Zimbabwe since the elections in July Tony Reeler & Kudakwashe Chitsike Research & Advocacy Unit

Transcription

1 Zimbabwe since the elections in July 2013 Tony Reeler & Kudakwashe Chitsike Research & Advocacy Unit April 2014

2 Background This paper is a brief overview of developments since the harmonised elections in These elections marked the end of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the Inclusive Government, a period of moderate economic stability, and a decided lessening in political violence, but there was a near-complete failure to put in place the reforms agreed to by the political parties under the GPA. In retrospect, this was not unexpected, given that the nature of the GPA was more of a peace accord rather than a genuine transitional instrument. However, whilst some commentators were inclined to take a benevolent view of the prospects under the GPA 1, others were more cynical, suggesting that reform was improbable, and that there was need for civil society (and the opposition parties) to concentrate more strongly on insisting on the reformation of state institutions ahead of what would be highly contested, and quite possibly violent, elections 2. In the end, a new constitution was produced, but only after a protracted and acrimonious process, and far too late for any significant amendment or repeal of the draconian legislation that remains in conflict with the constitution. Thus, Zimbabwe went into elections, went into them much earlier than was necessary, and without much-needed reforms to the electoral environment, that should have been the consequence of having a new constitution. The aftermath of the elections The 2013 harmonised elections, whilst purportedly giving ZANU PF a massive majority both in the National Assembly and for the Presidency, raised more problems than they solved. The lead-up to the elections were marred by political, constitutional, and legal uncertainties and problems. The political arena was marked by serious reservations about the electoral playing field, so serious that even SADC raised concerns that Zimbabwe was not ready for elections. There were many suggestions that the defective electoral climate would result in the opposition political parties boycotting the elections, but, in the final analysis, the opposition parties, and especially the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), seemed convinced that the elections could be won, and unwisely participated. However, there were many ominous signs: severe abnormalities in the voters roll 3, a dramatic increase in the number of Special Voters (up from in 2008 to 66,000 in 2013), a largely unchanged and unresponsive Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), and an almost inevitable use of Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) by Robert Mugabe to amend the Electoral Act and gain an unfair advantage in an election in which he was a contestant. 4. The elections themselves were not marred by violence, although there were credible allegations of widespread intimidation and threats, and the results had Robert Mugabe obtaining over 1 million more votes than in However, the process was flawed in many respects, and all the prima facie indications of massive rigging were noted by virtually all observer groups, both national and international. Even SADC and the AU were forced to make adverse comments on the 1 SPT (2010), What Options for Zimbabwe? 31 March JOHANNESBURG: SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST. 2 RAU (2010), What are the options for Zimbabwe? Dealing with the obvious! Report produced by the Governance Programme. 4 May HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT. 3 RAU (2013), Key statistics from the June 2013 Voters Roll. Governance Unit, Research & Advocacy Unit. 5 th July HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT. 4 Matyszak, D. A, & Reeler, A.P (2013), Report on the conditions for the 2013 Harmonised Elections. August HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

3 state of the voters roll, the unavailability of the voters roll electronically, the huge numbers of assisted voters, the equally huge numbers of voters turned away, and the very large numbers of citizens voting using voting slips and not identified on the voters roll 5. Thus, the elections were deemed peaceful and credible, but no observer group was willing to call them fair 6. Nonetheless, ZANU PF and Robert Mugabe were elected for a five-year term in the absence of any credible evidence of rigging. The MDC-T mounted a number of electoral petitions challenging the results, but these have been unable to provide the concrete evidence needed to reject the elections wholesale. The MDC-T suffered a serious loss, enabling ZANU PF to gain a twothirds majority in the National Assembly, and thus restoring their ability to pass legislation that helps ZANU PF to entrench its power as well as amend many parts of the Constitution (but not the Declaration of Rights) - something that it has rarely been reluctant to do when deemed necessary. The results prompted a number of commentators to produce rather jaundiced analyses of the outcome. Respected political scientist, Stephen Chan, opined that the result had been expected, due to the increase in ZANU PF s popularity and the waning support for the MDC-T 7. Others drew from findings of the 2012 Freedom House opinion survey, which suggested that there had been greatly increased support for Mugabe and a serious decline in support for Morgan Tsvangirai. Few drew upon the methodologically more sound analysis by Bratton and Masunungure 8 : based on the 4 th Round of the Afrobarometer, these analysts concluded that there was little to choose between the two. They interpreted the large number of respondents were unwilling to state a preference due to fear, and suggested that the 2013 elections would be a close race. More careful analysis of the elections supports the conclusions of Bratton and Masunungure, and indicates plausible evidence for massive rigging, but also concludes that any one of the obvious sources of irregularity i.e. voter registration bias, assisted voters, turnaways, and the use of voting slips would on their own have been sufficient to produce a clear majority for Robert Mugabe in a close race, let alone all these irregularities in combination 