Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

Transcription

1 Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

2 Crisis reports Somaia

3 Somaia at a gance The crisis and the response Piar 1 10 Proonged drought, increased insecurity, further dispacement, worsening restrictions on humanitarian access and high food prices have resuted in the worst food security situation since US restrictions on funding operations in ashabab-controed areas and an overa cut in US humanitarian funds for Somaia caused operationa cutbacks in south and centra Somaia Piar 5 The operationa environment worsened: extortion and insecurity ed a further reduction in internationa staffing, forcing more INGOs to operate remotey from Nairobi through Somai partners. Approximatey two-thirds of those in need of food were reached in the first haf of 2009, but ony 44 percent in the second haf. Piar 4 HRI 2010 scores by piar Piar 1 Responding to needs Piar 2 Prevention, risk reduction and recovery Piar 3 Working with humanitarian partners Piar 4 Protection and internationa aw Piar 5 Learning and accountabiity 212 By October 2010, the 2010 CAP is 60 percent covered. Frustrated at poiticisation of the response and uncritica donor support of the transitiona government, many humanitarians want an end to UN doube-hatting and a separate HC post to advocate for more impartia addressing of humanitarian needs. Humanitarians criticised donors for not robusty advocating for humanitarian access and GHD Principes. Some donors are commended for understanding the need for programme fexibiity in a voatie environment. Key chaenges and areas for improvement There are concerns about OCHA s roe as both coordinator and aocator of funding Piar 3 Somaia A Crisis Average The humanitarian response is generay insufficient, ineffective in most sectors, often provided too ate, based on inaccurate data and not provided uniformy and impartiay to vunerabe popuations. Donor performance Piar 2 2 Donors shoud heed cas to support internay-driven reconciiation processes, rather than those which refect regiona and internationa poitica interests. More donors shoud fund preparedness, maintenance of contingency stocks and buiding capacity of Somais. There is a need to carify whether UN Security Counci resoutions targeting terrorism are as the US argues appicabe to humanitarian aid.

4 Somaia Humanitarian needs unmet as counter-terrorism focus constrains response Neary two decades after the coapse of Somaia as a unified state, the humanitarian situation further deteriorated in Proonged drought was accompanied by increased insecurity, dispacement and worsening restrictions on humanitarian access. By mid 2009, the overa food security situation was the worst since 1992, with 3.64 miion peope (49 percent of the popuation) in need of assistance (OCHA 2009a). Ongoing confict between Somaia s internationay-supported Transitiona Federa Government (TFG) and a- Shabaab, a designated terrorist group, has further compicated the provision of emergency assistance. The warring parties continue to perpetrate grave human rights abuses, subjecting civiians to murder, rape and other forms of gender-based vioence, assauts, theft, iega arrests and chid recruitment. None of the many protagonists in the myriad conficts engufing Somaia, incuding the TFG, has made serious efforts to hod those responsibe accountabe, or to end the cimate of impunity. Donors poitica interests shaped by the War on Terror have infuenced aid decisions and have had serious impications for the provision of neutra, impartia humanitarian assistance. As a resut, the response continues to be too itte, too ate, mosty ineffective in many parts of the country, not provided impartiay and not based on the needs of vunerabe popuations. Operationa environment A-Shabaab, which emerged foowing the Ethiopian miitary intervention against the Isamic Courts Union in 2006, and Hizbu Isam are the main Isamist groups engaged in combat against the TFG and the African Union Mission to Somaia (AMISOM) which supports it. Despite the eection of a moderate, former member of the Isamic Courts as President in January 2009, fighting between the TFG and Isamist fundamentaists has continued unabated. Since eary 2009, the baance of power, particuary in southern and centra areas, has shifted. By the end of 2009, a-shabaab controed most southern regions and most of Mogadishu, except for northern areas and the internationa airport (Internationa Crisis Group 2010). Some anaysts fear that as ong as the TFG remains indecisive, an effective presence ony in parts of Mogadishu, a- Shabaab