How To Resolve The North Korea Nuclear Crisis? : A Nixonian Approach

Transcription

1 How To Resolve The North Korea Nuclear Crisis? : A Nixonian Approach Jabonn Kim 1 February 7, 2018 Because that s our greatest responsibility to this life: to leave a safer and more peaceful world for our children. War is always wrong. (Madam Secretary, Season 1-18, 19) Through carefully coordinated public and private signals to the PRC s leadership, President Nixon aimed to establish a new strategic framework built on peaceful relations with Beijing and stability in Asia, a relaxation of Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union, and an honorable end to the Vietnam War. (Richard Nixon Foundation) Everybody dislikes crisis. However, once it comes, no one hesitates to challenge it. In Korean, the word crisis has two meanings: risk and opportunity. South Korea and the U.S. now face the North Korea Nuclear Crisis. There exist incompatible expectations: Sooner or later, the United States will either be in negotiations with North Korea or at war with North Korea. 2 How can this crisis be turned into an opportunity for true peace in the Korean Peninsula and on the globe? According to Thomas Friedman, a New York Times columnist, 3 the nuclear strategy of North Korea is a survival instrument in order to get through their current extreme economic poverty. If Friedman s understanding is correct, then North Korea s current military strategy may follow the path of China from 1959 to Military strategy, on the one hand, is an expression of aggression against 1 UCLA School of Law (LLM) and Korea Institute of Finance (Senior Research Fellow, Ph.D. in economics) 2 Michael Fuchs, Why diplomacy is still the best option, Foreign Affairs, December 21, U.K. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Preparing for War in Korea, Whitehall Report ( War is now a real possibility. )

2 the U.S. and South Korea as it appears. However, on the other hand, it may reflect their urgency of national economic difficulty, exactly opposite to the appearances. A nation using their military power may intend to mask and block out light from outside for their survival, otherwise economic failure may burst the nation into fragments. According to this logic, the North Korea Nuclear Crisis is not an obvious threat to South Korea and the U.S., but a desperate calling for economic help and formal relations with outside world. In the strategic sense, as North Korea now develops nuclear weapons, there is no longer such a situation in which strategic ambiguity prevails. In the last 20 years or so, nobody believed that North Korea would succeed in nuclear weapons, nor has anyone wanted to face reality. During this period, North Korea had two options: either pursue or stop nuclear weapon development, and South Korea and the U.S. had also two options: either sunshine or cold wind policies. 4 It is clear that whereas North Korea has continuously pursued nuclear weapons, South Korea and the U.S. has walked zig-zag from cold wind policy to sunshine policy, and again to cold wind policy. Sunshine policy is an economic approach to achieve political as well as economic peace in the long run in Korean Peninsula, by eliminating nuclear crisis in the end. Now North Korea holds nuclear weaponry. Then, what options are now available for South Korea and the U.S.? It is more likely to be either war or peace given anti-nuclear weapon stance of South Korea and the U.S. There may be no longer ambiguity on what will happen. What is a peace option? One is what Fuchs (2017) suggests. He suggests the freeze for freeze agreement in which Pyongyang stops missile and nuclear tests and Washington stops military exercises with South Korea (Fuchs 4 The name of sunshine or cold wind policies alludes to Aesop s Fable, The North Wind & the Sun. The fable says: The North Wind and the Sun had a quarrel about which of them as the stronger. While they were disputing with much heat and bluster, a traveler passed along the road wrapped in a cloak. They agreed that he is the stronger who can strip that traveler of his cloak. The North Wind sent a cold, howling blast against the traveler, but all his efforts were in vain. Then the Sun began to shine. At last he became so heated that he pulled off his cloak. South Korea ex-president Kim Dae-Jung named his policy to open North Korea Sunshine Policy. 2

