Towards an Integration of Domestic and Transnational Dimensions of Democratisation. Regime Transition in Indonesia.

Transcription

1 Towards an Integration of Domestic and Transnational Dimensions of Democratisation. Regime Transition in Indonesia. Anders Uhlin PhD, Assistant Professor, Political Science Södertörns högskola Box 4101, S Huddinge, Sweden phone: 46-(0) fax: 46-(0) Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop 4: Democracy and Development: Theoretical Gains and Challenges, Copenhagen, Denmark, April, This is a first draft. Please do not quote without permission from the author.

2 Introduction From 1965 until May 1998 General Suharto ruled Indonesia in a highly authoritarian way. The military dominated New Order regime seemed to be able to resist pressure for democratisation. Contrary to predictions based on modernisation theory, steady economic growth since the early 1970s did not lead to political liberalisation. Instead it enabled Suharto to buy some legitimacy for his authoritarian regime. Despite corruption of a tremendous magnitude and a very unequal distribution of the fruits of development, there were enough resources to raise the material living standard of most citizens. The New Order state was relatively autonomous in relation to society. The military dominated the state apparatus and controlled potentially oppositional sections of society with brutal force. Although the military was not completely unified, factional conflicts were easily controlled and manipulated by Suharto. No reform-minded soft-liners emerged within the armed forces. Civil society was kept weak, depoliticised and fragmented. Indonesia s position in the global capitalist system and the anti-communist ideology of the Suharto regime ensured substantial economic, military and political support from the West. The Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand in 1997 marked the beginning of the end for the Suharto era in Indonesian politics. When the economic crisis hit Indonesia, the authoritarian regime could no longer get any legitimacy from economic development. Demands from the IMF further worsened the economic and political crisis. When student led mass demonstrations demanded the President s resignation, the military elite eventually abandoned Suharto in order to protect its own interests. On 21 May 1998 he was forced to step down. Suharto s hand picked successor Habibie, under strong international and popular pressure, introduced some political reforms. The political space was considerably widened. New political organisations and parties were formed and media reports became much more independent and critical of the government. Some - but far from all - political prisoners were released. Free elections were promised. Indonesia had clearly entered a phase of regime transition. Elections in June 1999 were surprisingly free and peaceful. New reform-oriented parties gained a substantial majority of the votes. In October 1999 the liberal Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid was elected the new president. He formed a coalition government including all major political forces in the country. The process of democratisation has been successful in many respects, but severe problems remain and prospects for further democratisation are uncertain. The military is fighting to keep its political and economic privileges. Violent repression by the armed forces continued after the fall of Suharto, especially in East Timor in connection with the August 1999 referendum leading to the independence of the occupied territory. The new government has to face strong demands for self-determination in the provinces of Aceh and West Papua too. So far the military has been allowed to apply a violent security approach to popular demands in these problem areas. In order to stabilise the new and more democratic political system economic improvements are necessary. Civil society is still weak and fragmented after decades of authoritarian state dominance and policies of depolitisation. Social conflicts take the form of violent clashes between different religious and ethnic groups. These dramatic developments in the country with the fourth largest population in the world cannot be understood without a thorough analysis of a combination of domestic and transnational factors. For a long time there was an unfortunate divide within political science between comparative politics and international relations. Within the field of development studies modernization theory has suffered from a neglect of the international dimension, whereas 1

