India. FAST Update 3 / September November Dr. Susanne Schmeidl Lic. Phil. Irene Autolitano

Transcription

1 Berne, 13 December 2000 India FAST Update 3 / 2000 September November 2000 Dr. Susanne Schmeidl Lic. Phil. Irene Autolitano Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs

2 Contents Risk Assessment...1 Analytical Monitoring Raster...4 Tension Barometers...6 Chronology...8 Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs

3 Risk Assessment 1 There is no likelihood of major domestic or international armed conflict in the next three to six months. Moreover, the recent unilateral cease-fire offer by the Indian government to Kashmiri militants is a clear window of opportunity for peaceful conflict management in the region. The situation in other parts of the country remains relatively unchanged and stable. India, an extremely diverse country, has two main pockets of on-going armed conflict: Kashmir and the Northeast. For this purpose we present a risk assessment for these regions separately from the situation in India. Positive Factors Increasing the Likelihood of Peacebuilding in Kashmir and the Northeast The most crucial development over the past three months was India's recent unilateral cease-fire offer in Kashmir that was met with international and domestic approval. This offer is important in light of the failed peace negotiations with Hizbul Mujahideen in July (see FAST Report 2/2000) and the timing of the truce during the Islamic holy month of Ramzan (Start: November 29 th ) shows respect for the overwhelming Muslim majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It also signals that the Indian government seems to increasingly acknowledge the necessity for a political solution in the region. 2 The move has been met with a very positive response from within the civil society in both India and Pakistan, 3 and Pakistan's government, not being able to dismiss the Indian initiative without loosing face internationally, agreed (even if reluctantly) to practice restrain at the Line of Control. The ceasefire has also sparked renewed offers for peace talks from several militant groups, notably the Umbrella organization Hurriyat Conference, and a new pro-indian political party called Jammu Kashmir Awami (People's) Conference (JKAC). The current truce is unlikely to resolve the five-decade-old dispute any time soon, and the next months are crucial for revealing if violent events in the region (Sept:42, Oct: 51, Nov: 40) are likely to diminish and the window of opportunity remain open for peaceful talks. This depends a great deal on the restraint from militants in Kashmir and Pakistan's ability to control cross-border support and movement. 1 This assessment is based on the analysis of events and developments during the past three months along the FAST Analytical Monitoring Rasters for India and the Indo-Pakistani relations. 2 This was already signalled in early September when India's head of army said Kashmir could not be resolved militarily. See Tension Barometer (Conflict Carrying Capacity chart) demonstrating a drop in India's CCC after the Kargil incident (May 1999) and the failed cease-fire with Hizbul Mujahideen (August 2000) reflecting the negative impact of Kashmir on domestic governance. 3 Track two diplomacy interactions have become more visible in the past few weeks. An increasing number of prominent Indian and Pakistani citizen are committed to a resumption of talks. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 1

4 Negative Factors Decreasing the Likelihood of Peacebuilding in Kashmir and the Northeast Despite the overall positive effect, there is still a possibility that the cease-fire offer could create some backlash originating from Pakistan-supported militant groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba already denounced the Indian offer and vowed to continue its armed struggle) and from radical Hindu groups inside India (Shiv Sena, a key constituency of Vajpayee's coalition government accused the Indian PM of selling out to militants). If this cease-fire is called off prematurely as the one in August (see FAST Report 2/2000), it could have a damaging effect on overall peace negotiations. There are two other international factors, that, while possibly strengthening India's position in South Asia, have questionable effects on domestic conflict in Kashmir and the Northeast. 4 First, India's quest for alliances with countries that seek isolation of Afghanistan (U.S., Russia and China) resulted in a "strategic partnership against a common threat" with Russia on an anti-terrorism campaign. India (with the U.S. and Russia) is also strongly pursuing onesided UN sanctions against the Taliban that are likely to affect Pakistan negatively, increasing its isolation which could potentially back-lash through intensifying violence from Islamic militants, particularly in Kashmir. Second, India is currently seeking greater security cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan in fighting the separatist movements in the north-eastern state of Assam. 5 This development shows the spill-over potential of India's domestic conflicts, and negates the tendency for exploring political solutions for separatist ambitions demonstrated recently in Kashmir and for over a year with the rebels of Nagaland. In light of this alliance, it is yet to be determined if the peace rally lead by the chief ministers of seven states in the Northeast reflects a novel trend towards peacebuilding or a further attempt to isolate separatist groups and cut off their popular support. Either event (domestic and international), if not met by clear political offers for peace talks or cease-fires is likely to lead to a continuation of violence in Assam. 4 See Tension Barometers (Conflict and Cooperation chart) demonstrating the continuous fluctuating level of conflict and cooperation in India. 5 The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFP) have set up camps in the neighboring countries. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 2