3 Resolution). Alternative is freeze for peace agreement which, above the Fuchs Resolution, transforms a truce agreement to a peace agreement including official foreign relation between the U.S. and North Korea (Alternative Resolution), which was the package of the resolution of the China Nuclear Crisis. What is a war option? It is tit for tat that would inevitably produce huge mass casualties from both sides. There are 230,000 Americans living in South Korea. There are 90,000 Americans in Japan. 5 Thus, massive casualties may include Americans too. Under this clearer strategic situation, no strategic ambiguity remains. This is a challenge since war threat approaches imminently. However, this situation may be a necessary chance for talk that could turn the crisis into opportunity for peace as the lesson from the resolution experience of the China s Nuclear Crisis says. About 50 years ago during the period of , 6 the U.S. had faced the China Nuclear Crisis. President Nixon and his subsequent seven U.S. Presidents had initiated and continued the soft power program for the opening of China since 1967 to resolve the China Nuclear Crisis, and the success proves that antagonistic nuclear crisis can be resolved without war. We can call this policy as the sunshine policy for China. The experience is a priceless example for efforts to resolve the North Korea Nuclear Crisis. President Nixon initiated the sunshine policy to resolve the China Nuclear Crisis in spite of the opposition of those around him, 7 and resolved the China Nuclear Crisis. This history gives important policy implications for resolving the Korean Peninsula Crisis. 5 Victor Cha: Giving North Korea a bloody nose carries a huge risk to Americans, 6 In the periods of 1959 to 1967, there was a Chinese nuclear crisis: China succeeded in developing ICBM in 1959, Nuclear Weapon in 1964, and hydrogen bomb in In the time of the military development in China, Chinese economy was at a devastated situation like North Korea now. 7 The Opening of China ( Though President Nixon faced fierce opposition on the Vietnam War from the political left, it was conservatives within the Republican Party who were vexed about his future meeting with communist leaders, and saw it as a betrayal to the US s long standing ethnic Chinese and democratic ally, Taiwan. Tokyo, too, was startled and angered about not being informed of President Nixon s moves. The United States had a treaty with Japan; an obligation to insure its security. ) 3

4 President Nixon s Sunshine Policy for the Opening of China: According to Henry Kissinger (2011), 8 the current global peace and economic prosperity after the opening of China should be attributed to the consistent efforts by the eight U.S. Presidents since President Nixon and four generations of Chinese political leaders since Mao Ze Dong. Once imperialistically ambitious, China has now become a significant and strong engine of global economic developments and political peace. In the article published at Foreign Affairs, 9 President Nixon says that:...[w]e simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors... But we could go disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this long-range goal, we failed in the short range to read the lessons of history. The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change:... that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems China, within three to five years, will have a significant deliverable nuclear capability and that this same China will be outside any nonproliferation treaty that might be signed, free, if it chooses, to scatter its weapons among "liberation" forces anywhere in the world. Immediately after his inauguration as the President, Nixon took a series of sunshine policies for the opening of China that includes the annulment of the banning of free travels and economic trades 8 Henry Kissinger (2011), On China, Penguin Group. 9 Richard M. Nixon (1967), Asia after Viet Nam, Foreign Affairs, October 1967 Issue. 4

5 by private individuals, investors and businessmen until the U.S. made an official diplomacy with China in March President Deng Xiao Ping visited Washington D.C. in January 1979 after President Nixon visited China in 1972 and President Ford in After the official diplomacy, China itself opened their closed door toward the world and has become a powerful engine for world economic growth. If we change the subject country China to North Korea in the President Nixon s article and then we can see that it exactly describes the current North Korea Nuclear Crisis. This reads that North Korea now is almost the same situation as the China 50 years ago, and awakens us that the U.S. and South Korea need to launch a second sunshine policy package. The True Force That Nudges a Closed Society to Open Toward Outside World The success of the sunshine policy in China tells a truth that soft power program is more nudging and effective than hard power program in the long run as well as in the short run. Unlikely the hard power competition and war that costs economy and lives, and creates uncertainty for the future, the soft power strategy has advantage: its end is win-win as exemplified in the experience of China. Soft power program utilizes economic trades and cultural exchanges, while hard power program utilizes military competition and possibly a war in the end. It rarely works that a threat can change a country to open toward the outside world. Threat merely ends with either war or bitter coldness whose cost and results we do not exactly know. Let us look at the evidence of soft power in the case of China. There is an unattended factual story more than 100 years ago. After the Yihetuan Movement (so-called Boxer Uprising), an anti-foreign uprising in China during 1899 to 1901, the eight belligerent western countries sent the war reparations from China to their home countries. But exceptionally, the U.S., instead of sending it home, established Tsinghua University using the reparations as seed money. Fascinatingly, the Chinese 5