3 dependency and world system theories used to ignore the domestic context. An increasing number of scholars from different subdisciplines, however, have argued that domestic and international factors are so interrelated that they must be studied simultaneously (e.g. Gourevitch 1978; Almond 1989; So 1990; Risse-Kappen 1995; Whitehead 1996: 24). There are three interrelated aims of this paper. First, I offer an explanation to the fall of Suharto and the regime transition it initiated in Indonesia. Second, I seek to evaluate prospects for further democratisation in the country. Third, I present a theoretical argument concerning the importance of integrating domestic and transnational dimensions in the analysis of democratisation processes. 1 In the explanation of recent political developments in Indonesia, including the regime transition that started with the fall of Suharto, three factors stand out as essential: First, the economic crisis. Second, the role of the military (which is highly intertwined with the state in the Indonesian context). Third, civil society. I will argue that these factors are more essential than other potential explanations to the current regime transition in Indonesia. Furthermore I will argue that all these factors have important transnational dimensions that are necessary to take into account if we are to understand processes of democratisation as well as other forms of political development in contemporary Third World states. Other factors including ethnic and religious conflicts (a topic that would deserve a paper on its own and which is of utmost importance for future political developments in Indonesia), political culture, state structure, class structure, elite negotiations etc. are excluded because of lack of space and because I consider them less important in explaining the Indonesian transition. These factors are discussed only in relation to the main factors. In the remaining part of this paper I will first discuss democratisation and its transnational dimensions on a theoretical level. Then there are three sections for each of the main factors the economic crisis, the military, and civil society. Each of these sections begin with a brief theoretical discussion on the relationship between the respective factors and democratisation in general and in a transnational context, before the specific case of regime transition in Indonesia is examined. I end the paper with a conclusion about democratisation in Indonesia and a brief discussion on theoretical implications of the analysis for research on democratisation in general. Democratisation and its Transnational Context The theoretic (and practical) discourse on democracy is to a large extent characterised by the antagonism between two opposing positions concerning the definition of democracy. On one side we have proponents of narrow, formal, macro-level, institutionalist, and electoralist definitions. On the other side we have those favouring broad, substantive, micro-level, society oriented, participatory, and equality oriented definitions. The main advantage of a narrow definition is that it provides the researcher with a useful tool for empirical research. Democracy becomes possible to measure and there are plenty of really existing democracies to study. This is the main reason for the popularity of narrow definitions in the literature. The main disadvantage, as pointed out by proponents of a broader definition, is that a focus on form rather than substance devalues the concept democracy by 1 The analysis is explorative. I will not be able to present any conclusive evidence. The aim is rather to specify and develop some concepts and theoretical aspects and thus lay the ground for future research. I offer a new interpretation of recent political developments in Indonesia based on secondary literature and newspaper reports. Interviews and discussions with academics, journalists and activists in Jakarta in November 1998 and in November 1999 have also informed the study. 2

4 including political systems and processes that have many undemocratic aspects. There is also a risk that a narrow definition limits the research agenda, excluding many relevant problems of democracy. In this study I use a definition of democracy that is procedural, but still far more substantial than most mainstream definitions. With David Beetham (1993: 55) I define democracy as a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control. The most democratic arrangement is where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly (ibid.). The key components of this definition are popular control and political equality. Democratisation is simply the processes towards democracy, i.e. the (re)introduction or extension of this mode of decision-making based on the principles of popular control and political equality. As most research on democratisation uses a narrow definition of democracy, the main focus has been on the democratisation of formal political institutions. In particular the concept of regime transition has been used. A regime transition means a change of norms and principles of the political organisation of the state (Lawson 1993: 187). With the fall of Suharto Indonesia left the pre-transition phase (Uhlin 1997: ) and entered a phase of regime transition. In this study I focus on formal institutional democratisation or regime transition, as analysed in most mainstream democratisation studies. But I will also discuss prospects for more substantial societal democratisation, which may be covered by my definition of democracy and democratisation. As argued by Grugel 1999: 12), democratisation involves not only the elimination of authoritarian institutions, but also the elimination of authoritarian social practices. These two aspects of the democratisation process are treated as analytically distinct. Formal institutional and societal democratisation may accompany and strengthen each other, but they may also conflict. A certain process of formal institutional democratisation can, for instance, be an obstacle to societal democratisation and the deepening of democracy that this implies. A pacted democracy may for instance leave more substantial democratisation off the agenda in order to ensure the acceptance of limited democratic forms by authoritarian elites. Research on transitions to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America tend to conclude that domestic factors were predominant (e.g. O Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 19). The more recent transitions in Eastern Europe and some Asian countries, however, suggest that international factors can be very important, if not more important than domestic factors. Three different modes of external influence on democratisation processes can be identified (Schmitz & Sell 1999). First, pressure from the international environment (based on a realist perspective on international relations). Second, voluntary adaptation to concrete institutional models (a liberal perspective on international relations). Third, socialisation via diffusion of ideas (a constructivist perspective). These aspects of external influence will be kept in mind when I discuss the transnational dimensions of the main explanatory factors: the economic crisis, the role of the military, and civil society. Economic Crisis One of the most quoted propositions within the field of comparative politics is Lipset s claim that /t/he more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy (Lipset 1959: 75). Working within the paradigm of modernisation theory many scholars have refined the analysis and found empirical evidence of the relationship between economic development and democracy (e.g. Diamond 1992; Hadenius 1992). Given the obvious 3