wi continue to gain ground. As in previous years, the situation in the north (the de-facto state of Somaiand) and the north-east (the de-facto state of Puntand) was far better than in southern and centra Somaia. In Somaiand, successes in confict resoution, peace-buiding and creation of governance structures have resuted in an environment conducive to ongerterm deveopment. Despite Puntand s reative stabiity, it is increasingy difficut to carry out deveopment work. Piracy continued, with 29 ships seized in 2009 (OCHA 2009b). There is evidence that a-shabaab has coerced pirates into sharing their profits. In southern and centra Somaia, confict severey imited humanitarian access and response. Increasing humanitarian needs The Food Security and Nutrition Anaysis Unit (FSNAU) which is funded by the United States (US) and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and given manageria support by the United Nations (UN) Food and Agricutura Organization (FAO) worked with the Famine Eary Warming Systems Network to assess conditions after the Apri-June 2009 rains (the gu). The resuts confirmed that Somaia faced its worse humanitarian crisis in 18 years. The 2010 Consoidated Appea Process (CAP) aunched by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in December 2009 caed for assistance for 3.64 miion peope, noting that 1.1 miion were facing an acute food and iveihood crisis (OCHA 2009). In many areas, 20 percent of under-fives were manourished more than 75 percent of those in need were concentrated in southern and centra Somaia (FSNAU 2009a). In addition, 25 percent of underfives assessed had suffered from acute respiratory infections and 21 percent from diarrhoea during the two weeks preceding assessment. Acute manutrition eves in Somaia are among the highest in the word. The under-five crude death rate is neary 30 percent higher than in the rest of sub-saharan Africa. Haf of a deaths of under-fives are attributabe to manutrition. FSNAU reported that 19 percent of the popuation was acutey manourished and 4.5 severey manourished in mid There are ony 0.3 medica doctors and 1.7 nurses or midwives for every 10,000 peope (FSNAU 2009b). Crisis reports Somaia 213

5 214 Dispacement has assumed massive proportions. Data is unreiabe but it is thought that since eary 2008, the number of Somai refugees in neighbouring countries has increased by neary 40 percent. In January 2010, some 678,000 Somai refugees were officiay registered by governments and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, Eritrea, Uganda and Tanzania (UNHCR 2010). Actua numbers are undoubtedy higher. In eary 2009, 524,000 internay dispaced persons (IDPs) were thought to be setted in the Afgooye Corridor the strip of and between Mogadishu and the town of Afgooye one of the word s argest IDP concentrations (OCHA 2010a). In the fina quarter of 2009, drought, fooding and/or ack of iveihood opportunities accounted for approximatey 40 percent of new dispacement. Fighting in southern Somaia caused a new wave of interna dispacement and movement across the Kenyan border in December The 2010 CAP reported 1.55 miion IDPs at the end of 2009 (OCHA 2009b). Dispacement is sti continuing, with more IDPs feeing to aready congested areas where they do not have the right to own and. Decining donor response The overa eve of funding was ess in 2009 than in 2008, with 64 percent of the CAP funded in 2009 as compared to 72 percent in 2008 (OCHA 2010b). This was mainy due to a sharp decrease in funding of food, which is by far the argest sector and absorbs more than two thirds of the tota avaiabe amount. There was considerabe differentiation in donor response per sector. The decrease in funding in 2009 was primariy the resut of significanty reduced US funding. Whie US funding was US$237 miion in 2008, it decined to US$99 miion in 2009 and ony US$27 miion had been aocated in the first five months of The United Kingdom (UK) has foowed suit, its contribution of US$40 miion in 2008, decining to US$18 miion in Other donors who provided ess incuded Norway, Itay and France. By contrast, Spain s contribution has risen from US$4 miion in 2008 to US$36 miion in As of mid-october 2010, 60 percent of requirements set out in CAP had been met, much of it a ate funding carry-over from Enormous difficuties were encountered in the attempt to assist the severey manourished under-five popuation in The objective to stabiise the eve of manutrition was not achieved in many areas, particuary where fighting was intense. The Word Food Programme (WFP) was unabe to meet monthy distribution in terms of quantities