Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East

Transcription

1 4 December 2007 FIFTY-THIRD SESSION Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East REPORT submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Dario Rivolta, Rapporteur (Italy, Federated Group)

2 ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY 43, avenue du Président-Wilson, Paris Cedex 16 Tel Fax: Internet:

3 4 December 2007 FIFTY-THIRD SESSION Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East REPORT submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Dario Rivolta, Rapporteur (Italy, Federated Group)

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5 Document A/ December 2007 Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East REPORT 1 submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Dario Rivolta, Rapporteur (Italy, Federated Group) TABLE OF CONTENTS RECOMMENDATION 810 on Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Dario Rivolta, Rapporteur (Italy, Federated Group) I. Introduction II. European military and security operations in the Middle East 1. Lebanon and the UNIFIL dilemma: a peacekeeping or peacemaking force? 2. Israel and Palestine: a security role for the European Union? III. European countries forces in the Middle East: lessons learned and future prospects DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East AMENDMENT MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 1 Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 6 November

6 The Assembly, RECOMMENDATION on Europe and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East (i) Expressing its full support for the forces of the European states involved in the Interim Force (UNIFIL II) being deployed under United Nations command in Lebanon and the Mediterranean; (ii) Expressing also its full support for the European personnel being seconded to the European Union Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EU BAM Rafah) in the territories under Palestinian administration; (iii) Considering that through its active involvement in the management of crises in the Middle East, the European Union is making a major contribution to the efforts to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian and Lebanese crises; (iv) Considering that a lasting settlement of those crises is first and foremost the responsibility of the Lebanese, Israeli and Palestinian leaders; (v) Recognising the crucial role to be played by the United States in the efforts to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (vi) Recognising also the importance of supporting the Middle East Quartet as a framework for multilateral contacts and decision-making; (vii) Expressing its full support for the Quartet s Middle East Envoy in charge of assistance to the Palestinians, Tony Blair; (viii) Regretting that the European Union member states did not show greater unity with regard to the war in Lebanon in 2006; (ix) Considering that the European Union could have played a larger part in managing the crises in the Middle East by conducting an autonomous military crisis-management mission alongside UNIFIL II, on the model of its mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) in 2006; (x) Concerned about the continued institutional deadlock in Lebanon; (xi) Supporting the efforts of the United States to convene an international Conference on Israel and Palestine in 2007; (xii) Taking the view that such a Conference can only succeed if it makes tangible progress on the issue of the final status of the Palestinian Territories and their transformation into a sovereign State of Palestine; (xiii) Noting the important role played within UNIFIL II by the military forces of the European countries in terms of the number of troops and operational capabilities being deployed; (xiv) Taking the view that this European presence could be more substantial if the effort was more evenly shared among the 27 member states; (xv) Considering that within the EU and NATO alike, the biggest effort in the area of military crisis management is repeatedly being made by a small number of member states, leading to problems of overstretch of troops, aggravated equipment wear and tear and higher costs for the member states concerned, due to the lack at European or transatlantic level of a common funding mechanism for operations; (xvi) Supporting the efforts of the European Union to establish autonomous military crisismanagement capabilities, with the option of recourse to NATO command, control and planning capabilities in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements; 2 Adopted by the Assembly on 4 December 2007 at the 7 th sitting. 2

7 (xvii) Considering that this process of reinforcing Europe s military capabilities is quite rightly being conducted in parallel to efforts to strengthen civilian, humanitarian, security assistance and rule of law capabilities; (xviii) Of the opinion, however, that the European Union will never be able to become an autonomous global player on an equal footing with the United States and other international power centres unless the Union gives itself the full political and military means that are necessary for the planning, command and execution of crisis-management operations decided at its own initiative or at the request of the United Nations or other international bodies such as the African Union; (xix) Taking the view also that the development of autonomous European military capabilities means seeking a common harmonised doctrinal and conceptual basis for military crisis-management operations, including the rules of engagement for forces (operational caveats); (xx) Considering also that, humanitarian aid to the civilian population being of fundamental importance in peacekeeping operations, it is important, therefore, for it to be coordinated by a single authority, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU STATES INVOLVED IN UNIFIL II IN LEBANON AND IN THE EU S EUPOL COPPS AND EU BAM RAFAH MISSIONS TO 1. Maintain and be prepared to step up their current level of engagement in accordance with developments in the security situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories; 2. Envisage launching an autonomous civil-military security assistance operation in the Palestinian Territories to support and strengthen the Palestinian Authority in the framework of the implementation of the decisions made at the Annapolis Conference in November 2007; 3. Better coordinate their national policies with respect to Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories in order to strengthen the role of the European Union in the efforts to resolve the current crises, with the prior agreement of the parties concerned; 4. Strike a more even balance in the European countries involvement in military crisismanagement missions in the Middle East and other regions, so as to avoid certain countries being more exposed than others, for this generates tensions that are detrimental to the common effort; 5. Seek solutions for achieving the highest possible degree of harmonisation of the rules of engagement among the different national contingents, on the clear understanding that the common rules of engagement strengthen the operational effectiveness of action on the ground, in compliance with the mandates defined by the national parliaments in certain member states; 6. Ensure that wherever possible in peacekeeping operations civilian and military responsibilities are brought together under a Head of Mission whose task is to coordinate, through a civil-military cooperation cell (CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation), the activities of international civilian organisations, such as those attached to the UN and other bodies, and of non-governmental organisations (NGOs); 7. Keep the Assembly informed of decisions concerning the engagement of European forces in UNIFIL II in Lebanon and the staff involved in the Union s EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah missions in the Palestinian Territories, as well as of the aims of those different missions and the means of achieving them. 3