5 importance of the international economy in the contemporary world, the external or transnational dimension has been surprisingly lacking within modernisation studies (but see Johansson 1998). Structural theories of democratisation have paid more attention to the impact of the global economy and transnational power relations (e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992). In a similar analytical approach Winters (1996) has stressed the structural power of capital controllers, related to the mobility of capital. From this perspective the relationship between the global economy and national democracy is complex and external economic impact is not necessarily supportive of democracy. According to conventional modernisation theory, the steady economic growth under the Suharto regime should have resulted in political liberalisation. This did not happen. Instead it was the economic crisis that triggered the fall of the dictator. Modernisation theory has not shown any impressive explanatory power when it comes to sudden transitions from authoritarian rule. On a general level, however, there is something to the claim that economic development makes it easier for democracy to develop. An economic crisis can undermine the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime, as in Indonesia, but democracy is not likely to develop smoothly in a country struck by extreme poverty. Indonesia was hit harder than any other country by the Asian crisis. 2 In order to understand why it was so, we have to examine how domestic factors mediated the external economic impact. The short-term nature of a large portion of Indonesia s huge foreign debt made them impossible to repay when exchange rates dropped dramatically. The Indonesian economy was especially vulnerable because of the ease with which foreign money moved in and out. Corruption was worse in Indonesia than in other countries suffering from the economic crisis. Whereas the comparatively flexible and democratic political systems in Thailand and South Korea managed to produce new more reform oriented governments with democratic credentials to implement unpopular economic reforms, the authoritarian regime in Indonesia proved itself unable to adjust to the new economic and political situation. The first response by the Suharto government was to float the currency and call in the IMF for assistance. Some banks were closed and some major projects were postponed, but business interests close to the President were protected. The IMF package forced on Indonesia on 15 January 1998 did not stop the fall of the Rupiah. Prices on consumer goods rose rapidly, first on imported items, but it soon spread to the whole economy. Mass unemployment was another consequence of the economic crisis. Despite domestic as well as external pressure for reform, Suharto tightened his grip on the political system. 3 In March 1998 the People s Consultative Assembly filled with Suharto loyalists re-elected the ageing President for a new five years period. The new cabinet was made up of Suharto s closest associates, including his own daughter Tutut and his business and golf partner Bob Hasan. The new government neither satisfied international market forces, nor the Indonesian people. The fall of the Rupiah continued and mass demonstrations against the Suharto regime became increasingly common. The tough economic policies demanded by the IMF worsened the crisis. The removal of some subsidies on fuel and electricity in early May 1998 led to new price rises and riots. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 was the triggering factor for the transition in Indonesia. It is the single most important factor explaining the fall of Suharto. The economic crisis that had its origin outside Indonesia can be seen as a necessary, but not sufficient factor. The financial crisis and economic decline made the severe problems of corruption, nepotism, social and ethnic tensions, an unresponsive government structure and lack of political freedom 2 On the economic crisis in Indonesia see Hill 1998; McGillivray & Morrisey 1999; Suryahadi For an overview of events leading to the fall of Suharto see Bhakti 1998; Forrester 1998; Aspinall, Feith & van Klinken (eds.) 1999; Eklöf

6 more obvious and urgent. In this way the domestic situation worsened the crisis and turned it into a real regime crisis. Whereas the economic crisis led to the fall of an authoritarian leader and triggered a regime transition, it is not favourable for further democratisation. If the new government with democratic credentials does not manage to improve economic conditions, it may loose legitimacy too. Simultaneously reforming the economy and the political system is an enormous task. The regime transition is far from complete. Elites favoured by the corrupt New Order regime still hold powerful positions and resist any reforms challenging their economic and political interests. Since the elections in June 1999 the currency has stabilised and interest rates have fallen from 70% at their peak to 12% in March 2000 (The Economist, March 25, 2000: 72). But severe economic problems remain and investors have not yet regained confidence in the Indonesian economy. Ordinary people still suffer from high prices and unemployment. Concerning the economy, external influences predominantly take the form of pressure from the international economy and more specifically from the institutions of the IMF and the World Bank. The Indonesian government has almost no autonomy in dealing with the economic problems. Desperately dependent on foreign economic assistance, the government has to implement the policies prescribed by the IMF. I think that the economic policies of the New Order regime is best understood in the context of the structural power of capital (Winters 1996) rather than as voluntary or autonomous choices reflecting Soeharto s calculations, as argued by Liddle (1991: 403). Three distinct phases of policies toward investors in New Order Indonesia can be identified (Winters 1996). From late 1965 to late 1973 the New Order government was highly responsive to the interests of investors. In late 1973 the sharp increase in oil prices considerably weakened the structural constraints on state policies and the period was characterized by less favorable investment conditions and less investment due to the relative autonomy and bargaining strength of the Indonesian government. The early 1980s marked the end of the oil boom and the structural power of mobile capital was restored. Policies again became highly favorable for investors. The 1997 economic crisis resulted in an even stronger position for mobile capital interests. The policy recommendations of the IMF reflect those interests. The IMF recovery program for Indonesia includes the tightening of monetary policies in order to stabilise the Rupiah; cutting government spending; restructuring financial institutions; improving market efficiency through privatisation, trade liberalisation and increased transparency (McGillivray & Morrisey 1999). Some of these policies especially efforts to increase transparency and dismantle monopolies given to Suharto cronies are important aspects of the democratisation processes, but most of the program especially cuts in government spending, including subsidies on basic goods hit hard against the poor and may cause social unrest and threaten the process of democratisation. In contrast to the IMF - and contrary to what could be expected from the past record of the World Bank - this institution has focused more on social issues, including health, education and employment (McGillivray & Morrisey 1999: 20). This is an approach that seems to be more favorable for democratisation. The political liberalisation initiated by the Habibie government was due mainly to the strong pressure from below for political reform, but international political pressure was not insignificant. Indonesia had to improve its international image in order to receive the foreign economic assistance it so desperately needed. The new government led by Abdurrahman Wahid faces the same pressure and is likely to be more genuinely interested in reforms. Concerning economic policies, however, the Indonesian government is highly constrained. Wahid has promised the IMF to implement the same austerity measures as did the Suharto and Habibie governments. 5

