Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şeref İBA INTRODUCTION

Transcription

1 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY IN THE LIGHT OF THE LAST CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDEMENTS AND A COMPARATİVE ANALYSIS WITH BULGARIA, SLOVAKIA, FINLAND AND IRLAND MODELS INTRODUCTION Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şeref İBA In Turkey, reactive approach generally reigns the Constitutional amendments.each and every constitution or constitutional amendments thereon, reign in a manner which actually is a reaction to the problems encountered in the previous periods. The 1982 Constitution, for instance, consists of new regulations which rationalize parliamentary regime as a reaction to 1961 Constitution. The first version of the 1982 Constitution show parallelism with the rationalized parliamentarism trend that gained ground after World War II. throughout Europe. However, in this constitution period, which is in effect for almost 25 years, debates on the political system continued. Suggestions on the transition to presidential or semipresidential system were put forward. Various opinions on the political regime pursuit were expressed by almost every social class including political institutions and actors. As known, constitution-building is a pre-eminently political act. It is perhaps the quintessential political act, by which countries make choices concerning the most fundemental concepts in political life: power and authority; representation and legitimacy; liberty and equality. Constitution-building is aso a regime-defining process. 1 I believe that deliberative democracy can be a good solution to overcome the limition of private views and enhance the quality of public decision-making for a number of reasons 2 The Turkish experience in constitution-making can be described as a series of missed oppurtunities to create political institutions based on broad consensus. All constitutions except 1921 had weak political legitimacy. No doubt, the prospects of EU membership provided a powerful stimulus for these reforms, Turkey has sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and started accession negotations with EU. These reforms responded to the society s demands for a more democratic and liberal political system 3 External dynamics as well as the internal dynamics play a vital role in the constitution making process in Turkey. In order to measure the extent of influence of these factors, it is of great importance to examine the backstage of the constitutional amendments. It is mostly enough to go on with the legislative materials such as bill of law, Minutes of sessions of the General Assembly of GNAT and the Commission Reports to trace the constitutional amendments. Records of the GNAT which might be considered as archival materials having enormous historical value, illuminate the backstage of each and every amendment by communicative speeches and documentation. In 2007, the decision of the Constitutional Court on 367 thesis has caused a deadlock within the Assembly regarding the Presidency elections leading to a reactive and urgent 1 R.Elgie and J. Zielonka, Constitution and Constitution-Building:A Comparative Perspective, in R.Elgie (Ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Volume 1), p D. Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge, Madlen, Polity Press 2007) p E. Özbudun and Ö.F.Gençkaya (2009), Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey, CEU Pres, Budapest, New York, p.4. 1

