Department of Political Science, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration, Budapest, Hungary

Transcription

1 968 European Journal of Political Research 41: , 2002 Hungary GABRIELLA ILONSZKI & SÁNDOR KURTÁN Department of Political Science, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration, Budapest, Hungary Every year seems like an election year in Hungary. Although parliamentary elections are not due until April 2002, most political events as well as many economic, social and cultural developments in 2001 could have been tied to them. This was underlined by the decision of the Head of State, Ferenc Mádl, to declare the official dates for the elections in the middle of December His declaration reflected the fact that the parties had been engaged in campaign-like competition for months and were eager to know the exact election calendar. Thus the longest electoral campaign in the not very long history of the third Hungarian Republic began. It was commonly understood that 2002 will be a decisive year: if the Fidesz Party stays in power, this will be the first time that a governing force has continued for a second term. Moreover, 2002 might bring about a fundamental turn towards more bipolar, and possibly even two-party, parliamentary politics. The year 2001 was eventful not only in direct political terms. After a decade, a new national census was conducted and, to the surprise of many statisticians, roughly 200,000 extra citizens were found. This means that the number of inhabitants has not yet decreased below 10 million, although a decrease of about 2 per cent of the population as compared to the previous census year can be observed. This was the first census after the Second World War when people voluntarily could declare their religious affiliation. Roughly 89 per cent answered this question: 53 per cent Catholic, 16 per cent Protestant, 3 per cent Calvinist, 4 per cent other and 12,500 Jewish. The extended millennium year officially ended on 20 August when, as a final act of celebration, the royal crown was spectacularly transferred by boat from Budapest to Esztergom, the place of the coronation of the first king, Saint Stephen in the year 1000 AD. The Fidesz admittedly wanted to increase, or rather re-establish, national pride, but public response was not univocal. The millennium celebrations remained a focus of controversy because the major firm responsible for most of the organizational details has been closely tied to Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

2 hungary 969 Table 1. Cabinet composition For the composition of Orbán I on 1 January 2001, see Political Data Yearbook 2000: Changes during 2001: Minister of Finance/Pénzügyminiszter: M. Varga (1965 male, Fidesz) nominated 1 January Minister of Agriculture and Countryside Development /Földmu velésügyi és vidékfejlesztési miniszter: J. Torgyán (1932 male, FKGP) released 15 February 2001 and A. Vonza (1955 male, FKGP) nominated 26 March Minister of Education/Oktatási miniszter: Z. Pokorni (1962 male, Fidesz) released 15 July 2001 and J. Pálinkás (1952 male, Fidesz) nominated 16 July Minister of Health/Egészségügyi miniszter: I. Mikola (1947 male, Fidesz) nominated 1 January the Fidesz Party. The reconstruction of the bridge at Esztergom which had been blown up at the end of the Second World War and remained a tragic memento on the banks of the Danube for more than half a century also had a symbolic significance. European Union Phare resources contributed to the completion of this project. A more controversial development on the national agenda was the so called status law. Although the law was passed by a 93 per cent majority in Parliament only the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats opposed it it later became a source of controversy among the Hungarian parties. According to the law, ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries can apply for a Magyar certificate, which would entitle them to some benefits both within Hungary and in their mother country. The governments of the neighbouring countries protested against the law and even turned to international forums. Although neither the European Union regular report nor the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe opposed the law, they found that more bipolar negotiations would have been appropriate. Eventually, the Hungarian government signed an agreement with Romania that offers similar labour regulations within Hungary for Romanians as for ethnic Magyars. After this, the MSzP (Socialists) began a campaign that included elements of xenophobia against the law. The outcome in relation to other neighbouring countries has not yet been resolved. The year 2001 again brought huge floods in the north-eastern part of Hungary the fourth major flood in a row. The government transferred roughly 35 billion Forints for reconstruction.

