on Feb. 2, 1874 which in theory at least opened up eastern Turkistan to British Indian trade in a manner which, if it would produce little profit in practice, was at least pleasing to a vocal mercantile lobby in British. According to the article I of the treaty, 'the subjects of each [party] shall be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their merchandize and property into and through all parts of the dominion of the other, and shall enjoy all the 27 privileges and advantages with respect to commerce'. The treaty further goes on stating that on the goods imported from British India into the territories of Amir Yaqub Khan and vice versa, both the parties 28 agreed to levy no import duties. The Amir was also made to agree that the 'merchandize imported from 29 India into [his] territories [should] not be opened for examination till arrival at the place of consignment'. One of the most important provisions of the treaty was that the British should be given the liberty of appointing a permanent Representative at the Court of Yaqub Beg 'and to appoint Commercial Agents subordinate to [the British Representative] in any towns or places considered suitable within the 30 territories of [Yaqub]'. However, this provision was not implemented during the Yaqub Beg era. Article V of the treaty also provides that the 'British subjects [should] be allowed to purchase, sell, or hire land or houses or depots for the merchandise in the dominions of the [Amir], and the houses, depots, or other premises of British subjects [should] not be forcibly entered or searched [without] the cognizance of the 31 British Representative or Agent and in presence of a person deputed by him.' It is worth to mention here that besides the commercial motive there was a political reason 179

6 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN behind these British moves. From the moment Yaqub Beg came to power he was being courted by the Russians. In fact Russia entered into the commercial agreement with Yaqub Beg even before the British had done so. The British treaty of 1874 was a direct response to that Russian move. Maharaja Ranbir 32 Singh also sent his envoys to develop some sort of political relationship with Kashgar. It irritated the colonial government that they did not approve of Maharaja's adventures beyond his boundaries and 33 warned him to behave as a subordinate to the paramount power. In this way, the treaty signed with the ruler of Eastern Turkistan wiped off all the influence the Maharaja had in Central Asia. Clearly the British had no difficulty in securing the Maharaja's acquiescence in extending trade with Central Asia. The Treaty of Amritsar was unique in the sense that it made no provision for the appointment of a British Resident in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This left the Kashmir ruler relatively more independent than the other Indian princes. The more British started penetrating into Jammu and Kashmir and knowing about its beauty, the strategic importance and the pathetic conditions the people were living in, the more they began to lament over the sale of Kashmir to the Dogras. Most of the Europeans who visited Kashmir or had some professional or other links with it, in a true imperialistic tone advocated the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir for the British Empire; perhaps none of them 'truly' 'campaigned' for its deliverance from the Dogra oppression. Lieut. Colonel Torrens lamented that No Englishman can leave Kashmir without a sigh of regret that a province so full of promise should ever 37 have been allowed to slip through our fingers. Surprise has often been expressed, wrote Sir Francis Younghusband, that when this lovely land had actually been ceded to us, after a hard and strenuous 38 campaign, we should ever have parted with it for the paltry sum of threequarters of a million sterling. A vocal lobby emerged in the British political circles that began an active propaganda against Ranbir 39 Singh's loyalty. No small role was played by the increasing pressure placed by British trading interests on the colonial government to intervene more decisively in the affairs of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. A growing number of British traders had been clamouring for the extension of greater facilities to conduct free trade in Kashmir, especially the right to acquire the property there. This demand had been resisted by Ranbir Singh but was revived under his successor. Pratap Singh too, strongly protested against this proposal. He wrote to the Viceroy that the state had already taken all possible steps to promote the free course of trade and provided suitable houses to be had on the rent for this purpose. Allowing British traders to acquire and hold land, on the other hand, he argued would 'affect the peaceful administration of the country' by creating a large colony of Resident Europeans immune from the jurisdiction of his courts. This, he suggested, would 'eventually affect the integrity and undiminished 40 enjoyment of [his] ancestral rights solemnly guaranteed by the British government.' To discuss this and other important issues a meeting took place between the Maharaja and the Viceroy in the middle of January In this meeting and the subsequent communications between the two, besides the other 180