and numbers of beneficiaries. In the second haf of the year, distribution targets were reduced due to pressure from oca authorities to reduce genera food distributions during harvests, incompete access and weak food pipeines. The WFP monthy average case-oad of food aid beneficiaries was 1.74 miion in 2009, an increase of more than 50 percent from The Internationa Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2009) provided food to 464,118 beneficiaries. Some two thirds of those in need of food were reached during the first haf of the year, but a mere 44 percent were reached in the second. Due to funding imitations, heath sector objectives were aso not met. However, more than 50 outbreaks of communicabe diseases were investigated, and in most cases, an appropriate response was provided. An innovative new approach caed chid heath days aowed more than two miion chidren and an estimated 380,000 women of chid-bearing age to be aided (Morooka 2009). Education needs aso remained unmet. Ony 20 percent of IDP chidren in the Afgooye Corridor received any education. In the South, ony 100,000 peope were provided with forma or informa schooing. Schoo-feeding was argey discontinued and schoo attendance decreased dramaticay. The eve of funding earmarked for education in 2009 was a mere US$4.5 miion, haf the aocation for 2008 (OCHA 2010b). Funding to strengthen oca service deivery, preparedness and response capacity continued to be insufficient. Humanitarians interviewed by the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team generay expressed disappointment at donor faiure to adopt a hoistic approach to buiding oca capacity, some arguing that this payed into the hands of the Isamists. There was aso considerabe disappointment in donor prioritisation of ife-saving activities over addressing ongterm needs. One respondent to the HRI noted that funding goes to emergency reief first... and ast to food security. In regard to iveihoods support, funding increased by 16 percent in 2009, but the US$19.7 miion was ony 34 percent of the sum required. There is a genera regret that, in the words of one respondent: donors are ony interested in saving ives, not in saving iveihoods. Another wryy observed that for donors the sexiest term is emergency. Over a third of humanitarians who were interviewed noted that the 2009 donor response was negativey affected by the goba financia crisis. Rising goba food prices, particuary in the first haf of 2009, seriousy impacted food deivery agencies. Fuctuation in the vaue of stering and the US doar affected funding avaiabiity. Some respondents noted that withdrawa of internationa staff generated doubts among donors as to whether programmes coud be impemented.

6 Impact of War on Terror Neary a agencies interviewed during the HRI mission said that non-humanitarian interests and poitica criteria were infuencing donor decisions. A key event in 2009 was the decision of the Office for Foreign Assets Contro (OFAC), a US agency impementing goba counter-terrorism measures, to foow up the US State Department s designation of a-shabaab as an internationa terrorist group by refusing to issue a waiver for the provision of humanitarian aid in areas under its contro. Previous waivers have been issued for humanitarian assistance provided in Sudan, Iran and the Gaza Strip as we as for areas controed by US-designated terrorist groups such as Hezboah in Lebanon (Scribner 2009). The US Agency for Internationa Deveopment (USAID) cited the OFAC approva process as grounds for not funding partners working in non-tfg areas. The OFAC ruing has ed to a tota freeze of US humanitarian funds for Somaia in areas controed by a-shabaab. Some humanitarians interviewed by the HRI team described USAID s stance as cowardy, arguing it shoud do more to advocate within the US Administration for a more nuanced stance. One noted that efforts by USAID to meet with OFAC to expain operationa reaities in Somaia had been rebuffed. Donors poitica interests have infuenced aid decisions and have had serious impications for the provision of neutra, impartia humanitarian assistance. UNHCR/S.Abdue Crisis reports Somaia US counter-terror poicies have provoked debate on whether UN Security Counci resoutions targeting terrorism (UNSCR 1844 and 1267) are appicabe to humanitarian aid, and have aso initiated disagreement between many donor states foreign and aid ministries on how to dea with the issue. According to many agencies interviewed, US poicy has not ony hed up funding but has aso further poiticised the deivery of humanitarian aid. Many impementing agencies report that