UN Photo/Sophia Paris

Transcription

1 UN Photo/Sophia Paris

2 Crisis reports

3 at a gance The crisis and the response Piar 1 10 The US miitary s post-earthquake management of entry to prioritised US fights and expensive search and rescue missions and deayed the response of experienced actors. An infux of sma, often in-experienced, INGOs reduced the quaity of the humanitarian response. It has proven uniquey chaenging to determine the number of humanitarian actors, the tota eve of funding and to prepare accurate 3W (who does what, where) information Piar 5 Piar 2 2 OCHA s abiity to undertake basic post-emergency tasks was undermined by ow capacity and sideining of the HCT. The custer system was weakened by the number of actors and faiure to sufficienty invove the an state or civi society. Piar 4 Piar 3 Donor performance 160 HRI 2010 scores by piar Donor faiure to insist on UN and nationa government eadership of the response exacerbated frustrations and dupication of effort. Donors have funded INGOs to provide basic services and paid itte attention to buiding the capacity of the an state or civi society. There is an unprecedented mismatch between reconstruction pedges (US$5.3 biion promised in March 2010) and actua disbursements (US$509 by eary October 2010). Looking prematurey towards recovery, donors have been sow to acknowedge the ongoing humanitarian crisis and mounting evidence of faiure to provide adequate sheter or protection for the 1.3 miion homeess dispaced. Key chaenges and areas for improvement A Crisis Average Funding decisions were argey made at headquarter eve and not based on needs assessments. Donors shoud encourage simper, compatibe reporting formats. Quicker pooed fund disbursement is imperative. Piar 1 Responding to needs Piar 2 Prevention, risk reduction and recovery Piar 3 Working with humanitarian partners Piar 4 Protection and internationa aw Piar 5 Learning and accountabiity Note: Since the response to took pace in 2010 and a new fied questionnaire was used, survey responses from were not incuded in the cacuations of the index. Donors must require greater accountabiity to beneficiaries and the an government from INGOs they fund. Donors must acknowedge the pressing need to provide permanent housing for the dispaced. They shoud ony fund actors committed to sustainabe and equitabe urban deveopment and transparent and aocation and registration procedures.

4 Overwhemed by the response? The 7.0 magnitude earthquake on 12 January 2010 kied at east 220,000 peope over two percent of s popuation and dispaced around 2.3 miion peope (OCHA 2010a). It impacted densey popuated urban areas of the poorest country in the Americas whie it was sti recovering from a series of devastating hurricanes in Government response capacity was severey imited as 13 of 15 ministries were destroyed and an estimated one in five federa government empoyees was kied. Senior government and United Nations (UN) officias were among the dead (CBC News 2010). The scae of the disaster, and the internationa response, was comparabe to the Indian Ocean tsunami in Amid the ongoing response, comprehensive evauation and anaysis is not yet possibe. The answers to key questions remain uncear: Were there too many response actors? Are evauation essons from the tsunami being heeded? Has the internationa community shown it can respond effectivey to a mega crisis in an urban environment? Wi the postearthquake promise made by Bi Cinton and other key actors to buid back better be fufied? Or wi ans fee et down by donor promises to a nation accustomed to aid dependency and unpredictabe funding? It shoud be stressed this is a preiminary crisis report, based on a rapid mission to. A more considered anaysis of how donors responded wi be presented in Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) The initia response was a media-driven emergency. Harrowing images compeed action. Many donors attempted insofar as possibe in the immediate aftermath of such a major disaster to base their funding on needs assessments. At the same time, many fee that major donors fet impeed to act before they necessariy had sufficient information. The massive outpouring of internationa soidarity and the rapid, initiay United States (US)-ed response, heped avoid the potentia further deaths and epidemics that were initiay feared. Within a day of the disaster, the US miitary had arrived the first of a contingent which grew to 22,200 personne (US Southern Command 2010). Taking over the Port-au-Prince airport, the US miitary handed over 150 fights a day. US decisions on which fights to prioritise caused controversy, particuary when Hoywood star John Travota was aowed to and his own Boeing 707 carrying ready-to-eat rations and feow Scientoogists whie there was a backog of 800 fights awaiting a anding sot (CBS News 2010a). Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) which had been working in for 19 years protested deays in aid deivery due to diversion of severa initia fights to the neighbouring Dominican Repubic (MSF 2010). Brazi which ost 18 of its sodiers serving in the miitary component of the UN Stabiization Mission in (MINUSTAH) which it eads was indignant when three of its aid fights were denied anding permission and joined France in formay compaining. A Word Food Programme (WPF) officer noted that US miitary priorities are to secure the country. Ours are to feed, (Carro & Nasaw 2010). There was concern about the US miitary s undue focus on security. A US medica non-governmenta organisation (NGO) found an eement of racism in beieving that ans were going to riot and they had to be controed, (Bhatt 2010). Many humanitarian representatives interviewed by the HRI team stressed the difficuties of coordination with miitary contingents, particuary those from the US. Cooperation between the incoming US miitary and the ong-estabished MINUSTAH miitary contingent was probematic. This indicates that there is sti significant effort needed to impement the Oso guideines a framework for the use of miitary assets in response to natura disasters drawn up in 2004 and updated in 2007 (OCHA 2007). However, despite the frustrations expressed by many, there is genera agreement among humanitarians that sodiers saved ives and enabed access by rapidy repairing the airport and port. Crisis reports Doubts about search and rescue The despatch of dozens of search and rescue (SAR) teams six from the United Kingdom (UK) aone (Department for Internationa Deveopment 2010) saved 134 ives and was haied by the UN as the highest number of ives ever saved after an earthquake disaster (Inter- Agency Standing Committee 2010). More than 1,900 SAR staff were depoyed. Coordination was difficut in a crowded urban space and SAR teams acked counterparts as an civi protection teams were initiay absent. French and Chinese SAR teams were criticised for prioritising the ocation of their own nationas, whie Cuba and Israe were among those reported not to have kept records of where they had searched. 161

