The Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict of many decades long, and for one to understand it,

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1 Ahmad M. Osman April 21, 2017 Osman War between Egypt and Israel: Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger The War Criminals The Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict of many decades long, and for one to understand it, it is a must to look at the historical incidents in detail and to weigh the different perspectives. The conflict, especially between Egypt and Israel, reached its peak during Gamal Abdel-Nasser s era, and was being diplomatically negotiated - with one-sided efforts - by Anwar Sadat as soon as he became the president of Egypt after Abdel-Nasser s death in The United States had a role in the negotiations that took place over the period between 1967 to 1973, and even after the war of Egypt was an ally with the Soviet Union which played a role, too, in (some of) the negotiations; although not as crucial as the one the United States played. Although Anwar Sadat declared war, however, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger caused the war between Egypt and Israel in The war between Egypt and Israel in 1973 was the result of the Six-Day War that took place on June 5, 1967, between the Arabs and Israel. Israel started a surprising attack against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and was able to occupy new territories and achieve a military superiority over the Arabs. Among the occupied territories was the Sinai Peninsula. Liberating the Sinai Peninsula was the goal of the Egyptian administration since 1967, and until it was fully liberated and returned to Egypt in The US-Soviet proposal in 1967 for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands was rejected by Abdel-Nasser as he refused to have direct negotiations with Israel. Under President Johnson s administration, the principle of acquiring land by force ( Moshe 16) was not

2 Osman 2 acceptable, and the US, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, asked Israel to give back the lands it occupied to its rightful owners, especially if Egypt is to subscribe to a signed peace treaty (Moshe 16). However, the proposal was rejected by Abdel-Nasser, the defeated country s leader, as he believed that no self-respecting, sane state could enter into negotiations from a position of weakness, with its lands in enemy hands (Moshe 11). It was Abdel-Nasser, in 1967 that rejected a diplomatic solution to the conflict as he refused acknowledging Israel and having direct negotiation with it. Later on, in 1970, Sadat becomes the president and starts seeking a similar proposal, however, Johnson succeeding administration, Nixon s, would not favor that proposal. Israel insisted on direct negotiations with Abdel-Nasser and did not abide by the UN resolution 242 in 1967 which required Israel to withdraw all its forces from the land that it occupied during the Six-Day War, and to respect its neighbouring countries. Gunnar Jarring was the UN representative assigned to embark on a round of exploratory talks (Moshe 29) between Egypt and Israel, yet the question of Abdel-Nasser and his administration was whether the Swedish diplomat was capable of engineering an Israeli withdrawal (Moshe 30). It was not in Abdel-Nasser s intentions to have any negotiations with Israel, neither was it part of resolution 242. Both, Egypt and Israel were willing to accept the resolution, yet with different conditions. Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, failed to explain what his government considered safe and secure boundaries, observing that this would become clear in the course of negotiations (Moshe 42). Later on, during Nixon s administration, Israel will not have to think about explanations to why they are not seeking peace with Egypt, as Egypt s efforts will be dismissed by Kissinger and Israel will feel safe. Abdel-Nasser s intransigence about the direct negotiations

3 Osman 3 with Israel was not the only reason Israel did not abide by 242, but also Israel s greed to keep the new land that it has occupied. Nixon assigned Joseph Sisco to negotiate with Soviet Union about a possible peace proposal between Egypt and Israel, however, Kissinger did not see any value in such proposal if Egypt is not offering something in return. Shortly after getting elected in 1969, Nixon assigned Joseph Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State, to negotiate with the Soviet on an Egyptian Israeli settlement... being that the two would embark on indirect talks, to be followed by direct negotiations and a peace treaty (Moshe 55). However, this time it was not just the Egyptian administration that was skeptical, but also Kissinger, the National Security Advisor appointed by Nixon, as he was certain that the Soviet Union s sole motive in entering into these talks was to get the United States to force an Israeli withdrawal, without Egypt having to offer anything of substance in return (Moshe 56). Kissinger appeared here to have a different view on the peace process between Egypt and Israel, keeping in his mind that neither Egypt nor the Soviet Union is an ally of the United State, and that it is important for the United States to look after Israel, the United States ally, benefits. Nixon assigned the Middle East to William Rogers in order to prevent the United States from looking biased, however, Kissinger still influenced the Middle East conflict more than Rogers did. Nixon s administration had the Middle East on its agenda, yet it had higher priorities such as the Vietnam War. Nixon wanted to make the Vietnam War Kissinger s top priority. In addition, Nixon did not assign the Middle East (right away) to Kissinger because Nixon had a concern about Kissinger s Jewishness (Hersh 213). Worried that his administration might seem biased if a Jewish is to overlook the peace process in the Middle East, Nixon decided to leave the