9. As for the huge majority obtained by Mugabe, this seems to violate common sense, and established political science theory was lost in the aftermath of the confusion. However, it was hardly unpredictable that few commentators would be focused on anything more than the scale of the victory, no matter how achieved 10. The international response The election produced a very confused response from the international community. It is clear that there are a wide variety of positions, but mostly based on an acceptance of a de facto, rather than de jure, ZANU PF government. Since neither the Southern African Development Community (SADC) nor the African Union (AU) could give unequivocal decisions on the outcome, and the EU had determined that they would be guided by Africa s position on the elections, it is hardly 5 Matyszak, D. A, & Reeler, A.P (2013), Report on the conditions for the 2013 Harmonised Elections. August HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT; RAU (2014), "Numbers out of Tune? An examination of the vote in Hamonised July 2013 Election." Full Report. Governance Programme, Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU]. 10 th April HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT. 6 Matyszak, D.A, & Reeler, A.P (2013), ibid. 7 Chan, S (2013) Zimbabwe: Reading between the lines, The Africa Report, 28 October [ 8 Bratton, M & Masunungure, E (2012), Voting Intentions in Zimbabwe: A Margin of Terror? August Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No RAU (2014), A Select Audit of Zimbabwe s 2013 Poll Preliminary Observations. RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT (forthcoming). 10 See, for example, RAU (2012), Bucking the Trend: Africa, Zimbabwe, Demand for Democracy, and Elections. May HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT

4 surprising that a stalemate of a serious nature emerged. Only the US has been totally clear: it has rejected the outcome, and its policies remain unchanged. This has important consequences, particularly in relation to Zimbabwe s economic future and its relationship with international finance institutions. For the US, Zimbabwe represents neither a democracy problem - since it poses no terrorist threat, nor a resource problem. Additionally, Zimbabwe is of trivial importance to the US in terms of its economy and trade. SADC and the AU have argued (weakly, given their election observations) for the removal of sanctions, and the re-engagement of the West, and more strongly for the restitution of bi-lateral assistance. This last assertion is undoubtedly in light of the probable meltdown of the Zimbabwean economy and the regional consequences thereof. However, it is significant that SADC has yet to issue a final report on the 2013 elections, and it may be conjectured that this is problematic, in view of the probable refusal by Botswana to sign such a final report, as well as its repeated assertions that the SADC Principles and Guidelines on Democratic Elections imply a considered response in the event of a SADC country violating these 11. Thus, Zimbabwe continues to provide exactly the same problem for SADC (and the AU) as it did before the elections: stranded between a disapproving West and an uncomfortable Africa; a problem from which South Africa sought very strongly to extricate itself. For South Africa, Zimbabwe poses exactly the difficulty that a denying hegemonic power would wish to disappear 12. Furthermore, it is clear that Zimbabwe has contributed to a regional problem within SADC, and has significantly diminished the possibility of a brighter future for the SADC region as a whole 13. For the European Union, the elections have resulted in a major crisis, and exacerbated the division within the EU as to how to respond to the Zimbabwe crisis 14. There are two significant developments here, revolving around the Cotonou Agreement 15. The first is related to Zimbabwe itself, and the decision, or the lack thereof, in February 2014, to suspend Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement until November 2014, albeit keeping minor aspects of previous resolutions in place: i.e maintaining the sanctions on Robert Mugabe, his family and the Zimbabwe Defense Industries. However, it is not clear where the EU will go next, and whether it will resume the Economic Development Fund support to Zimbabwe; begin discussions under Article 8; or merely tread water for another year while the conditions for renewed engagement are debated internally. The second development speaks to the heart of the Cotonou Agreement itself, and the setting of a new precedent in disputes between ACP countries and the EU. Since it seems evident that all past 11Botswana breaks ranks with AU, Sadc, Makomborero Mutimukulu, The Herald, January 26, Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from 12 For an analysis of the problems of a denying hegemonic power, which is a fair characterisation of South Africa in SADC, see Habib, A (2013), South Africa s Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. 13 For a prospective analysis of how SADC might have developed without Zimbabwe s actual trajectory, see SAIIA (2003) SADC 2005 to 2015: Renassiance,, Decay and Decline. JOHANNESBURG: SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Certainly this scenario analysis did not anticipate the overall consequences of Zimbabwe remaining on its 2003 path, and there do not seem to be detailed analyses yet of the overall effects of the Zimbabwe crisis on SADC as a whole. However, it seems fair to conclude that Zimbabwe has been a significant contributor to the decay and decline scenario posited by the SAIIA. 14 See RAU (2014), Zimbabwe, the European Union, and the Cotonou Agreement: An Opinion. March RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT (in press). 15 In 2000, Zimbabwe and a whole range of other countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific (the ACP Countries), signed an agreement, The Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and Its Member States. It was called the Cotonou Agreement because it was signed in Cotonou, Benin. The Cotonou Agreement replaced the previous Lome Agreements, and created a new framework for Europe s developmental and other assistance, which included the new perspectives on human rights and good governance.