7 Among the most controversial policies prescribed by the IMF is the reduction of fuel subsidies. Anticipating huge protests against the price rises the Indonesian government postponed the reform due to be implemented on 1 April 2000 (Straits Times 1 April, 2000). By delaying loan payments the IMF can put strong pressure on the Indonesian government. In April 2000 the Wahid government seemed to be squeezed between IMF demands for tough economic policies in return for renewed loan payments and the threat of mass demonstrations and civil unrest as a reaction to the same policies. The global capitalist system constitutes the framework for national political processes. Capitalist development helped keep the Suharto regime in power for more than three decades and changes in the capitalist world economy led to the fall of the dictator. Powerful capital controllers are likely to be more interested in political stability and the repayment of loans than in a democratic development in Indonesia. To some extent pressure from the global economy and the institutions of the IMF and the World Bank will nevertheless push Indonesia s formal political system in a more democratic direction. International economic impact, however, is likely to have a negative effect on substantial or societal democratisation. The Military If there are different views on the impact of economic development and economic crisis on democratisation, there is much more agreement about the negative democratic impact of the military. Military involvement in politics is clearly not compatible with democracy. There is no liberal democracy in which the military has a formal political role. Military organisations are to their nature hierarchical and authoritarian. Military activities demand a clear command structure and obedience of orders from the superiors. This is very different from what is required in a democratic political system. Civilian control of the military is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. The armed forces have often been a major component of the authoritarian regime and a main obstacle to democratisation. Although it has been argued that new democracies have been more successful in improving civil-military relations than they have in most other problem areas (Huntington 1995), establishing full civilian control over the military has been a major problem in many democratisation processes. Civilian control in theory means that all government decisions, including on issues of national security, are made or approved by officials outside the military (Kohn 1997: 142). A process of democratisation must include a systematic reduction of many of the military s professional prerogatives and of most, if not all, of its political prerogatives; of the special powers of security and intelligence agencies; and of many other authoritarian residues entrenched at the heart of the state. (Luckham 1996: 128) Because of its power, the military is still an important actor in the process of democratisation. Many regime transitions have started with a split within the armed forces. Tension between hard-liners and soft-liners often within the military - open up and undermine authoritarian regimes (O Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 15-17). The transnational dimension is to a large extent neglected both in the general theoretical literature on politics and armed forces and in texts on the Indonesian military. This is both strange and problematic given the magnitude of foreign military assistance during the cold war. Representatives of the US military establishment and its academic supporters argue that the US training of soldiers from authoritarian and military dominated states in the Third World contributes to the diffusion of liberal democratic norms of military professionalism and civilian control (Huntington 1995: 12), whereas critics point out that Western training and support 6