8 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Dario Rivolta, Rapporteur (Italy, Federated Group) I. Introduction 1. Since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the first world war ( ) the Middle East region has not ceased to be a focus for the attention of the European states and to mobilise their political, military and economic resources. Following the Second World War ( ) this former Franco-British condominium became a theatre of confrontation between Israel and the Arab states, between the US and USSR (by proxy) and between the Israelis and Palestinians. 2. These days it is not conflicts between states and peoples separated by frontiers that constitute the main source of instability, but rather the confrontation between non-state or quasi-state players and established states, and that between communities defined not by ethnic criteria (as was the case in the Balkans) but by their political-religious affiliation: secular Fatah and Islamic Hamas, Shiite Hezbollah and the secular Sunni March 14 coalition, for example. 3. On top of this we have the international Jihadist movement (including al-qa ida and affiliated or sympathetic groups) and the more strategic issues of Iraq s future and the gradual emergence of Iran as a regional power that can influence events and the region s geopolitical and geostrategic development. In our globalised world the Middle East is a region where a traditional sectoral approach does not offer any lasting solution to the crises there. Rather this vast area holds the key to the future relations between a Muslim world caught up by globalisation and a Christian-secular world represented by Europe and the United States. 4. The European states essentially recognise the leading role of the United States in the search for a solution to the conflict between the Israeli and Palestinian national claims to the occupied, disputed and divided territories. However, this has not stopped the European states from adopting national positions or seeking an autonomous common approach in the UN and EU frameworks. Thus European states are militarily engaged under UN auspices in Lebanon and the European Union has launched police and justice missions in the territories under Palestinian administration. 5. In a different geographic context (outside the Middle East), and more controversially, European armed forces are engaged in Iraq, albeit it in gradually declining numbers. The European Union has also launched a judicial reform mission for Iraq, but most of its action takes place outside the country. However, the European states have no influence over events inside this country whose future lies in the hands of its different communities (the Shia, Sunni, Kurds and various tribes and political movements), but also the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey Whichever way things develop in Iraq towards preservation of a state within the current borders or an imposed partition it will have lasting consequences for the region as a whole, in terms of whether the situation calms down or, on the contrary, the current or latent tensions are exacerbated. Europe will be directly affected, in view of its geographic proximity and its involvement (as a whole or through individual states and institutions) on the ground, on its own or in alliance with the United States. This represents a challenge for a continent that is just recovering from its past divisions at a time when its leading institution, the European Union, aspires to become a global player in favour of A secure Europe in a better world 4. II. European military and security operations in the Middle East 7. Europe s military involvement in Middle East crises is not new. What has changed since the periods before the second world war, during the cold war and following the 1991 Gulf war is the geostrategic context, as a direct consequence of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the 3 Turkey is directly concerned by developments in the north of Iraq where the majority of the population is Kurdish. 4 A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy adopted on 12 December 2003 by the European Council in Brussels. 4