6 leaders who have led China s opening toward the U.S. are all alumni of Tsinghua University since Zhu Rongji who participated in the democratic movement in his youth. The current President Xi also once stayed at Iowa during his youth for the study of U.S. agriculture. Returning the reparation by establishing an educational institute for the next generation rather than sending it outside is an impressive story enough to nudge young students to understand the distinction of the U.S. among other imperialistic countries and have them recognize: This country is different. The Comparison of Two Options: New Nixon Initiative v. War Initiative President Nixon created an initiative that peace wins war in gaining friendship and economic prosperity among all parties. As Nixon realized that peace was the strongest strategy at that time, so it is now too. As the U.S. read the China Nuclear Crisis as a desperate signaling for economic help, the North Korea Nuclear Crisis also may need to be read as signaling for the same thing. After the resolution of the China Nuclear Crisis, the Nixon Initiative established the leadership of the U.S. in Far East Asia over the last 50 years. A New Nixon Initiative will contribute to enhance the leadership more firmly under which multilateral alliances can arise as in the Europe, while war initiative may destabilize the leadership. Once launched, new Nixon Initiative will be in the right place at the right time. In the war, North Korea may be collapsed or may not, but tens of thousands or multi millions people will be killed including North Korean, South Korean and Americans. Korean economy may be devastated as a result. While New Nixon initiative will obtain another friend, war initiative may lose friends. Specifically, war initiative may turn China into war friend of North Korea, and South Korea will, once turned into war field, be devastated economically as well as politically. As a result, South Korea may no longer be capable of strong alliance with the U.S. War possibly put the U.S. leadership into peril in the region. 6

7 The Necessity of Sunshine Policy for the Opening of North Korea The experience of the U.S. in the opening of China is valuable. The situation with North Korea is different from that of China of course. However, we can draw valuable implications from the experience of China about how the program for the opening of North Korea should develop over time. The soft power program of the U.S. consisted of three stages. First, the preparatory period. This period took over 10 years in the experience of the opening of China. Second, the formation and deepening of an official diplomacy period. This period lasted over 20 years. Third, China s becoming of a member of WTO period. In the beginning of this period, China obtained the low-tariff access to the U.S. market that became an obvious base for the booming of Chinese economy. The soft power program adopted by President Nixon and subsequent administrations were consistent, persistent and comprehensive including economic cooperation and cultural exchanges beyond politics, and lasted over 10 years before formal diplomacy with China in Another 20 years after the official diplomatic relation with the U.S., China ultimately gained a membership in WTO in 2001, meaning that China became a regular member of global economy. At the WEF conference last year 2017, President Xi emphasized the benefits of globalization against protectionism. 10 This is a thrilling moment in which China voices the benefits of free economic trade and highlights the history of wisdom and patience for the opening of China since Further, not merely China s opening-up, but this address tells us the possibility that China can make a role for sound competitions inspiring warmth for global economy. If North Korea could be another engine for global economic growth and peace, it will be good for all of us. The successful experience of China opening-up implicates that North Korea can be another possibility of opening-up. Further the stabilization of Far East Asia by a peace agreement between the

8 U.S. and North Korea will make the area to better contribute to global peace and economy. This is the ultimate objective of the soft power program. In particular, North Korea has already begun to change. According to Kim Byung-Yeon (2017), 11 North Korea faces extreme economic poverty and cannot find any alternative except for turning to market economy as China did, and in fact the market economy already began to develop at its grass root level of economic activity in North Korea. If this grass root level economy meets sunshine policy, it may get a momentum some time later that can change overall level of economic activity in North Korea. A Nixonian Strategy: Three Stages of Soft Power Program for the Opening of North Korea The experiential program of the resolution of the China Nuclear crisis offers us a tentative schedule for the soft power program tailored for the Korean Peninsula. Of course, this tentative schedule will be or should be realistically adapted as situations develop in reality. First of all, a preparatory period. As the experience between the U.S. and China, South Korea and North Korea may need time to come off their severe Korean War trauma that may still remain. During this period, the freeze for freeze or freeze for peace agreement can be reached, South Korea and the U.S. begin free economic trades and cultural exchanges with North Korea, and the U.S. and North Korea transform the truce agreement to peace agreement. This will help lay the foundation for next stage of development. If the freeze for peace agreement is introduced, the preparatory period may shorten 5 to 6 years compared with the 10 years in the case of the China Nuclear Crisis. Second, a completion of official diplomacy period. As the case in China, this period should last over one or two decades. 20 years is not that long compared to the case of China and the U.S. During the time, the official diplomacy relations should form and complete between the U.S. and North 11 Byung-Yeon Kim (2017), Unveiling the North Korean Economy, Cambridge University. 8