5 162 Internationa teams got the pubicity, but far more peope were rescued by ans. One donor representative tod the HRI team that the cost of each ife saved by the SAR teams it supported was around US$1 miion. The donor community shoud to refect on the costs of SAR teams compared to the benefits of investing in oca response capacity. It is inevitabe that SAR teams wi be despatched after disasters, but diaogue is needed to determine appropriate numbers and to ensure better coordination. Pethora of humanitarian actors The earthquake generated an enormous response from private and pubic supporters of estabished humanitarian organisations, but aso a wave of new actors unfamiiar with or post-disaster response. Cose proximity to the US meant that, in the words of one HRI mission interviewee, the barrier to entry was the cost of a pane ticket. The exact number of actors remains uncear. Within three weeks of the disaster, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were 400 humanitarian agencies and a subsequent rea-time evauation estimated there were 2,000 operationa agencies (IASC 2010). There are reports that there may be 8,000 nationa and internationa humanitarian and aid agencies in Port-au-Prince (BBC News 2010b), perhaps giving the highest number per capita of any country (Macnaughton 2010). The resut is a patchwork of efforts that make it difficut to get an overa picture of what is being done, where and by whom. Respondents noted that many internationa non-governmenta organisation (INGO) and UN newcomers rarey consuted ongestabished agencies with experienced staff. One evauation judged the uncontroabe fow of frequenty inexperienced sma NGOs as a major factor imiting the quaity of the humanitarian response (Grünewad et a. 2010). The Word Bank regrets the arriva of many agencies new to the country tending to prioritize uniatera action over coordination (Word Bank Group 2010). Needs assessments Some humanitarians expressed concerns about the timeiness and accuracy of needs assessments in such a major disaster. Others argue the UN did as we as it coud have been expected, given the tragic reaity that UN staff and their dependents were among the dead. The HRI team was aso tod of concerns that the resuts of a Rapid Inter-Agency Needs Assessment for were ony pubished in mid-february. Reportedy, its resuts were not seen by many donors before funding decisions were made. Some actors did not know it took pace. An Inter- Agency Standing Committee report amented that assessments in the eary stages of the response foowed different standards, methods, and focuses, thereby hampering efforts to create an overview of cross-custer needs, (IASC 2010). The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) has been criticised on severa grounds, incuding ack of a gender perspective. In a submission to the March 2010 donors conference in New York, a coaition of women s groups highighted faiure to consut with women earthquake victims, the absence of gender concerns in as mandated by UN Security Counci Resoution 1325 and faiure to acknowedge, or seek to remedy, past gender inequaities in an pubic institutions and access to state services ( Gender Equaity Coective 2010). aid hard to track The HRI 2009 noted that donor response to hurricanes in 2008 was disappointing (Gasser 2009). This was not the case after the earthquake. A massive infux of funding probaby 80 percent of it from the genera pubic eft many humanitarian actors with more resources than anticipated. As with the tsumani, the chaenge is for a actors to use resources effectivey to meet immediate and ong-term needs. The exact amount of money donated to the response wi never be known. According to OCHA s Financia Tracking System (FTS), as of 9 October 2010, over US$3.5 biion had been raised. However, significant donations have not been reported to the FTS. By far, the argest response has been from the US according to the FTS, 34.7 percent of the tota far ahead of Canada (4.1 percent). As of 9 October 2010, 70 percent of the funds sought in the 2010 Revised Humanitarian Appea had been provided. So widespread was internationa sympathy that numerous non-traditiona donors many themseves major recipients of humanitarian assistance such as Afghanistan, Burundi and the Democratic Repubic of the Congo contributed funds. A factor further compicating quantification is the significant roe payed by states such as Argentina, Brazi, Chie, Cuba, Mexico and the Dominican Repubic who were among the first to send medica and rescue teams and have subsequenty provided substantia biatera aid. These non-traditiona donors have argey worked outside estabished coordination mechanisms. Cuba s substantia humanitarian presence as with its 2004 post tsunami and 2005 Pakistan earthquake missions has gone argey unreported (Fawthrop 2010). FTS data suggesting that private donations tota US$1.24 biion, 36.8 percent of the tota humanitarian assistance, is generay beieved to be an under-estimate. Many INGOs reported an unprecedented response from their supporters. By Juy 2010, the American Red Cross had received US$468 miion CNN 2010). MSF reported receiving 91 miion euros in private donations (MSF 2010) and in the UK, the pubic provided 101 miion for the work of major NGOs (Disasters Emergency Committee 2010).