5 Factors Increasing or Decreasing the Likelihood of Armed Conflict in India There are two major developments in India that need to be monitored in order to assess their impact on armed conflict in India in general. While a clear interpretation at this point is difficult, we presently assume that they are likely to minimize conflict in the long run while potentially leading to short-term conflict escalation. First, there is an increasingly visible ideological struggle between the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Hindu extremist groups. This is manifested in the BJP's attempt to distance itself from the more radical views against minorities of its "mother organization" Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This stand-off is further emphasized by the criticism against Vajpayee's policy in Kashmir and a recent demand by the hardline Hindu group Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) to tear down an 11 th Century mosque in New Delhi to build a cluster of temples. While a moderation of the BJP decreases the likelihood of political conflict (based on religion) in the long run, it is likely to increase domestic violence against religious minorities in the near future. Secondly, as India struggles with the management of a heterogeneous country that is afflicted with poverty, ecological disasters (recent flood in West Bengal), and low-level conflicts, it is attempting to implement a more decentralized form of administration by splitting big states into smaller units to improve local governance. However, it is unclear if this decision was forced upon the Center out of sheer necessity as it was unable to cope with domestic problems in another fashion or came from the desire to improve upon the (federal) governance structure. In addition, it is still to be determined if the three new administrative splits will indeed solve existing problems rather than adding new ones: Chhattisgarh was created out of the largest state, Madhya Pradesh, in the center. Eight out of 16 districts that make up Chhattisgarh are affected by drought and seven are home to outlawed leftist groups fighting against the state government. While solving some of the internal struggles, the mother state Madhya Pradesh will now be left struggling for electricity (about 35% is fed by power stations in Chhattisgarh) and suffer losses in revenue generated from mineral deposits (nearly 47% come from Chhattisgarh). The tribal Jharkhand region was created in the poverty-stricken Bihar (long considered a failed state) in the east after decades of struggle. It is unclear if this particular administrative split will change anything as controlling the Maoist guerillas that are active across large parts of the new state and are openly supported by many tribal people, will be the biggest challenge for Jharkhand's government. The hill state of Uttaranchal was sliced out of the most populous state of Uttar Pradesh in the north. After the separation, Uttaranchal will have to depend solely on federal assistance (losing Uttar Pradesh s funding). Even though the region has potential in tourism, hydroelectricity, floriculture and food processing, it will be facing a deficit at $ 215 million. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 3