4 Osman 4 Middle East to William Rogers who was the Secretary of State up until September However, Rogers was being systematically stripped of authority (Hersh 213) much earlier as Kissinger, the National Security Advisor up until November 1975, was in fact more influencing on the Middle East conflict than Rogers as Kissinger was haunting the State Department s efforts in the Middle East (Hersh 213). By September 1973, Kissinger took over Rogers and became the Secretary of State. Moreover, Kissinger setuped Rogers and misinformed him that Nixon agreed on his peace initiative between Egypt and Israel, and gave him green line on announcing it to the media in order to sabotage Rogers and stop his peace initiative. After meeting with the Soviets in October 1969, Rogers came out with what was known as Roger s first plan, where Israel was to withdraw to its pre-1967-war borders with Egypt, in return for guarantees of peace and security from Egypt (Hersh 218). However, this plan was not successful for many reasons. First, Abdel-Nasser insisted on refusing any direct negotiations with Israel (Hersh 219). Second, Nixon did not fully back the initiative as he felt Rogers is acting without his permissions, especially because Kissinger insisted that Rogers did not present his plan to him. However, Sisco confirms that Rogers actually showed his plan to Kissinger, showing that Kissinger was trying to setup Rogers to be in a bad stand with Nixon (Hersh 220). Third, Kissinger opposed having peace in the Middle East - which will be expressed later to Egypt s administration - where Kissinger constantly urged the President to discourage the State Department from going ahead with any initiative that called for Israel to give up some of its occupied lands in return for a peace guarantee (Hersh 216). Kissinger saw no value in achieving peace between Egypt and Israel,

5 Osman 5 prefered for Israel to keep that land as he considered it a strategic asset, and was willing to sabotage and setup Rogers to stop his peace initiatives. Nixon neglected Rogers peace plan and assured Israel that they do not have to abide by it, which is what Kissinger wanted. Despite the fact that it was Rogers assigned mission to solve the Middle East conflict, Nixon was influenced by Kissinger s opinion, as Nixon ordered White House aide Leonard Garment to give private assurance to Prime Minister Golda Meir that the State Department initiative would not have his full backing (Hersh 221) What Rogers did not know was that he had no political support whatsoever from Nixon to support his plan, and that the government of Golda Meir obviously knew what Rogers did not: that the White House would not force any concessions (Hersh 408). Kissinger s influence on the Middle East, even though not assigned to him, stopped Rogers peace initiative between Egypt and Israel before it could take any effect, and assured Israel of its safety from any borders retreats. As a result, Israel s impression was that their war against Egypt is United States war against Soviet, showing the Kissinger s opinion influenced the conflict the most. Yitzhak Rabin was the Israeli Army s chief of staff during the 1967 war. When he got in touch with Nixon s administration after Israel started attacking Egypt in 1969 during the war of attrition, was told that his military operations are the most encouraging breath of fresh air the American administration has enjoyed recently... Thus the willingness to supply us with additional arms depends more on stepping up our military activity against Egypt than on reducing it (Hersh 218). There was a different view on Israel s war held by the United States administration to his opinion. Israel understood that the United States see it as an invaluable ally and got assured by