8 strengthens military regimes and that Western trained troops often have committed serious violations of human rights. In Indonesia, like in many other Third World countries, the post-colonial society was born with powerful armed forces that had fought for independence. Political ambitions of the Indonesian military, ABRI, were evident already in the 1950s, but it was the 1965 coup events that made the armed forces a dominant political power. ABRI leaders have tended to consider their political involvement a permanent feature of Indonesian politics. The doctrine of the armed forces dual functions, dwi-fungsi, served to legitimise this. The organisation of the Indonesian army differs from most other armed forces because of its territorial structure, which means that army units are spread all over the country, supervising the civilian administration in every town and village. This is an important aspect of the political power of the military, which has so far received far less attention in the public debate than the doctrine of the dual functions of the armed forces (Crouch 1999: 145). A split between hard-liners and reform minded soft-liners has often weakened authoritarian regimes and paved the way for democratisation. Neither conflicts between President Suharto and the armed forces nor conflicts within ABRI have been of this character. No real softliners have been possible to identify. An often-cited cleavage is between a secular nationalist (red and white) and an Islamic (green) faction within the army (Liddle 1996: 61). Suharto has always managed to rule by creating or manipulating such splits. No military leader has been allowed to develop a power base strong enough to challenge the President. After Suharto had managed to secure support for his re-election in February 1998, he promoted members of both the nationalist and the green factions to the top posts of ABRI. General Wiranto (representing the secular nationalists) became commander-in-chief and Suharto s son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo (with Islamic connections) took over the post as commander of the Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) (Mietzner 1999: 73). Rivalries between the two factions would guarantee that a united military would not move against Suharto. This time, however, the split weakened the armed forces to a degree that it contributed to the fall of Suharto. The two factions had different approaches to handling the student led mass protests against Suharto in March-May Whereas Wiranto chose a softer approach allowing student activists to continue with their demonstrations as long as they stayed inside campuses, troops under the command of Prabowo kidnapped, tortured and murdered some radical activists. There is substantial evidence that some of the worst violence in the May 1998 riots was orchestrated by elements within ABRI (Walters 1999: 61; Bourchier 1999: 151). The riots went on for two days without intervention by troops loyal to Prabowo (Mietzner 1999: 79). As the mass protests continued the army leadership eventually realised that its own interests were no longer served by protecting Suharto s presidency at any cost. Wiranto overlooked the transfer of power to Suharto s Vice-President Habibie, promised to protect Suharto and his family and managed to get Prabowo and his associates dismissed from their active command. Thus Wiranto had full control of the armed forces and seemed to be in a very powerful position. Under Suharto s rule no political force in Indonesia - with the important exception of independence movements in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh - had the courage and capacity to seriously challenge ABRI. But from early 1998 student activists and other civil society actors started to denounce the armed forces with increasingly great defiance. The fall of Suharto created more space and opportunities for civil society to challenge the armed forces. Reports of atrocities committed by the military and demands for the abolishment of the armed forces dual function and political power became increasingly common in the Indonesian media (Bourchier 1999; Crouch 1999: ). The Indonesian military was forced on the defensive. The weakening 7

9 power of the Indonesian armed forces came as a surprise to most observers of Indonesian politics. When Michael Vatikiotis in a paper published in 1998 argued that the most likely contenders for power in a post-suharto power-struggle are either in the armed forces, or are retired senior officers (Vatikiotis 1998: 45), few would have quarrelled with this prediction. Nevertheless, the military leadership accepted first the civilian Habibie and then Wahid as presidents. Wiranto officially apologised for human rights abuses committed by Indonesian troops in Aceh. ABRI agreed to a reduced representation in the parliament. On 1 April 1999 the police force was officially separated from the armed forces, which changed its name from ABRI to TNI. A combination of internal weaknesses and external pressure reduced the power of the Indonesian military in 1998 and The factional splits and power struggle between Wiranto and Prabowo, the shooting of students at the Trisakti University, the failure to contain the riots in May 1998, the killing of protestors outside the parliament in November 1998, and not least the humiliating defeat in East Timor in 1999, all contributed to the problems of the armed forces. More important, however, was the political pressure from the popular reformasi movement, which brought down Suharto and continued to call the military to account for violations during the New Order regime (Bourchier 1999). President Wahid has continued to gradually weaken the political power of the armed forces and promote reform-oriented officers. He included several retired Generals in his new government, but the fact that a civilian (albeit a conservative academic close to the military) became Minster of Defence was of great symbolic significance. By giving the post as commander of the armed forces to the navy, Wahid further weakened the army. When he in February 2000 effectively dismissed Wiranto from the government due to investigations into his responsibility for the violence in East Timor during 1999, this was another important step on the way to civilian supremacy. Nevertheless, the Indonesian military is still in a powerful position and constitute a big obstacle to the process of democratisation. Some observers of Indonesian politics argue that the armed forces must continue to play an active political role because civil institutions are so weak. According to Walters (1999: 60) ABRI remains the only truly national institution in Indonesia with a cohesive and disciplined network that stretches down to the village level. This argument echoing the claim by Huntington (1968) as well as the discourse of the leadership of the Indonesian armed forces is flawed. The main obstacle to the development of strong civilian institutions is the military and especially its territorial structure. Far from being a guarantee for national unity, TNI might well be the biggest threat against the survival of the republic. There are plenty of evidence that the security approach of the armed forces is a major factor behind increasingly strong demands for self-determination in Aceh and West Papua. Strong indications point to the involvement of sections of the armed forces in the violent conflicts between different religious and ethnic groups. How then can the political power of the Indonesian military be abolished? There is a lot at stake for the military, not only prestige and political power but also business interests. It is unlikely that the armed forces will give up their power unless there is extremely strong popular pressure and they are given something for their return to the barracks. A truth and reconciliation commission, like in South Africa, might be a possibility to deal with the violations of human rights that have been committed by the military under the Suharto regime. In this way military officers can be given amnesty for their crimes provided that they give up their political and economic ambitions and transform the armed forces into a more conventional professional military. Not punishing the responsible for grave human rights abuses during a period of dictatorship might cause severe problems in the consolidation of democracy, as events in Chile and South Africa show. Nevertheless, some concessions to TNI might be 8