9 Korea, and between South Korea and North Korea. In particular, an official diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea will become a cornerstone and complement for the official relation between South Korea and North Korea. If the freeze for peace agreement can be adopted in the preparatory period, then the diplomacy period can be flexibly adjusted. Third, North Korea s becoming a member of global economy and trade period. During the period, North Korea will get opportunities for low-tariff agreements with the U.S. and other countries, which will become opportunities for the sustained economic growth of North Korea. In particular, during the third period, Koreans can discuss and determine their long lasting dream: reunification between South Korea and North Korea. Every South Korean learns a song for reunification from childhood: Reunification is our dream. However, Korean War trauma and the antagonism between South Korea and North Korea has been over 70 years, therefore, a strongly realistic recognition and preparations are required. One possible procedural option is a referendum 30 years later from now, for example in 2050 to decide whether two Koreas would really reunite or not. From now till that time, Koreans should keep the time of patience, effort and trust so that such time will shape the possibility of reunion. The Fundamental Problem of North Korea and the Era of Internet Activism High tension may create the willingness of confronting both sides to talk. To make use of the nuclear crisis for a necessary talk, party countries, in particular, North Korea, South Korea and the U.S., should be careful not to be framed and trapped as prisoners in a prisoner s dilemma. 12 A prisoner s dilemma assumes that prisoners cannot communicate, therefore, distrust each other, and then would knowingly choose worst payoff strategy. Prisoner s dilemma postulates that disconnectedness leads to betrayal and vengeful decisions. In order to get out of this frame, we need 12 Recently, there are many analysis on North Korea Nuclear Crisis using prisoner s dilemma theory. For example, What game theory tells us about nuclear war with North Korea, Aug. 16, 2017, Washington post

10 to recognize that a prisoner s dilemma is just one possible frame. The framing effect of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 13 explains what frames generally consist of and how they work. There are in general two types of conflicting frames: negative belief (distrust) and positive belief (trust). The negative belief is the basis for the case of prisoner s dilemma, while the positive belief is an awareness to get out of a trap under negative belief if it is trap. If a negative belief prevails that peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea merely extends or supports the dictatorship of North Korea prevails, then we will go to nuclear war. However, if a positive belief prevails that peace agreement would lead North Korea to adopt market economy and democracy, and make it become open society, then we will go to peace agreement. The experience of the resolution of the China Nuclear Crisis can be a ground for the positive belief. Another potential ground for the positive belief exists in North Korea. Amid this nuclear crisis though, South Korean and North Korean have a memory of sunshine policy during the period of 1999 to As one of the results of the sunshine policy, Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST) 14 has been established and operates through the funding of South Korea and the U.S. Simply speaking, they are beneficiaries of scholarship from the U.S. and South Korea. In the university, all classes are taught in English and many of teachers are American, Korean American including South Korean. Nobody can deny the possibility that PUST can be Tsinghua University in North Korea in the future even if it may take time. Given positive belief, what could we expect from Re-Nixon strategy? In order to get some expectations, we need to look at the fundamental problem of North Korea society. The most fundamental problem of North Korea is its isolatedness as the China 50 years ago, 13 Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman The framing of choices and the psychology of choice. Science 211:

11 not nuclear weaponry itself. 15 This isolatedness is the underlying reason that shackles its economic development and deludes North Korea that nuclear weapon may save its hardship. De-isolation will provide chances for North Korea society and citizens to perceive the outside world, engage in global society and economic activity, and become source of driving power to change North Korea toward open society. Of all the things, North Korea citizens free internet access to global society will create stronger impacts for social progress than any military programs. Military engagement will hurt North Korea citizens who are otherwise willingly likely to engage in changing their society, and this additional trauma may remain another 70 years under antagonism. We all, South Korea and the U.S., are standing at the same line. We do care the value of democracy. We do care about turning North Korea into an open society. Let Re-Nixon strategy work to dismantle the isolatedness which will answer the question how to resolve the Nuclear Crisis. 15 North Korea: the hermit kingdom, Jan. 12,