POSC 233 Corruption, Authoritarianism, and Democracy Spring Term 2010 SYLLABUS. Professor: Alfred P. Montero Office: Willis 407

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1 POSC 233 Corruption, Authoritarianism, and Democracy Spring Term 2010 SYLLABUS Professor: Alfred P. Montero Office: Willis 407 Phone: x4085 (Office) Web Page: Office Hours: Tuesday 4-6 p.m.; Wednesday 5-7 p.m.; Thursday by appointment via Skype Skype: amontero9601 Course Description After three decades of democratization, most countries are democratic. But the quality of these democracies is questionable as many suffer from continuous problems of corruption, poor elite accountability, human rights violations, and even policies that can only be described as semiauthoritarian. This course investigates the classic regime types (totalitarianism, authoritarianism, democracy), transitions between them, and the problems of deviations from democratic norms and processes. Special attention will be paid to problems of democratic governance such as electoral fraud, campaign finance malfeasance, vote-buying, the corruption of the judiciary, and political and bureaucratic institutions created to address these issues. What is Expected of Students Students will be expected to read, think, criticize, and form arguments. That means that students must keep up in their reading assignments and attend class regularly. Students must be fully prepared at all times to discuss the readings and concepts from previous lectures. The best students will be critical but balanced in their assessments, and will develop coherent arguments that they can defend in their writing and their in-class discussion. Attendance is required. Reading Materials This course requires your purchase of two books that are presently on sale at the college bookstore: Andreas Schedler, ed Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Charles H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris, eds Corruption and Democracy in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. In addition to these texts, this course requires your study of a number of other readings and multimedia from diverse sources. These readings are all available on the course Moodle page. Additionally, I will occasionally distribute clippings from The New York Times, Journal of Democracy, Current History, and the Economist on Moodle and via . Video and audio 1

2 materials will also be posted on the course Moodle page. Other resources are available on the course web page ( Grading Assessment of the students in this course will be based on their performance on two papers, a group data gathering and coding project with written preliminary reports and a debate tournament component at the end of the term. The grade breakdown follows: First Writing Assignment 25% Second Writing Assignment 35% Group Data Coding Project Preliminary Reports: Group Dynamics: Oral Presentation: 25% (10%) (5%) (10%) Class Participation (including periodic diagnostic exams) 15% Writing Assignments Paper assignments in this course are of varying lengths. Yet they must all be typed, paginated, and double-spaced with 12cpi font size and one-inch margins (unjustified). I require the use of Times New Roman font type. Beyond these style requirements, parenthetical and bibliographic citations must follow the required format described in detail in the Bibliographic Format handout posted on the course webpage. Furthermore, students will be expected to use the checklist against the most common errors committed on papers before uploading their work. These assignments must be turned in as PDF files unless otherwise indicated by 5 p.m. in the student s hand-in folder on the Courses directory on the due date specified in the assignment handout. Late work will receive no credit. Technical problems involved in converting and uploading work onto Courses will not be accepted as a reason for late or improperly formatted 2

3 work. Students remain responsible for addressing all glitches unless they are systemic. Proper use of spelling, punctuation, and grammar is expected. Since ability to edit your own work and produce concise argument is a touchstone for assessing and developing your critical skills, students will not be allowed to surpass the required number of pages. A handout will be distributed with the particular parameters of each of these assignments well before the due date. Paper #1 The first writing assignment will ask students to select two countries that had a previous democratic experience that broke down into a type of authoritarianism. Both the process and the resulting authoritarian regime are to be compared across these two countries. This section will focus on a test of Juan Linz s theory for democratic breakdown. Then, if applicable, the student will analyze the conditions underlying the liberalization of the authoritarian regimes and subsequent transitions to democracy in each case. The focus will be on the causal importance of at least two variables governing the democratization process. This paper will require sustained research on the empirical cases, so work on this project must be initiated shortly after the handout on the assignment is posted on Moodle. This paper will be 7-8 pages in length plus endmatter (e.g., figures, tables, endnotes, and bibliography). Paper #2 This second writing assignment will act as an accompaniment to the group data coding project. Based on the data collected in this project, the student will select between 5 and 8 countries, study the variance of several indicators of democratic quality, and then design a hypothesis for testing that explains this variance. The method of analysis may range from qualitative case comparisons to quantitative techniques involving nonparametric comparison of group characteristics, cluster analysis, and linear regression. This paper will be 8-10 pages in length plus endmatter. A handout will be posted on the course Moodle page well before the assignment deadline. Group Data Coding Project After the first two weeks, small teams of students will be assembled by the professor to work on a common project involving the design and measurement of political institutional variables. The guiding principle of the project will be measuring the quality of democracy in comparative perspective and over time. This project will involve extensive data gathering and meetings with the professor to design variables measuring different dimensions of the quality of democracy. Once assembled, each team will contribute a module to a common dataset that will then be used for basic nonparametric analysis. A series of short handouts will explain the different steps of this project. Students will be assessed on their collaborative skills and their collective work products. 3