OFAC has made them waste time and energy with very itte support from donors who usuay firmy uphod humanitarian principes on demonstrating compiance to antiterrorism measures which shoud have been spent on improving and increasing response to humanitarian need. Some interviewees report they fear prosecution for potentiay aiding a terrorist group. In February 2010, the UN s Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination (RC/HC) caed US aid rues impossibe to foow (BBC News 2010). Many aid actors compain that the TFG is manifesty incapabe of improving security, deivering basic services, or seeking an agreement with cans and opposition groups that might encourage accountabe governance. It has been argued that if the internationa community is serious about addressing the reaity of faied states, it shoud eschew the poarising rhetoric of the War on Terror and instead begin engaging in earnest with a mutitude of uncomfortabe actors invoved in ugy birthprocesses of re-configurations of poitica authority (Verhoeven 2009). Yet, most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Deveopment / Deveopment Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors continue to support the TFG. Some, incuding Norway and the European Commission (EC), are trying to convince agencies to focus more on TFG-controed areas. Another cause of concern is reports that USAID tenders have attracted for-profit contractors and private security companies to operate in Somaia as they have in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are fears that their presence and ack of interest in humanitarian principes coud further affect the often negative image of estabished humanitarian actors (Bradbury 2010). 215

7 216 Security, protection and access Incidents targeting Somais and humanitarians incuded improvised exposive devices, kidnapping, abduction, assassination and piracy. In 2009, 10 aid workers were kied compared to 34 in 2008, a reduction expained both by ess targeting of humanitarian workers and their assets and the reduced profie of the humanitarian community in many areas. In the second haf of 2009, the number of UN internationa fied staff dropped from 66 to 28 and internationa staff of internationa non-governmenta organisations (INGOs) from 168 to 67 (OCHA 2009d). The vast majority of remaining in-country UN and INGO internationa staff are in Somaiand. There is no permanent presence of internationa staff in southern and centra areas. Agencies remain stymied by extortion and theft from armed groups. A report to the Security Counci estimated that 30 percent of a food aid was skimmed by oca partners and oca staff of WFP, ten percent by ground transporters and between five and ten percent by armed groups (UN 2010). As a resut, WFP decided in January 2010 to stop deivering food aid to a-shabaab-controed areas, after having tried for months to negotiate access. The Isamist group responded by ordering WFP and its staff to eave Somaia. The argest group of IDPs those in the Afgooye Corridor have not received any food from WFP since November Reports of corruption and pifering of aid have reinforced US arguments justifying cessation of aid to a-shabaab areas, but the end resut has been faiure to meet the needs of a significant proportion of the vunerabe popuation. Access probems and insecurity have further increased reiance on Somai nationa staff and nationa NGOs. Day-to-day supervision is typicay via engthy cas to Nairobi using Somaia s we-functioning mobie networks. Humanitarian agencies report that access to nutrition and heath interventions is barey affected by the absence of internationa staff. However, response to new crises is highy probematic due to constraints around estabishing new ogistica mechanisms and staff hiring and firing. An unfortunate consequence of insecurity-driven remote management is that INGOs are effectivey becoming donors for nationa impementing agencies. This inevitaby increases overhead - an additiona burden which many donors are unwiing to meet. Agencies that have traditionay reied on nationa partners such as the ICRC have faced fewer probems. OXFAM/NOVIB uses severa mechanisms to ensure the high quaity of programmes that are impemented by partners. An important eement is the invovement of Somai communities in programme design and muti-eve monitoring. In 2009, there was increased use of Somai diaspora-based consutants and information technoogies to monitor programme impementation. OCHA and the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) jointy deveoped an access coefficient, based on eight indicators such as