Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Transcription

1 European Journal of Political Research 41: , Denmark LARS BILLE Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Issues in national politics A general election had to be called by March 2002 at the latest, but the political climate during the first nine months of 2001 was strongly influenced by the fact that it is the prerogative of the Prime Minister to call a general election whenever it suits his or her political and/or tactical objectives. Hence the parties campaign preparations speeded up and, by Summer, all parties were ready to push the button. The public announcements by parties, their initiatives, proposals, voting record in Parliament, their reactions to the government s proposal in August for the annual state budget, etc. were all guided by the prospect of the approaching election. The general pattern of conflict and cooperation between the parties remained by and large the same as it had been during Danish politics was in a state of stall. The reaction of the Danish government to the terrorist action on 11 September in New York was to support fully initiatives and actions taken by member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union in their efforts to fight international terrorism. In this, the government was supported without reservation by all parties in Parliament except the leftist Unity List. The climate in the public debate on Muslim immigrants and refugees sharpened markedly. At the party conference of the Danish People s Party shortly after the attack, the leading politicians of the party linked terrorism and Islam. They expressed the fear that Denmark would be conquered by Muslims in the long run if no countermeasures were taken. Opinion polls indicated that the party prospered in the new situation. Opinion polls also indicated that the popularity of the Prime Minister increased due to his firm and well-balanced handling of the situation. Furthermore, for the first in a very long time, the Social Democratic Party reached 30 per cent in a couple of opinion polls. This upward trend in popularity for the Prime Minister and his party might be one of the reasons why he decided on 31 October to call a general election to be held 20 November. Another reason might be that the prospects for the minority government to reach an Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

2 Table 1. Election to folketinget Date of election: 20 November 2001 Total number of seats: Electorate: 3,998,957 Total votes cast: 3,484,915 (87.14 per cent) Valid votes cast: 3,449,668 (98.98 per cent) Turnout: per cent Percentage Percentage Number of Percentage change Number Percentage change No. Party votes of votes since 1998 of seats of seats since Socialdemokratiet Social Democratic 1,003, Party (SD) 5 Det radikale Venstre 179, Social-Liberal Party (RV) 1 Det konservative Folkeparti 312, Conservative People s Party (KF) 20 Centrum-Demokraterne Centre 61, Democrats (CD) 16 Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialist 219, People s Party (SF) 19 Kristeligt Folkeparti Christian 78, People s Party (KRF) 6 Venstre Liberal Party (V) 1,077, Fremskridtspartiet Progress Party 19, (FRP) 24 Enhedslisten Unity List (EL) 82, Dansk Folkeparti Danish People s 413, Party (DF) Independents 1, lars bille 1 In addition to the 175 seats for Denmark, 2 Members of Parliament are elected in Greenland and 2 on the Faroe Islands. Source: Danmarks Statistisk. Statistiske Efterretninger. Befolkning og Valg 2001:14.