4 Class Participation Communicating your insight into the subjects analyzed in this course is an integral part of the learning experience. In no way do I consider class participation a residual category for subjectively determining the final grade. In this course, I will evaluate your performance in both formal, scheduled presentations and informal class discussion. The following are structured presentation formats that will be used in this course, in addition to the formal presentation of the group data coding project: (1) A simulation on transitions to democracy. (2) A debate tournament on the quality of democracy and the role of corruption. (3) Two case study exercises. (4) Small group discussions on selected questions and cases. In addition to these activities, occasionally students will prepare homework assignments or answer written and oral questions based on the readings and the lectures. These periodic diagnostics will assess listening and reading comprehension skills. They will compose half of the total participation score in the final assessment but will be individually ungraded. Progress and overall performance by the end of the term will dictate how the diagnostics will be assessed. The Grading Scale I will be using the following grading scale in this course: A A A B B B C C C- 67/below D/F Academic Misconduct Given the fact that academe relies upon the ethical conduct of scholars, students are held to the same standards in their own work. Any act of academic dishonesty or misconduct will be referred to the Office of the Dean. For further information, see the useful handout on Avoiding Academic Misconduct, available on the course webpage. 4

5 Special Needs Students requiring access to learning tools/special schedules approved by Student Support Services should contact me at the beginning of the course. NOTE: Readings must be completed for the dates assigned below. PART I: REGIMES AND TRANSITIONS The Murder of Democracy (Monday, March 29) Juan Linz The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, pp Types of Authoritarianism (Wednesday, March 31) Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: John Hopkins, ch. 3. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz A Theory of Sultanism: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule. In Sultanistic Regimes, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Barbara Geddes, The Role of Elections in Authoritarian Regimes. (Unpublished manuscript). Recommended for discussion on Moodle: David Collier and Steven Levitsky Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. World Politics 49:3 (April): The Outlier: Totalitarianism (Friday, April 2) Walter Laquer Fascism: Past, Present, Future. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp & Film: The Architecture of Doom (Dir. Peter Cohen, Germany). Will be screened over the weekend in LIBR 344 (time and date TBA). 5

6 The Determinants of Regime Change (1): Modernization and Social Conflict Theory (Monday, April 5) Adam Przeworksi and Fernando Limongi Modernization: Theories and Facts. World Politics 49:2 (January): Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes Endogenous Democratization. World Politics 55:4 (July): Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared Reevlauating the Modernization Hypothesis. Journal of Monetary Economics 56: The Determinants of Regime Change (2): Elite Approaches and Strategic Interaction (Wednesday, April 7) Guillermo O Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins, chs Lucan Way, Authoritarian Failure: How Does State Weakness Strengthen Electoral Competition? in Schedler. The Resurrection of Civil Society : Pressures for Transition From Below (Friday, April 9) Nancy Bermeo Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions. In Transitions to Democracy, Lisa Anderson, ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Valerie Bunce Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience. World Politics 55:2 (January): The Transitions Game: Strategic Interaction Tested in the Classroom (Monday, April 12) The Transitions Simulation Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe. In Transitions to Democracy, Lisa Anderson, ed. New York: Columbia University Press. 6