9 United States. The so-called global war on terror (GWOT) launched by President George W. Bush in response to those attacks is also a battle for hearts and minds with the Arab-Muslim world. And the European states, notwithstanding their reservations, are allies of the United States and as such are party to that endeavour. 8. The global war on terror entails a three-pronged approach: military action in Afghanistan and Iraq; undercover action by the intelligence services in order to avert acts of terrorism and neutralise terrorist cells with links to al-qa ida or inspired by this branch of the global Jihadist movement; and political-diplomatic action with a view to encouraging the Arab-Muslim world to take a more favourable direction from a geostrategic point of view. It also entails efforts to resolve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the creation of a cordon sanitaire around Iran. This is a fairly classical approach for any world power seeking to manage crises that concern it; it is also an all-or-nothing approach, as reflected in the famous statement by President Bush, Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists That idea has direct repercussions for the Middle East, since it has been extended to include the various state and non-state players that oppose the Bush Administration s plans for the region, in particular Iran and Syria, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, the setbacks in Iraq have created a diversion that has stood in the way of direct military action against this disparate group of four which cannot be linked, even remotely, with the Jihadist threat constituted by al-qa ida: Iran and Hezbollah because they represent Shia Islam, Syria because of the secular nature of the regime and Hamas because its agenda is above all the Palestinian national cause. 10. The European states, caught between the United States post 9/11 strategy and the complexity of the regional dynamics, are trying to have their say, for want of a common policy for the region. They are actively engaged there, individually and in the framework of the EU s external action at community and intergovernmental level. Their geopolitical and economic interests, as well as the presence of large Muslim communities in Europe, call for a European Middle East policy that is not just a subtle variant of the American approach. In the case of Iraq, this was not possible. In Lebanon and with regard to a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Europe has the wherewithal to assert its interests and demonstrate its diplomatic independence from the United States. 1. Lebanon and the UNIFIL dilemma: a peacekeeping or peacemaking force? 11. The United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon which later became the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was created by UN Security Council Resolution 425 on 19 March Like the two other UN missions in the region, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) 6 and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 7, UNIFIL has reached an honourable age (30 years old in 2008), which is also indicative of the failure of the successive international peace plans designed to resolve the problems created by the partition of Palestine and establishment of the State of Israel in (a) Origins and development of UNIFIL: UNIFIL today is the result of the gradual evolution of its mandate and mission during the various phases of the crises between Lebanon and Israel. At least five periods can be identified, the 5 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), the oldest UN peacekeeping mission, is still under way in the Middle East. UNTSO was set up following the 1948 Israeli-Arab war by UN Security Council Resolution 50 of 29 May It has a staff of 359 (June 2007), of which 150 military observers (including Europeans). Its headquarters is in Jerusalem under the command of Major-General Ian Campbell Gordon of Australia; 7 UNDOF, set up by UN Security Council Resolution 350 of 31 May 1974, has the task of monitoring compliance with the ceasefire signed between Israel and Syria following the Yom Kippur War in It consists of personnel (including units from 4 European states), assisted by 57 UNTSO military observers. Based in the Golan Heights (Camp Faouar), UNDOF is currently under the command of Major General Wolfgang Jilke (Austria). 5

10 last one corresponding to the current situation: ; ; ; ; The initial troop strength of soldiers in March 1978 has risen to almost today : following the Black September massacres of Palestinians in Jordan on 17 September 1970, combatants of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and their families took refuge in Lebanon, in temporary camps which are still there today. Southern Lebanon became the rear base for Palestinian attacks against Israel, which retaliated by invading its neighbour in March 1978 during Operation Litani. On 19 March, in response to an appeal from the Lebanese Government, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon and setting up UNIFIL to supervise that withdrawal, as well as to guarantee the security of the region until such time as the Lebanese forces were able to control the southern border and prevent further action by Palestinian combatants. The two phases subsequent to the creation of UNIFIL could not be carried out and Israel again invaded Lebanon in : in response to constant Palestinian incursions and bomb attacks Israel decided to reinvade Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee) in order to destroy the PLO infrastructure there. The campaign, which gave rise to intensive diplomatic efforts at international level, was marked by a siege of the Lebanese capital, Beirut, where the PLO leaders, including Yasser Arafat, had established themselves. UNIFIL, overtaken by events, and in the absence of a decision by the UN Security Council, adopted a neutral stance, confined to protecting the civilian population in southern Lebanon without intervening in any other way in the conflict The 1982 Israeli campaign ended following the evacuation of the PLO leaders and most of the Palestinian combatants to Tunis. France played a leading role in that withdrawal, together with Italy and in coordination with the United States, Israel s traditional allies in the region. Israel agreed to withdraw to southern Lebanon following the deployment in Beirut of a multinational force composed essentially of American and French troops. That force soon found itself confronted with a new Lebanese political and military player, the Islamic Jihad, which later became Hezbollah, the Party (Hezb) of God (Allah). Supported by Iran and Syria, which controlled the Bekaa plain in eastern Lebanon, on 23 October 1983 the Islamic Jihad carried out two major and almost simultaneous suicide attacks against the American and French forces, killing 241 American and 58 French soldiers, prompting the departure of the multinational force (1984). 16. Israel for its part maintained its control over southern Lebanon in cooperation with an allied Lebanese force, the Free Lebanon Army, which subsequently became the South Lebanese Army (SLA). UNIFIL, which was also deployed in this zone, entered into a complex relationship of cohabitation with Israel, its Lebanese allies and soon also the resistance against the Israeli occupation led mainly by Hezbollah. UNIFIL s presence did not prevent violence, but as a witness to excesses on either side it helped encourage restraint on the part of the belligerents, in particular vis-à-vis the civilian population. The UN force was also a deliberate or collateral target for attacks, especially during Operation Grapes of Wrath in April : Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath (11 to 27 April 1996) in order to destroy the infrastructure of the armed Lebanese resistance to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. The 1982 war had attracted Iranian volunteers to Lebanon. These had entered into contact with the Shia population of Lebanon, which up until then had tended to remain aloof from the power struggle among Christians, Sunnis, Druze, the Shia urban population (Amal movement) and Palestinians who had all fought for the control of the country during the first civil war from 1975 to Iranian agents had 8 Its helplessness was brought home in tragic fashion by the slaughter of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on 16 and 17 September These crimes were committed by one of the Lebanese Christian militias in an area under the control of the Israeli armed forces. Estimates of the numbers killed range from 700 to more than The Lebanese civil war, which went through many different phases with numerous switches of alliances and interventions from foreign countries, started officially in 1975 and ended in 1989 with the inter-lebanese Taif Accords. The Lebanese General Michel Aoun (Christian) waged a solitary combat against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, which ended with his forced exile to France in October At the time Syria had joined the United States in the coalition against Iraq following the latter s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August