3 denmark 943 Table 2. Cabinet composition of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen IV For the composition of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen IV on 1 January 2001, see Political Data Yearbook 2000: Table 3. Cabinet composition of Anders Fogh Rasmussen I A. The party composition of Rasmussen I: Date of investiture: 27 November 2001 Number & Number & percentage percentage of No. Party of parliamentary seats cabinet posts 6 Venstre Liberal Party (V) 56 (32.0%) 12 (67.0%) 1 Det Konservative Folkeparti 16 (9.1%) 6 (33.0%) Conservative People s Party (KF) B. Cabinet members of Rasmussen I: Prime Minister/Statsminister: Anders Fogh Rasmussen (1953 male, V) Minister of Finance, Trade and Industry and Minister of Nordic Cooperation/Økonomi-og Erhvervsminister samt minister for nordisk samarbejde: Bendt Bendtsen (1954 male, KF) Minister of Foreign Affairs/Udenrigsminister: Per Stig Møller (1942 male, KF) Minister of Finance/Finansminister: Thor Pedersen (1945 male, V) Minister of Employment/Beskœftigelsesminister: Claus Hjort Frederiksen (1947 male, V) Minister of Justice/Justitsminister: Lene Espersen (1965 female, KF) Minister of Cultural Affairs/Kulturminister: Brian Mikkelsen (1966 male, KF) Minister for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration and Minister without Portfolio (Minister for Europe)/Minister for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration samt minister uden protefølje (Europaminister): Bertel Haarder (1944 male, V) Minister of Taxation/Skatteminister: Svend Erik Hovmand (1945 male, V) Minister of Transport/Trafikminister: Flemming Hansen (1939 male, KF) Minister of Science, Technology and Development/Minister for videnskab, teknologi og udvikling: Helge Sander (1950 male, V) Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries/Fødevareminister: Mariann Fischer Boel (1943 female, V) Minister of Defence/Forsvarsminister: Svend Aage Jensby (1940 male, V) Minister for the Environment/Miljøminister: Hans Christian Schmidt (1953 male, V) Minister of Interior and Health/Indenrigs- og sundhedsminister: Lars Løkke Rasmussen (1964 male, V) Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs/Kirkeminister: Tove Fergo (1946 female, V) Minister of Education/Undervisningsminister: Ulla Tørnæs (1962 female, V) Minister for Social Affairs and Minister for Gender Equality/Socialminister og minister for ligestilling: Henriette Kjær (1966 female, KF)

4 944 lars bille acceptable agreement on the annual state budget were very uncertain. The Prime Minister stated that the new international political and economic situation demanded new far-reaching decisions by government and Parliament that required that the national political scene be settled by an election. Nevertheless, it was a surprise that the Prime Minister chose this particular date for the election, since municipality and county elections were to take place on the same day. For the first time ever, voters had to vote in three elections on the same day. Widespread criticism was advanced because of the risk that local and regional elections might be totally overshadowed by the national election to the detriment of the sub-national democratic institutions. A total of 10 parties ran in the national election. Apart from the 9 parties represented in Parliament, the Progress Party had in August managed to present to the Ministry of Interior the required number of voter signatures to participate in the election. After the return of Mogens Glistrup as leader (see Political Data Yearbook 2000: 369ff.), the party had adopted a very harsh anti- Muslim platform and placed itself on the extreme right wing. If the Prime Minister s calculation was that the new and uncertain international situation after 11 September would be a main theme in the campaign and hence convince voters to vote for the well-known and experienced leadership, he was proved wrong. Domestic issues dominated the election totally. First of all, was the question on how to reduce the number of refugees and immigrants coming to Denmark from the Third World and how to integrate better those already living in Denmark into Danish national, social and political culture. The right-wing opposition parties strongly demanded a substantial reduction in numbers and a halt to Denmark s role as a welfare office for the Third World. Other issues included: better care for the elderly and healthcare, more law and order, improvement of the situation for families with children and a total freezing of the level of taxation. The prime ministerial candidate for the Liberal Party, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stressed continuously during the campaign that it was time for change, that his party was a firm defender of the vulnerable in society and of welfare state programmes, and he advocated more individual freedom for citizens to make individual choices instead of being considered and treated as clients in a bureaucratic state apparatus. In all, the Liberal Party managed skilfully to keep those issues on the agenda during the whole campaign. The opinion polls showed that the governing parties were on the defensive right from the start of the campaign, and they remained so throughout. They were not able effectively to communicate their quite solid results, either on the improvement of the various welfare programmes or their economic policy that had given Denmark a strong and healthy economy. Issues of unemployment, inflation, balance of trade and payments, national and foreign debts, the

