SOUTH VIETNAM's PROSPECTS IN THE IMMEDIATE AND NEAR FUTURE. Van Thieu made a momentous strategic decision concerning South

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Virgil Osborne
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1 -J <.~.". ~ Pc..::RA.=Fc...:T:...:O:.:N.:,:L:..:y:...-_--=N.:..:O:;.;T:.:E:..::=--c...:(.:,::E:..:R:.:;T:.:A.:.:I:.:Nc:...:F:...:A.:.:C:..:T:.:S::...:A.:.:N::,:D::...:S:..:T:.:A.:.:T::..:I:..:S:..:T::..:I:..:C:::.:S::...:=::..:...:== BEING VERIFIED. 1 SOUTH VIETNAM's PROSPECTS IN THE IMMEDIATE AND NEAR FUTURE Background: On Friday March 14, 1975, President Nguyen Van Thieu made a momentous strategic decision concerning South Vietnam's deadly struggle with the Vietnamese communists. The magnitude of that decision is not yet fully apparent to us. Nor have its many ramifications even been fully cataloged. Thieu's decision was to alter the basic strategic nature of the Vietnam War and to convert it from what it was -- a mixture of revolutionary guerrilla war and what the communists call regular force strategy -- to what might be described as orthodox old-fashioned limited warfare, much on the order say, of the Korean War. This characterization of the Thieu strategy can not be called particularly precise, if for no other reasons than it is here expressed in a western frame of reference; correctly accurate it would have to be explained in Vietnamese. Thieu's decision -- and this point should be stressed -- has about it a high quality of Vietnameseness. It was arrived at in Vietnamese style, employing Vietnamese logic and the Vietnamese thought process (parenthetically it should be noted this was the first major Vietnam decision in nearly two decades

2 - 2 - that was not essentially an American decision). There was no advance staff work by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no preparation of option papers complete with recommendations, no prior consultations with allies. Thieu and his generals met, discussed (undoubtedly in their usual oblique manner) and then decided. In the decision-making process they did not march up to the new idea as would we in the West with our Greek-Judiac-Roman heritage of major-minor premises, thesis-antithesis, etc. all ; n n~tgeometry. Rather, Thieu seized on his idea/purely Vietnamese fashion which has been metamorphically described "as an eagle circling" -- from over a field of rabbits suddenly the eagle soars down on a single rabbit (idea) chosen by some pattern of though we can never truly understand. Quite naturally then his decision puzzles foreigners. It is not the one an American general would have made in the same circumstances, nor would he have executed such a decision once taken in the manner that has Thieu. The whole idea seems to us to be peculiar, alien, illogical, and beyond this, excessive, inappropriate and unnecessary. The purpose of the above background note is not to engage in esoteric description of conflicting patterns of thought, but to suggest caution in that we do not completely understand what is the Thieu strategy and where it will lead. Can ARVN Stabilize? In the two weeks since the fateful decision was taken to abandon the Highlands and most of Central Vietnam, in favor

3 - 3 - of a truncated vietnam, we have seen Thieu's strategy whether or not soundly conceived -- turn into debacle in its implementation. The initial orderly withdrawal became a route. ARVN suffered staggering losses: men; large sized artillery pieces; armored vehicles; and tons of ammunition. A vast new dislocation of the population threw up what may b e come in excess of two million refugees. A social truma benumbed the South Vietnamese, although its nature and effect at this writing remains unmeasured. Unleashed was a new and powerful de-stabilizing political force in Saigon. Thieu may have succeeded in restructuring the strategic nature of the war, but at a fearful pric~one far beyond his original expectations. At this writing (March 28) ARVN continues to fall back. How much of its retreat is due to military pressure, how much to orders from Saigon, how much to enemy military pressure and how much to simple chaos, remains unsure. In any event the fall-back continues. The basic question in the midst of these rapidly unfolding events is whether we are witnessing quick and total catastrophe in South Vietnam, whether complete communist victory is only weeks away. It is possible, as almost anything is possible when the dice of war are thrown, that the end is at hand, that the ARVN crumble will continue and soon all organized resistance thoughout the country will cease. The latest estimate by the intelligence community is

4 - 4 - If the military situation does stabilize, what can we reasonably expect in the near future, the period from summer through the end of the year? Probably these characteristics will mark the scene: * A military front line a Main Line of Resistance (MLR) in military parlance -- will be drawn across the lower third of South Vietnam and (less likely) around key cities on the central lowland coast (Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Ninh Hoa, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh). A conservative estimate would be an MLR running from Nha Trang to Dalat to Tay Ninh. A more conservative MLR prediction would be Ph an Thiet to a few miles above Saigon to the Parrots Beak area of Cambodia; in either of the two latter cases there would be nothing, no city enclaves, above the line. *The war will become more orthodox, one of mass and movement, firepower and mobility: divisions manuevering on each side of the MLR, tanks attacking and counter-attacking, artillery batteries engaged in long-range duels, air strikes in one direction (quite possibly in two directions). * The PRG will plant a flag, establish a capital, announce itself as a firm geographical entity. Rather than fading into the jungle if enemy forces approach, it will defend its territory. It will seek to hold the Vietnamese people it finds in its newly acquired territory and to attract back those who have fled. A broadened diplomatic offensive will be launched, seeking to gain additional international recognition and to induce friendly countries to post diplomatic representatives in the new