2 amendment on the Constitution. The debates that took place within and outside the GNAT frequently referred to Bulgaria and Finland models in which the President popularly elected. What would be the consequences of the 2007 constitution amendment which merely sets forth the election of the president by the people, while keeping the other parameters of the parliamentary regime unchanged? What is the current situation with respect to similar models currently in force in Ireland, Slovakia, Finland and Bulgaria? In this study, answers to these questions will be provided with a comparative approach. 1. The 1982 Constitution and Governmental System In Turkey 1982 Constitution stipulates new rationalizing regulations as a reaction to the previous 1961 Constitution. The new constitution has brought remarkable innovation to institutional and functional features of the legislative organ 4 For instance, it returned to unicameral pattern from bicameral system through abolishing the Senate of Republic. And the 1982 Constitution which provided pro-authority constitutional solutions. 5 Thus, right after entering into force, the constitution became the target of dense and reasonable criticism of every segment of society in this incipient democratic environment. The two most recent constitution of Turkey (those of 1961 and 1982) were the products of military interventions, made with limited or no input by civilian political forces. Therefore, both enjoyed weak political legitimacy. 6 The current Constitution, which has been in force since 1982, preserved basically the governmental system formed by the Constitution of 1961, however the presidential powers and prerogatives were strengthened. Recent constitutional amendements, accepted through a nation-wide referandum on 21 October 2007, made the President potentially even more powerful by introducing the principle of popularly election of the President When we overview the relatively long history of parliamentarism in Turkey, we clearly see that its presidents have always been more active and stronger than presidents in the classical parliamentary system. While the Constitution of 1961 envisaged a ceremonial president, the Framers of the Constitution of 1982 wanted a strong presidency, while still elected by the National Assembly for a seven-year term. According to Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution, the powers of the President are divided into legislative, executive and judical powers. The process of constitutional reform picked up speed starting from the mid-1990 s. It is generally argued that the basic philosophy of the 1982 Cosntitution was to protect the state and its authority against its citizens, rather than protecting individuals against the enroachmennts of the state authority. 7 the Persident was given important substantive powers. Therefore,1982 Constitution provides a constitutionally strong presidency deviating somewhat from the classical parliamentarism in the Constitution of It is generally accepted that at although the governmental system in the Constitution of 1982 is not a classical parlimentary system, the reinforced powers of the President do not change its fundemental parlimentary characteristic either. Accordingly, as Prof. Ergun Özbudun rightly put it, the 1982 Constitution s governmental system can be described as modified or weakened form of parlamentarism. 8 In practice, the presidents were and are even more 4 Ş. İba &R. Bozkurt (2006), 100 Soruda Türk Parlamento Hukuku, (Ankara, Nobel Yayınevi, 3. Baskı.), p. 5 Ş.İba, Yeni Anayasa Yapmak, Çankaya University-Gündem 6 E. Özbudun and Ö. Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (CEU Press, Budapest, New York 2009), p E. Özbudun and Ö. Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (CEU Press, Budapest, New York 2009), p E. Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder, Lynne Rinner Publishers 2000) p

3 powerful than the constitution of 1982 itself provided. This phenomenon is the result of the inherent logic of Turkish governmental system and of cyclical factors and the personalities of the presidents. The tenure of the presidents elected under the Constitution of 1982: Kenan Evren, Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel and Ahmet Necdet Sezer can be categorised under two headers; first the partisan presidency, i.e., the president regularly acts with partisan motives; second the guardian presidency, the President regularly acts with the motive to protect the regime. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, fourth President under the Constitution of 1982, was the President of Constitutional Court. He was the most active president in the Turkish constitutional history in terms of using his constitutional powers; for example, he exercised his veto power 72 times, including in relation to five constitutional amendments and applied to the Constitutional Court 26 times to review the constitutionality of laws, including one constitutional amendments. 9 Sezer, best known as one of the guardian presidents, stated in his speech at the opening ceremony of the 37 th anniversary of the formation of Constitutional Court, the following: The powers given to the President by Article 104 far exceed the limits of parliamentary democracy. Yet, it is unacceptable for an unaccountable president. 10 His seven-year performance was full of crises. Sezer was particularly sensitive about the headscarf issue and he did not tolerate headscarf in the public realm. The search for an entirely new constitution was triggered by the constitutional crises in the spring 0f 2007 over the question of the presidency. 2. The Crises of Presidency and 2007 Constitutional Amendments in Turkey At the and of President Sezer s term of office, the governing JDP seemed to have enough votes in the parliament to elect its own candidate. Because the desicional quorum is two-thirds of the full membership of the Assembly on the first round, it does not mean that the same quorum required for opening of the session. But a retired chief prosecutor of the Republic (Sabih Kanadoğlu) put forward an argument that the two thirds majority is not only the decisional quorum, but also the necessary quorum for the opening of the session. The number of the AK Party deputies was below the constitutionally required majority for the election of the President in the two first rounds, the AK Party would ultimately be able to elect its candidate in the third round. 11 There was intense speculation that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would announce his candidacy. The AK Party s aspirations for the Presidency, not surprisingly, provoked a strong reaction from the secular forces. As the deadline for the announcement of presidential candidates was approaching, the tension between state elites and the AK Party reached its peak. The Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt commented that the armed forces hoped that the next president would be somebody who would commit himself to basic values of the republic, including secularism, 9 L. Gönenç, Persidential Elements in Government European Constitutional Law Review, (4/ , 2008) p Sezer criticizes the President s power, Turkish Daily News, 7 jan.2000, p.1 11 According to Article 102 of the Constitution the President is elected by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of Assembly. If a two-thirds majority can not be obtained in the first two ballots, a third ballot is held and the candidate who receives the absolute majority of voters of the total number of members is elected President. If an absolute majority of voters of the total number of members is not obtained in the third ballot, a fourth ballot is held between the two candidates who receive the greatest number of voters in the third ballot; if the President can not be elected by an absolute majority of the total number of members in this ballot, new general elections for the Assembly are held immediately. 3