internationa staff presence, humanitarian fights and security incidents. Mogadishu scored two out of a possibe 100 points, whie the averages for southern and northern Somaia were much higher: 25 and 70 respectivey. UN agencies and NGOs undertook severa initiatives in 2009 to reduce the vunerabiity of humanitarian staff. Ground rues deveoped by the UN provide guidance to humanitarians and beneficiaries. The Somaia NGO Consortium pubished a position paper on operating principes incuding threshods and criteria regarding access, security, and the provision of aid. A major chaenge in 2009 was the ack of fied presence and the resutant inabiity to conduct fied missions and assessments. Severa strategic towns, which had previousy served as significant UN operationa hubs, are now in the hands of anti-tfg forces, with which humanitarian access has had to be negotiated anew. Despite mounting probems in 2009, donors did not generay advocate for access. There were some exceptions. Sweden was very outspoken about the need to faciitate humanitarian access, but was said to have done itte. The EC was circumspect, but heped to faciitate access by informay providing medica evacuations. ECHO undertook a considerabe amount of poitica obbying. Activities reated to security, protection and sheter were ony 28 percent funded. Donors who contributed to protection incuded ECHO, Denmark, Ireand, Japan, the Netherands, Norway, Sweden, UNHCR and the United Nations Chidren s Fund (UNICEF). Lack of funding ed to non-impementation of programmes addressing IDP/ chid protection and gender-based vioence. Austraia, Begium and Ireand contributed to the creation of the UN s Security Information and Operation Centre, which coects data on the access and security situation in the country. Information on security and access is pubished in OCHA Somaia s Humanitarian Access Anaysis. Funding air transport for movement of humanitarian goods and personne is seen as vita to ensure access to areas in dire need. Donors funding UN/WFP fights incuded Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireand and Spain. The Centra Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and WFP aso provided funds for air services. Agencies are concerned at the high charges for passengers currenty US$800 per person and want to see improvements in air transport ogistics.

8 Coordination Coordination of interventions in southern and centra Somaia was undertaken in Nairobi, primariy through the custer system. Fied coordination further decined in 2009 and is now argey imited to Somaiand and, to a esser extent, Puntand. Instabiity has prevented coordination from humanitarian hubs such as Gaacayo, Beet Weyne and Baidoa. Agencies interviewed generay reported that most Nairobi-based custers effectivey coordinated CAP activities and reporting, contingency panning and prioritisation of projects funded by the Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) a pooed fund at the disposa of the humanitarian community estabished in Somaia in In some custers, however, coordination was confined to unfocused information exchange. Major contributors to OCHA s coordination in 2009 incuded ECHO, the Netherands and Spain; whie Canada, Itay and Switzerand made smaer amounts avaiabe. Some concerns were expressed at OCHA s roe as both coordinator and aocator of funding. There is a perception that custer effectiveness is reduced as nationa NGOs seek funds from OCHA. There was itte coordination between custers and within the UN. Agencies operating in centra and southern Somaia were said to be reuctant to share information, est this compromise their capacity to work. Geographica coordination was argey imited to assistance for IDPs in the Afgooye Corridor. The Somaia NGO consortium, estabished in 1999, now has over 50 internationa and 20 nationa NGOs. It has faciitated information exchange and produced a position paper on operating principes. At a meeting in Naivasha, Kenya in November 2008, the Somai Donor Group (SDG), consisting of seven OECD/DAC donors (incuding Canada, the US, the UK and severa other European countries), the EC, the UN and severa mutiatera agencies, agreed on a framework for improving coordination, monitoring and accountabiity and undertook to reguary review progress. The Coordination of Internationa Support to Somais Executive Committee (CISS ExCom) brings together representatives from the SDG, the custers/sectors, the NGO consortium and the UN country team and is co-chaired by the Resident Coordinator (RC) / Humanitarian Coordinator (HR) and the Word Bank. Severa informants noted that coordination