6 Osman 6 that to go on with its war of attrition against Egypt. The war of attrition was supported by Nixon s administration. The idea of peace is coming into place from the other side, Egypt, however is not taken seriously. As Abdel-Nasser passed away in September 1970, Anwar Sadat was chosen as the new president of Egypt. In his first meeting with Richardson, the United States ambassador to Abdel-Nasser s funeral, he told him that all he want is peace. Let us work together for peace. I m today committed to the Rogers Plan... Once again let me call on you to work for peace. I am prepared to go to any lengths to achieve it (Sadat 276). Yet it looked like the United States administration, and Kissinger, had already made their decision about Sadat, as Kissinger recalled telling a journalist shortly after Sadat was named President that he considered him an interim figure who would not last more than a few weeks (Hersh 403). Kissinger took neither Sadat nor his peace offer seriously, showing that he supports Israel in occupying other countries lands regardless of the conflict that causes. Anwar Sadat peace initiative and how he was willing to take the diplomatic route to solve the conflict. Believing that diplomatic means of solving the conflict is more worthy than war, Sadat came out with an initiative where Egypt was willing to conclude a peace agreement with Israel which would end the state of war that had existed to this day, since 1948, between the Arabs and Israel, and to give Israel all the guarantees she had asked for (Sadat 279). Sadat was planning to follow Gunnar Jarring s initial plan and build up on top of it. William Rogers, surprised by the very unique, first time, Arab open-mindedness toward Israel, got in touch with Sadat and told him that previously Golda Meir had summoned the U.S. ambassador in Tel-Aviv and asked him to write to Rogers and Nixon that she, Golda Meir, challenged any Arab lead to

7 Osman 7 declare that he was prepared to conclude a peace agreement with Israel (Sadat 281). It seemed like Sadat s goal was not far away from him, especially with what Rogers informed him. However, Kissinger opposition to Sadat s 1971 initiative caused it to fail. As Kissinger has already expressed, he did not see Sadat as a lasting president, and so he did not support Sadat s initiative to solve the conflict between Egypt and Israel. Kissinger, a few years later in his own words, apologized for not supporting the initiative as the agreement would have prevented the 1973 war. I must say now that I am sorry that I did not support the Roger's effort more than I did ( Vanetik 127). In one of Sadat s meetings with Kissinger after 1973 war, Sadat elaborated that if Kissinger had accepted his initiative, no war would have broken out at all. I care very much for human life, and am loath to losing one soldier, not to mention an officer. But you didn t take me seriously - and this is the outcome (Sadat 269). Kissinger and his underestimation of Sadat led to the war between Egypt and Israel in Rogers second plan for peace between Egypt and Israel failed as Nixon s administration assured Israel they would not back Roger s initiative earlier. Following Sadat s initiative, Rogers decided that direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel are possible, and that unlike Abdel-Nasser, Sadat was ready to sign a peace treaty. Sadat was willing to reopen the Suez Canal if the Israelis were willing to... permit some Egyptian soldiers or police to cross over to Israeli-held territory... Moshe Dayan, the Defense Minister, who privately insisted that the reopening of the canal would stabilize the region (Hersh 403). However, Nixon s assurances to Israel before that they would not be backing Rogers initiative, led Prime Minister Golda Meir to give a speech in the Knesset which was tantamount to a lesson - and a hard one at that - for William Rogers... The speech influenced U.S. public opinion and terrified Rogers sufficiently