5 denmark 945 environment, etc. were almost totally absent from the agenda. Furthermore, the Social Democratic Party publicly displayed an internal disagreement on how to position itself on the dominant question of refugees and immigrants. However, the question of government formation was of course the most important question. The alternatives were quite clear. The incumbent government was supported by the Unity List and the Socialist People s Party, while the rest of the parties supported a government to be headed by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, although the centre parties (the Centre Democrats and the Christian People s Party) interest in a bourgeois government was dampened by the prospect that the Danish People s Party would be part of the parliamentary basis of such a government. Turnout at the general election was the highest since 1984 and the result was historic. First of all, the Liberal Party became the largest party, a position the Social Democratic Party had occupied continuously since Second, for the first time since 1929, parties right of centre (i.e., the Liberal Party, the Conservative People s Party and the Danish People s Party now Denmark s third largest party) held a majority of the seats in parliament. Third, the traditional pivotal centre parties were of no relevance for majority building in Parliament, either to the left or to the right. This has only been the case twice since 1945: in and when the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People s Party could form a majority without the support of the centre parties. Fourth, the Centre Democrats did not pass the electoral threshold and were for the first time since 1973 not represented in Parliament. Fifth, the Progress Party was not able to come back in spite of the, as seen from the viewpoint of the party, almost perfect background created by the events of 11 September. The party s sometimes influential, but always turbulent, role in the Danish party system seems to have come to an end. The torch has been passed to the more pragmatic Danish People s Party. Parties to the left of centre polled the lowest number of votes since 1973 (37.9 per cent), the centre declined slightly to 9.3 per cent, while parties to the right of centre had their best election since the introduction of proportional representation in 1920 (53.0 per cent). The swing to the right was manifest. The net volatility was 13 per cent while gross volatility was around 30 per cent. This was the same level as in 1998, but this time volatile voters moved in the same direction. Since no scientific research on the election has yet been published, it is not possible at the moment to trace the motives and movements of voters in more detail. Faced with a clear electoral defeat, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen resigned on 21 November. The negotiations to form a new government were headed by the Liberal Party leader, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in very close cooperation with the leader of the Conservative People s Party, Bendt

6 946 lars bille Bendtsen. The negotiations were rather uncomplicated and resulted in the formation of a Liberal-Conservative minority government. By Danish standards, a very comprehensive governmental programme was agreed upon by the two parties. The manifesto was published in full, followed by an announcement of legislation that would be initiated within the first 100 days. Top priority was given to a substantial tightening of the rules regulating immigration, residence permits and asylum; cutbacks in public subsidies to immigrants and refugees; an extra DKR1.5 billion to be given to the hospitals in order to minimise the waiting list for operations; freedom for citizens to choose between public or private health and elderly care; tougher punishment for crimes of violence; privatisation of public enterprises; and a total freeze on the level of taxation. A major reshuffling of the ministries and the central administration was enacted. Most importantly, a new ministry was established: the Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration. In general, the government aimed at modernising the public sector under the headline: the individual human being over the system. The only options for the new government to pass its legislation were either to cooperate with the Danish People s Party or with the Social Democratic Party. The distribution of seats in Parliament gave no other alternative. Of these alternatives, the entire political situation up to the calling of the election, the development during the election campaign, the defeat of the Social Democratic Party and the victory for the Danish People s Party all pointed to the fact that the government had to base its policy on support from the Danish People s Party. The decisive question was how this party would handle its newly won powerful parliamentary position. Since its formation in 1995, the party had been without any direct influence whatsoever on majority building in Parliament. It had been in a position where it could read loud from the party manifesto and follow a competitive strategy of irresponsible opposition and a politics of outbidding. Now it was forced to enter into negotiations and to make compromises with the government. A first serious test for the government and its supporting party will come when the annual state budget has to be adopted in March The centre parties could no longer exercise their traditional moderating influence since their seats were without importance for majority building. How this, in a Danish context, very unusual political configuration would unfold remains to be seen. In any event, it sparked off political mobilisation. From a democratic point of view, it is after all healthy that the public experience that their role at the ballot box is not just a ritual act, but has real political consequences.