6 There is a major mismatch between reconstruction pedges and actua disbursements. In March 2010, 59 donors at the Donor s conference pedged US$6.04 biion in support of the Action Pan for Recovery and Deveopment. However, by ate September, ony US$538.3 miion had been deivered (Office of the Specia Envoy 2010). The US has not deivered anything towards its US$1.15 biion pedge. Anaysts warn that US procrastination in deivering on its pedges is setting a negative precedent for other major donors (IRIN 2010a). The separatey-administered Reconstruction Fund was pedged US$509 miion, but by eary October 2010 had ony received US$66.8 miion. Over 80 percent has been provided by Brazi, with no deivery of significant pedges made by the US, Spain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or France ( Reconstruction Fund 2010). In October 2010, the an prime minister amented that many aid pedges subsequenty factored in debt forgiveness or money aready spent on the humanitarian emergency (Reuters 2010). A network of an civi society actors notes that the process of securing funding is characterised by a near-tota excusion of an socia actors and a weak and non-coordinated participation by representatives of the an state, (Be & Fied 2010). There is uncertainty about how and where pubic and private funding wi be used. An Associated Press study of US federa government documents found that 33 cents in every US$ of immediate post-earthquake US aid went to the miitary and one cent to the an government (The Grio 2010). The Internationa Peace Operations Association (IPOA) the trade body of private miitary companies (PMCs) hed a postearthquake saes fair in Miami to showcase their expertise pedging to donate profits to the Cinton-Bush Reief Fund (Fenton 2010). This prompted compaints from US activists concerned at their increasing infuence and disregard for human rights and nationa sovereignty (Institute for Justice and Democracy in 2010). US government funds have been provided to PMCs for damage assessments, security guards, shipping, cean-up, construction and ong-term panning (ibid), drawing paraes with disaster profiteering of Backwater in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Scahi 2010). Shoud camps have been prioritised? A key emerging issue for discussion are the impications of the initia decision to focus aid on makeshift settements in Port-au-Prince. Faiure to provide assistance in the provinces to which many residents had fed caused many to return to the city. Many humanitarians argue that the focus shoud have been on where peope were iving when the quake struck, rather than creating camps where, in the words of one informant, peope are putting down roots as iving conditions are often better than they enjoyed prior to the disaster. Critics point to the insufficient coverage of services and inabiity to adequatey manage the 1,300 informa camps, engage beneficiaries in aid distribution or provide adequate sheter and protection. It is cear that many camps are unikey to be dismanted as quicky as once anticipated. There is no cear communication from either the government or many internationa actors as to what services camp residents can expect or what ong-term sheter pans are being deveoped. One critic contends that despite decarations of commitment to recovery the UN and an government have done itte more than move citizens from one set of temporary housing to another, ( Advocacy Working Group 2010). Some response actors strongy dispute this assessment. Many urban sites where survivors ive have commercia vaue. A survey in six camps found that coercive attempts to evict earthquake victims are intensifying and aeged that peope are not consuted about their needs and aid has tricked to a hat (Institute for Justice and Democracy in 2010). A Canadian-an academic team found that seven months after the disaster, 40 percent of camp residents did not have access to water and 30 percent acked toiets of any kind (Schuer 2010). Despite the fact that many INGOs tak about empowering residents to seect recipients and distribute aid, some commentators argue that committees are unrepresentative, perhaps as a resut of INGOs ack of oca knowedge. Less than a third of peope iving in camps are reported to be abe to name those on their committee. Twothirds of members are men, despite we-documented concerns about gender-based vioence (ibid). The sheter custer ead, the Internationa Organisation for Migration (IOM), has been criticised for not appointing managers in each camp. Others point out it was unreaistic to ask IOM to assume responsibiity for so many sites and that many INGOs were reuctant to assume camp management responsibiities, given these chaenges. Crisis reports 163