4 not only in words, but also in substance. 12 Mass protests, organised in major cities (İstanbul, Ankara.) with the partipication of secularist civil society organisations and with support of the main oppossition party RPP (Republican People s Party)completed the Picture. Recep Tayip Erdoğan on 24 April 2007 put forward not himself, but Abdullah Gül, one of the founding members of the AK Party and Foreign Minister in the Government at the time, as the AK Party s candidate for the persidency. 13 Despite the reactions, the AK Party maintaned the candidacy of Gül. In the first round of the presidential election on 27 April 2007 he could not muster the support of the qualified majority (367) of deputies, as only 361 of 550 MPs were persent in the presiedntial election. Immediately after this first round, the main opposition party RPP, which had boycotted the balloting in the Assembly, applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the ballot. Article 96 of the Constitution states that The Assembly convenes with at least one third of total number of members, unless otherwise stipulated in the Constitution. In view of Kanadoglu and RPP, the election of the President constitutes one of the exceptions. On the day when the first round of presidential election was held, another significant event occured. The military issued a statement at midnigt, a e-memorandum on the official website of the Chief of the General Staff. Top commanders stated that: It should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed forces are a side in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism 14 Thus, two powerful veto players, the military and the Constitutional Court stepped in the process. With the Court s ruling on 1 May 2007, in which it put the RPP in the right, it became apperant that the alliance of veto players would strongly resist to the change in the status quo, within the context of the presidential elections. 15 Then, Abdullah Gül withdrew his candidacy. In response, the AK Party called for early election, which were scheduled by the High Electoral Commission for the 22 July Moreover, the AK Party proposed a package of constitutional amendments, consisting of the introduction of the popular election of the president, the reduction of the President s term from 7 to 5 years with the possibilty of one re-election, the reduction of the Parliament s term from 5 to 4 years and a clarification of the quorum of the Assembly. The Assembly passed all the amendments on 7 May President Sezer returned them to the Assembly on 25 May 2007, but they were readopted on 1 July Sezer argued in his reasoning that changing the method of election of the president is not a simple procedural change, but one directly related to the political system preferred by the Constitution. He also warned that a popularly elected president will easily bceome the dominant element of the political system and the system will lead to conflicts and frictions within the ecutive. Finally, President Sezer argued that such a fundemental change in the political system should not be introduced in haste without sufficient consideration and deliberation. 16 Upon consideration, the Assembly readopted the amendment bill verbatim. On 18 June 2007, Sezer signed the amendments for publication in the Official Gazete and in accordance with Article 175 submitted them to a referendum. He also applied to the Constitutional Court for annulment of the package, yet the Court, this time, rejected his application on 5 July The amendements were approved by a referandum on 21 October Cumhuriyet 13 April 2007, p Ibid, 25 April 2007, p Military Issues Harsh Warning over Secularism Turkish Daily News, 28 April 2007, p Decision of the Constitutional Court, dated ;E.2007/45;K.2007/ Sezer s Statement, 25 May 2007, 3/1281, Minutes of the GNAT, Period 22, Legislative Year 5, Volume 159, Session 113, 26 May Decision of the Constitutional Court dated ;E.2007/72; K.2007/68. 4

