RMD. The Rise in Conflict Associated With Mining: What Lies Beneath? Tony Andrews & Bernarda Elizalde

Transcription

1 The Rise in Conflict Associated With Mining: What Lies Beneath? Tony Andrews & Bernarda Elizalde Principals & Co-Founders Centre for Responsible Mineral Development December 13, 2016 Presentation at Ryerson University s Institute for the Study of Corporate Social Responsibility Toronto, Ontario RMD Centre for Responsible Mineral Development 1

2 CSR A term that has become too burdened and overused? The Junk Lady From the movie Labyrinth RMD 2

3 Responsible Mineral Development & CSR CSR RESPONSIBLE MINERAL DEVELOPMENT RMD 3

4 The Rise in Conflict Associated With Mining: What Lies Beneath? CONFLICT RMD 4

5 RMD Ian Thomson Ian OCGThomson OCG Philippe Le Billon Philippe UBC Le Billon UBC CONFLICT PROJECT TEAM Tony Andrews, RMD Inc. Bernarda Elizalde, RMD Inc. Philippe Le Billon, University of British Columbia Chang Hoon Oh, Simon Fraser University David Reyes, Triple R Alliance Ian Thomson, Shinglespit Consultants Inc., EXTERNAL REVIEW COMMITTEE Steven Agbo. Senior Social Scientist, Minerals Commission of Ghana Javier Caravedo, Director Ejecutivo, ProDialogo, Lima, Peru David Reyes David Reyes Triple R Alliance Triple R Alliance PROJECT ASSISTANTS Marta Conde, Literature Review Jonathan Gamu, Literature Review Maria Jose Gonzales, Peru Field Case Study Héctor Córdova, Bolivia Field Case Study Rames Abhukara, Madagascar Field Case Study Rolando Luque, Deputy for Prevention of Social Conflicts and Governance, Defensoria del Pueblo, Lima Peru Kathryn McPhail, Independent Consultant, formerly Senior Director, International Council for Mining and Metals, Singapore Glenn Nolan, Vice President, Government Relations, Noront Resources, Former Chief, Missanabie First Nation, Ontario, Canada Margaret Wachenfeld, Director of Research and Legal Affairs, Institute for Human Rights and Business, London, UK Kernaghan Webb, Associate Professor & Director of the Institute for the Study of Corporate Social Responsibility, Department of Law & Business, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada Luc Zandvliet, Founder and Director, Triple R Alliance, Consulting Group, Ontario, Canada Emmanuel D. Tehindrazanarivelo, Chair, Department of Ethics and Systematic Theology, Ambatonakanga Faculty of Theology, Madagascar

6 Ian Thomson Shinglespit Consultants Philippe Le Billon UBC David Reyes Triple R Alliance Bernarda Elizalde RMD Chang Hoon Oh SFU

7 RMD Ian Thomson Ian OCGThomson OCG Philippe Le Billon Philippe UBC Le Billon UBC CONFLICT PROJECT TEAM Tony Andrews, RMD Inc. Bernarda Elizalde, RMD Inc. Philippe Le Billon, University of British Columbia Chang Hoon Oh, Simon Fraser University David Reyes, Triple R Alliance Ian Thomson, Shinglespit Consultants Inc., David Reyes David Reyes Triple R Alliance Triple R Alliance PROJECT ASSISTANTS Marta Conde, Literature Review Jonathan Gamu, Literature Review Maria Jose Gonzales, Peru Field Case Study Héctor Córdova, Bolivia Field Case Study Rames Abhukara, Madagascar Field Case Study EXTERNAL REVIEW COMMITTEE Steven Agbo. Senior Social Scientist, Minerals Commission of Ghana Javier Caravedo, Director Ejecutivo, ProDialogo, Lima, Peru Rolando Luque, Deputy for Prevention of Social Conflicts and Governance, Defensoria del Pueblo, Lima Peru Kathryn McPhail, Independent Consultant, formerly Senior Director, International Council for Mining and Metals, Singapore Glenn Nolan, Vice President, Government Relations, Noront Resources, Former Chief, Missanabie First Nation, Ontario, Canada Margaret Wachenfeld, Director of Research and Legal Affairs, Institute for Human Rights and Business, London, UK Kernaghan Webb, Associate Professor & Director of the Institute for the Study of Corporate Social Responsibility, Department of Law & Business, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada Luc Zandvliet, Founder and Director, Triple R Alliance, Consulting Group, Ontario, Canada Emmanuel D. Tehindrazanarivelo, Chair, Department of Ethics and Systematic Theology, Ambatonakanga Faculty of Theology, Madagascar