7 164 Bi Cinton s many hats In no other response to a natura disaster has one individua exercised as much infuence as former US President Bi Cinton. Wearing various hats, he is UN Specia Envoy, co-chair of the Interim Recovery Commission (IHRC), head of the Cinton Foundation and co-chair of the Cinton Bush Fund (which has raised over US$50 miion). Severa peope interviewed by the HRI team acknowedged Cinton s abiity to focus attention on. He is a vociferous critic of the US poiticians who have bocked congressiona approva of pedged US reconstruction aid (Katz 2010). However, informants noted the frequent gap between his rhetoric and the actions of both the Cinton Foundation and the Specia Envoy s Office. Some interviewees reported that the Foundation does not propery coordinate with either the an Department of Civi Protection (DPC) or custers. Cinton s reationship with the US State Department remains uncear. Many compained of the arrogance of Cinton Foundation staffers described by one informant as a bunch of 24-year-ods running around teing government officias and humanitarian workers what to do. Cearing debris and aocating and It has been estimated that ony five percent of the 26 miion cubic yards of rubbe has been removed (Smith 2010). Cearing rubbe is ceary a huge technica chaenge. The question of who owns the and on which destroyed houses ie and where to take rubbe is unresoved and the government is unabe to make decisions. In some upmarket neighbourhoods the private sector is shifting rubbe, but in genera, itte is being done and the feet of avaiabe trucks is grossy inadequate. Many donors are unwiing to meet the cost of debris cearance, estimated by the Prime Minister s office at US$300 miion. The IHRC is co-chaired by former US President Bi Cinton and an Prime Minister Jean-Max Beerive. Haf of its directors are from mutiatera financia institutions, the others members of an eite famiies. After a stormy pariamentary session, the IHRC was given controversia emergency powers to make and use decisions without the need for any pubic consutation. Critics argue that andowners and the IHRC are more interested in deveoping sweatshop factories, offices and upmarket housing than providing and for sustainabe housing and iveihoods for the dispaced (Abert 2010). It is reported that there are disagreements among donors about how the IHRC approva structure shoud work, who is authorised to sign off disbursement of funds from the Word Bankadministered trust fund and how much discretion shoud be given to the IHRC secretariat (IRIN 2010b). Incusion of ans in recovery panning For decades, the capacity of the an state has been weakened by the brain drain from the an government to internationayfunded NGOs and INGOs. The UN Assistant Secretary-Genera of Peacekeeping Operations has sympathised with the government s post-earthquake frustrations, noting that the internationa community has a ong history of weakening the nationa government by working with outside organisations: we compain because the government is not abe to (ead), but we are party responsibe (Katz 2010). Decades of funneing aid through NGOs has eft state institutions weak and made ans ook to NGOs for basic pubic services in a country described by the US Institute of Peace as a repubic of NGOs (Kristoff & Panarei 2010). An INGO director refected the reaity of the frequent ack of state presence by teing the HRI team that by defaut we are taking on state responsibiities. ans appear to increasingy resent the reative affuence of foreign aid workers (Saignon & Evrard 2010). Many critics note the imited forma avenues for either the an government or civi society to shape recovery programming (Be 2010). OCHA strugges to fufi basic roes OCHA, ike many organisations, has had high staff turnover. A Head of Office was ony appointed in August 2010, foowing severa interim appointments. The basic who, what, where information that OCHA tried to gather reied on peope providing information, instead of OCHA staff activey going out and obtaining it. Information systems were mosty Internet-based, which in the words of one informant is sexy, but doesn t necessariy work in circumstances where many organisations had probematic Internet access. Most interviewees did not rate positivey the oneresponse. info website. Frustrated with OCHA s system, severa custers resorted to using Googe Groups and Googe Docs, with one person describing as a Googe response. An incoming custer ead noted that it woud have been better to use odfashioned Exce sheets, rather than fancier Internet-based systems. Managing and monitoring the Emergency Reief Response Fund (ERRF), a pooed funding mechanism estabished in in 2008, has been chaenging for OCHA. In the eary months of the response, there was ony one OCHA staffer in to dea with proposas for ERRF support, so the vetting process was passed to custers. Custers with strong coordinators submitted more projects than those with weaker eadership. In principe, the ERRF offers a rare opportunity for an NGOs to access internationa funds. Severa submitted projects to the protection custer ony to get no repy for severa months. Some informants note its positive eements but others criticise the ERRF for its ack of transparency. It is not yet cear whether efforts to support nationa NGO access to the ERRF wi bear fruit.