11 contributed to setting up political military structures within the Shia community, leading ultimately to the establishment of Hezbollah. Having contributed to the departure of the multinational forces in , the movement engaged in a long-drawn-out campaign of resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and against the SLA. 18. Notwithstanding their conventional superiority, the Israeli troops were subjected to constant guerrilla attacks and the territory of Israel itself was the target of rocket and mortar attacks by Hezbollah. Israel again opted for the strong-arm approach (Operation Grapes of Wrath) with very mixed results that gave rise to criticism from the international community, in particular following the 18 April 1996 bombing of UNIFIL installations at Cana, where large numbers of civilians had taken refuge, killing 102 people. Those attacks brought home the weaknesses of UNIFIL, which was unable to retaliate and whose reputation for protecting the civilian population was considerably tarnished as a result. The Israeli operation ended with the status quo (26-27 April 1996 ceasefire between the Israeli and Lebanese forces), which was tantamount to a victory for Hezbollah, since it survived and was able to continue its action against the occupation forces and their Lebanese helpers. This situation persisted until 2000, when the Israeli Government at last decided to withdraw militarily from southern Lebanon : in May 2000 the Israeli armed forces withdrew from southern Lebanon. The war of attrition conducted by Hezbollah and other Lebanese armed resistance groups had made the occupation of southern Lebanon unpopular not only with the Israeli population but also its armed forces. The situation in the occupied territories was also mobilising a considerable proportion of Israel s defence resources. The economic cost of the Lebanese occupation was increasing with no real political or economic benefits. The withdrawal was conducted in haste, with dire consequences for Israel s Lebanese allies in the SLA. Pursued by Hezbollah, many SLA soldiers and officers were killed or imprisoned and some were obliged to take refuge in Israel where they did not receive the warmest of welcomes. These SLA members finally returned to Lebanon accompanied by their families in exchange for guarantees concerning their physical safety. 20. UNIFIL found itself with the task of defining and delimitating the separation zone between Israel and Lebanon on the one hand, and of verifying the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and their Lebanese allies, on the other. During a third phase, the Lebanese armed and security forces were to be deployed along this so-called Blue Line. This proved to be impossible due to physical barriers and the regular presence of Israeli patrols at certain points on the Lebanese side. Those violations of the May-June 2000 agreements put UNIFIL in a delicate position, since it did not have a mandate to impose compliance with the withdrawal line. The Lebanese Government for its part decided not to deploy its forces in this contested area as long as the Israeli forces remained there. 21. The situation improved as of July 2000 and UNIFIL was able to deploy along the full length of the withdrawal line. Lebanese forces also began to deploy in the southern region formerly occupied by Israel and its SLA allies. In order to enable UNIFIL to fulfil its new tasks, its strength was increased from to troops. That increase was needed in order to allow it to be present along the full length of the Blue Line (on the Lebanese side). Eventually UNIFIL s strength was to be increased to once all Israeli units had been withdrawn and the physical barriers dismantled. 22. Progress accomplished in contributed to the stabilisation of southern Lebanon, although clashes continued, with almost daily violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and attacks by Hezbollah against the Israeli Defence Forces or civilian targets in Israel. Generally speaking, the overall situation was sufficiently under control for the United Nations to start giving thought to scaling down UNIFIL to soldiers. As a first step, under UNSC Resolution 1337, adopted on 31 January 2001, the Force was to be reduced to soldiers as of 1 August However, given the unpredictable situation on the ground, caution was called for, and on 31 March 2001 the Force still stood at soldiers. UNIFIL s reconfiguration to a strength of was to be completed in the second half of 2002, with an intermediate step of soldiers between October 2001 and July One of the conditions for that reconfiguration was for the Lebanese Government to extend its control to the Blue Line. Such a deployment proved impossible due to the persistent clashes between Hezbollah and Israeli army forces in the contested Shabbah farms area (14 farms with an estimated 7