5 actions by the EU under Article have resulted in very serious attempts by both parties to these actions to restore adherence to Article 9, Zimbabwe has been the one exception. Zimbabwe has merely faced down the EU, avoided serious discussion, continuously breached all bench-marks (whether these were formally stated or not), and, in the end, forced the EU to find a new route to resolving the dispute. All of this in spite of the objective evidence that the EU, and many member countries, have dealt with Zimbabwe in a considerably more lenient fashion than in most of the previous Article 96 disputes 17. Once again, Zimbabwe has shown the capacity to override international obligation, and force crisis on international bodies. This was the case for the Commonwealth, and the Harare Declaration, as well as for SADC, and the SADC Tribunal. The EU may well regret this precedent in future problems under the Cotonou Agreement. However, it seems evident that the main result of the 2013 elections has been to deepen the paralysis of the international community in respect of Zimbabwe, and the stalemate outside Zimbabwe is replicated within Zimbabwe. The state of the political parties Internally, there are a series of stalemates. Behind all political problems besetting Zimbabwe lies the succession problem, and the question about who will succeed Robert Mugabe and when will this happen given the advanced age of the President. It is a seemingly intractable problem, and bedevils the whole political economy. For ZANU PF, despite its trumpeting about the massive victory, there are scarcely credible attempts to govern. Nine months after the election and all the hyped assertions of its election manifesto, there seems to be a near absence of governance and policy. Rather, ZANU PF is beset by a vicious internal struggle that is all but overwhelming any real governance, with a President seemingly preoccupied with both this struggle and his own personal priorities; more attention was given to his birthday and his daughter s marriage than the near-daily disclosures of rampant corruption by a wide range of officials from the parastatals. It seems that there is scarcely a parastatal untouched by the corruption scandal, with, for example, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Air Zimbabwe being prominent, as well as enterprises in which the government has substantial holdings, such as Hwange Colliery and the Public Services Medical Aid Society (PSMAS). Additionally, it seems that Mugabe is unwilling to do more than pay lip service to dealing with corruption because of the factional fighting within ZANU PF Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement specifies the agreed conditions under which countries should operate, and it is essentially a statement of the mutually agreed conditions for democratic governance. Article 9 is a very comprehensive set of obligations that all parties to the Agreement signed up to voluntarily, Zimbabwe included. A country that was seen as being in breach of Article 9 (including an EU country) would be subject to a political process, and eventually to dispute proceedings under Article 96, and this was the case with Zimbabwe. This can result in a range of actions being taken against the offending country, usually suspension of economic support, but sometimes additional actions such as sanctions, and, in Zimbabwe s case, these were targeted restrictions on identified individuals and a ban on military aid. 17 See, for example, Hazelet. H (2005), Suspension of Development Cooperation: An Instrument to Promote Human Rights and Democracy? Discussion Paper No. 64B. August MAASTRICHT: ECDPM; Laakso, L., Kivimäk. T., & Seppänen,M (2007), Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Studies in European Development Co-operation Evaluation, FINLAND & DENMARK: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION SERVICE. 18 Why Mugabe won't act on graft, 20 Mar 2014, Takudzwa Munyaka, Mail & Guardian. [Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from

