Autumn semester of Political Issues in. Contemporary Korean Politics. Professor : Taek Sun Lee

Transcription

1 Autumn semester of 2015 Political Issues in Contemporary Korean Politics Professor : Taek Sun Lee

2 Week 3 Notes for class 1.Basically this class is in English, so you have to try use English as far as possible. 2.Since the aim of this class is improving your English, you have to do your best for using English. 3.You make your own composition in English before asking questions. 4. If you do not try to make English writing at all, I will not answer questions, too.

3 Week 3 5. However, Korean will expression. Notes for class if you try to speak English, be permitted to compensate for using your 6.Since your final grade will be decided on your efforts for using English, please try to use English as far as possible instead of using Korean. 7.Of course, I will permit using Korean before and after class.

4 Week 3 Tips for English in class 1.You have to try to easy English according to your composition style. 2.Using easy English is the first step for improving English. 3. Even the famous Lawyer does composition in the court of law. not use difficult

5 Week 3 Tips for English in class 4.Ban ki moon, who is the secretary general of the United Nations, focused on communication instead of using fluent composition or native pronunciation. 5.Since you are not a native speaker, you do not need to feel the shame of your English at all. 6. In conclusion, you have to make your own composition according to your English level.

6 * Korean political history as seen through photos of the Samuel Berger Papers Who is Samuel Berger? 1 He was the 8th American ambassador in Korea, and vice-ambassador in Saigon. 2 He introduced Park Chung Hee's talks with John F. Kennedy after military coup. 3 During his term as an ambassador, Korean government began to consider for normalizing relations with Japan and joining the Vietnam war. 4 After he returned to USA, he submitted some secret report for cope with Cold war in Asian countries, which became a basic material for making a foreign policy in Vietnam.

7 * Korean political history as seen through photos of the Samuel Berger Papers Who is Samuel Berger? 1 He was the 8th American ambassador in Korea, and vice-ambassador in Saigon. 2 He introduced Park Chung Hee's talks with John F. Kennedy after military coup. 3 During his term as an ambassador, Korean government began to consider for normalizing relations with Japan and joining the Vietnam war. 4 After he returned to USA, he submitted some secret report for cope with Cold war in Asian countries, which became a basic material for making a foreign policy in Vietnam.

8 * Korean political history of the Samuel Berger Paper s before and after. 5 Despite fierce domestic opposition based on antipathy to the former colonial matters, the Seoul-Tokyo normalization, which was encouraged by Washington, brought an immediate Japanese assistance package of $800 million and led to many more millions in Japanese investments and valuable economic tie-ups with Japanese firms. 6 In 1966 revenues from the war made up 40 percent of South Korea's foreign exchange earnings, making Vietnam the country's first overseas profit center.

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10 At the Dae-Han Heavy Indusry

11 VIDEO CLIPS 12 min 34 seconds- 13 min 30 seconds

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13 At the Highway Construction

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18 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning 1 Business in the city's tall buildings were asked to leave their lights on all nights to present a more impressive view and, not incidentally, to prove that Seoul had electricity to spare. 2 At the time of the division of the country, North Korea had inherited the main municipal power plant, which had been located well north of the city. Until the South built a new power plant, the North had caused privation and consternation by shutting of the electricity whenever it choose.

19 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning 3 To create more traffic, Seoulites were asked to drive their cars on the highway even if they had no place to go. 4 It quickly became apparent that the North had little interests in the limited accommodations for divided families that were proposed by the South, demanding instead such moves as repeal of the South's Anti-Communist Law and extensive exchange of political cadres down to the lowest governmental levels.

20 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning Park Chung Hee

21 1 min 28 seconds- 1 min 51 seconds 3min 36seconds-4 min

22 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning Park Chung Hee 1 Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung had one thing in common: each had come to dominate his respective section of the Korean landmass. 2 The overall results of the development program that Park put in place between 1961 and 1979 were spectacular. 3 Although this facilitated Korea's economic rise in the 1970s and beyond, the intimate relations between government and business also set the mold for corruption.

23 VIDEO CLIPS 50 min 12 seconds-50 min 51 seconds

24 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning Park Chung Hee 4 Park Chung Hee had to respond to a perilous security combination: the North Korean military buildup and his decreasing confidence in American security assurances, as the United disengaged from the Vietnam War and sought to reduce its commitments elsewhere in East Asia. 5 In view of these achievements, it is small wonder that he is viewed by most South Koreans in retrospect as a leader of unparalleled greatness.

25 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning Washington Blinks At Park s Coup 1 Park Chung Hee declared the martial law, junked the existing constitution, disbanded the National Assembly, and prepared a plan for indirect election of the president. 2 US ambassador Philip Habib cabled Washington to say that the measures proposed are designed to insure that Park Chung Hee will stay in office for at least twelve years with even less opposition and dissent and with increased executive powers

26 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning Washington Blinks At Park s Coup 3 The Nixon-Kissinger White House, which prided itself on realpolitik in diplomacy, was fixated on the politically difficult situation in Vietnam. Additionally, US had the campaign period of presidential election. 4 Marcos and Park had sprung their power grabs during these period. In other words, US government didn't have time to be bothered.

27 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning The Impact Of Yushin 1 Before the voting, Kim Dae Jung accurately predicted that if Park Chung Hee won, he would become a generalissimo and arrange to be in office forever. 2 It was increasingly clear that the inter-korean talks were not leading to the withdrawal of US military forces. Moreover, the exposure of North Korean delegates to the more prosperous South was making Pyongyang's leaders uncomfortable.

28 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning The Impact Of Yushin 3 The dialogue was helpful to Park Jung Hee's regime internationally,especially St in the United ates. Domestically, the opening to the North was broadly popular with the South Korean public. 4 Kim Il Sung also found the dialogue with the South to be beneficial, especially in breaking out of his diplomatic isolation. Also for the first time, as part of its peace offensive, North Korea communicated directly with the United States.

29 Chapter 2. The End of the Beginning The Impact Of Yushin 5 Neither Kim Il Sung nor Park Chung Hee was willing to seriously compromise the policies and interest groups on which their respective regimes were based to pursue the long-term goal of national unity. To a great degree, the militarybacked governments of both the North and the South had been shaped by the rivalry between them. 6 Nonetheless, the exchange of the early 1970's were a turning point in the Cold War on the Korean peninsula, holding out the possibility, for the first time, of mutual cooperation and eventual peaceful reunification.

30 Key Question What was the results of Two Korea's dialogue on 1972? Do summarize them from the standpoints of the North&South.

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