8 Presentation Structure 1. Project Rationale, Methodology, Approach 2. Conceptual Models 3. Results From the Individual Study Components 4. Summary of Observations & Conclusions 5. Latin American Case Studies RMD

9 100 CONFLICTS INCIDENTS PER YEAR Source: International Council for Mining & Metals (ICMM), ,002 2,003 2,004 2,005 2,006 2,007 2,008 2,009 2,010 2,011 2,012 2,013 RMD

10 Study Purpose To delve beneath the surface manifestations of conflict in order to develop a deeper understanding of: Root causes, systems and pathways What is driving the dramatic increase The players involved; roles & responsibilities Evolutionary trends over past 20 years RMD

11 Study Premises Conflict is: A normal aspect of the relationship between mining companies and stakeholders The result of the interplay of multiple actors A process with a history prior to outbreak A process with potential for both positive & negative outcomes RMD

12 Expected Outcomes 1. Improved understanding: for example a) Conflict as a process including its determinants, the players involved & their roles & responsibilities b) Conflict as an inhibitor and as an enabler 2. Improved policies, practices, tools for conflict prevention, mitigation and management 3. Development of a continuously updated database on mining and conflict case studies RMD

13 DEFINING CONFLICT FOR THIS STUDY Focus Community-level social conflict associated with the large scale mining sector Not Including Conflict Minerals, ASM, Labor-Related Conflict Conflict Definition 1. A broad definition including both negative and positive outcomes 2. Lessons can be learned from conflict cases a) With NEGATIVE outcomes b) With POSITIVE outcomes c) That simply avoided conflict Definition of Conflict The interaction of two or more parties with perceived incompatible goals, who engage each other through a range of practices including dialogue, persuasion, negotiation, arbitration, legal action, protest, intimidation and physical violence.

14 STUDY APPROACH 1. Literature Review 2. Quantitative Analysis 3. Field Investigations (18) Phase 1 Literature Review Quantitative Analysis (Compiling, Upgrading) 4 Field Case Studies Phase 2 Quantitative Analysis ( ) 14 Case Studies

15 Presentation Structure 1. Project Rationale, Methodology, Approach 2. Conceptual Models 3. Results From the 3 Individual Study Components Literature Review Field Case Studies 4. Summary of Observations & Conclusions 5. Latin American Case Studies RMD

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17 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK RMD 17

18 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK RMD 18

19 CUMULATIVE CONFLICT INTENSITY CONFLICT CONTINUUM Conflict Drivers Conflict Outbreak Field of Contextual Factors Field of Structural Factors TIME Trigger Creation of Enabling Environment Rising Tensions Conflict Outbreak

20 NORMATIVE MODEL FOR MINING RELATED CONFLICT At the Community Company Interface RESISTANCE High COEXISTENCE High Influence High Protection Low Interests are Protected High Low influence Low Protection Low influence High Protection Low 20

21 NORMATIVE MODEL FOR MINING RELATED CONFLICT At the Community Company Interface RESISTANCE High COEXISTENCE Dialogue Collaboration Low Interests are Protected High Passive Aggression Passive Acceptance Low 21

22 Presentation Structure 1. Project Rationale, Methodology, Approach 2. Conceptual Models 3. Observations From the 3 Individual Study Components Literature Review Field Case Studies 4. Observations & Conclusions 5. Latin American Case Study Detail RMD

23 Literature Review 303 Publications Reviewed 80% academia 11% CSOs 5% Industry 4% Government Seek to explain conflict & with frequent focus on voices & Interests of the communities Good practice guidance & advice to extractive companies on how to avoid conflict Focus on Latin America compared to Africa, SE Asia other parts of the world RMD

24 Literature Review Strengths Weaknesses Majority based on case study analysis Moderate detail over large number of cases Cover large historical and geographic scales Frequent lack of clearly defined variables Often presented from perspective and interests of communities & NGOs Paucity of studies from industry 24

25 Literature Review Observations 1. Rise in conflict coincides with global commodity boom 2. Rise in conflict correlates with broader rising trend in large scale protests globally 3. Conflict determinants are broadly similar across case studies and confirmed the rationale for classifying them into structural factors, contextual factors and conflict drivers RMD