8 Osman 8 to make him take back all he said. It wasn t only a retreat on Rogers part; he drastically changed his position (286). The assurances given by Nixon and Kissinger to Israel made Israel refuse Rogers second peace plan. What Israel was seeking once of direct negotiations between them and Egypt before Nixon s administration was refused thanks to all the assurances given by Nixon s administration. Nixon s opposition to Roger s second plan and how valuable that was (politically) for his reelection. Nixon was a Republican, and usually the votes of the Jews went to the Democrats, however, as Nixon proved to be the most supportive United States President to Israel up to that point, the Jews votes could go to him. Kissinger believed that Nixon would never take the political risk of imposing a settlement on the Israelis (Hersh 406). In addition, it was even clear for Israel that Nixon would not provoke a fight with American Jews - and potential campaign contributors - by punishing Israel for not negotiating (Hersh 408). It was Nixon s political goals that led him to oppose Rogers second plan - one of the few initiatives to avoid a bloody war in Nixon wanted to be reelected, and for that he wanted to have as much support as he could, therefore he considered it to be a good move for his reelection if he does not support Rogers second plan and get the support of the Jews. If it was not for Nixon s own personal gains as a politician, peace could have been achieved between Egypt and Israel. Sadat was left with no option but either acknowledge Egypt s defeat, or prepare for war. By November 1972, it was clear for Sadat that the United States was not planning to assist him in his diplomatic negotiations, Sadat believes his efforts were not taken seriously and he decided that November 15, 1972, should be the date in which the Egyptian military would be ready by to go to war. Sadat, choose that date specifically as he wanted to give the President-elect a chance

9 Osman 9 to try to find a peaceful solution to the problem. So, if nothing was achieved in this direction by then, we would be ready to take military action (Sadat 234). However, by November 15, the Egyptian military was not ready, and Sadat was never fond of war, so he decided to give diplomacy one more chance, while at the same time keeping his hopes down and getting the armed forces ready to go to war against Israel to liberate his land. While the Egyptian army was getting prepared for war, Sadat decided to give the diplomatic initiatives one more try with Kissinger. In February 1973, Hafiz Ismail, Sadat s National Security Adviser went to visit Kissinger, who was by then Nixon s Secretary of State. This, was indeed the most important initiative taken by Sadat, it was after Sadat had proved to the United States that he was not going to fall politically, and that he was serious about peace, and unlike the other initiatives, in the broker was either too weak (Jarring) or at least not strong (Rogers), here the go-between was Henry Kissinger, the architect of President Nixon's foreign policy who in early 1973 was at the height ( Bar-Joseph 546). Nixon s administration was the one that indicated to Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Army s chief of staff during the 1967 war, earlier that to gain United States support, it is fighting not having peace that United States is interested in. Here again, in the last initiative that Egypt tried to come up with to achieve peace, Kissinger, under Nixon s administration, told Hafiz Ismail that the United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority (Sadat 238). It is a question of logic of where did that false superiority derived its power, and of course the answer is Nixon s administration. On the other side, and at the same time Sadat was negotiating for peace, the United States was giving Golda Meir new American arms

10 Osman 10 ( Bar-Joseph 550). Sadat came to believe that the United States will not support a peace initiative between Egypt and Israel. Despite Israel and the United States being superior, Sadat decided to go to war. Sadat s decision to go to war against Israel was not easy, however he knew that it was impossible, as I have always said, for the United States... to make a move if we ourselves didn t take military action to break the deadlock (Sadat 238). On the other side, United States full support under Nixon s administration to Israel, and Israel feeling of superiority, failed to comprehend the impact their reaction had on Egypt's motivation to go to war ( Bar-Joseph 551). The decision of war, emphasised many times by Sadat s initiatives, was not his best go-to move. Sadat wanted diplomacy. If Kissinger had tried to support Rogers initiatives, it could have been a step that would have prevented the 73 war from taking place (Hersh 407). If Kissinger has supported Sadat s peace initiatives, the 1973 war would not have happened. If Nixon has not assured Israel of his support whether or not they agree on peace, the 1973 would not have happened. Sadat declared war against Israel, and even though it was Kissinger s words that the United States would not be able to help if Egypt was defeated, the United States supported Israel in the war. Coming to nowhere diplomatically, Sadat decided that October 6, 1973, was the day where Egypt would restore its conquered land. However, the United States did not stand still while its so-called strategic asset, Israel, was being attacked. Sadat was not surprised, after all his unsupported initiatives, to find the United States was taking part in the war to save Israel, following the famous plea sent out on the fourth day (Sadat 260). However, Sadat was not intending to put his military to fight the entire United States of America (Sadat 261). According to Israel, two events would occur on October 14 to make it the decisive day of the