7 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN things the issue of British traders to buy lands in Jammu and Kashmir also came up. The response of Dufferin, the Viceroy was swift and sharp. He pointed to what he perceived was an inconsistency in the Maharaja's argument, namely that a colony of resident Europeans in Kashmir 'would be equally free from the jurisdiction of his courts, whether they lived in houses supplied by [him] or in his houses belonging to them.' But, most importantly, the Viceroy insisted that 'it [wa]s not possible that any Native State in India c[ould] be allowed to prevent European British subjects from enjoying in any of part of the 42 empire so common and necessary a right.' Asserting the paramount character of the British Empire, Dufferin wrote that, 'the whole of India, from Himalayas to Cape Comorin, now formed a part of Her Majesty's Empire, and it was absurd to suppose that Her Majesty's European subjects could be 43 subjected to disabilities of this kind in one of the feudatory states of the Empire.' So the colonial government made it clear to the Dogra ruler of Jammu and Kashmir that being the paramount power they had every right to establish their business or residential establishments throughout his kingdom. One of the important fields in which the British showed their interest was the Kashmiri shawl. It was the backbone of the Kashmir's economy. As soon as the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir came under the effective British control they tried to manipulate the shawl trade so that their economic wants 44 could be fulfilled. The shawl was and continues to be one of the most important material 45 representations of Kashmir to the outside world, including Persia, Turkey, Europe and America. The origin of the shawl industry may lie in the fifteenth century, but it was not until the Mughal period ( ) that the industry achieved its full potential. During the Afghan rule ( ), the industry 47 received its first set back as a result of the exorbitant excise taxes imposed on the shawls. However, the Kashmiri shawl industry prospered towards the end of the eighteenth century with the increasing European, particularly French, demand for these prized articles of fashion. With the increase in 48 European demand, shawl looms in Kashmir increased. In order to obtain sufficient quantities of raw material for the shawls, Kashmiri merchants began to travel as far as Yarkand and Khotan in Central Asia in as early as the late eighteenth century. These merchants established their warehouses in the whole 49 of Chinese Turkistan and monopolized the wool trade of region. In turn, merchants from British India, after the British consolidated their hold on Kashmir, began to come to Srinagar, commissioning shawls 50 for export to particular markets. The presence of French and British agents in Srinagar had an indelible 51 impact on the shawl industry of Kashmir. Several imitation shawl industries emerged in France to 52 formulate cheaper methods of shawl production. This signaled the beginning of the decline of the decline of the Srinagar shawl trade, which has continued in significantly attenuated form into the present. 181

8 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN CONCLUSION It can be said that as soon as the British Indian Empire started expanding towards the north, Jammu and Kashmir, being commercially and strategically located at an important point, caught their eye. Thinking that retaining or annexing it with their Indian empire would prove costly, they decided to put it under some subordinate feudatory. Gulab Singh seemed to be a perfect choice. Jammu and Kashmir was handed over to him, but while doing so they took the best care of their economic interests. They received money from him in lieu of the transfer of the territories to him. The imperialistic designs did not stop there. Throughout their 101 years ( ) of relationship with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, the colonial government kept this princely state both politically and economically subservient to it. To develop their trading relations with different Asian kingdoms, the state was used as a sort of a 'free zone'. REFERENCES AND NOTES: 1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is usually referred to as simply Kashmir. In that, strictly speaking, Kashmir means the valley of Kashmir only, and not other parts of the State such as Jammu, Ladakh and Baltistan. It has been tried here, as much as possible to use the term Kashmir to mean the valley of Kashmir, and Jammu and Kashmir to refer to the State as a whole. Inevitably, however, it has not been possible to be consistent in this system of terminology as one might wish. 2. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. 9, (Calcutta, 1892), p Ibid., pp J.D. Cunningham, A History of Sikhs, (London, 1853), p a. The phrase 'ZarKhureed' had unfortunate overtunes and would haunt Kashmiri selfrespect for many generations to come. M.J. Akber, Kashmir Behind the Vale, (New Delhi, 2002), p C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. 6, (1909), pp The notable biographies written on the life and activities of Maharaja Gulab Singh are; Gulab Nama written by DiwanKripa Ram (Delhi, 1977), the official biographer of Gulab Singh, The Biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh bypandit Salig Ram Koul (Srinagar, 1923), and Sardar K.M. PanikkarThe Founding of the Kashmir State (London, 1923). These works are more or less written in the same tune. The main purpose of these works was to extol the virtues Gulab Singh. They argue that it was in lieu of the valuable services rendered by Gulab Singh in the first Anglo Sikh war that the British handedover Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh. 182

9 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN Foreign Dept., Sec. Branch, Ref. No. 7 March, 1846, National Archives of India (N.A.I.) 8. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. 9, pp C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. 9, p N.N. Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoevueres, , (New Delhi, 1988), p. 21. Further arguing, Riana contends that this British experiment, however, did not succeed because the pashmgoat (pashmis the raw material for manufacture of pashmina shawls) needs an altitude above the sea level, the separation of hair from wool involves backbreaking labour and could not be spun in machines. Ibid., pp The Treaty of Amritsar was denunciated as a saledeed by a number of people, especially by the people who were involved in the freedom struggle against the Dogras that was 12. W. Wakefield, The Happy Valley, (c. 1908, repr. Srinagar, 2008), p J.D. Cunningham, A History of Sikhs, p For a detailed description of the importance and outcome of the travels of William Moorcraft see, William Moorcraft& George Trebeck, (ed.), Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab in Ladakh, Kunduz, and Bukhara, from 1819 to 1825, 2 vols., (London, 1841). For a more critical analysis of the travels of Moorcraft see, G.J.Alder,British India's Northern Frontier , (London, 1900). 15. For a background of the Boundary Commissions, see, T. Thomson, Western Himalya and Tibet, (London, 1853); Alastair Lamb, British India and Tibet , (London, 1986). 16. YaqubBeg's rise in Chinese Turkistan is discussed in, O.E. Clubb, China and Russia The Great Game, (New York, 1971). 17. Kashmir Government Records, File No. 215A.H. of 1863, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar (hereafter referred as JKAS). 18. Notification dated, Muree, July 1868, File No. I.C.F. 2 of 1868, (Old English Records), Kashmir Government Records, JKAS. 19. Ranbir Singh to Lt. Governor Punjab, 26thBisakh 1924 Samvat (1867), File No. 371, Kashmir Government Records, JKAS; File No. 67 of 1867, Kashmir Government Records, JKAS. 20. C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol.9,treaty between the British Government and Maharaja Ranbir Singh, pp Ibid., Article II, p Ibid., Article III & IV, pp