through the NGO consortium and the CISS ExCom was effective. However, agencies were not impressed by coordination among donors in the SDG, particuary their inabiity to forge a common position on the US-driven ban on funding activities in a-shabaab-controed areas. In retrospect, the commitments made in Naivasha were too ambitious, a participant noting this was presented as a window of opportunity... I have seen many windows, but very itte improvement. Humanitarian agencies report considerabe barriers to effective coordination. NGOs and UN agencies are in competition to be viewed as in charge of coordination, a reaity most donors do not address. Some respondents urged donors to be stricter with NGOs at an eary stage of reationship-buiding, specifying who shoud do what. One noted that each NGO has its own mandate, and fighting for funding is going on. It was suggested that donors shoud set a better exampe for each other in order to promote coordination, acquire Somaia-specific expertise and improve their technica capacity. Respondents refections on donors Humanitarians interviewed by the HRI mission noted marked divergences in the capacity of individua donors and UN agencies to make informed decisions. Some cited positive exampes of donors incuding ECHO, the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID, and the Netherands who have staff famiiar with fied reaities in Somaia. Others are reported to have itte capacity or expertise. The UK Department for Internationa Deveopment (DFID) and Canada each had ony one dedicated regiona officer, and most of their time was spent on other countries. ECHO received more positive remarks than any other donor. Those praised for fexibiity incuded the Netherands and Sweden. Managers of the HRF were praised for wiingness to fi genera funding gaps and DFID and ECHO were praised for pugging gaps in food aid funding. Norway had emergency funds avaiabe for minor funding gaps. Most interviewees acknowedged greater awareness among donors of the need to operate outside the box. Donors cited as more transparent incuded DFID, the EC, Sweden and USAID. Lack of timey provision of funding was frequenty mentioned as a poor donor practice. Donors whose funding arrived ate in 2009 incuded ECHO and the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The HRI team earned through respondents that some donors prefer to fund their own nationa agencies (e.g. Norway); to focus on particuar sectors (e.g. US emphasis on food aid and UK prioritisation of heath) and that they prefer particuar agencies (e.g. the UK s disproportionate funding for the ICRC and UN agencies). Humanitarians reported that donors had itte way to verify whether fexibiity was justified due to imited, and at times competey impossibe, scope for fied monitoring. Donors rey on reports and feed-back from UN agencies and internationa NGOs which are sometimes significanty dependent on input from nationa impementing partners. Crisis reports Somaia Some donors were praised for their attention to maintaining standards, earning essons from evauations and promoting beneficiary invovement in programming. These incuded ECHO, USAID, and DFID. In 2009, there were severa exampes of donor support of earning and accountabiity, incuding a Danish-funded project to improve the quaity of humanitarian action. In 2008 and 2009, donors were severey criticised for their faiure to work with their humanitarian partners to ensure evauation-derived recommendations are incorporated into future programming. OECD/DAC donors 2009 performance was even worse in this regard than in Some donors who actuay visited projects and gathered information incuded Finand, Japan and DFID. 217

9 218 Humanitarian agency representatives tod the HRI mission they were reasonaby satisfied with donors reporting requirements. Some mentioned that donors generay understood their operationa constraints, not insisting on unreaistic monitoring and evauation requirements. Others, incuding ECHO, were criticised for imposing procurement and tendering standards which are not practica in Somaia. Many agencies want donors to reaise the vaue of funding for preparedness and contingency panning. They woud wecome having the freedom a bock grant woud provide to preposition and store stocks, fund security measures and aow capacity buiding, particuary to boost the technica and operationa capacity of Somais. Norway and ECHO were commended for permitting agencies to keep a part of the funding to maintain contingency stocks. Some agencies said that donors shoud, in genera, better anayse strengths and weaknesses of agencies