POLS2126 Democracy: Its Causes and Consequences. The Carnation Revolution: Democratisation in Portugal

Transcription

1 POLS2126 Democracy: Its Causes and Consequences The Carnation Revolution: Democratisation in Portugal Andrew Donnellan 19 April 2013 Portugal s transition to democracy was a unique process that marked the beginning of Huntingdon s Third Wave of democratisation. The Salazar dictatorship, having outlived most other far-right governments in Europe, had built up an impressive state apparatus to control opposition, but Portugal s dire economic situation, exacerbated by extremely unpopular foreign wars, ultimately led to the downfall of the Estado Novo. Portugal s democratisation is an archetypal example of Varol s democratic coup theory and Huntington s breakthrough coup d etat. 1 The Carnation Revolution, as dramatic and surprisingly bloodless as it 1. Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup d État, Harvard Journal of International Law 53, no. 2 (2012): , pdf (accessed April 18, 2013). 1

2 was, did not instantly bring about stable democracy something which would take a few more years to accomplish, as revolutionaries worked out their political differences. Background The so-called Estado Novo was established during the early 1930s as António de Oliveira Salazar took control of the government. 2 Salazar s rise to power was the culmination of 16 years of unstable republican rule, during which there were 45 administrations. Gomes da Costa s military coup, which led to Salazar s installation, was seen as restoring order and economic stability. 3 Salazar, formerly a little-known economics professor, was an ultra-conservative who resisted modernisation according to a US diplomat, he lived in more than one century. 4 Salazar s regime established excellent mechanisms to control opposition. Organised opposition movements (and tolerance thereof) waxed and waned, reaching their peak in the 1958 presidential election where it is generally believed that opposition candidate Humberto Delgado would have won but for electoral fraud. 5 Following an accident in 1968, Marcelo Caetano replaced Salazar as Prime Minister. 6 Caetano implemented a number of liberalising measures which removed 2. Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Martin Kayman, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal (London: Merlin Press, 1987), Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, Kayman, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal, Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, 22. 2

3 some economic protections. 7 A shift in focus away from the agricultural sector caused significant economic problems, including a drop in exports and a spike in emigration at its peak, overseas remittances were equal to 70% of Portugal s merchandise exports. 8 This was combined with the long-running series of African colonial wars as Portugal fought to protect the final vestiges of its empire, which unlike other European powers was still of great economic importance to the Portuguese. 9 This was amidst international pressure from other Western powers in favour of decolonisation. 10 The Carnation Revolution and PREC As the economic situation continued to deteriorate, repression increased. 11 A number of important movements formed during the late 1960s and early 1970s, generally involving communist and socialist groups. 12 In 1973, changes to the structure of the armed forces led to the creation of the Movement of Officers, whose immediate demands were employment-related, but whose broader concerns were with general government policy. 13 As the movement expanded to include some senior officers, some of its members pushed for a harder line, with Luis Banazól finally making the suggestion of a coup. 14 On 25 April 1974, the 7. Kayman, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal, Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, Ibid., Kayman, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal, Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., 62. 3

4 Movement of the Armed Forces executed a well-planned plot to install the Junta of National Salvation, with General Spínola as figurehead leader. 15 The population s immediate release of anger led to public order issues, and Spínola s disagreements with the predominant left wing of the MFA immediately caused problems. 16 Instability quickly arose as the revolutionary movement quickly splintered into a number of factions and plenty of political parties formed, whilst the economy went into freefall. 17 Until the 1976 elections, there were conflicts and a number of attempted coups as the MFA disintegrated. 18 Spínola, who was much more conservative than many in the MFA, led a coup on 11 March 1975, which according to Kayman failed because of an underestimation of the genuine working-class support for the left. 19 PREC ended when Communist forces failed in an attempted coup on 25 November 1975 strengthening the hand of the official moderate socialist authorities. 20 Models of democratisation The Portuguese case is somewhat difficult to categorise theoretically in Huntington s theory, it is a replacement, but one that was not initiated by a mass movement. 21 The 25 April coup was not a grassroots democratic movement, but 15. Kayman, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal, Ibid., Ibid., 74-75, Phil Mailer, Portugal: The Impossible Revolution? (Oakland, USA: PM Press, 2012), Kayman, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal, Mailer, Portugal: The Impossible Revolution? Samuel Huntington, How? Processes of Democratization, in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, USA: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 142-4

5 the period of instability which followed was not entirely controlled by the military junta, which did not see itself having long-term control of the government. Varol notes that in much of the academic discourse, coups are viewed as universally anti-democratic. In contrast, he argues that in a democratic coup, the military can act in response to popular opposition to the existing regime and specifically in favour of democratic transition. This is the exception, rather than the norm, but has occurred in a number of cases, including most recently the Egyptian coup of One of Varol s seven attributes of democratic coups is the existence of a respected military, generally through extensive conscription which keeps the army in touch with the people independently of the corrupt regime. 23 Conscription for the unpopular colonial war was indeed a major issue in Portugal. The 25 April coup also falls in what Huntington calls breakthrough coups, as the army moved to completely replace the existing regime and install a new bureaucratic elite. Varol notes that breakthrough coups are not automatically democratic coups. 24 Moving to stability The post-revolution development of Portugal s democratic institutions was rapid. Elections were held for a constitutional assembly in April 1975, leading to a new constitution in 1976, with the military maintaining influence through the Coun Varol, The Democratic Coup d État. 23. Ibid., Ibid.,

6 cil of the Revolution something which Varol believes is typical of democratic coups. 25 However, the military s special provisions in the new constitution were removed after just six years. 26 Within a matter of a few years, a strong multiparty system developed, with party platforms becoming less radical as the revolutionary influence waned. 27 Portugal is now considered a strong and flourishing democracy, entering the European Union in Portugal s democratic transition has been one of the most successful democratisation processes in history. The Carnation Revolution makes an excellent case study on the effectiveness of democratic coups, which has contributed substantially to theoretical understanding. The peaceful revolution which brought down one of Western Europe s last dictatorships had a number of factors, but the role of the armed forces was crucial lending support to Varol s democratic coup model. As a result of their highly successful democratisation, Portugal today is a thriving democratic nation and a full participant in the community of democratic states. Word Count: Varol, The Democratic Coup d État, , Ibid., Mário Bacalhau, The Political Party System in Portugal: Public Opinion Surveys and Election Results, in Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal, ed. Thomas Bruneau (Boulder, USA: Westview Press, 1997), European Union, European Countries Portugal, 2013, eu/abouteu/countries/member-countries/portugal/index_en.htm (accessed April 18, 2013). 6

7 References Bacalhau, Mário. The Political Party System in Portugal: Public Opinion Surveys and Election Results. In Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal, edited by Thomas Bruneau. Boulder, USA: Westview Press, European Union. European Countries Portugal about- eu/countries/member- countries/portugal/index_en.htm (accessed April 18, 2013). Huntington, Samuel. How? Processes of Democratization. In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, USA: University of Oklahoma Press, Kayman, Martin. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal. London: Merlin Press, Mailer, Phil. Portugal: The Impossible Revolution? Oakland, USA: PM Press, Maxwell, Kenneth. The Making of Portuguese Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Varol, Ozan O. The Democratic Coup d État. Harvard Journal of International Law 53, no. 2 (2012): http : / / www. harvardilj. org / wp - content/uploads/2010/05/hli203.pdf (accessed April 18, 2013). 7