5 - 5 - capital. The objective will be, legitimacy. * Almost certainly there will come, within weeks, one large all-important battle. Most likely site for this is in Tay Ninh province, west of Saigon, although it could be one of the cities on the central coast. Should ARVN lose this battle it will quickly be followed by a second and a third. If ARVN wins, or there is a stand-off, quite likely there will come a mementary diminution in military activity. The war of manuever would then go on through the summer but at a reduced tempo, as both sides prepared for Armageddon, early next year. The current military estimate of ARVN's likely performance is: Such a conclusion in the final analysis turns largely on personal judgement by each individual on-looker as he weighs in his mind the separate factors: the past military record of each ARVN unit or elements in the reconstituted unit; the force ratio, of men, weapons, supplies; the grand strategy and the planned tactics; the degree of logistic support by the U.S.; and the highly important but intangible factors of officer leadership and troop morale. Near Future Prospects. The criterion for predicting South vietnam's immediate prospects then is quite easily fixed (although not the estimate itself): Combat will be the determinant. Battle will decide all.

6 - 6 - Assuming that ARVN can fix and maintain an MLR, that the GVN (and ARVN) remain coherent organizations, what then can be said of near-future prospects? Major ones appears to be fourfold: a) A general condition of flux. The South Vietnam scene will become highly dynamic: each function, every process both military and non-military will undergo enormous change and this change will result in alteration of each function and every process. I It will be like trying to count the spokes of a spinning wheel. Only the most mechanistic of determinists will be able to believe he can chart the course of events within a South Vietnam that continues to hold off the communists. This means, among other things, that normal planning work will be impossible. Projecting military and economic aid needs, for example, can only be guessing. Daily readings will be the chief guide and all involved should avoid believing that they or anyone can see very far ahead. b) A desperate effort to re-build ARVbN as an effective fighting force. GVN leadership. This will be the over-riding imperative for the What happened to ARVN precisely remains at this moment a major unanswered question. By virtually all judgements of competent military observers ARVN was a first-class fighting force. Some of its infantry divisions were rated as among the best in the world -- including the First Division, which performance in the DaNang debacle defies understanding.

7 - 7 - In rebuilding ARVN therefore the initial step is to find out what went wrong, not so much why ARVN in Central Vietnam failed, but why it failed so badly. The answer to this question will provide guidelines to what must be done now (and will also help us estimate future ARVN performance). Building armies, or rebuilding them, is an extremely slow and painstaking task, full of setbacks. If the ARVN failure in Central Vietnam is found to be primarily due to confusion, then there is hope that an effective fighting force can be reconstituted. But if it is found that the causes are deeper and more basic -- a cowardly officer corps, inability to maintain discipline, internal communication break-down, troop demoralization, etc. -- then we must conclude there is little prospect ARVN can withstand future onslaughts by North Vietnamese troops. c) Political turbulence and change in Saigon. The odds of President Thieu continuing in office are considerably less than even. Either the civilian oppositon -- primarily the Catholicmilitant Buddhist elements will combine to force him out, or the generals will conclude he must go and depose him. of civilian leadership appears remote at the moment. Any sort The most likely prospect is a military junta, a return to the Military Directorate of the mid-1960's. Quite possibly Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky will emerge as the central power holder. He sees himself as a Charles Degaulle figure returning to the helm under his own personally dictated conditions at a moment when the nation has no way to turn. Ky a lso has been quietly busy these past several years attempting to build himself a power base among young

8 - 8 - Vietnamese. d) Continued uncertainty about the U.S. role in Vietnam affairs under conditions in which military and economic assistance become as crucial for immediate survival as they now are in Cambodia. Assistance estimates of the past have now been rendered obsolete. Much military e quipment has been lost and needs to be replaced. At the moment ARVN, having lost 50% of its ammunition supply, is down to about 60,000 MT. This is normally around two to three months supply, but could be expended in a single, long, major battle. In addition, in the new kind of warfare emerging, ARVN's needs will be different, hence it is not simply a matter of replacing lost equipment but of determining and fulfilling new needs. For example, anti-aircraft weapons, assuming they could be delivered in time. Economic aid plans -- the five year and out idea for example -- no longer make any sense. All economic aid of necessity must be short-run and essentially of a crash humanitarian nature; moving, caring for and resettling refugees; feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, in short keeping the e conomic functioning on its most elementary level. d) There is a fifth factor, a negative one. Inevitably there will be raised the cell for a "political settlement" of the war. Prospects for a settlement among the DRV, the GVN and the PRG -- never bright in the past -- have for the moment dimmed to virtual nothingness. S/P:DPike/lr 3/31/75

VIETNAM WAR

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