11 Osman 11 war.... The second, but equally important, was the arrival of the first airlift aircraft from the United States ( Boyne 127). This proves that Nixon s administration was about an ultimate strategic asset, which is Israel, and that it was not Israel s superiority stopping peace to take place but the United States. If Kissinger had supported Sadat s last peace initiative in February 1973, Sadat would not have declared war; it was even the complete opposite when Kissinger said that the United States would not be able to help the defeated country, giving Sadat an incentive to go to war against Israel. Kissinger s cease-fire initiative after the 1973 war, and how he became proactive, only after causing a bloody war, to solve the conflict. As Sadat started the war, he was not taken easily as he used to be by the United States administration anymore, as the Pentagon report to the effect that the war on the Egyptian front was not proceeding in favor of Israel (Sadat 257). Sadat recalls that from the moment Kissinger knew about the 400 Israeli destroyed tanks, Kissinger would persistently for a cease-fire with the Soviet Union (Sadat 257). The United States administration never really understood Sadat until after the 1973 war as Kissinger later said that Sadat aimed not for territorial gain but for a crisis that would alter the attitudes into which the parties were then frozen - and thereby open the way for negotiations ( Kissinger 460). If it was not for Kissinger s and Nixon s insisting on overlooking Egypt as a country that had the right to have peace, the 1973 war would not have had happened. Kissinger used Rogers plan in 1974 for the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement despite opposing Rogers plan before the 1973 war. About five years later, Kissinger, who opposed Roger s plans for peace between Egypt and Israel, and caused its failure; and only after 1973 war, and many lost lives in the war, adopted the Rogers plan as his own and won its

12 Osman 12 acceptance (Hersh 403). Egypt, only after starting a war that caused many lives loss of both, Egyptians and Israelis, got Kissinger to play the role of mediator between us and Israel (Sadat 270). Kissinger caused the deaths of many lives between 1969 to 1973, and if he had not opposed Rogers initiatives, many lives would have been saved. Kissinger could be called a war criminal for opposing Rogers plan as if it was not for him, the 1973 war could have been avoided. The Egyptian-Israeli conflict could have been resolved much earlier if it was not for Nixon s personal influences of getting the Jews to vote for him in the reelection, and Kissinger s uni-polar way of thinking. The 1973 war could have been avoided if it was not for the United States blind support for its newly considered strategic asset by Kissinger. The United States saw in Israel a strategic asset against the Soviet Union, and they did not consider the humane aspect of the conflict where human being should be provided with peace, especially when seeking it, like many Egyptians before Kissinger said that the United States could not support Egypt s peace initiatives because it was the conquered country, the defeated weak one, yet when Egypt tried to restore its pride and to regain its occupied territories, the United States Pentagon sent aircrafts to support its ally, showing that it did not care about peace, neither for the Israelis nor for the Egyptians, and that all what it wants is to have superiority on any nation that the Soviet Union supports. Kissinger is a war criminal for making possible peace initiatives seem impossible and causing the 1973 war. A question arises here on how the United States treated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and whether something could have been done differently - long since 1948 and till today - to avoid all the losses, to minimize the amount of casualties, or to even save

13 Osman 13 a single life of an infant, child, man, or women. It is a question that is suggested for further upcoming researches, yet can be reflected on based on this research. Works Cited Bar-Joseph, Uri. Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and Its Failure. Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 41, no. 3, 2006, pp , Boyne, Walter J. The Yom Kippur War and the Airlift Strike That Saved Israel. New York: St. Martin's Griffin, Print. Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power : Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit Books, Print. Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, Print. Moshe Gat. In Search of a Peace Settlement : Egypt and Israel between the Wars, Bastoke, GB: Palgrave Macmillan, Print. Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity : An Autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, Print. Vanetik, Boaz, and Zaki Shalom. Nixon Administration and the Middle East Peace Process, , edited by Boaz Vanetik, et al., East Sussex, UK: Sussex Academic Press, ProQuest Ebook Central,