before providing funds for strengthening organisationa capacity. Severa agencies expressed concern about an increasing number of donors who, when asked for a quick response, instead referred them to the HRF. They noted that HRF funding was generay restricted to emergency IDP assistance. Neary a donors have separate budget-ines and departments for deveopment and humanitarian departments. Hardy any deveopment aid is avaiabe for southern and centra Somaia. Donor poicies regarding fexibiity and reaocation of pedged funds vary widey. Larger actors incuding UN agencies and bigger INGOs appeared better informed about these variations and possibiities for fexibe funding and reaocation of non-earmarked funding for under-funded activities. Humanitarian organisations generay thought the CAP priority to strengthen the protective environment for civiians was unreaistic. Even the ICRC, despite its extensive protection experience in southern and centra Somaia, is now restricted to the promotion of internationa humanitarian aw (ICRC 2010). Services for those who have experienced fundamenta human rights vioations do not exist. Some of those peope interviewed suggested UN agencies stressed protection in order to compete for donor funds. Protection activities focused on improving data coection and mosty depended on Somai UN and INGO staff. Informants reported that there is no evidence that improved data coection has ed to more effective UN advocacy. Some humanitarians criticised donors for not doing more to advocate for humanitarian access. It was noted that whie countries ike Sweden were very outspoken, they did itte to actuay promote better humanitarian access. Donors were aso criticised for refusing to acknowedge how insecurity greaty increased operationa costs and for faiure to fund security mitigation measures, communication networks, air transport and war risk insurance. Lessons earnt and recommendations for the future So grave are operationa constraints in Somaia that one INGO is reported to have changed their approach from needs-based programming to constraints-based programming ony responding to those needs which can feasiby be addressed (Bradbury 2010). The concerns expressed by many of those interviewed by the HRI team are echoed by the concusion of a study of the inherent tensions between stabiisation and humanitarian goas in Somaia: State-buiding efforts that insist humanitarian reief be channeed through the nascent state in order to buid its egitimacy and capacity undermine humanitarian neutraity when the state is a party to a civi war. Counter-terrorism poicies that seek to ensure that no aid benefits terrorist groups have the net effect of criminaising reief operations in countries where poor security precudes effective accountabiity, (Menkhaus 2010). There are fundamenta differences of opinion among humanitarian agencies and donors on the way forward. Most INGOs woud ike donors to push for incusive, internaydriven reconciiation processes, and some wish to bring Isamist groups, incuding a-shabaab, into a nationa reconciiation process. Many humanitarian workers, incuding some UN staff, criticise donors and the RC/HC for primariy supporting externay-driven mediation efforts refecting. Some want an end to doube-hatting and have demanded a separate post for an HC abe to act more impartiay to meet humanitarian needs. Many are highy critica of donor and UN support to the TFG, particuary the European Union s training of Somai troops in Uganda (ReiefWeb 2010), and find itte evidence that the TFG has any interest in assisting those it caims to govern. They argue that the internationa community shoud be neutra and acknowedge the transitiona nature of the TFG. There was much criticism of the internationa toerance for the TFG s shortcomings, one noting that the internationa community indugenty treats the TFG as a todder... and does not hod it accountabe. Looking ahead, donors coud do much more to: 1 Advocate for IHL: Donors must defend the human rights of affected popuations and argue for adherence to humanitarian aw and guarantees for safe humanitarian access, incuding with the TFG, a-shabaab and the authorities in Somaiand and Puntand 2 Defend a needs-based approach: It is essentia to protect humanitarian assistance from poitica and security objectives and chaenge pressures on humanitarian organisations to work ony in TFG-controed areas. Donor shoud foster a common approach towards a parties to the many conficts in Somaia, foowing the exampes of Canada and Sweden the ony donor governments that were consistenty praised for being scrupuousy nonpoitica.