6 Analytical Monitoring Raster INDIA ROOT CAUSES Historic Partition from Pakistan adding to historic religious tensions and low-level religious conflicts (Muslim minority vs. Hindu majority) Caste-System resulting in social and economic inequality Territorial and other separatist movements (Kashmir/Punjab/North-East/Sikh) Political / Institutional Government's resort to coercion to resolve social conflict and maintain social order Government's preference for military resolution of internal conflicts (Kashmir/North-East) Conflicting Center-State Relations (Center Dominance, increasing imposition of presidential rule) PROXIMATE CAUSES Political / Governance Lacking control from the central government to guarantee basic constitutional/fundamental rights for lower casts and minorities (such as non-prosecution of bad practice by local authorities) Frequent human rights violations (or lacking guarantee of rights, i.e. lacking protection) of minorities and lower casts by municipal, local, and regional authorities (police etc.) Rise of Hindu Extremism Corruption within politicaladministrative system Growing voices of new politically mobilized groups and increasing pressure on state for accommodation (e.g. Dalits) Security Strong and/or militant opposition groups in Kashmir and the North- East Spread of terrorism Small weapons trade Economic Unequal income-distribution/uneven impact of economic growth on different groups (farmers etc.) Strong economic diversity( northsouth) I N T E R V E N I N G F A C T O R S DECREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT Thriving economic force in the region of South Asia New economic ties with USA Increasing political assertiveness of the Indian civil society Growing realization that there is no military solution in Kashmir (cease-fire efforts) Institutionalization of multi-level governance structures (Panchayati Raj institutions) aimed at transferring power from the center to local governments INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT Militants in Kashmir and the North-East Pakistani involvement in Kashmir Violence against religious minorities nurtured by Hindu Extremist Elements (RSS, VHP) Immigration from Bangladesh into the North-East Ecological changes (droughts or floods) Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 4 A R M E D C O N F L I C T

7 Analytical Monitoring Raster PROXIMATE CAUSES I N T E R V E N I N G F A C T O R S INDO-PAKISTAN ROOT CAUSES Historic Partition of Pakistan from India along religious lines (1947) Wars over Kashmir in 1947 and 1965 War over East Pakistan resulting in the creation of Bangladesh (1971 ) Pakistan lost Deep rooted ideological difference between both countries leading to fundamental disagreement over how to interpret historical events On-going territorial dispute over Kashmir (also ideological) Political / Institutional Problematic Civil-Military Interaction in Pakistan s governments with military dominance/ failure of civilian governments Weak attempts at peace-building (more lip-service than actual desire to reach an agreement) Political / Governance Military coup in Pakistan on Oct 12, 1999 Pakistan support for Islamic militants and terrorism in Kashmir "Biased" historical teaching in the education system of both countries, fostering cross-border animosities Security Military build-up on both sides On-going cross-border dispute at the LoC in Kashmir Military Imbalance in favour of India (conventional weapons, size of army) Societal / Socio-Demographic Rise of extremism (Hindu/Muslims) on both sides (intensifies religious polarisation) Growth of madrassahs supporting Islamic militants in Kashmir in Pakistan Weak constituencies/organized groups for peace in both countries Economic Pakistan's attempt to contest India's regional (economic) hegemony No existing economic ties between the two countries Smuggling networks between the two countries DECREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT Outside (particularly) US pressure for peaceful resolution of Kashmir conflict Civil society efforts re: Indo-Pakistan dialogue Strong individual ties between the two countries International engagement with Pakistan to decrease isolation Presence of nuclear weapons (deterrent for a full-fledged conventional war) U.S. as new partner of India (economic) IMF and other economic assistance used as leverage Seasonal effects on fighting in Kashmir (less cross-border incidences in winter) Presence of nuclear weapons (deterrent for a full-fledged conventional war INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT Deep emotional distrust of India s Hindu nationalist groups toward Pakistan India s attempt to paint Pakistan as "rogue" state Growing international isolation of Pakistan (esp. after coup) Growing influence of Islamic fundamentalist parties (on Pakistani army, and through madrassahs) Taliban regime in Afghanistan, supported by Pakistan Russia and China as new partner of India over Taliban threat U.S. as new economic partner for India India s application to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council A R M E D C O N F L I C T Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 5

8 Tension Barometers Conflict Carrying Capacity and Forceful Action in India (based on Reuters) Proportion /1999 9/ /199911/199912/1999 1/2000 2/2000 3/2000 4/2000 5/2000 6/2000 7/2000 8/2000 9/ /2000 Monthly Forceful Actions Conflict Carrying Capacity Conflict Carrying Capacity (CCC): Reflects the stability of the system or polity as a whole rather than a particular regime or administration. A CCC trend line approaching 1.0 suggests 100 % stability. Forceful Action (FA): Refers to the proportion of any and all uses of physical force and any associated manifest violence by any actor. When the CCC and FA trend lines intersect it implies severe regime instability coupled with violence. In such cases the regime might be in danger of collapsing or being overthrown, or the country might face other severe internal conflicts such as civil war. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 6