5 Early general elections were held on 22 July The AK Party managed to secure the support of 46.5% of the votes cast and gained 341 seats in the 550 member Parliament. On 14 August 2007, Abdullah Gül re-declared his candidacy. On 28 August 2007, Gül was elected as the 11 th President of Turkey with 330 votes of the deputies in the third round The Impacts Of Amendments On The Future Of The Governmental System in Turkey: A Comparitive Analysis With The Models of Bulgaria, Slovakia, Irland and Finland In the Turkish parliamentary government system, the president appears stronger and more active than presidents in classical parliamentary system. With the 2007 amendments, Turkey made a transition from a parliamentary system of government to semipresidentialism, 19 if we define the semi-presidential system of government as the situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament. 20 The adoption of the principle of popular election of the president was not part of a well thought-out and well-designed constitutional engineering scheme; rather, it was a reaction to an escalating crisis concerning presidency. I think we will have to say farewell to parlimentary regime 21 in Turkey. i.e. the dualist nature of semi-presidential regimes may provoke ceompetetion and struggle between the President and the Prime Minister, even if they are members of the same political origin. Most of the new democracies outside the former Soviet Union- Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Poland- have developed an idiosyncratic form of semi-presidentialsm. 22 There is a huge range of variaton in presidential powers of presidents in semipresidential systems. In some countries such as France the presidency is much stronger than provided for in the constitution; in others such as Finland or Iceland, it is de facto weaker than provided for by the constitution. This relative power position may even vary over time New Democracies: Bulgaria and Slovakia Models Bulgaria emerged as a consolidated democracy chronically incapable of coping with its social and economic problems. Bulgaria may serve as a case study of the benefits and disadvantages of a quick-fix constitution, since only twenty months after the palace coup deposing communist dictator Todor Zhivkov (10 November 1989). In the preamble of the constitution, Bulgaria is defined as a democratic, law-governed, and social state. 24 The new Constitution forcefully corroborates the hypothesis that parliaments that possess the pouvoir constitutiant usually ensure a strong role for parliament. Article 1 proclaims that Bulgaria is 18 GNAT Decision, dated , No: L.Gönenç, Persidential Elements in Government European Constitutional Law Review, (4/ , 2008) p R.Elgie, The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism in R.Elgie (Ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999), p Ş.İba, Farewell to Parliamentary Regime, (The Journal of Çelik-iş Trade Union,2008/23) p C. Lord and E.Harris, Democracy in the New Europe, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p K. Von Beyme, Democratic Consolidition in Eastern Europe in J. Zielonka (Ed.), Instutional Engineering, (Oxford University Press,Volume 1 ) p

6 a republic with parliamentary form of government. 25 Despite the fact that parliament has to share the distinction of representing the people with a popularly elected president. 26 The president does not have the power to appoint ministers, can not introduce draft legislation, has a weak veto (the veto may be overridden by an absolute majority in parliment). At the same time the president does possess some potential powers: the authority to make strategic appointments (ambassadors, four of twelve constitutional court justices etc.). The president can not be dismissed by parliament( although the president can be impeached by the Constitutional Court pursuant to a motion filed with the Court by no less than 2/3 of all deputies, Art.103), and parliament can be dismissed by the president only if it fails in three successive attempts to install a government (Art.99) President Zhelev repeatedly expressed the view that Bulgaria should become a presidential republic and that the constitutionally delineated domain of presidential prerogatives should be expanded. Constitutions are sculpted to enhance the capacity of the political system to respond to public demands. So far this coveted process has not transpired in Bulgaria. 27 Bulgaria has been spared one specific type of political turmoil, namely institutional chaos.. The drafting of the Slovak Constitution began soon after the collapse of the communist regime in November This decision was legitimized and legalized by the provisions of the old constitutional law On the Czecho-Slovak Federation. Slovakia s Constitution s formel rules placed parliament at the center of power, while informel rules developed since 1994 have allowed the cabinet to effective control of governance. The hastly drafted Constitution of Slovakia has proven insufficient to foster the consolidation of democracy, and unsatisfactory to leading political actors. 28 Article 1 states that Slovakia is a sovereign, democratic state governed by the rule of law, and thus provides for the separation of powers. Article 77 of the Constitution states that a deputy who becomes a minister, the president, a judge, or prosecutor must give up his or her Council seat. The cabinet is constitutionally made responsible to the legislature. Therefore, its life very much depends upon the party in power, and the extent of party discipline. The prime minister is appointed and removed by the president (Art.110) But some uncleaer constitutional provisions that define presidential powers create the potential for institutional conflicts. Before the 1999 amendment of the constitution, parliament also enjoyed the power to elect and recall the president constitutional change provided for direct elections of the president and adressed the main shortcomings of the previous arrangement. Presidential candidates can be nominated either by fifteen MP or by popular petition, signed by citizens. Presidential elections are held in two rounds. If no candidate draws an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, a second round with the two front runners competing is held within fourteen days. If there is only one candidate in the first round, that person must gain a majority of voters in order to be elected. The role of president was stripped of some of its prerogatives, but at the same time the president s power was expanded in some respects. On the other hand, the president lost the power to preside over cabinet meetings and to take part in parliamentary sessions. Besides, the amendments restricts some of the president s V. I. Ganev, Bulgaria: The (Ir)Relevance of Post-communist Constitutionalism Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999), p Ibid, p D. Malova, Slovakia: From The Ambiguos Constitution to the Dominance of Informal Rules, in R.Elgie (Ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Volume 1), p indx.html 6