10 3 Go beyond ifesaving: Humanitarian programming must expand to foster capacity-buiding of Somai communities and civi society, support iveihoods and provide heath and education services. The wider donor community shoud foow Sweden in funding education services, and France in contributing to iveihoods. 4 Defend humanitarians: Donors can provide more support to enabe greater protection for humanitarian workers, both internationa and Somai. 5 Aow fexibiity: The constraints of remote management cannot be overcome, and the chaenge of buiding impementation, monitoring and evauation capacity of Somai partners cannot be achieved uness donors simpy procedures and wecome innovative programming. References BBC News (2010). US aid rues in Somaia are impossibe, says UN envoy. 17 February. Avaiabe from africa/ stm [Accessed 25 February 2010] Bradbury, M. (2010). State-buiding, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somaia. Feinstein Internationa Center. Avaiabe from: tufts.edu/confuence/downoad/ attachments/ /bradbury- Somaia.pdf version=1 [Accessed 14 October 2010] Food Security Nutrition Anaysis Unit (FSNAU) (2009a) Post Gu Anaysis. FSNAU Technica Series, Report No VI September. Avaiabe from: reiefweb.int/rw/rwfies2009. nsf/fiesbyrwdocunidfiename/ AZHU-7WD5JT-fu_report. pdf/$fie/fu_report.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2010] FSNAU (2009b) Post Gu Anaysis. FSNAU Technica Series, Report No VI September. Avaiabe from: org/downoads/post-gu-09- Nutrition-Situation-Technica-Series. pdf [Accessed 10 March 2010] Internationa Committee of the Red Cross (2010). ICRC Annua Report May. P Avaiabe from eng/siteeng0.nsf/htm/somaia-icrcannua-report-2009 [Accessed 3 Juy 2010] Internationa Crisis Group (2010). Somaia s Divided Isamists. Africa Briefing N 74 Nairobi/Brusses, 18 May 2010; Avaiabe from: somaia-s-divided-isamists%20.aspx [Accessed 3 Juy 2010] Menkhaus, K. (2010). Stabiisation and humanitarian access in a coapsed state: the Somai case. Disasters, 2010, 34. Morooka, I. (2009). Second round of Chid Heath Days aims to boost chid surviva in Somaia. UNICEF. 3 September. Avaiabe from: somaia_51054.htm [Accessed 27 Juy 2010] ReiefWeb (2010). Counci adopts decision on the aunch of EUTM Somaia. Avaiabe from: rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/azhu- 843Q8H?OpenDocument [Accessed 14 October 2010] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2010). Somaia: Widening strife causing increased dispacement. 12 January. Avaiabe from: [Accessed 3 Juy 2010] United Nations (2010). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somaia pursuant to Security Counci resoution 1853, (2010), Security Counci 2010/91, p 60. Avaiabe from: committees/751/mongroup.shtm [Accessed 20 Apri, 2010] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2010a). IDP Popuation Assessment of the Afgooye Corridor. January. Avaiabe from: ochaonine.un.org/ochalinkcick. aspx?ink=ocha&docid= [Accessed 26 Juy 2010] OCHA (2010b). Financia Tracking Service. Avaiabe from: www. reiefweb.int [Accessed 26 Juy 2010] OCHA (2009a). Humanitarian Overview vo. 2 Issue 8. August Avaiabe from: un.org/somaia/situationreports/ ArchivedSituationReports/ tabid/2880/defaut.aspx [Accessed 8 February, 2010] OCHA (2009b). Somaia Consoidated Appea Avaiabe from: somaia/home/tabid/2713/anguage/ en-us/defaut.aspx OCHA (2009d) Monthy Access Report. December. Avaiabe from: un.org/ochalinkcick. aspx?ink=ocha&docd= [Accessed 21 Juy 2010] Scribner, S (2009). Oxfam testimony on Somaia. Testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Reations Subcommittee on African Affairs. 20 May, Avaiabe from: oxfam-testimony-on-somaia [Accessed 3 Juy 2010] Verhoeven, H. (2009). The Sef-fufiing prophecy of faied states: Somaia, state coapse and the Goba War on Terror. Journa of Eastern African Studies 2009 (3) issue 3 p Information based on fied interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Nairobi from 14 to 23 February 2010, and 209 questionnaires on donor performance (incuding 155 OECD/DAC donors). Crisis reports Somaia The HRI team, composed of Fernando Espada, Daniea Ruegenberg, Abertien van der Veen (Team eader) and Frank Vomer, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to a those interviewed in Nairobi. 219