9 Conflict and Cooperation in India (based on Reuters) Level of Conflict/Cooperation /1999 7/1999 8/1999 9/ / / /1999 1/2000 2/2000 3/2000 Domestic Conflict Monthly 4/2000 5/2000 6/2000 Domestic Cooperation 7/2000 8/2000 9/ /2000 Domestic Conflict captures contentious or conflictual interactions between diverse domestic actors. The type of conflict can vary from verbal antagonism/disagreements, contradictory action, to outright physical force with various levels of intensity. Domestic Cooperation captures various forms of accommodative or cooperative behavior between diverse domestic actors. Such behavior can vary from verbal agreements, meetings to concrete joint efforts or operations for the forwarding of mutual benefits between domestic actors. Conflict and Cooperation between Pakistan and India (based on Reuters) Level of Conflict/Cooperation /1999 7/1999 8/1999 9/ / / /1999 1/2000 Cooperation 2/2000 3/2000 Monthly 4/2000 Conflict 5/2000 6/2000 7/2000 8/2000 9/ /2000 Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 7

10 Chronology Sept Oct Domestic Violence: Angry and hungry mobs attack relief teams, district officials and troops demanding food, after flood waters swamped huge areas of the Indian state of West Bengal leaving 758 dead and 200 missing. The deluge, West Bengal's worst in 22 years, has affected some 17 million, of whom 5.7 millions are still marooned by vast lakes of water; Reported violent incidents throughout September in Kashmir: 7 cross-border fire and 42 internal; in the Northeast: 1 in Bihar, 3 in Assam, 1 in Tripura; other: 2 against Dalits and 1 against Christians. Kashmir-related domestic politics: Ajay Chrangoo, the leader of Panun Kashmir (a leading group of displaced Kashmiri Hindus) urges the Indian government not to accept a peace initiative on Kashmir which does not include their aspirations and that of the people of Jammu and Ladakh [Sept 7]; General Ved Prakash Malik, the head of India s army says there could only be a political solution to the decadeold revolt in Kashmir [Sept 11]; Authorities in J&K announce the start of the second phase of population census, despite threats by the frontline militant group Hizbul Mujahideen. The group had earlier [Sept 3] threatened to use force if Indian authorities did not stop the head count in the state because it would miss thousands of people who had fled, migrated, were in hiding or imprisoned [Sept 11]. Northeast-related domestic politics: According to Indian government officials, some soldiers from Buthan are being trained in India to fight Indian rebels from the northeast region (the United Liberation Front of Assam, ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, NDFB) who have moved into the Himmalayan kingdom and set up camps there [Sept 8]; Chief ministers of seven states in the northeast lead a peace rally appealing to rebels to give up violence. More than people take part in the rally that is aimed at isolating separatist groups and cutting off their popular support [Sept 9]; Two hundred guerillas all members of the hardcore ULFA - fighting Indian rule in the northeast state of Assam surrendered to the government [Sept 15]. Overall domestic politics: India's Election Commission strips the country's main communist party of its national party status. This decision largely means a loss of image for the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which looses exclusive rights to its hammer, sickle and star symbol in all but three of India's states [Sept 30]. Relations with Pakistan: Indian Defense Minister Fernandes rebuffs an offer of talks expressed by Pakistani military leader Musharraf at the United Nations Millenium Summit the day before, saying that Pakistan must first stop cross-border terrorism before a meaningful dialogue could resume [Sept 7]; Pakistani military leader Musharraf blames an Indian intelligence agency, on Sept. 21, for a bomb blast that killed at least 15 people in the capital of Islamabad [Sept 19]. Other international Relations: On the sidelines of P.M. Vajpayee's visit to Washington, the U.S. announces $ 1 billion in trade-financing and loans for India aimed at shoring up commercial ties between India and the U.S.. India's P.M. Vajpayee pledges to stick to a nuclear test ban [Sept 14]. Domestic Violence: J&K authorities announce that 83'804 people have been displaced by cross-border firing and shelling by Pakistani forces since May, but many had returned home [Oct 12]; Reported violent incidents throughout October in Kashmir: 6 cross-border fire and 51 internal; in the Northeast: 7 in Assam, 7 in Bihar and 1 in Tripura. Northeast-related domestic politics: Sixty-eight rebels belonging to various separatist groups surrender to the government in Assam [Oct 25]. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 8