12 surface area of 40 km 2 ). This piece of territory, to which Lebanon, Syria and Israel all laid claim, was recognised by the UN in July 2007 as belonging to Lebanon. The continued Israeli incursions into the airspace above southern Lebanon were another major reason given for postponing the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces. Under these circumstances UNIFIL was not able to scale down its presence and maintained the same level of activities, taking note of acts of violence without being able to put a stop to them. (b) Enhanced UNIFIL (2006?) 24. The internal situation in Lebanon began to deteriorate in 2005, with dramatic consequences. Syria had imposed a strong military presence in the centre and northern regions of the country, in its role as Lebanon s protector following the civil wars and Israeli invasions. It enjoyed strong support from Lebanon s political elite, among Christians, Sunnis and Shiites alike. Syrian intervention was encouraged by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan during the 1970s. But now at the beginning of the 21 st century, Syria is perceived as the ally of Shiite Iran. These effects are compounded by the American and British invasion of Iraq, which shifted the balance of power in Iraq from the Sunnis to the Shiites. 25. In the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, a leading Lebanese politician, Rafik Hariri, a businessman (with links to Saudi business circles) and several time Prime Minister of Lebanon ( and ), became the leader of the political movement that opposed the Syrian presence. Credited with Lebanon s successful economic reconstruction, he had been able to win the support of large sections of the Christian, Sunni and Druze communities, with the notable exception of the Shiites represented by the Amal movement and Hezbollah. In October 2004, Rafik Hariri had resigned from his post as Prime Minister and engaged in a political campaign with a view to winning a sufficient majority in Parliament to be able to influence the 2007 presidential elections 10 (the President of the Republic being elected by Parliament), thereby reducing Syria s influence in Lebanon. 26. On 14 February 2005, a convoy of vehicles in which Rafik Hariri was travelling was the target for a large-scale attack involving at least 1.8 tonnes of explosives. He was killed outright and Lebanon entered a period of contained instability and violence which persists to this day. The incident gave rise to intensive diplomatic efforts at international level initiated by France 11 with the support of the EU and the United States, with a view to achieving two objectives: bring about the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and identify the authors of the 14 February attack (with the setting-up of a UN international tribunal for Lebanon). The first of these objectives was achieved on 26 April 2005, with the confirmed withdrawal of all Syrian forces from Lebanon. The second was to trigger a political crisis which still has not been resolved in In the May 2005 parliamentary elections, the Martyr Rafik Hariri s List led by Rafik Hariri s son Saad Hariri won a majority of seats: 72 out of 128 (but not the two thirds needed to challenge the extension of the President s term of office or to guarantee the appointment of the chosen candidate as the presidential successor). The political debate in Lebanon is also marred by acts of violence and assassinations directed primarily against the bastions of the March 14 Bloc (another name for Martyr Rafik Hariri s List) and associated politicians, journalists and other personalities. Among those that stand accused, in addition to the usual pro-syrian elements in the Lebanese intelligence, security and armed forces, is the Hezbollah Shiite movement. 28. Neutralising Hezbollah is a major objective of Israel and also the United States, which view this party/army as a terrorist organisation. Lebanon is also becoming a theatre of confrontation between Israel (supported by the United States) and Iran (represented by Hezbollah), which is taking advantage of the Iraqi impasse to pursue its nuclear programme in disregard of all the threats and pressure coming from the United States and its European allies. UNIFIL s role in this Lebanese and Middle 10 Or bring about his early departure. The mandate of the current President, the Christian General Emile Lahoud, was extended for 3 years in 2004, under Syrian pressure. Rafik Hariri s party approved that extension but subsequently the ministers from the Hariri Bloc and Prime Minister Rafik Hariri himself resigned as a gesture of public protest against that measure. 11 Rafik Hariri was a personal friend of former French President Jacques Chirac. When Jacques Chirac stepped down from the office of President in May 2007, he moved to a flat in Paris belonging to the Hariri family. 8