7 PART II: THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY Assessing the Quality of Democracy : Hybrid Regimes and their Varieties (Wednesday, April 14) Thomas Carothers The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy 13:1 (January): Larry Diamond Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13:2 (April): Richard Snyder, Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes, in Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism. Guillermo O Donnell Delegative Democracy. In The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2 nd Ed., eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Recommended for discussion on Moodle: Patrick Heller Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India. World Politics 52:4 (July): Elite Accountability and Government Responsiveness (Friday, April 16; Monday, April 19) Guillermo O Donnell Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization of Mistrust. In Democratic Accountability in Latin America, Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, eds. New York: Oxford University Press. Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz Social Accountability: An Introduction. In Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies, Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, eds. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Susan C. Stokes Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism By Surprise in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, ch. 6. G. Bingham Powell The Chain of Responsiveness. In Assessing the Quality of Democracy, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 7

8 Electoral Authoritarianism (Wednesday, April 21) William Case, Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena? in Schedler. Mark R. Thompson and Philipp Kuntz, After Defeat: When Do Rulers Steal Elections? in Schedler. Staffan I. Lindberg, Tragic Protest: Why Do Opposition Parties Boycott Elections? in Schedler. Class on Friday, April 23 cancelled due to the Midwest Political Science Association meetings. Machine Politics: Patronage, Clientelism, and Patrimonialism (Monday, April 26 & Wednesday, April 28) James Scott Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change. American Political Science Review 63 (December): Scott P. Mainwaring Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press, ch. 6. Simeon Nichter Declared Choice: Citizen Strategies and Dual Commitment Problems in Clientelism. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Toronto, Ontario, September 3-6. Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, and Federico Estévez Clientelism and Portfolio Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico. In Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, Herbert Kitschelt and Steve I. Wilkinson, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. Guest lecture: Simeon Nichter (Carleton Class 98), via Skype. Monday, May 3 is Midterm Break Vote-Buying (Friday, April 30 & Wednesday, May 5) F.C. Schaffer and Andreas Schedler What is Vote Buying? In Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, ed. F.C. Schaffer. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 8

9 Andreas Schedler Might Cleaning Up Elections Keep People Away from the Polls? Historical and Comparative Perspectives. International Political Science Review 23:1: Susan Stokes Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review 99 (August): Simeon Nichter Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. American Political Science Review 102 (February): Case #1: Monitoring and Re-designing an Electoral System Electoral Fraud (Friday, May 7) Jonathan Hartlyn and Jennifer McCoy, Observer Paradoxes: How to Assess Electoral Manipulation, in Schedler. Fabrice Lehoucq Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization. International Political Science Review 23:1 (January): Beatriz Magaloni The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule. American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming, Summer). The Geography of Democratic Quality: Subnational Authoritarianism (Monday, May 10) Edward Gibson Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. World Politics 58 (October): Agustina Giraudy The Politics of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Reproduction in Argentina and Mexico. Unpublished paper. Alfred P. Montero No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast. Unpublished paper. (To be presented in the Athenaeum). 9

10 PART III CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY What Does Corruption Do To Democracy? (Wednesday, May 12) John Bailey, Corruption and Democratic Governability, in Blake and Morris. Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support? in Blake and Morris. Margit Tavits Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption. American Journal of Political Science 51:1 (January): Corruption and the Economy (Friday, May14) A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lusztig Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth. International Political Science Review 27:2: Strom C. Thacker, Democracy, Economic Policy, and Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective, in Blake and Morris. Elections, Campaign Finance, and Graft (Monday, May 17 and Wednesday, May 19) Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, Francesco Trebbi Electoral Rules and Corruption. Journal of the European Economic Association 1:4 (June): Eric C. C. Chang Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation. The Journal of Politics 67:3 (August): Carlos Pereira, Marcus André Melo, and Carlos Mauricio Figueiredo The Corruption- Enhancing Role of Re-election Incentives? Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil s Audit Reports. Political Research Quarterly 62:4 (December): David Samuels Informal Institutions When Formal Contracting Is Prohibited: Campaign Finance in Brazil. In Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 10

11 Case Studies of Corruption (Friday, May 21) Eric C. C. Chang and Yun-han Chu Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies? The Journal of Politics 68:2 (May): José R. López-Cálix, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Lorena Alcázar, Local Accountability and the Peruvian Vaso de Leche Program, in Blake and Morris. Case #2: Designing Auditing Institutions to Prevent Corruption Debate Tournament: Designing Political Institutions (Monday May 24-Wednesday June 2) 11