3 970 gabriella ilonszki & sándor kurtán Changes in parliament and government The disintegration of the second largest party of the coalition, the FKGP (Smallholders), occurred in parallel with government changes. The FKGP disintegrated under intra- and extra-party, personal and institutional, political and social, pressures. The FKGP was always a controversial force in Hungarian democracy. In the first government period ( ), they were a government party, but Party Leader J. Torgyán led the party out of the coalition as early as 1992, while the majority of the parliamentary party group remained loyal to the government under a new name. Torgyán has been regarded a populist and an unreliable partner ever since, but he was asked to join the Fidesz and MDF coalition as a third party after the 1998 elections to ensure a clear majority. Problems with the party and its leader multiplied in Thus, when at the end of 2000 a two-year budget was accepted by Parliament and the FKGP was no longer necessary to the government, the time was ripe to challenge the party. The challenge was based first of all on the corrupt practices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Countryside Development (the ministry of the party leader) and also on the authoritarian practices prevalent in the party. In the first instance, the political state secretary of the ministry was put under investigation and the police found ample evidence to start proceedings against him. Under pressure from the Prime Minister, Torgyán resigned from his ministerial post. When Torgyán tried to cement his position by making changes in the party hierarchy, some influential figures within the FKGP rebelled. After bitter intra-party struggles, the parliamentary party group expelled the party leader from its ranks. Some members followed him and found a place among the independents. By the end of the year, the FKGP party group consisted of 33 Members of Parliament as opposed to 44 at the beginning of the year and the number of independents increased from 11 to 19. Some of the independents joined other political party groups, which explains why the total number of independents is not higher. It is widely assumed that the disintegration of the FKGP was part of a wellthought-out scheme of the Fidesz to create an exclusive position for itself on the right. Torgyán was an obvious failure as a minister: he could not get his policies accepted in the government, nor could he establish social peace among the agricultural population. When he had to resign from his ministerial post, he nominated his successor from among the FKGP in line with the coalition agreement but the Prime Minister, V. Orbán, rejected the nominee. The Prime Minister also rejected Torgyán s demand that the other FKGP ministers resign from the government, and the ministers themselves opted to

4 hungary 971 support the Fidesz in this battle. Eventually a peculiar situation took shape: although the Fidesz and FKGP coalition ceased to exist, the FKGP ministers remained in government (the newly nominated Minister of Agriculture and Countryside Development also came from among the FKGP ranks) and most of the FKGP Members of Parliament (either in their old place or on the independent benches) supported the government. An important exception occurred when 13 no votes were cast by FKGP members against the previous year s budget. A substantial proportion of FKGP politicians appear to be seeking political careers in other parties on the Right. The other change in the government was also connected to party politics. The old Minister of Education, Z. Pokorni, became the Fidesz Party Leader, replacing L. Kövér (see the entry for Hungary in Political Data Yearbook 2000) who assumed responsibility for the electoral preparations and campaign for his party. J. Pálinkás, the new Minister of Education, had previously served in the same ministry as the political state secretary. (Two other cabinet changes (Minister of Finance and Minister of Health) came into effect on 1 January 2001, but these were reported in the Hungary entry in Political Data Yearbook 2000.) Issues in national politics Electoral and party politics were prominent in The position of the Fidesz on the Right was officially accepted at its May Congress, completing an official transformation of the party which had begun its career in the Liberal Party family more than a decade before. As of May, according to its Constitution, it has become a bourgeois people s party (see also the Hungary entry in Political Data Yearbook 2000). Various measures were taken in order to cement an uncontested position. One was the successful marginalization of the FKGP. The measures were different with respect to the other coalition partner, the MDF (Fórum). The MDF managed to remain a parliamentary force with the help of the Fidesz in 1998, but its leaders, including I. Dávid (who is the only woman among the national party leaders and the most popular politician in Hungary) resisted the Fidesz s attempts to absorb the party. Finally, the two party leaders made an electoral agreement the first one since the democratic transition which ensures that the two parties run common candidates in single-member constituencies. The dominance of the Fidesz in this coalition is unquestionable, and some contemplate an evolution similar to what eventually occurred with respect to the CDU/CSU in Germany. The Fidesz was regularly supported