13 East turmoil is marginal, although the United Nations is aware that the force will be the first collateral victim of any international action taken to neutralise Hezbollah, which has a firm foothold in southern Lebanon. 29. This latent conflict broke out into an open war in July On 12 July an armed Hezbollah group crossed the Blue Line, attacked an Israeli army patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers 12. The same day Hezbollah attacked Israeli positions with rockets fired from Lebanese territory. The Israeli Government retaliated unexpectedly by launching a general military offensive aimed at wiping out Hezbollah s military and civilian infrastructure in Lebanon. Although the Hezbollah leaders had not expected that response, they were nonetheless prepared, as subsequent events were to show: the Israeli offensive met with an organised, coherent and versatile resistance that took the Israeli Defence Staff by surprise. 30. The result of this one-month war (from 12 July to 14 August 2006) was the status quo on the ground and large-scale destruction in Lebanon (causing the deaths of civilians). Israel s military losses (some 120 soldiers) and inability to fend off rocket attacks by Hezbollah against military and civilian targets on Israeli soil triggered a major political crisis compounded by a loss of confidence in the country s defence capabilities. The scale of the conflict was such that it became internationalised, against the backdrop of a highly volatile and literally explosive situation in Iraq, in the occupied territories and in terms of the relations between Iran and the United States and its allies. Thousands of European nationals found themselves trapped in Lebanon when Israeli attacks destroyed large sections of the runways and installations at Beirut airport, leading the European states to launch noncoordinated operations to evacuate their nationals. 31. One European state France was to stand out in terms of the speed and efficiency of its military evacuation operations and also its diplomatic efforts to put an end to the conflict. For historical and political reasons, as well as out of a desire to exert influence and to support the new Lebanese Government formed by the March 14 Bloc, France mobilised the efforts of the United Nations and European Union to put an end to hostilities and strengthen the international presence in Lebanon. This approach, which was actively supported by Italy but initially opposed by Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom and other European states, proved to be the only credible alternative. A continuation of Israeli military operations would have led to the break-up of Lebanon and the emergence of a new Middle East conflict zone. 32. To begin with France tried, unsuccessfully, to get the European Union to intervene in the form of an extended Petersberg mission under a UN mandate, similar to that given to NATO during the Balkan crises and in Afghanistan. The idea of recourse to NATO was also considered but met with little enthusiasm on the part of the organisation. The inability of the European states to overcome their differences blocked France s efforts to achieve a common European position. Under these circumstances recourse to UNIFIL seemed to be the least bad solution and it was in any case the only one acceptable to all the parties concerned. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 implementing that solution was adopted on 11 August The aims of that resolution, which took over parts of the seven-point plan presented by the Lebanese Government at the Rome Conference 13 on Lebanon, on 26 July 2006, were to put an end to hostilities, prevent a return to the status quo (for this would inevitably generate further conflict, given the internal political instability in Lebanon, the situation in Iraq and the state of relations between Iran 12 The soldiers are Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser (aged 31) and Eldad Regev (26). On 25 June an armed Palestinian group close to Hamas had also taken the 19-year-old Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit prisoner. The three soldiers are still in captivity and their whereabouts are not known to the public at large. 13 The Rome Conference did not produce any concrete results. The United States and some European countries persisted with their aim of neutralising Hezbollah and thus handed Israel politically the victory that it had not been able to win militarily. The seven-point plan put forward by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora received the support of the Arab League and (with some reservations) that of Hezbollah and Iran. It was also calculated to counter the draft resolution providing for the deployment of an international force outside the UN framework, being brought before the United Nations Security Council by France and the United States thought to be overly supportive of Israel (since it also envisaged disarming Hezbollah). 9

14 and the United States) and strengthen UNIFIL in order to thwart any attempts to resume hostilities. Thus on 7 August the Lebanese Government, including the Hezbollah ministers, approved a plan for the deployment of Lebanese army soldiers in southern Lebanon, up to the Blue Line, something which had not been seen since The main provisions of Resolution 1701 in that respect are as follows: Cessation of hostilities: [The United Nations Security Council] 2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel; 3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory ( ), so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon; ( ) Managing the situation in southern Lebanon: 8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements: full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL ( ) deployed in this area; full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that ( ) there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State; no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; no sales or supply of arms ( ) to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government; Strengthening UNIFIL and extending its mandate: 11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978): a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities; b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon ( ); d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8; 12. ( ) authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties ( ) and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, 10