6 This is all the more interesting in light of the elections and the clear demonstration that the opposition is in serious disarray (see below). Given its de facto mandate, it would seem that the most profitable course of action for ZANU PF would have been to reach an accommodation within the party, on succession internally, and then take strong steps to govern effectively, taking advantage of the international confusion, and probably chart a course to win the elections in 2018 at a canter. There are signs that this is the course of action advocated by a caucus within ZANU PF, shown especially in the assertiveness within the National Assembly for Ministerial accountability and demands to deal with corruption. However, there is no sign that the inertia in the government as a whole can be overcome, and the struggle over succession seems to dominate everything. For the opposition political parties, it is not merely a matter of stalemate, and waiting (as in the past) for ZANU PF to reveal its hand: it has rapidly become a problem of survival, and a survival dominated by extremely serious internal conflicts. The MDC-T is now beset by a vicious and public succession struggle, pitting populist support for Morgan Tsvangirai against the need for reform, advocated by an increasingly large section of the senior members of the party. Instead of a controlled process of succession within the party, the MDC-T has allowed an acrimonious public squabble to prevail, and further undermined the confidence of the citizenry and the international community in the party. It becomes increasingly probable that MDC-T will split again. For the rest, the other opposition political parties have become largely insignificant, probably marginalized beyond redemption by the 2013 elections. ZANU PF, in spite of the problems of the election, seems to have an untrammeled hold on power, and possibly beyond the next elections in The failure of governance Notwithstanding the disputes over the legitimacy of the 2013 elections, ZANU PF has to govern, and it is of major concern that there is little evidence of it doing so coherently. The internal conflicts within the political party seems to have produced a situation where there is little concern for a rapidly developing socio-economic crisis. A major concern lies in the endlessly conflicting statements emerging from the government. For example, and in respect of indigenization, investors can scarcely know what the policy is, for on successive days, there can be statements insisting that all business will have to cede 51% (and very shortly) as well as statements that the process will operate over several years, and might not even adhere rigidly to the 51% rule 19. Then, there has been the lengthy process of just putting in place the full executive, which took nearly three months, and which now has started to look unstable with speculation about pending changes to cabinet, e.g Gideon Gono replacing Patrick Chinamasa as Minister of Finance. A further growing concern has been the exposure of rampant corruption in many parastatal organisations, mainly in the form of massively bloated salaries and tender irregularities, which probably was already apprehended by the citizenry. However, instead of rapidly acting to restore public confidence, government has reverted to its time-honoured strategy of requesting more information, promising Cabinet discussion and action, and suggesting that the President is concerned and will act. However, a month after serious disclosures in the press, little has happened, apart from suggestions that some of the worst offenders will have salary cuts, and some of the more 19 Indigenisation refers to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33].The Bill was first gazetted in 2007, and passed shortly before ZANU PF lost its majority in the 2008 elections. In short, the proclaimed intention of the Regulations is that all foreign-owned businesses and all businesses owned by white Zimbabweans or permanent residents, valued at a prescribed amount, cede a controlling 51% share to black Zimbabweans.