5 972 gabriella ilonszki & sándor kurtán in parliamentary politics by the right-wing MIÉP (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life) but, despite the MIÉP s offers, avoided electoral cooperation with them. Rather, it sought to attract potential MIÉP voters with occasional populist or nationalist slogans. By the end of the year, the Fidesz made its electoral list complete with some slots for the most influential Roma organization, the Lungo Drom. The political as well as social integration of the Roma remains high on the political agenda, but controversies do not diminish. In 2001, close to 10 billion Forints (the highest amount ever) was devoted to this aim. Nevertheless 3,400 Roma applied for exile status in Canada, as a result of which Canada reinstated visa regulations between the two countries. In addition to the MIÉP which was often called only a quasi-opposition the MSZP (Socialists) and the SZDSZ (Liberals) (the two opposition parties) were also widely engaged in preparations for the election. The popularity of the socialists exceeded that of the Fidesz until the Autumn, but then the senior coalition partner took the lead. Uncertainty in the leadership did not help the socialists to stabilize their position. Eventually the party leader, L. Kovács (Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government), withdrew from the contest. Miklós Németh, the last prime minister of communist and in-transition Hungary (whose potential leadership has been kept on the agenda even during the period of his non-involvement in politics in the past decade), finally and conclusively, also decided to withdraw. In the face of a kind of leadership crisis, the MSZP Congress in June changed the party constitution so that the only candidate, P. Medgyessy (Minister of the Finance in the government and vice-premier in the last communist government), could be the list leader. Quite exceptionally, he would lead the socialist list as a non-party member. It harmed his and his party s popularity when allegations were made that his former consulting agency sold political influence to achieve certain policy decisions. The SZDSZ again went through a leadership change this year (see the entry for Hungary in Political Data Yearbook 2000). G. Demszky s politics of equal distance from Left and Right alike did not work, and the party fell dangerously near or even under the 5 per cent parliamentary threshold in opinion polls. The new-old leader, G. Kuncze, had served in the post during most of the former government period and was the Minister of the Interior in the socialist-liberal government. Both his common sense and his sense of humour make him a popular politician. In terms of government policies, two explanatory features can be observed: on the one hand, the intention to increase potential electoral support and, on the other, the intention to realize the Fidesz s credo about creating a relatively strong state, not only in politics but in economics as well. As for the first, the

6 hungary 973 government turned toward social groups and problem areas that had not been targeted before: a loan system for students was introduced to ease the material burdens of education at the university level, and further mortgage and loan schemes were established to overcome housing shortages. These policies are also interpreted as attempts to expand and enliven the economy, similarly to the so-called Széchenyi plan, which with a budget of 125 billion Forints for 2001 is a scheme to help small- and middle-size entrepreneurs with special loans. Some of the loans go to firms that are engaged in investment projects that will eventually become state property. The image of the strong state appeared in legislation on the Hungarian Development Bank. The bank is engaged in major national and government investments (like the motorway system) and is under direct government control, with the government guaranteeing its economic activities and finances. The new law on civil servants (an amendment to the 1992 law) largely embodies similar intentions. Part of the law allows the Prime Minister to nominate a 300-member civil service elite with particular privileges. They are undoubtedly the clientele of the Fidesz and cannot be removed from their posts, even in the case of electoral and government change. After an extended crisis, the boards of the public television (MTV) and the public radio (MR) institutions finally elected new leaders. The political neutrality of the decisions remains a much-debated point because only the government representatives on the boards have taken up their positions (see the entries for Hungary in Political Data Yearbook 1999 and 2000). After the expiration of their 6-year term, two of the three ombudsman offices also went through a change. While the ethnic and minority ombudsman, J. Kaltenbach, remained in place, Parliament elected a new general ombudsman of citizens rights (B. Lenkovics) and a new data protection ombudsman (A. Péterfalvi). These elections were also politically overloaded, but altogether the role of the ombudsmen diminished when the Constitutional Court decided to withdraw some institutions (including Parliament) from their surveillance. In the negotiations with the European Union, Hungary concluded 21 chapters by the end of the year, including some sensitive areas. In the environmental chapter, Hungary asked for and received derogation in some areas. With respect to the free flow of labour, Hungary accepted that the European Union Member States might apply their own national regulations in limiting the employment of Hungarians for another seven years. The same would apply within Hungary. In contrast to the original 10-year exemption claim, Hungary accepted that it would maintain its current regulations that limit foreigners rights to buy agricultural property only for seven years. The European Union country report was generally favourable about Hungary.

7 974 gabriella ilonszki & sándor kurtán After extended political debate, the government finally decided on the modernization of the Hungarian Air Force. From among several offers (American, Belgian, Swedish), Hungary despite its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership and some American pressure in the affair eventually opted to acquire 14 Swedish Gripen aircraft.