7 powers: the president may no longer impose a veto on constitutional laws (passed by a 3/5 majority), and will no longer able to intervene in the process of forming a government On the other hand, the power of the president to dissolve parliament in case of conflict between the legislative and executive branch has been broadened. The amendment to the Constitution also provides for the impeachment of the president, a somwhat unusual provision in a parliamentary system. Although the Slovak presidency is largely a ceremonial position, the fact that the head of state is directly elected by the people lends it somewhat greater political authority than in countries where the president is elected by the parliament. The parliamentarism in Slovakia suggests one general conclusion: that systems with dominant unicameral legislatures, weak checks on executive power, and disciplined political parties produces majority rule, polarisation, ad esclating conflicts within a deeply divided polity Old Democracies: Finland and Irland Models The President is elected directly by the people in Finland. Political parties which have at least one member elected for the parliamet or people, all of whom are eligible to vote, could nominate the President as a candidate. The candidate who receives the vote of absolute majority in the first ballot is elected as the President. In case this is is not achieved in the first ballot the candidates who have the highest number of votes are called for second ballot election, the top rated candidate is elected as the President. In case there is only one candidate, this candidate is appointed as the President without making elections. (Art.54) 31 Finland Constitution of 2000 reduces the dominance of the governmental system and the President. Finnish model has begun to function more like a parliamentary system. Although the President is elected by the people, he posessess symbolic powers. The governmental model prescribed by 2000 Constitution is still being described as semipresidential system. The only requirement that should be fulfilled by the candidate who will be directly elected by the people to perform presidential duties for 6 years, is to be a Finn by birth. Same president can only be elected twice, at most. (Art.23) 32 Ireland Constitution dated 1937 sets out the general principles on the Presidency in articles 12 to 14. Irish Parliament has a bicameral system. Government is accountable to the Parliament. The constitution describes the President as an executive organ and the president is directly elected by the people however s/he has limited authority. The President, elected for 7 years, posessess symbolic position and neither has direct power of annulment of the parliament, nor power of revocation of the ministers. In the political system the Prime Minister is the most significant actor and as a result of this, system doesn't also exactly comply with the semi-presidential system. 33 The Finland and Irland models, as examples of old European democracies, have smiliar charecteristics in terms of president with a popularly elected, but symbolic powers in a stable political systems Ibid, p Ibid The Constitutional Committee Report, (No: 1409), Legislative Term:22, Year:5, 7

8 TABLE 1. Turkey and some examples of semi-presidential models in old and new European Democracies. Countries Election of president Powers president of Political stability Constitutional model Finland Irland Bulgaria Slovakia Turkey Directly by people Directly by people Directly by people Directly by people Directly by people Symbolic Stable Near parlamentarism Symbolic Stable Near parlamentarism Symbolic Unstable Near presidentialism Largely Unstable Near symbolic presidentialism Not symbolic Stable Unique/nonexisting As it may be seen on Table 1, Turkey, except popularly election of the president, does not have any resemlance to other models that can be defined as different types of semipresidential systems, because basic constitutional framework remained unchanged. Therefore, we will have to wait for doing more clear-cut comparative analysis regarding de facto operation of the political regime in Turkey after the 2007 constitutional reforms. 8