10 necessary. President Wahid s promise to pardon Wiranto if he is found guilty of the crimes in East Timor is an indication that he is reasoning in this way. For a deeper process of democratisation to occur it is not enough to abolish the formal political power of the armed forces. Indonesia needs a complete demilitarisation of the political culture. After decades of military propaganda, the Indonesian society is infected by military ideas and values. Violent riots, mob lynching and gang rapes can be seen as a result of that. From the perspective of societal democratisation, these are problems that must be dealt with. The transnational dimension is an important but highly neglected aspect when discussing problems of the Indonesian military. Industrialised countries have supplied the Indonesian armed forces with modern arms technology used for internal repression to an extent that its capacity to use force is much higher than the ability of the Indonesian government to govern and gain popular consent. It is no overstatement to argue that Western support made the authoritarian New Order regime last much longer than it would otherwise have done. This is a result of the Cold War and it is by no means specific to Indonesia. On the contrary it was a general trend in the Third World (cf. Luckham 1996: 120). The new political situation in the world after the breakdown of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has lessened the Western powers support for authoritarian regimes in the Third World and made the ideology of anti-communism obsolete. Nevertheless, there are many indications that the US embassy still has very close ties to the military leadership in Indonesia. The US Defence And Army Attaché in Jakarta , for instance, acknowledged his widespread contacts at every level within the Indonesian military and presented a view of East Timor echoing that of the ABRI leadership (Haseman: 1995). Lieutenant General Prabowo in particular seems to have enjoyed strong support from the US until he lost the power struggle with General Wiranto after the fall of Suharto. Elite units within the Indonesian military have received regular training in the US (Nairn 1999). In March 2000 President Wahid indicated that he would like to decrease Indonesia s dependence on US arms. According to the President, Indonesia should develop its own military industries in order to avoid a one-sided dependency (Straits Times, March 27, 2000). Nevertheless, the Indonesian armed forces are likely to remain highly dependent on international support and assistance for a long time to come. This dependency also make the Indonesian military vulnerable for political pressure, should the Western powers choose to tie continued military support to specific political demands. This vulnerability was demonstrated in September 1999 when the international community pressured the Indonesian government to allow foreign troops into East Timor when the Indonesian army and the militia groups it had created ran amok following the referendum on independence. The US and European decisions to suspend military links with Indonesia forced the political and military leadership in Jakarta to accept international troops in East Timor. When military relations with the Western powers were threatened, this was a powerful sanction against the Indonesian elite, arguably more powerful than economic sanctions that would have hit the population at large. Western powers are, however, likely to resume military links with Indonesia without strong conditions concerning democracy and human rights. The European Union arms embargo was not renewed in January Two additional points should be made concerning external democracy related pressure on the Indonesian military. First, although Indonesia may have considerably less power than the United States, its bargaining power has proven to be substantial in several bilateral negotiations with the superpower (Kivimäki 1993). There is absolutely no guarantee that external pressure on Indonesia has the intended effects. Second, external pressure, even if it is aimed at strengthening democracy, might have mixed democratic effects. For example, the Carter administration s 9