26 $ Billions Comparison of Trends in Mining Sector Activity And Conflict Incidents ( ) Conflict Incidents by Year Annual Exploration Expenditures Source: International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM), Source: SNL Metals Economics Group, RMD

27 Literature Review Observations 1. Rise in conflict coincides with global commodity boom 2. Rise in conflict correlates with broader rising trend in large scale protests globally 3. Conflict determinants are broadly similar across case studies and confirmed the rationale for classifying them into structural factors, contextual factors and conflict drivers RMD

28 INCREASING WORLD PROTEST INTENSITY Rising Social Instability DISEMPOWERMENT, INEQUALITY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AUSTERITY MEASURES, CUT-BACKS ON SOCIAL SERVICES, POLITICAL UPHEAVAL (ARAB SPRING 2011) RISE OF TERRORISM Occupy Together Protest, 2011 Cold War & Anti-Apartheid Tensions Return of Political Protest Activity Relative Calm Source: The Global Risks Report 2016, World Economic Forum

29 SHARE OF COUNTRIES (UN MEMBERS) PARTICIPATING IN CONFLICT, Source: PRIO, The Peace Research Institute, Oslo

30 NUMBER OF REPORTED TERROTIST EVENTS BY YEAR, Source: PRIO

31 Literature Review Observations 1. Rise in conflict coincides with global commodity boom 2. Rise in conflict correlates with broader rising trend in large scale protests globally 3. Conflict determinants are broadly similar across case studies and confirmed the rationale for classifying them into structural factors, contextual factors and conflict drivers RMD

32 Conflict Determinants Structural Factors Global commodity boom: investment in politically risky, underregulated countries Rising social instability since 2003 History of colonialism, authoritarian rule, neoliberalism Contextual Factors Ill-designed and/or poorly implemented mineral development strategies Weak governance capacity, rule of law, corruption, lack of transparency Conflict Drivers Inconsistent corporate social responsibility practices Community willingness to use conflict as a negotiating tool RMD 32

33 Presentation Structure 1. Project Rationale, Methodology, Approach 2. Conceptual Models 3. Observations From the 3 Individual Study Components Literature Review Field Case Studies 4. Observations & Conclusions 5. Latin American Case Study Detail RMD

34 Peru Haquira, Cu Project First Quantum Advanced Exploration Las Bambas, Cu Mine MMG, Open Pit Construction Bolivia San Cristobal, Ag, Pb, Zn Mine Sumitomo, Open Pit Operating 9 years Tanzania Tanzania Bulyanhulu, Au Mine Acacia, Underground Operating 20 years Madagascar Ambatovy, Ni Mine Sherritt Intn, Open Pit Operating 4 years

35 Haquira

36 Open Pit Concentrator 1.5 kms First Quantum Camp Haquira

37 Peru Las Bambas-Haquira Chile San Cristobal Argentina

38 Salar de Uyuni San Cristobal 50 kms

39 Kenya DRC Zambia Mozambique

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42 Source: PRIO, The Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2015

43 FIELD CASE STUDIES COMPARISON OF GLOBAL INDICES (2015) Poverty: Poverty head count ratio of $1.90/day (2011PPP) (% population); World Bank, 2015 Human Development: Ranking out of 188 countries, UNDP, 2015 Governance Effectiveness, Political Stability, Rule of Law, Corruption Control: Percentile Score out of 100, World Bank, 2015

44 FIELD CASE STUDY APPROACH Field Team Bernarda Elizalde: Latin American Field Lead David Reyes: African Field Lead Ian Thomson: Field Coordinator Local Field Specialists Field Investigation Initial desk top research On-site interviews with all stakeholders 90 Man-days in the field RMD

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46 Peru: Haquira-Las Bambas Structural Factors 1. Colonialism ( ) 2. Neoliberalism 3. Poverty 4. Corruption 5. Partial democracy 6. Shining Path Activity Bolivia: San Cristobal Structural Factors 1. Colonialism ( ) 2. Neoliberalism 3. Poverty 4. Corruption 5. Partial democracy 6. Mining Cooperatives Tanzania: Bulyanhulu Structural Factors 1. Colonialism ( ) 2. Neoliberalism 3. Poverty* 4. Corruption 5. Anocracy 6. Tribal System Madagascar: Ambatovy Structural Factors 1. Colonialism ( ) 2. Neoliberalism 3. Poverty** 4. Corruption* 5. Anocracy 6. Poor Governance