11 Overall domestic politics: Thousands of volunteers of the hardline Hindu nationalist RSS gather for a three-day conclave on the outskirts of Agra on the occurrence of the group's 75 th anniversary. The aim is to discuss issues related to national security. According to a representative, the country faces internal and external threats, and the effort of the RSS would be to increase the awareness of the volunteers on security issues from developing their own intelligence units to keeping an eye on Christian and Islamic institutions [Oct 13]; The BJP distances itself from the hardline views of its ideological mentor (RSS) on the country's minority Christians and Muslims by saying that all Indians are equal and the party was committed to upholding the country's secular traditions [Oct 19]: According to the annual report of Islamabad-based Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Center, South Asian women's access to health, education and other facilities lags far behind that of men [Oct 19]; India's ruling Hindu nationalist party (BJP) takes power for the first time in the western tourist resort state of Goa, where nearly a third of the population is Christian [Oct 24]. Relations with Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based guerilla group states it has doubled the number of fighters battling Indian rule in Kashmir this year. Leader: Hafiz Mohammad Saeed [Oct 2]. Other international relations: During a four-day visit Russian President Vladimir Putin (first Russian leader to visit India in nearly eight years) signed a host of pacts, defense and trade deals. Most important: the establishment of a strategic partnership binding the two countries to a joint approach on fighting international terrorism, defense issues and nuclear energy. The two countries state that they intend to rekindle the warmth of their Cold War-era friendship, but stress that they are not seeking to create a new military-political alliance. Pakistan voices worries over defense deals India has made with Russia and says major powers should instead try to persuade New Delhi to settle its disputes with Islamabad [Oct 5]; Indian and Bangladeshi security officials announce, after a five-day meeting in Dhaka, that they have agreed to combat smuggling, insurgency and all illegal crossing of their 4'000 km long border [Oct 25]. Nov Domestic violence: Reported violent incidents throughout November in Kashmir: 5 cross-border fire and 40 internal; in the Northeast: 3 in Tripura, 11 in Assam, 3 in Bihar and 3 in Manipur. Kashmir-related domestic politics: Authorities in J&K announce that separatist violence increased in the year 2000: 1'499 separatist guerillas, 689 civilians and 408 security personnel were killed between November 1999 and October 2000 [Nov 21]; A pro-india militant group, Jammu Kashmir Ikhwan, launches a political party called Jammu and Kashmir Awami (People's) Conference (JKAC) to press for peace in Kashmir, urging a six-month truce between separatist guerillas and Indian security forces [Nov 18]; Start of a unilateral cease-fire against separatist guerillas in Kashmir during the Islamic holy month of Ramzan enacted by the Indian government [Nov 29]. Overall domestic politics: According to analysts and commentators, Indian communists, who have ruled the state of West Bengal for a record 23 years, will face turbulent times after Chief Minister Jyoty Basu has retired [Nov 5]; The hardline Hindu group Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or World Hindu Council holds a rally with nearly 200 protesters in New Delhi to demand that an 11 th century mosque in the city be torn down to make way for a cluster of temples; criticizing P.M. Vajpayee and the BJP-government for "lack of support on the issue [Nov 14]; Sonia Gandhi is overwhelmingly re-elected president of India's opposition Congress party, despite her being unable to lift the party's fortunes over the past two years [Nov 15]; The Indian government announces to introduce a bill in parliament in the coming winter session to set up the office of ombudsman to investigate corruption charges against serving civil servants and ministers [Nov 16]. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 9