15 humanitarian workers and ( ) to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; ( ) 14. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request; 15. Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above; 16. ( ) expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps ( ) ; 34. UNIFIL II owes its increased strength to contributions from European states, in particular Italy and France. At the time the Force was commanded by the French General Alain Pellegrini. On 2 September a large Italian contingent of 880 soldiers and 158 vehicles14 began to deploy in Lebanon through the port of Tyre. On 8 September an interim maritime force the naval component of UNIFIL under Italian command was declared operational and sent to patrol and monitor the Lebanese coast. On 14 and 15 September, French and Spanish advance units (consisting of 200 and 500 soldiers respectively) arrived in Lebanon. With the arrival of these Italian, French and Spanish forces UNIFIL II s strength reached men. 35. The UNIFIL II maritime force was activated on 15 October 2006, in replacement of the interim force. It was placed under German command and consisted of 19 ships, of which 8 from Germany, 5 from Norway, 2 from Denmark, and 1 each from Bulgaria, Greece, Sweden and Turkey. The fact that these are European and for the most part also NATO states gives this force a degree of cohesion and credibility that is a strategic asset for strengthening the capabilities of UNIFIL II in the Lebanese- Israeli theatre of operations. The principal task of this naval component is to support the Lebanese navy in the tasks of coastal surveillance and enforcing the arms embargo contained in UN Security Resolution In October 2007 the maritime task force comprises 16 vessels, Bulgaria and Norway having withdrawn and the Netherlands having joined the force. 36. At the end of November 2006 UNIFIL II had a strength of soldiers (including the sailors in the maritime task force), thanks to the arrival of new troops from the existing contributing states but also new ones such as Indonesia and Portugal. At the end of December 2006, the date that had been set for reaching a strength of , UNIFIL II still had only soldiers, including a contingent from Qatar (this country s first participation in a UN peacekeeping mission). On 2 February 2007 the command of UNIFIL II was handed over to Italy s Major General Claudio Graziano. At the time it was composed of soldiers from 27 states (as opposed to soldiers from 10 states in September 2006). In October 2007 it had a strength of troops from 31 states, with South Korea being the most recent contributor. (c) The European states in UNIFIL II 37. The adoption of Resolution 1701 was the result of a difficult compromise between Lebanon and the Arab League on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other. The European states, at least those that were most strongly engaged, found themselves at the centre of the efforts to strengthen UNIFIL. Thus, given the suspicion with which Hezbollah, Syria and the pro-syrian 14 These were components of the San Marco and Lagunari Serenissima regiments professional forces often deployed on external missions. UN Department of Peacekeeping, 1 September

16 elements in Lebanon regarded the United States allies, they also became leading players in the efforts to resolve the Israeli-Lebanese crisis. As such, and in view also of their military deployment, they exposed themselves to the ups and downs of internal political developments in Lebanon. Paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 are a reflection of that compromise. 38. In paragraph 12, UNIFIL is authorised to to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. Up until 2006, UNIFIL was confined to the role of observer of this phoney war being waged by Hezbollah and Israel along and beyond the Blue Line. Now, theoretically, it can intervene in order to prevent hostile action on either side. While such intervention is possible in principle, in practice it depends on the national rules of engagement, and on having the requisite capabilities in terms of intelligence and the gathering of information, areas in which neither Hezbollah and even less Israel are inclined to cooperate. 39. There were one or two incidents, including an episode on 31 October 2006 involving the activation of a French air defence battery when Israeli fighter aircraft overflew French and German ships stationed off the coast of Lebanon where the European naval force had been deployed in support of UNIFIL. The governments concerned lodged official protests with Israel. Since then there has been a significant reduction in the number of such incidents. 40. As for Hezbollah, its combatants have returned to their civilian occupations or are engaged in rebuilding the south of Lebanon and are refraining from launching armed attacks against Israeli targets. One can rightly assume that this organisation has for the moment turned most of its attention to the political battle for power in Beirut while more or less discreetly continuing to reorganise and re-arm in the south 15. In the absence of hostile activities of any kind, however, UNIFIL is not really in a position to interfere with Hezbollah s civilian or other activities. 41. Another major extension of UNIFIL s mandate concerns the monitoring of arms transfers to Lebanon (paragraphs 14 and 15 of Resolution 1701). This measure is directly aimed at both Hezbollah and Syria, Lebanon s immediate neighbour and the traditional supporter, together with Iran, of the Party of God. UNIFIL s border surveillance activities are, however, limited by the position of Syria, which views the deployment of international troops along its border with Lebanon almost as a casus belli. This is first and foremost the responsibility of the Lebanese security and armed forces, which are assisted by European states, Germany in particular. Germany also plays a central role in the maritime surveillance of the Lebanese coasts, with a view to preventing the delivery of equipment banned under Resolution UNIFIL controls the south of Lebanon by means of daily patrols and surveillance activities that it has been able to step up thanks to the enhanced intelligence capabilities offered by the European contributors. Indeed it is here that the European contribution gives UNIFIL its added value in strategic terms. A stronger presence on the ground and more effective surveillance will not prevent Hezbollah s rearmament, but they do have a genuine deterrent effect in that they make it necessary to organise clandestine routes which are longer, more time-consuming and more costly. Regarding defence capabilities, although the European forces have definite superiority in terms of equipment and command and control systems, the example of the 2006 Israeli campaign demonstrated the risks of an open military engagement with Hezbollah. 43. The European forces have enhanced the capabilities of UNIFIL, but due to the divergent policies of the states concerned with regard to Lebanon, relations with Syria, the role of Hezbollah and, more generally with regard to the Middle East following the invasion of Iraq, there are real limits to their engagement. It is not a matter of the numbers and quality of forces, but of the political mandate. And there are constantly risks, as brought home by the attack of 24 June 2007 which cost the lives of three Spanish soldiers and three Columbian members of the Spanish contingent. This attack, for which no-one claimed responsibility and which was condemned by Hezbollah, was a reminder of 15 These accusations which were given a lot of publicity in the American and European media were denied by UNIFIL Commander Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy) in an interview he gave to the Israeli press; Hizbullah not rearming in S. Lebanon, Jerusalem Post, 14 June