47 Peru: Haquira-Las Bambas Contextual Factors 1. Lack of strategic approach to mineral development & preparation for FDI 2. Central govt control & decision-making; poorly designed decentralization 3. Govt. policies designed in favor of mining companies as opposed to citizens 4. Ineffective policies and measures for conflict prevention Bolivia: San Cristobal Contextual Factors 1. Government and society better prepared for FDI & LSM 2. Decentralization well-designed & successfully implemented 3. Balanced approach by central govt to the governance of mineral development 4. Local communities well-prepared for & supportive of mineral development Tanzania: Bulyanhulu Contextual Factors 1. Lack of strategic approach to mineral development & preparation for FDI 2. Central govt control & decision-making; poorly designed decentralization 3. Govt. policies designed in favor of mining companies as opposed to citizens 4. Government encourages ASM and informs Tanzanians that they own the resources 5. Oppression of people by police & government Madagascar: Ambatovy Contextual Factors 1. Lack of strategic approach to mineral development & preparation for FDI 2. Central govt control & decision-making; poorly designed decentralization 3. Govt. policies designed in favor of mining companies as opposed to citizens 4. Weak governance; political instability 5. Oppression of people by army & government

48 Peru: Haquira-Las Bambas Conflict Drivers Government 1. Lack of coordination among central govt agencies dealing with conflict prevention 2. Poorly designed dialogue tables 3. Unresolved land use & ownership issues Communities 4. Deep mistrust of government 5. Fragmented, competition over land rights 6. Asymmetrical distribution of benefits 7. Use conflict as a tactic in negotiations Company 8. Change in ownership & mgmt approach 9. Selective engagement with communities 10. Flawed, selective decision-making process Tanzania: Bulyanhulu Conflict Drivers 1. Central govt appointment of local authorities 2. ASM evicted to make way for LSM 3. Company well-being a priority over communities 4. Passive, non-confrontational, but underlying resentment grows; they took our gold 5. Dependency on company; dissatisfaction with benefits- us vs them attitude prevails 6. Passive aggressive; uncooperative; subversive 7. Perceived as complicit with ASM eviction 8. Frequent turnovers of mine managers-13/17 yrs 9 Inconsistent approach to workers & communities Bolivia: San Cristobal Conflict Inhibitors 1. Central govt helps to resolve 2011 crisis through dialogue tables; facilitates resolution, new agreement, reestablishment of good relations 2. Collective decision-making, trust among communities 3. Robust system of accountability, discipline 4. Willing to protest but value relationship with company 4. Committed to empowerment; shared decisions 5. Outstanding community relations team 6. Negotiated company-community agreements Madagascar: Ambatovy Conflict Drivers 1. Authoritarian govt + role of the military cause fear or reprisals to organized opposition 2. Mine construction coincides with military coup 3. Malagasy patient, tolerant, non-violent but frustration is building 4. Don t trust govt & deeply dependent on company 5. Feel that commitments by company have not been met + frustration with revenue distribution 6. Allows Catholic Church to assume advocacy role 7. Change in management during construction 8. Transactional approach to community relations

49 Peru: Haquira-Las Bambas Bolivia: San Cristobal Conflict Triggers (Outbreak) Bilateral decision between company and central govt that left out the communities Conflict Triggers (Outbreak) Communities believe that company not living up to Its commitments (2000, 2011) Tanzania: Bulyanhulu Conflict Triggers No conflict outbreak yet. Long-standing resentment and passive aggression but conflict has been contained Madagascar: Ambatovy Conflict Triggers No conflict outbreak yet but high level of dependency on company and heightened expectations fuel a significant increase in conflict potential. So far has been contained

50 HAQUIRA-LAS BAMBAS STRUCTURAL FACTORS Colonialism Neo-liberalism Partial Democratization Shining Path CONFLICT DRIVERS Central govt decision-making Lack of Inter-agency coordination Ineffective Conflict Prevention Unresolved Land Use & Ownership Issues Communities Fragmented, Competitive, Prone to Using Conflict Selective, partial Consultation Asymmetrical benefits distribution CONTEXTUAL FACTORS No Mineral Strategy Focus on FDI Policies Favoring Companies Failed Decentralization Income disparity: Urban vs Rural Lack of Trust in Government TRIGGERS Players Host Government, Company, Communities Govt-company bilateral decision to change key element of mine design without community consultation