8 Humanitarian Country Team sideined At the beginning of the crisis, the pre-existing Comité Permanent Inter-Organisations (CPIO) ater restyed the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) did not meet for over two weeks. It was convened ony after NGOs on the CPIO wrote to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the Emergency Reief Coordinator in UN headquarters. Faiure to assert the primary strategic decision-making roe of the HCT enabed the emergence of a Coordination Support Committee (CSC) which brought together the government, certain parts of the UN, some donors and the US and Canadian miitaries. The CSC, whie probaby one of the more functiona coordination mechanisms, did not invove non-un actors. The HRI team was tod that severa HCT meetings simpy became occasions to provide information on what the CSC was doing. As the US and Canadian miitary presence decined, so too did the roe of the CSC. However, an important issue remains to be addressed by donors why did they aow the functions of the HCT to be usurped? The exact amount of money donated to the response wi never be known. Phuong Tran/IRIN Crisis reports Custers: the same od probems? The custer approach was introduced in in An evauation competed just before the earthquake found it had improved coordination but was weak on ownership and accountabiity; had been impemented in a top-down fashion without regard for existing nationa coordination structures; did not sufficienty engage with nationa NGOs; was hed back by OCHA s imited capacity and that the ink between the custer approach and the Humanitarian Coordinator remained uncear (Binder & Grünewad 2010). A these shortcomings became further manifest after the disaster. Severa HRI mission interviewees reported disappointment with the caibre of custer eaders. One noted that was an opportunity to showcase what had been buit in the ast few years. The peope they had initiay were maybe very technicay savvy, but they did not have the skis to run a custer. In terms of getting the A team there, quicky, it didn t happen. To make matters worse, there has been a high turnover in custer coordinators. Ony the camp coordination camp management (CCCM) custer has had the same coordinator since February At the outset of the crisis amost a custer meetings took pace at MINUSTAH s Logistics Base (Logs Base). The inaccessibe venue, strict security procedures and the use of Engish deterred an attendance. Ony the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) custer was cochaired by the government from the outset. Ony WASH and the education custer excusivey used French (Goba Education Custer 2010). Custer eads had a hard time identifying oca NGOs to invite and those who did attend reported the meetings were often irreevant. The government was ony peripheray invoved at the outset. Those appointed to attend custer meetings were often businessmen without inks with reevant ministries. The government was insufficienty represented and it took a ong time to re-estabish reationships with reevant ine ministries. Donors coud have done more to promote government co-eadership of custers. 165

9 When it comes to protection, the experience highights the inadequacies of the concept of provider of ast resort. It is widey acknowedged that the internationa community is incapabe of protecting the inhabitants of many camps against sexua and gender-based vioence (SGBV), theft and forced evictions. It has to be asked whether in the aftermath of a massive natura disaster in a country aready facing massive protection probems and with no immediatey identifiabe government partner to work with it is reaistic to expect a protection custer to substitute fuy for gaps eft by the state. Questions are aso being asked about the eary recovery custer. The HRI team was tod that the UN Deveopment Programme (UNDP) shut down the custer in August without apparent consutation or expanation. Coordination frustrations The huge number of newyarrived and generay inexperienced INGOs greaty compicated eary coordination. One interviewee tod the HRI team that UN initia coordination was a circus: 250 peope, under a tent without a microphone! Some major INGOs were suspicious of donor attempts to promote coordination but given the enormous infux of privatey donated funding, many INGOs no onger reay needed arge support from pubic donors. Some, the HRI team was tod, were so we-resourced that they saw itte need to co-ordinate. In any case, many had other priorities: finding new office space, assisting their own staff affected by the disaster and hiring new staff. Many were reuctant to spend time in traffic to attend Logs Base meetings which they found ineffective and thus stopped attending. The resut was that there were no effective forums in which the government, donors, the UN, IOM, the Red Cross and NGOs coud come together to discuss strategy. For the first six weeks of the response, a number of major government donors, together with representatives from OCHA and the office of the an Prime Minister, met each day to share information. This was appreciated by many in the humanitarian community. However, the mission