9 4. CONCLUSIONS The constitutional reforms in the post-1983 period were the outcome of broad interparty negotiations and agreements as a response to the society s demands for a more democratic and liberal political system. Finally, the constitutional revisions adopted since 1995 were strongly conditioned by Turkey s hope of accession to the European Union Constitutional amendments in effect created a semi-presidential system, since popular elections would increase the political weight of the president already endowed with broad constitutional powers. Indeed, the establishment of a presidential or semi-presidantial system had long been advocated by such center-right leaders as Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel. During 1982 Constitution period, proposals and political projects on the transition to presidential and semi-presidential increased dramatically but there has never been an actual and remarkable attempt on this issue. However, it was obvious that the crises incurred during the election of the 11 th President would bring new and radical developments the berth of which with no doubt was the Constitutional text. On the one hand the civillian constitution preparations and discourses gain intensity, but on the other hand with a point shooting, amendment of solely the regulations regarding the election of the President was brought into agenda.this was actually an imprompt, spontaneous and a typical reaction to the political crises on the Constitution. Today, it can be argued that seven European states have semi-presidential system. Those are İrland, Iceland, Finland, Austria, France, Portugal and Russsia. In fact, these coutries have differences. For instance, Irland is much closer to parlementarian system. On the other hand, Finland is much closer to presidantial system. In those ancient European democracies, president is elected by public. In Finland, Irland and Iceland, if just one person is nominated to the election of president, the election is not been realised. Person who nominated to the election, accepted as a president. Without making any amendments in constitution which is based on parliamentary system, the provision that president is popularly elected will mean introduction of uniqe and non existing system. Because, on the one hand this system is getting away from parliamentary system, on the other hand this system do not have the basic features of the semi-presidential system. 9

10 5. REFERENCES 1. E. Özbudun and Ö.F.Gençkaya (2009), Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey, CEU Pres, Budapest, New York D. Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge, Madlen, Polity Press 2007) 6. Ş. İba &R. Bozkurt (2006), 100 Soruda Türk Parlamento Hukuku(Turkish Parliamentary Law in 100 Question), (Ankara, Nobel Yayınevi, 3. Baskı.) 7. Ş.İba, Güle Güle Parlamenter Rejim (Farewell to Parliamentary Regime), (The Journal of Çelik-iş Trade Union,2008/23) p Ş.İba, Yeni Anayasa Yapmak (Making A New Constitution), Çankaya University-Gündem 9. Ş.İba, Anayasa Hukuku ve Siyasal Kurumlar (Constitutional Law and political Institutions), (Ankara, Turhan Yayınevi 2.Bası, 2008). 10. E. Özbudun and Ö. Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (CEU Press, Budapest, New York 2009) 11. E. Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder, Lynne Rinner Publishers 2000) 12. L. Gönenç, Persidential Elements in Government European Constitutional Law Review, (4/ ) 13. Sezer criticizes the President s power, Turkish Daily News, 7 jan Cumhuriyet 13 April Military Issues Harsh Warning over Secularism Turkish Daily News, 28 April Decision of the Constitutional Court, dated ;E.2007/45;K.2007/ Sezer s Statement, 25 May 2007, 3/1281, Minutes of the GNAT, Period 22, Legislative Year 5, Volume 159, Session 113, 26 May Decision of the Constitutional Court dated ;E.2007/72; K.2007/ GNAT Decision, dated , No: R.Elgie and J. Zielonka, Constitution and Constitution-Building:A Comparative Perspective, in R.Elgie (Ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) 21. R.Elgie, The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism in R.Elgie (Ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) 22. C. Lord and E.Harris, Democracy in the New Europe, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 23. K. V. Beyme, Democratic Consolidition in Eastern Europe in J. Zielonka (Ed.), Instutional Engineering, (Oxford University Press,Volume 1 ) 24. V. I. Ganev, Bulgaria: The (Ir)Relevance of Post-communist Constitutionalism Semi- Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) 25. D. Malova, Slovakia: From The Ambiguos Constitution to the Dominance of Informal Rules, in R.Elgie (Ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) 10