51 RESISTANCE High COEXISTENCE Low Las Bambas MMG Haquira Interests are Passive Ambatovy Aggression San Cristobal Dialogue Xstrata Collaboration Protected Passive Bulyanhulu High Acceptance Low 51

52 Presentation Structure 1. Project Rationale, Methodology, Approach 2. Conceptual Models 3. Observations From the 3 Individual Study Components Literature Review Field Case Studies 4. Observations & Conclusions 5. Latin American Case Study Detail RMD

53 High Level Observations 1. The rise in conflict associated with mining ( ) is directly linked to the rise in global mining activity during this time 2. The rise in conflict associated with mining occurred within the context of a widespread resurgence of social instability and protest intensity driven by multiple and profound transformations worldwide 3. Organized opposition to mining is rare in Africa compared to Latin America. This is likely due to: a) Differences in history of colonialism b) Anocracy still dominant in Africa vs democracy in Latin America c) Tribal system characteristic of many African nations RMD

54 Formation of Enabling Environment For Conflict Creation or Prevention CONFLICT DETERMINANTS STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONTEXTUAL FACTORS KEY PLAYERS Colonial Powers National Governments International Institutions Host Governments CONFLICT DRIVERS (INHIBITORS) Companies Communities Host Governments Company Normative Model Community History Culture Internal Systems Attitudes Beliefs Priorities Behaviors Activism Passive Aggression Triggers Dialogue Collaboration Passive Acceptance Attitudes Beliefs Priorities Behaviors History Culture Internal Systems Company-Community Interface

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56 THANK YOU!

57 Presentation Structure 1. Project Rationale, Methodology, Approach 2. Conceptual Models 3. Observations From the 3 Individual Study Components 4. Integrated Observations & Conclusions 5. Latin American Case Study Details RMD

58 Field Case study: Peru Haquira Las Bambas RMD CIRDI

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62 The Haquira Project site RMD CIRDI

63 Ccahuanhuire Workshop to increase local s negotiation capacities Centro de Análisis y Resolución de Conflictos, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, 2014

64 Lahuani RMD CIRDI

65 Huanacopampa RMD CIRDI

66 Paranani RMD CIRDI Collective planting season: Ayni

67 Haquira Challhuahuacho RMD CIRDI

68 RMD CIRDI El Montonero e-newspaper

69 RMD CIRDI

70 Fuerabamba Alta (relocated community) Huanacopampa RMD CIRDI

71 Fuerabamba Alta RMD CIRDI

72 Fuerabamba Alta RMD CIRDI

73 Interviewees quotes - relationships Quotes Sometimes there were difficult questions, with no easy answer, but the fact we were there helped Mutual respect cannot be regulated it is earned Local people protected me from the organized crime. This alliance wasn t a written pact, it was a link that needed constant nourishment the repercussion of Las Bambas over the Haquira Project is fear to have rights breached. Some people fear that the same situation will be repeated with the Haquira Project. We (the communities) have an individualistic approaches to negotiate Representantive from: Industry Industry Industry Community member from the area of direct impact Community member RMD CIRDI

74 Interviewees quotes wealth distribution The differences in wealth between communities that receive benefits from the company and those that don t create envy and internal conflicts. (NGO) RMD Just a handful of communities receive benefits, but the rest [of the communities] don t. How can someone hungry see others eat so much? It is unfair. We all want to receive benefits. (Community member) : Locally, neoliberal ideas have prevailed since colonial times. In the past, communities were more united and ensured that all 33 communities receive benefits, not only a handful of communities. Most communities receive just leftovers Those who speak about equality are called anti-miners and terrorists (The Resistance Committee) CIRDI It would help if the mayor would work efficiently with community members to plan and manage the use of those [Canon Minero] resources. (Community member) There is no integral management of economic resources (Peruvian Ombudsman)