17 those which occur daily in Iraq and frequently in Afghanistan. A link has been established with the Fatah-al-Islam group This Arab-Palestinian armed group was set up in the Nahr el Bared Palestinian refugee camp, where the Lebanese army finally succeeded in eliminating it after three months of fighting 17. This victory on the part of the Lebanese National Army gave it greater prestige in the eyes of the population, which considers it more than ever to be the guarantor of the country s integrity. Indeed its leader General Michel Suleiman is considered as a possible candidate for the post of President of Lebanon. However, the process of nominating the President, who for constitutional reasons has to be a Christian, has been suspended due to the failure of the parliamentary majority (emanating from the March 14 Bloc) and the opposition (Hezbollah, Amal and General Michel Aoun) to reach agreement. 45. A major feature of Europe s engagement is its practice of organising contacts and joint exercises with the Lebanese army, which gives the latter indirect access to the procedures and equipment typical of the NATO member states armed forces. In the long run this will enhance the effectiveness of the Lebanese armed forces. The contacts established in this way could also involve them more closely in Euro-Atlantic defence cooperation (within NATO). Furthermore, the European forces expertise and capabilities in the reconstruction sector are helpful to the local population, which, moreover, will enjoy better protection in the event of a fresh outbreak of conflict thanks to the presence of experienced, well-equipped forces. 46. It is undeniable that the strengthened European contingent in UNIFIL marks a major turningpoint in Europe s engagement in the Middle East. Although the European contribution is composed of national contingents, UNIFIL benefits from the enhanced cohesion that comes from their experience of working together during NATO and EU military missions. Moreover it is not impossible, should conditions on the ground evolve favourably, that these contingents may gain greater independence from the United Nations and become the forerunners for a possible new EU assistance mission for the stabilisation and reconstruction of Lebanon. This would only be possible if requested by the Lebanese side in a spirit of partnership between the EU and Lebanon. Indeed this would be a promising project in the framework of the plans put forward by the new French President Nicolas Sarkozy for the Euro- Mediterranean partnership. 2. Israel and Palestine: a security role for the European Union? (a) The situation in 2007 historical background and consequences 47. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on since the proclamation of the State of Israel on 14 May It has been a constant factor in the regional and international crises and wars of the last 60 years. It is also a recurring theme of the reports drafted by the WEU Assembly s Political Committee. On 19 December 2006, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 787 on a lasting solution for the Middle East: a role for Europe calling on the European Union: 1. To relaunch the Quartet initiative for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this historic moment in time in order to support the ceasefire and specify once again the essential points of a lasting settlement on the basis of: recognition of the State of Israel and the State of Palestine, the 1993 Oslo Accords and the cessation of all acts of violence; 2. To establish a dialogue with the Arab countries and regional powers concerned, including Syria and Iran, in order to launch a global process that can lead to a balanced and lasting peace, for this is urgently necessary; 16 The fact that the Spanish contingent was stationed near the border with Syria hence in a possible transit area for arms supplies to Hezbollah might be another explanation for the attack, which could have been intended as a warning. However, that theory was not officially endorsed by the Spanish authorities. This provides yet another demonstration of the political complexity of the European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East in general. 17 The Lebanese army took control of the camp on 2 September