10 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN Ibid., Article VIII & IX, pp Ibid., Appendix I, pp File No. 569 of 1873, (Old English Records), Kashmir Government Records, JKAS. 26. File No. 473 of 1873, (Old English Records), Kashmir Government Records, JKAS. 27. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. 9, Treaty between the British Government and Amir Yaqub Khan, Article, II, p Ibid., Article IV, p Ibid., Article V, p Ibid., Article VI, pp Ibid., Article VII, p Naba Shah, WajeezulTawarikh, p. 208, and Publication Department, Srinagar. 33. Sir Henry Davis to Maharaja Ranbir Singh, Foreign Department, Political, dated September 26, 1873, National Archives of India (NAI). 34. Gulab Singh, the first Dogra ruler, was determined to make his power felt throughout his newly founded kingdom. His successors were in no way better than him. The Dogra rulers were greedy for revenue and the taxes were burdensome, with the result the standard of living of the people did not show any positive change. Aggravating to the situation was the fact that though the vast majority of the state happened to be Muslims, they were treated as second class citizens by the rulers and their officers. 35. Letters from India and Kashmir, (Anonymous, London, 1874), pp , letter no. xiii; J.C. Ansley Murray, Our Visit to Hindostan, Kashmir and Ladakh, (London, 1879), p. 202; Wakefield, The Happy Valley, p The Dogras, broadly speaking, are a linguistic group found primarily in the Jammu region. Their language, Dogri, is highly influenced by Punjabi. The Dogras include Muslims and Rajputs among their members. Ibid., pp. 910, 437, G.M.D. Sufi Kashir, (Delhi, 1974), vol.2, pp See also, Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (Srinagar, 1967), p Torrens, Travels In Ladakh, Tartary and Kashmir (London, 1878), pp Sir Francis, Younghusband, Kashmir, (c. 1908, Srinagar, 2008), p Ranbir Singh was the son and successor of Gulab Singh, the founder of the state. Ranbir was followed by Pratap Singh, who ruled the state till Letter from Maharaja Pratap Singh to the Earl of Dufferin, Viceroy, dated 14 January 1886, Foreign Department SecretE, Progs. July 1886/ nos. 4238, NAI. 41. Memorandum of Conversation between Lord Dufferin and Pratap Singh dated 15 January 1886, 184

11 An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Humanities ISSN Foreign and Political Department, SecretE, July 1886, No. 426, NAI. 42. Letter from the Viceroy to the Maharaja of Kashmir, dated 16 March 1886, Foreign Department, Secret E, Pros. July 1886/nos. 4238, NAI. 43. Memorandum of Conversation between Lord Dufferin and Pratap Singh dated 15 January 1886, Foreign and Political Department, SecretE, July 1886, No. 426, NAI. 44. A specific 'grievance' the British had against the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was the maintenance of two great monopolies. The state had a monopoly on shawl trade, so that the foreigners could not deal directly with the weavers. The state also had a monopoly in the import of pashm, coming from the Tibetan plateau. To end this monopoly, the British tried every means by which they could get over the trade of these commodities. In this endeavour, they succeeded to a great extent. 45. Of the Kashmiri shawls exported to the western world in the 1860s, France imported the major portion, followed by United States, Italy, Russia, Germany and Great Britain. French agents exported about twothirds of total shawls exported from Kashmir. the agents purchased it directly from Kashmiri merchants and then exported it to France 46. Until 1871, the Jammu and Kashmir government derived revenues of Rs 600,000 per annum from taxation on shawls. See Walter Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p Frank Ames, The Kashmir Shawl and its IndoFrench Influence, (England, 1986), pp Shawl looms in the city of Srinagar increased from 12,000 in 1873 to 24,000 in Hajji Mukhtar Shah Ashai, Tract on the Art of Shawl Weaving (Lahore, 1887), translation from the Persian by K.N. Pandita, (Central Asian Studies Department, University of Kashmir, Srinagar), pp Ibid., p Veronica Murphy, Kashmiri Shawls: Woven Art and Cultural Document (London, 1988), p Hajji Mukhtar Shah Ashai, Tract on the Art of Shawl Weaving, p Veronica Murphy, Kashmiri Shawls: Woven Art and Cultural Document, p