7 egregious offenders will be criminally investigated, as in the case with Air Zimbabwe due to an apparent insurance fraud. However, as pointed out above, there are some encouraging signs of assertiveness in Parliament and this may indicate a willingness by new Parliamentarians to use the oversight powers of Parliament. The Inclusive Government was seen to have improved citizens lives, considering the introduction of the multicurrency system, availability of food, and improvement in the health and education sectors amongst others. During the brief election campaign period, political parties produced their election manifestos telling potential voters what they intended to do in the next five years until The election has now been and gone, and the country waits to see how ZANU PF intends to fulfill the pledges of its manifesto. There were promises of job creation, resuscitation of industries, empowerment and indigenization policies. Little has been done and there is a now an increasing sense of trepidation about what the future holds among the citizens. Job creation is critical, as is the need to restore the balance of trade, where currently imports represent 63% of GDP as opposed to exports (46%). Clearly this is unsustainable in the long term. The state of the economy ZANU PF, in its campaign for the 2013 elections, produced an economic recovery plan, called Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset). This is a plan that most commentators feel is unrealistic, and since Zimbabwe s policies are often largely incoherent and unlikely to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), would inevitably have to be financed by borrowing. At the macro-economic level, and with the governance crisis mentioned earlier, Zimbabwe seems to be piling up problems aplenty. The very modest gains made in controlling debt are beginning to fall away 20, and government seems to be returning to its old ways of borrowing its way out of problems. The Zimbabwe Treasury, in its economic report for January 2014, pointed out that whilst domestic credit had declined slightly (0.5%), loans and advances to government had increased over 100% from December 2012 to December In addition, Zimbabwe has virtually no reserves 22, and the Reserve Bank itself is unable to act as a bank of last resort due to its own indebtedness. Rather optimistically, the Zimbabwe government will lobby for debt relief, although currently owing the IMF and the World Bank US$124 million and US$1billion respectively 23. Although the Zimbabwe government claims that it only owes US$6.1 billion in external debt, the IMF says this is more realistically US$11 billion, owed to the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, European Investment and the African Development Bank. Domestic debt is reckoned to be more modest, about US$507 million, but the external debt now represents 85% of GDP, with 65% in arrears. Thus, debt forgiveness (in the absence of paying off arrears) is unlikely, FDI seems unlikely in the absence of the creation of an enabling climate (and clarity about indigenization), and the restoration of bi-lateral and multi-lateral development assistance awaits decisions from the EU. The 20 Government fails to service domestic debt as economic crisis worsens, Mthulisi Mathuthu, SW Radio Africa.March 17, Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from 21 Government borrowing doubles year on year Treasury, The Source, 14 March Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from 22 Zim economic reserves critically low, Alex Bell, SW RadioAfrica, 6 March Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from 23 Zimbabwe Seeks Debt Forgiveness, VOA, 20 March Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from

8 US will apparently take no action in removing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) and the resumption of bi-lateral assistance. Thus, the modest gains made under the Inclusive Government are being reversed at an alarming speed. One of the most serious aspects of this is the number of businesses closing, the numbers of workers being made redundant, and the failure of the government to pay thousands of employees of parastatals. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) reported that 75 firms have not reopened since the 2013 Christmas break, leaving 8,000 workers out of a job 24. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) reported that its workers had not been paid for three months, demanding that the government repay the US$42 million owed to the GMB 25. GMB workers aside, thousands of farmers who sold their grain to the GMB have yet to be paid, some having gone unpaid for several years. These are merely a few of all the parastatal workers that have not been paid, but the list includes staff of the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company (ZBC), the former ZiscoSteel, and the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), whilst civil servants keep waiting for government to make good on its promises to increase the levels of pay (in an amount far below that promised ahead of the election) and back date these. Further layoffs are likely amongst the thousands of municipal workers as a consequence of the financial difficulties being faced by local authorities 26. Most serious of all for the ordinary citizen is the near collapse in the delivery of public goods and services. Most local authorities have faced a serious decline in revenues, partially because the government forced debt forgiveness for the provision of water and electricity, but also because of the economic downturn. Health services are in a parlous state, with many hospitals short of staff, drugs, and equipment, whilst being adversely affected by power and water cuts. Education, having made modest improvement under the Inclusive Government, is once again facing serious problems. In short, Zimbabwe is once again in