was tod that some major actors did not know about the meetings. Severa informants noted that the group s work was not adequatey communicated to other response actors. Cash for work programmes highighted the inadequacies of coordination and information sharing. Through the eary recovery custer, UNDP used one rate for those recruited whie another donor and its partners used a different wage based on the government s ega minimum wage. The heath custer provided another exampe. The Cinton Foundation heped the Ministry of Heath set up a compicated registration system that gathered information in different formats from those being used by the heath custer. Chaenges At east 1.3 miion peope both earthquake-dispaced peope and pre-quake urban homeess and sum-dweers remain dispaced in around 1,300 camps in Port-au- Prince. Severa hundred thousand others are shetering with host famiies and some haf a miion are thought to have been dispaced outside the city. A few have been provided with transitiona housing, but in genera camps are overcrowded, ack sufficient ighting, and tents and tarpauins offer scant protection. As funding dries up, there is ikey to be an exit of INGOs and UN agencies and withdrawa of vita INGO-provided heath, education and iveihoods support. Many of those interviewed by the HRI team are sti understandaby focused on immediate issues. However, some are expressing concerns about the sow pace of recovery panning. The Brookings Institute warned in September 2010 that the recovery process is not going we and reconstruction has barey started... recovery efforts on the ground have been sower than usua sower than for the 2004 tsunami or the 2005 Pakistan effort (Ferris 2010). There does not appear to be a concerted pan to meet the sustainabe housing needs of either camp residents or those iving with host famiies. There are reports that armed gangs are regrouping (Berg 2010) and that dispaced women are increasingy vunerabe to crimes of theft and sexua vioence. Arguing that the humanitarian response appears parayzed, Refugees Internationa reports an increase in gang rapes (Teff & Parry 2010). The Women s Refugee Commission fears that reproductive heath services made avaiabe by the infux of new agencies wi cose uness donors fund the an authorities to take over (Tanabe 2010). Aid pedges are not being honoured and there are reported tensions between the Word Bank, the IHRC, the Obama Administration and Congress over aid management (Cark & Chares 2010). Médecins du Monde has warned that in 2011, aid to is ikey to fa significanty. Aid agencies wi start to eave and their oca empoyees wi ose their jobs, mobie cinics wi cose and the range of heath services avaiabe to the poorest wi be reduced. By 2012, there may we be nothing eft to show for the unprecedented humanitarian response (Saignon & Evrard 2010). Lessons earnt and recommendations for the future It is disappointing that many reevant recommendations from the Tsunami Evauation Coaition and those in the ast HRI report on appear to have not been heeded in the earthquake response. 166

10 Areas for further anaysis and diaogue between donors and other humanitarian stakehoders incude: 1 Leadership and coordination: Lack of carity about the initia response roe of the US miitary vis-à- UN peacekeepers, the confusing roe of Bi Cinton, the uneven coordination provided by many custers and the reativey minor engagement of the an authorities and civi society in ong-term recovery panning points to the need to discuss how to improve civi-miitary coordination of immediate response and carify responsibiities during recovery from natura disasters. 2 Transparency and accountabiity: There is evidence that there have been too many actors, uncear communication, different priorities, ack of transparency on tota disbursements, itte emphasis on participation and fostering ownership of ans in response panning and itte promotion of a cuture of accountabiity towards beneficiaries. These major gaps in adherence to GHD Principes require discussion. 3 Custers: Convening of custer meetings in accessibe ocations, the over-use of Engish, the imited engagement of government and civi society and the quick turnover of coordinators highight the need to discuss how to make the custer system more effective. 4 Long-term dependence on externa actors: Changed power dynamics and access to considerabe sources of funding have made many response actors ess dependent on traditiona donors. demonstrates the risk that if NGOs become major service providers they may undermine state capacity. Governments need to discuss how to ensure greater accountabiity of internationa actors and take a coordinated approach to buiding greater state response capacity, perhaps drawing on reevant experience from Centra and Latin America. 5 Land: Discussion is needed on how the internationa community can hep address unresoved issues of access to and and deveop transparent and aocation procedures to enabe permanent sheter for the homeess. Funding and registration schemes which do not recognise informa tenure wi ony exacerbate tensions. 