75 In the political arena - Proposals for the creation of more districts In favor Against Will receive direct benefits from the Canon Minero It wont allow the development of high impact projects (infrastructure projects that benefit a larger segment of the population), instead the revenues from the Canon Minero will be distributed in smaller amounts to the same number of inhabitants divided into more politically divided locations. It will empower communities. Each district will have different objectives. It will be a way to unite communities. It responds to political interests to garner more votes. It will allow new districts to manage their Canon Minero with more autonomy. It is a tactic created to divide communities, get them disorganized and weaken their ability of organize. The creation of new districts will create additional problems with water distribution. It won t be successful because there are land ownership issues between some communities that need solving. It will create more conflicts between communities. It will generate more administrative expenses. RMD CIRDI

76 Key stakeholders at the local level Haquira s Project s staff Communities located outside the area of direct impact Las Bambas Project staff Communities in the area of direct impact Small business people The resistance committee Municipality RMD CIRDI

77 Key stakeholders at the regional and national level Governor s office Presidency of the Council of Ministers - PCM Peruvian Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) regional level Ministry of Environment (MINAM) Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) RMD CIRDI

78 Field Case study: Bolivia Minera San Cristobal - Salar de Uyuni San Cristobal RMD CIRDI

79 A view of the area RMD CIRDI

80 RMD CIRDI

81 RMD CIRDI

82 RMD CIRDI

83 RMD CIRDI

84 Colcha K RMD CIRDI

85 RMD CIRDI

86 Culpina K RMD CIRDI

87 Vila - Vila RMD CIRDI

88 Rio Grande RMD CIRDI

89 Levels of Social License CO- OWNERSHIP --Trust boundary-- APPROVAL The company and the community established a marriage relationship where the baby was the mine, so we both had to take care of it as mother and father. And we have problems like any married couple. (Community member San Cristobal) Credibility boundary ACCEPTANCE Legitimacy boundary WITHHOLDING / WITHDRAWAL 89 Source: Thomson and Boutilier, 2011

90 LEGITIMATE CREDIBLE TRUSTED The Social License to Operate at San Cristobal Mine EXPLORATION CONSTRUCTION OPERATION Source: Thomson I., Boutilier R., 2011, The Social License to Operate

91 San Cristobal RMD CIRDI

92 2011 Conflict situation Latent conflict as the company has some pending matters in order to comply with the agreement known as the Mother Agreement (Acuerdo Madre). What started as a concern for improved medical attention, included a cascade of events that escalated into a conflict situation consisting of a prolonged strike and an eleven-day blockade of the mine Conflict trigger: the death of Pablo Calcina RMD CIRDI

93 RMD CIRDI As a result of the conflict Improved infrastructure for medical attention, ambulances and improvements to the road Community leaders lose their political power The union emerges as the voice of the workers in social matters The company-community dynamic is institutionalized Vila-Vila gains political power and creates a foundation for productive projects Culpina-K takes further steps - productive projects Local communities mourn the days when the relationship with the company had no third parties involved The company and communities sign a Peace and Harmony Memorandum of Understanding

94 Factors that helped in (communitycompany) negotiations Local community members have a well organized society General assembly Authorities Council (keep authorities accountable) Corregidor (with the authority to correct any misbehaviour or lack of compliance with the community. Community relations team Compliance with community rules (applicable to everyone without distinction, including community leader and company staff) Community relations team s commitments very closely monitored by the General Assembly or the Corregidor A shared identity MSC s and community s mutual learning and understanding The negotiation abilities of local communities are strategic and most often follow the rule of mutual respect and equality 90% of MSC s workforce is local.

95 THANK YOU!

96 ANALYSIS OF 167 INCIDENTS IN 2012 & 2013 CONFLICTS BY REGION (87%) Top 3 Contextual Factors (%) Benefits asymmetry (12.7) ASIA 17% (9%) AFRICA 24% (14%) LATIN AMERICA 46% (29%) Mexico Peru Chile Guatemala Policies favoring companies (12.4) Environment (10.9) Top 3 Conflict Drivers Environment (28.1) Benefits asymmetry (12.2) Consultation (10) CONFLICTS BY MINERAL TYPE Precious Metal Mining (49%) North America=Energy; Africa=Specialty Minerals CONFLICTS WITH THE HIGHEST INTENSITY N. AMERICA 9.1% ASIA 57.1% LATIN AMERICA 45.2% AFRICA 53.8 % DOMICILES OF COMPANIES INVOLVED UK 7.6% SOUTH AFRICA 7.6% AUSTRALIA 7.6% USA 8.6% CANADA 30.3%