serious decline economically, and, unless the government takes strong steps to restore confidence and positively address the fundamental problems, this decline is likely to worsen considerably. The state of organised civil society The growth in political opposition in the 1990s was a direct consequence of a highly assertive civil society, but the gains were rapidly lost in the new millennium with the general preoccupation with political transition, and a preoccupation that sucked civil society into a de facto alliance with the opposition political parties. This clearly acted to the detriment of a genuine civil society agenda, and, with some justification, led to the government seeing civil society as partisan, with similar suspicions being held by industry, established churches, some sections of the international community and even citizens themselves. There was a significant opportunity arising from the signing of the GPA for civil society to re-align its strategies, and deal in particular with the partisan nature of virtually all state institutions. Since all political parties were now part of the government, there was a legitimate opportunity to push for reform without being seen as politically partisan. However, this did not materialize and the major emphasis was placed on the constitutional process, electoral reform, and 24 8,000 Zim Workers Left Jobless as 75 Companies Shutdown, Gibbs Dube, VOA, Thursday, March 20, Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from 25 GMB workers not paid for three months, demands govt pays $42 mln debt. The Source, 11 March Retrieved on 20 march 2014 from Harare City Council workers face axe, Moses Matenga, NewsDay, March 6, Retrieved on 20 March 2014 from

9 transitional justice. In the wake of the 2013 elections, civil society faced a serious need for a new approach, especially in the areas of democracy and governance. During the life of the Inclusive Government there was thus a great opportunity for civil society to move away from a preoccupation with political transition to its more conventional role of reflecting citizen voices and pushing for reform 27. Zimbabwe has been a very polarized country over the last decade and party politics governed supreme. This has been a weakness not only at the national level, but markedly in local government, and it has affected civil society as well. A culture of political intolerance and fear has reigned and this needs to change. One of the major challenges going forward is the lack of trust between government and civil society because of foreign funding. Civil society has been seen to be dancing to the tune of the funders, especially Western ones, rather than setting their own agenda. Since the elections, these civil society donors have taken a step back and are re-evaluating their policies towards Zimbabwe. Should relations improve between the West and Zimbabwe, this may also improve the relationships between the government and civil society. This already seems to be happening as ZANU PF appears to be mellowing; e.g. their stance towards the media has softened in minor ways. For the present, civil society is wrestling with finding a way to deal with this new government in ways that allow engagement on principle, not avoiding the legacy of the past 14 years, and presenting a civic perspective that government can accept as political-party neutral. In other words, how to develop an issue-based politics? There are signs that there is a growing consensus that civil society needs a new strategy, including the need to engage citizens more directly, but an equal fear that the changed situation may lead to very diminished funding were the international community to engage the state on a bi-lateral basis. However, there is little coherence and a tendency to assume that many of the previous initiatives can continue as before. Seeing like a citizen The Afrobarometer has been a very useful source of understandings about the views of Zimbabwean citizens. Of the Southern African nations surveyed - Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe; Zimbabweans were, paradoxically, the most active in areas of associational life, but the most pessimistic about being able to influence the political system or improve things through voting. There are multiple reasons for this pessimism, most important of these being the propensity of the state for violence, and especially violence around elections. Fears about political violence dominate the attitudes of citizens in respect of politics, and, as Bratton and Masunungure have demonstrated, it is near impossible to disentangle disengagement and apathy from fear in the Zimbabwean political landscape 28. Furthermore, as we have pointed out above, all political life is dominated by party politics, and, in this highly polarized environment, there is little space for civic action qua civic action on issues about the delivery of public goods and services. In this polarized environment, the youth find it very difficult to find opportunities to engage with civic life outside of party politics even though there is evidence that the youth have developed ideas about civic life and notions about how to become more active 29. Furthermore, and following on the 27 RAU (2012), On Restoring National Institutions and Elections. The Governance Programme. March HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT; see also RAU (2010), What are the options for Zimbabwe? Dealing with the obvious! Report produced by the Governance Programme. 4 May HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT. 28 See again Bratton, M & Masunungure, E (2012), Voting Intentions in Zimbabwe: A Margin of Terror? August Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No See, for example, Reeler, A.P., & Chitsike, K.C (2004), The youth are the hope of the future, but which future? A case study with Zimbabwean township youth. IDASA: DIALOGUE UNIT.