6 Deveoping an exit strategy: It is not sustainabe to expect internationa actors to continue to raise funds to provide key services. The donor community shoud initiate discussion about an exit strategy and how to attract recovery and deveopment actors when emergency response agencies depart. References Abert, D. (2010). The Interim Commission to Reconstruct. 17 Juy. Avaiabe from: danieeabert.bogspot.com/2010/07/ interim-commission-to-reconstructhaiti.htm [Accessed 10 October BBC News (2010a). s president in urgent appea for more tents. 26 January. Avaiabe from: news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ stm [Accessed 9 BBC News (2010b). US urged to stop rice subsidies. 5 October. Avaiabe from: co.uk/news/word-atin-america [Accessed 9 Be, B. (2010). From Disaster Aid to Soidarity: Best Practices in Meeting the Needs of s Earthquake Survivors, Patform to Advocate Aternative Deveopment in. Avaiabe from: otherwordsarepossibe.org/anotherhaiti-possibe/disaster-aid-report [Accessed 8 Be, B. & Fied, T. (2010). The business of disaster. -Earthquake: Where s the -bound going? Avaiabe from: spip.php?artice9436 [Accessed 8 Berg, L. (2010). Crime, Poitics and Vioence in Post- Earthquake. US Institute of Peace. Avaiabe from: crime-poitics-and-vioence-in-postearthquake-haiti [Accessed 9 October Binder, A. & Grünewad, F. (2010). IASC Custer Appoach Evauation, 2 nd Phrase Country Study, Apri Avaiabe from: reiefweb.int/rw/rwfies2010. nsf/fiesbyrwdocunidfiename/ MCOI-863CN9-fu_report. pdf/$fie/fu_report.pdf [Accessed 9 Carro, R. & Nasaw, D. (2010). US accused of annexing airport as squandering hinders aid effort in. The Guardian. 17 January Avaiabe from: guardian.co.uk/word/2010/jan/17/ us-accused-aid-effort-haiti [Accessed 8 CBC News (2010). Pau Farmer: Rebuiding, but buiding back better. 27 September Avaiabe from: story/2010/09/27/f-haiti-paufarmer.htm [Accessed 9 October CBS News (2010a). John Travota Piots Reief Fight. CBS News Word. 26 January Avaiabe from: com/stories/2010/01/26/word/ main shtm. [Accessed 9 CBS News (2010b). Sean Penn: Death to Reief Critics. 5 March Avaiabe from: com/stories/2010/03/05/sunday/ main shtm [Accessed 9 CNN (2010). donations: $1.3 biion. 3 Juy Avaiabe from: news/internationa/haiti_donation/ index.htm [Accessed 9 Crisis reports Cark, L. & Chares, J. (2010) Leaders ook to end dispute over earthquake aid. Miami Herad. 3 August Avaiabe from: com/2010/08/02/ /eadersook-to-end-dispute-over.htm [Accessed 9 167

11 168 Gender Equaity Coective (2010).Ensuring an Women s Participation and Leadership in a Stages of Nationa Reief and Reconstruction: A Gender Shadow Report of the 2010 PDNA. Avaiabe from: democracyinaction.org/o/5095/ images/gendershadowreport_ preiminary_version.pdf [Accessed 9 Gasser, G. (2009). Skimpy Living Swept Away by Storms. Humanitarian Response Index Avaiabe from: HRI_2009_.pdf [Accessed 9 Department for Internationa Deveopment (2010). A nose for surviva: UK search and rescue team. Avaiabe from: dfid.gov.uk/media-room/news- Stories/2010/A-nose-for-survivia- UK-search-and-rescue-team/ [Accessed 9 Disasters Emergency Committee (2010). Appea. Avaiabe from: [Accessed 9 Edmonds, K. (2010). Empty Promises and Empty Beies: Bi Cinton s Doubetak on an Agricuture. Avaiabe from: node/6576 [Accessed 9 October Fawthrop, T. (2010). Cuba s Aid Ignored by the Media. A Jazeera. 16 February. Avaiabe from: engish.ajazeera.net/focus/2010/01/ htm [Accessed 9 Fenton, A. (2010). Private Contractors Like Vutures Coming to Grab the Loot. Avaiabe from: truth-out.org/private-contractorsike-vutures-coming-grab-oot57049 [Accessed 8 Ferris, B. (2010). Burning Issues for s Recovery. Avaiabe from: Fies/rc/speeches/2010/0909_haiti_ recovery_ferris/0909_haiti_recovery_ ferris.pdf [Accessed 8 Goba Education Custer. Haïti Earthquake, January 2010 Education Custer Lessons Learned Report Fina Version 30 June Avaiabe from: info/gobacusters/education/ pubicdocuments/ EC Lessons Learned Report.pdf [Accessed 8 The Grio (2010). govt gets ony 1 cent of every US aid doar. Avaiabe from: com/top-stories/haiti-govt-gets-ony- 1-cent-of-every-us-aid-doar.php [Accessed 13 Grünewad, F. & Binder, A. with Georges, Y. (2010). Inter-agency reatime evauation in : 3 months after the earthquake. Groupe URD and Goba Pubic Poicy Institute. 31 August. Avaiabe from: reiefweb.int/rw/rwfies2010.nsf/ FiesByRWDocUnidFiename/EDIS- 89DQV8-fu_report.pdf/$Fie/fu_ report.pdf [Accessed 8 Advocacy Working Group (2010). Land Recamation in. Avaiabe from: ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/ upoads/2010/07/hawg_land- Recamation_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 8 Advocacy Working Group (2010). Donor Principes, the Reconstruction Fund, and Interim Recovery Commission. Avaiabe from: org/wordpress/wp-content/ upoads/2010/07/hawg-_donor- Principes-FINAL.pdf [Accessed 8 Reconstruction Fund (2010). Pedging Donors. Avaiabe from: org/hrf/members [Accessed 9 Institute for Justice and Democracy in (2010). We ve been forgotten : Conditions in s dispacement camps eight months after the earthquake. Avaiabe from: nsf/fiesbyrwdocunidfiename/ MCOI-89GB3C-fu_report. pdf/$fie/fu_report.pdf [Accessed 8 Institute for Justice and Democracy in (2010). Groups Caution Secretary Cinton on Private Miitary Contractors in Reief Efforts. Avaiabe from: ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/ upoads/2010/03/_sign_ on_letter_to_cinton_ipoa_-_ Fina2doc.pdf [Accessed 8 October Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2010). Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Foowing the 12 January 2010 Earthquake: Achievements, Chaenges and Lessons to be Learned. Avaiabe from: nsf/fiesbyrwdocunidfiename/ EGUA-87CQLK-fu_report. pdf/$fie/fu_report.pdf [Accessed 8 Internationa Crisis Group (ICG) (2010). : Stabiisation and Reconstruction After the Quake. Latin America/Caribbean Report No March. Avaiabe from: Fies/atin-america/haiti/32_haiti stabiisation_and_reconstruction_ after_the_quake.ashx [Accessed 8 IRIN (2010a). Unraveing the conundrum of US aid to. 21 October. Avaiabe from: aspx?reportid=90835 [Accessed 22 IRIN (2010b). : A country shoud not depend on the internationa community. Avaiabe from: Report.aspx?ReportID=89831 [Accessed 8 Katz, J. (2010). Bi Cinton obbies for earthquake aid to. 7 October. Avaiabe from: com/nationa/1102ap_cb_haiti_ earthquake.htm [Accessed 9 October Kristoff, M. & Panarei, L. (2010). : A Repubic of NGOs?. Unised States Institute of Peace. 26 Apri. Avaiabe from: org/fies/resources/pb 23 a Repubic of NGOs.pdf [Accessed 9

12 Lindorff, D. (2010). The Backout on Cuban Aid to. Counter Punch. 19 January. Avaiabe from: indorff htm [Accessed 9 Macnaughton, L. (2010). Putting NGOs in their Pace. Avaiabe from: org/content/haiti-putting-ngos-theirpace [Accessed 8 Médecins Sans Frontières (2010). Emergency Response after the earthquake: choices, obstaces, activities and finance. Avaiabe from: org/source/countries/americas/ haiti/2010/6months/haiti_6_months. pdf [Accessed 8 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2007). Guideines on the Use of Foreign Miitary and Civi Defence Assets in Disaster Reief. Avaiabe from: ochaonine.un.org/ochalinkcick. aspx?ink=ocha&docid= [Accessed 20 OCHA (2010a). January. 12th Earthquake Key Facts and Figures. Avaiabe from: ochaonine.un.org/ochalinkcick. aspx?ink=ocha&docid= [Accessed 8 OCHA (2010). Earthquake: Key Findings from the Muti-Custer Rapid Initia Situationa Assessment for. Avaiabe from: info/disasters//coordination/ pubicdocuments/rapid%20 Initia%20Needs%20Assessment%20 %20Engish.pdf [Accessed 9 OCHA (2010). Humanitarian Buetin Issue 10. Avaiabe from: Disasters//Coordination/ pubicdocuments/ocha Humanitarian Buetin 10.pdf [Accessed 8 Office of the Specia Envoy to (2010). Internationa Assistance to : Key Facts as of September Avaiabe from: com/haiti_production/assets/22/ Overa_financing_key_facts_ Sept_30_origina.pdf [Accessed 9 Oxfam Internationa (2010). Agricuture must be a priority for reconstruction efforts. 5 October. Avaiabe from: pressreease/ / agricuture-must-be-priority-haitireconstruction-efforts [Accessed 9 Rencoret, N. Stoddard, A., Haver, K., Tayor, G. & Harvey, P. (2010). Earthquake Response Context Anaysis. Avaiabe from: anap.org/poo/fies/haiti-contextanaysis-fina.pdf [Accessed 8 October Reuters (2010). Post-quake needs more, better funding PM. 1 October. Avaiabe from: in.reuters.com/artice/idinindia [Accessed 9 Saignon, P. & Evrard, L. (2010). cannot wait! 13 August. Onine Exchange. Humanitarian Practice Network, Avaiabe from: [Accessed 8 Scahi, J. (2010). US security companies offer services in. Avaiabe from: com/post/ /us-securitycompanies-offer-services-in-haiti [Accessed 10 Schuer, M. (2010), Unstabe Foundations: Impact of NGOs on Human Rights for Port-au-Prince s Internay Dispaced Peope. Avaiabe from: [Accessed 8 Smith, A. (2010). The Betraya of. 2 August. Avaiabe from: axisofogic.com/artman/pubish/ Artice_60810.shtm [Accessed 10 Tanabe. M. (2010). Six months ater: Reproductive Heath Needs are Sti Critica in. Avaiabe from: org/bog/1003-six-months-aterreproductive-heath-needs-sti-criticain-haiti [Accessed 8 Teff, M. & Parry. E. (2010). : Sti Trapped in the Emergency Phase. Refugees Internationa. 6 October. Avaiabe from: refugeesinternationa.org/sites/ defaut/fies/100710_haiti_sti_ trapped.pdf [Accessed 8 October United Nations Deveopment Programme (2010). Empowering to Buid a Better Future. Avaiabe from: org/haiti/doc/-mainbrochureefina-rev-sm.pdf [Accessed 8 October United Nations Stabiization Mission in (2010). : 6 Months After. 1 Juy. Avaiabe from: un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ minustah/documents/6_months_ after_commemoration.pdf [Accessed 8 United States Southern Command Partnership for the Americas (2010). Narrative History of Operation Unified Response (as of May 25, 2010). 25 May. Avaiabe from: factfieslarge.php?id=138 [Accessed 8 Word Bank Group (2010). WBG Response to the Earthquake: Evauative Lessons. Avaiabe from: defaut/main?nosurl=y&thesi tepk= &pipk= &pagepk= &contentm DK= [Accessed 8 October Information based on fied interviews with key humanitarian agencies in from 24 August to 4 September Crisis reports The HRI team, composed of Phiippe Benassi, Lucía Fernandez and Manisha Thomas (Team eader), contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to a those interviewed in. 169