11 foreign policy which claimed to focus on human rights led to a compromise with the Indonesian government resulting in the release of some political prisoners in return for a substantially upgraded level of military assistance (Kivimäki 1993). While the release of political prisoners was positive from the perspective of democracy and human rights, the strengthening of the Indonesian military led to sustained authoritarian rule and the continuation of grave human rights abuses. Civil Society Civil society is a public sphere in which different kinds of groups - which have some degree of autonomy in relation to the state, economic entities and the family, but constantly interact with institutions of these other spheres - develop identities, articulate interests and try to promote a specific political agenda. 4 Most research on civil society and democratisation has used civil society as a variable explaining the democratisation of formal political institutions. This perspective is of great interest for the present study, but we also need to consider the problem of democratisation of civil society itself. As part of the broader society, civil society is a relevant arena for the form of societal democratisation discussed above. The literature is rich in hypotheses and more or less well grounded empirical findings about the relationship between civil society and formal political democracy. I will here limit the discussion to three important aspects of the role of civil society under an authoritarian regime and in the transition to democracy. First, in a pre-transition phase as well as during the regime transition, actors within civil society put pressure on the authoritarian regime and struggle for democracy. The role of civil society actors like labour, women and environmental movements, human rights NGOs, intellectuals and religious leaders etc. have been widely acknowledged in the democratisation literature (e.g. O Donnell & Schmitter 1986, ch. 5; Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992; Haynes 1997). But a strong civil society is not by definition supportive of democratisation. Elements of civil society may in fact take any position towards democracy, from support to authoritarianism, via passivity to active struggle for democracy of some variety (cf. White 1994: 380). Second, after the transition has started civil society produces political actors to new democracies. Actors within civil society take the step into political society by forming political parties and other formal political institutions. Political leaders in new democracies may be recruited from civil society groups. This is an important role that civil society plays in the consolidation of democracy, but we still need to differentiate between different actors within civil society. Civil society produces both pro-democratic and anti-democratic actors. Third, the pluralist character of civil society in itself supports democratisation. A pluralist civil society balances different interests and makes sure that power is not concentrated to one dominating group. But real power relations must be analysed. The existence of a large number of civil society groups does not automatically mean that all its members have political influence and power. There is a lack of power perspective in many studies of civil society. The distinction between participation and influence must be problematised (Stubbergaard 1998: 11). Widespread popular participation in different civil society organisations is not a guarantee for popular influence on political decision-making in the polity at large or even inside specific civil society organisations. 4 This definition as well as part of the following arguments was first outlined in Uhlin

12 The critical comments above indicate a need to abandon an overly romantic view of civil society as always supportive of democracy. In fact civil society itself may have authoritarian tendencies. Patron-client relationships often characterise both the internal organisation of civil society and the ties between civil society groups and state agencies (Clarke 1998: ). Therefore we need to consider the problem of democratisation of civil society itself, an aspect often neglected in the literature on civil society and democracy. Analysts of civil society have mostly limited themselves to the study of civil society within the borders of a particular state. But civil society is a public sphere that has no absolute and clear geographic boundaries. As current processes of globalisation constrain the autonomy and capabilities of the state, the importance of both civil society and transnational relations is highlighted. The emergence of what might be called transnational civil society groups (TCSGs) is a trend that is likely to become increasingly strong not only because of the development and spread of new forms of communication technologies, but also because economic and political processes of globalisation give rise to new problems that stimulate interconnections between more local and geographically limited civil societies (Uhlin 2000). If we agree that developments within civil society are closely related to processes of democratisation, a transnational understanding of civil society has important implications for theories of democratisation too. Democracy has been closely related to the nation state in most conventional analysis. A transnational civil society offers a new political space for efforts at democratisation and raises the question of possible forms of democracy on a transnational level. Transnational civil society actors may put pressure on the authoritarian regime and support local and national pro-democracy movements. Transnational human rights and solidarity groups are often important actors in the struggle for democracy. Actors within the Indonesian civil society especially student activists - were instrumental in the popular protests that brought down Suharto. 5 Huge demonstrations were held daily on university campuses all over the country. The event that eventually led to the fall of Suharto was the killing of four student demonstrators at Trisakti University in Jakarta on 12 May Troops shot dead peaceful demonstrators at this university for the Jakarta elite. When the student activists were buried the following day opposition figures addressed crowds of demonstrators. Rioting broke out in the districts surrounding the university campus, but with little or no participation of students. The following days violent riots occurred in Jakarta. More than one thousand people died, dozens of women were raped and the material destruction was substantial. Ethnic Chinese were, as many times before, the main targets of the violence. Rioting also broke out in other cities. Meanwhile massive peaceful demonstrations occurred in many parts of the country. On 18 May student activists began to occupy the parliament buildings demanding Suharto s resignation. This show of people power increased the division within the ruling elite and eventually the armed forces abandoned Suharto. Most commentators agree that the interplay between civil society and the armed forces was essential in the fall of Suharto, but there are different views on who played the leading role. Some claim that civil society forced ABRI to abandon Suharto (Bourchier 1999), whereas others argue that civil society united against the president only when ABRI signalled it would not continue to support Suharto (Mietzner 1999). The problem might be similar to the question of which came first: the hen or the egg. It was obviously an interaction between public protests and splits and rethinking within the military that led to the resignation of Suharto. It is, however, highly unlikely that the armed forces would have departed from its support for Suharto if there 5 They included established activist groups of both radical and more moderate inclinations as well as Islamic groups and student senates that had previously been politically passive. For an analysis of the 1998 student movement see Aspinall