10 general indifference and contempt for citizens view by political parties, there is a relative dearth of understanding about citizens views outside of opinion surveys, and especially in relation to the ways in which citizens engage (or not) with local governance and the delivery of local government goods and services. It is clear that, notwithstanding the enormous difficulties in working with communities directly, a major area, i.e encouraging an active and engaged citizenry, has not been a major focus for civil society. One simple indicator here from the 2013 elections was the finding that relative to the 2012 Census, nearly two million citizens under the age of 30 years were not registered as voters: on the most minimal requirements for being a citizen, young Zimbabweans are disinterested, and this is not explained solely by the difficulties placed in their way by a partisan Registrar-General 30. In part this seems due to the perceived irrelevance of elections (because the outcome seems pre-determined), but also seems due to the political culture in Zimbabwe, and the way in which every issue, small or large, national or local, is bedeviled by political party affiliation. Thus, no issue around the delivery of public goods and services can be disentangled from questions of which a political party is seen as responsible for the failure, and no issue can be approached simply from the standpoint of technical failure. This prevents citizens from dealing with the problems from a common standpoint that can include diverse political affiliations. This is a deep structural problem, and will take many years of hard work to overcome. Overview and Conclusions The current situation offers civil society both opportunities and challenges for engagement. The most important opportunity that this new government presents is that it is made up of one political party with one ideology and following one policy decision, without a fractious coalition agreement. It is important to look at the ZANU PF manifesto as this is the guiding document for all government policies for the next five years. Yet a major challenge is the lack of political will to adhere to principles of good governance and democracy. Donor-funded programmes and activities that are seen to be addressing these issues are not popular with the government as they are seen to be pro-western. Western donors are regarded as having antipathy to the ZANU PF government and wanting the MDC in power, and this is not a wholly unwarranted perception. The manner in which the citizens are engaged on issues relating to good governance, at whatever level, should be framed carefully, taking into account the sensitivities of the past; i.e. the relations between the opposition and civil society and their donors. The new Constitution offers a potential area of engagement, informing and raising awareness to citizens about their rights; what they are and how to claim them is important in this new dispensation. Since the government uses both formal power (legislation) and informal power (intimidation and violence) in controlling the citizenry, it remains to be seen whether there will be a shift to adherence to formal power alone. There is a reasonable assumption that the government will honour the Constitution, albeit with some changes to suit their needs, and hence the realignment of laws with the Constitution is critical: working together on this may foster a relationship between civil society and the government, but much will depend on the judiciary taking a more expansive view on interpreting the rights in the new constitution. However, it may be strategic for civil society to engage Parliament more strongly than government, with the hope that 30 The point here is that young persons (and especially young urban persons) are seen as prima facie supporters of the opposition political parties, and that impediments are placed in the way of them obtaining IDs and registering as voters. This is just one example of the way in which state institutions are partisan.

11 the oversight function of Parliament might be strengthened, and, as pointed out earlier, there are some encouraging signs here. Civil society could potentially play a role in nurturing change agents in society and supporting active citizenship, if framed in a way that is not unduly confrontational or perceived by ZANU PF as be part of a regime change agenda. The citizens must decide for themselves what is in their best interest in a particular geographic community. The setting of civil society agendas must not be done only in consultation with their donors, but also with the communities set to benefit. There is a need to reconnect citizens with politics and enable citizens to define and shape a democratic political culture, the political institutions, and the legal frameworks. In order to do so, one first needs to understand what current citizen perceptions are of practices in Zimbabwe s political system. This includes an understanding of how citizens engage in politics and governance outside national elections; i.e in local community life. Based on such an understanding, civil society can come up with strategies that enable active citizenship. There is a great opportunity for organized civil society to connect with community-based organisations including churches and other faith-based organisations, as they have good access to the people. There is need for this interaction in a safe space, and churches and faith-based organisations are seen as such. This is not to say that these spaces have not been highly politicized over the years, as the highly public conflicts in the Anglican Church have shown, but religious principles can be used to bring communities together under a common goal of rebuilding the nation, one community at a time. Virtually all civil society organisations rely solely on foreign funding to carry out their activities, and there has been millions of dollars poured in especially for governance. Should there be a reduction of funding it is highly unlikely that civil society organisations will be able to continue their activities. Before the elections, there were hints from donors that funding to civil society would be reduced, as the money would be channeled through the government. This was with the thought that the MDC would win. Now that this did not happen, it is not clear whether funds will go to the current government or they will continue to be channeled to civil society, and, if so, will they remain at the same level. This is with regard to the global economic trends as well as donor fatigue towards the Zimbabwean issue, which can no longer be deemed the crisis that it was before. This is the greatest challenge to Zimbabwean civil society, but a further equal challenge for civil society is to find its roots back amongst the citizenry, and return to its critical role in articulating the views and aspirations of citizens, especially the marginalized, in particular women and the youth. Perhaps a final comment may be given to an eminent political scientist. Speaking on the role of civil society, and expressing reservations about the increasing focus on political parties in facilitating and consolidating democratic transitions, Larry Diamond commented: Often the energy for institutional innovation and reform comes from civil society, and partnerships between civil society and political parties or between civil society and the state can yield significant benefits. It s very important not to lose sight of that Diamond, L, Fukuyama, F, Horowitz, D.L, & Plattner, M.F (2014), Discussion. Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm, Journal of Democracy, 25, 1, [p100].