13 had not been such a strong pressure from civil society. It is easier to imagine a united civil society, including the prominent moderate leaders, without the military signalling that it might abandon the president. Thus, I contend that civil society was the driving force in the process. The pro-democracy movement, and especially student activists, can pride themselves with having forced Suharto to step down. But there has never been a united pro-democracy movement in Indonesia. Splits and conflicts within the democratic opposition are well documented (Uhlin 1997: ). Not even under the severe regime crisis that Indonesia went through in early 1998, could the various pro-democracy actors unite and present a unified oppositional alternative in the March elections. Student groups themselves divided on ideological and strategical grounds tried to bring together and radicalise the main opposition leaders: Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia s first president; Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of the large Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama; and Amien Rais the leader of Muhammadiyah, the other Muslim mass organisation. Various NGO-leaders also took part in efforts at organising a strong united opposition for democracy, but these efforts proved futile (Harrison 1999). After having brought down the Suharto government the pro-democracy alliance quickly disintegrated. Although the Habibie government was widely seen as a continuation of the New Order regime and the armed forces kept its dominant position in Indonesian politics, student activists found it impossible to keep the momentum of the struggle for more fundamental change. Many civil society leaders were satisfied with the slower pace of political reform that the weak Habibie government was forced to implement. Meanwhile they could position themselves in anticipation of the coming elections. In early September 1998 large demonstrations in Jakarta and other cities marked a new wave of student activism (Aspinall 1999: 226). In November 1998 the mass movement gathered new momentum when tens of thousands of students, workers and urban poor demonstrated outside the parliament demanding that Habibie immediately transfer power to a transitional government and that the military withdraw from politics. The military deployed about troops and over civilian vigilantes and 17 people were killed and more than 400 wounded (Bourchier 1999: ). The more moderate opposition figures concentrated on the coming elections and did not want to be pushed to power by the students. The movement once again lost its momentum. Civil society elites formed new political parties. Each of the main opposition figures became associated with a political party and many NGO-activists became involved in party politics. Civil society also produced political leaders for the new government after the relatively democratic elections in June Several of the ministers in the new government, including President Wahid himself, have strong roots in the Indonesian (and transnational) NGO community. Actors within civil society have thus played an important role in the regime transition in Indonesia, but civil society in itself is neither strong nor pluralistic. Patron-client relationships characterised many of the small NGOs that were allowed to exist under the authoritarian regime. Civil society groups that had a clear pro-democracy tendency, and especially those who tried to organise a mass base, were heavily repressed. The fall of Suharto considerably opened the political space within civil society. A large number of new political groups emerged. But it takes a long time to develop a democratic civil society. After the impact of the floating mass principle, 6 independent mass organisations are not created overnight. A situation of economic crisis, social tension and elite manipulated ethnic and religious conflicts are not favourable for the development of democratic civil society groups. 6 According to this principle the population should be a floating mass which concentrates on economic development and does not take part in politics. Political activities on the community level were thus forbidden. 12

14 In analyses of civil society in Indonesia the transnational dimension has to a large extent been neglected. Nevertheless, transnational support for the democratic opposition in Indonesia is nothing new. Transnational human rights groups played an important role in pressuring Western governments to tie human rights to foreign aid already in the 1970s. The release of political prisoners in the late 1970s was to a large extent due to such foreign pressure on the Indonesian government (Fealy 1995). Links between civil society groups in Indonesia and other parts of the world had a considerable impact on the ideas and actions of the Indonesian pro-democracy movement that developed in the 1990s (Uhlin 1997). In this case the foreign influence was mainly a form of socialisation through the diffusion of ideas. Modern information technology has increased the impact of such processes. Internet was an important means of communication for activists involved in the protests that brought about the resignation of President Suharto. Key organizers of demonstrations in different parts of the country kept contact through electronic messages. By using this new technology they managed to avoid censorship and spread their views of developments that might not have been broadcast in the government controlled radio and television. Indonesian dissidents were also able to communicate quickly with supporters abroad (Basuki 1998; Marcus 1999). Evidence of ABRI involvement in kidnapping political activists, orchestrating the May riots and not least in the systematic rape of dozens of Chinese women was gathered and publicized by NGOs with transnational contacts. This played an important role in the delegitimisation of the Indonesian military. Not least reports in international media contributed to the international pressure on the Indonesian government to take the human rights abuses of the armed forces seriously. Unlike in the case of the international economy and the military, however, socialisation and the diffusion of ideas seems to be the major mode of external influence related to civil society. This is not to say that transnational civil society relations are free from hierarchical power relations and coercive practices. Financial dependency tends to create new patron-client relationships within the NGO community. 13