STATE, YOUTHS AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Transcription

1 STATE, YOUTHS AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY By Kinge, Ruth Fanny Department of Political Science Gombe State University Abstract e in the fourth republic is the increase of youth violence has been marred with violence so much as to make mockery of the democratization process. A lot of works including Bangura: 1997, Momoh: 2000, Yau: 2000 have studied how the alienation and marginalization of the youth; thereby exacerbating the whole phenomenon of youth restiveness in general. However, very few works have attempted to study the relationship between competition for political power and youth restiveness since the transition to civil rule. This paper is an effort in this regard. With insights from the situation in Gombe state, the paper demonstrates how the electoral process has been subverted by hijacking the state machinery and by the exploitation of the youth- a process which has served as an impetus for the escalation of not only electoral violence but youth restiveness as well. The study relied on existing information on electoral violence in Gombe state among others. Finally the paper advocates for a comprehensive nationally coordinated youth empowerment program as a viable panacea for arresting the negative trend of youth restiveness in general. Keywords: State, Youth, elections, electoral violence, National security. Introduction Contemporary Nigeria has become a conflict prone society with the youths at the heart of most violent conflicts in the country. A recent study suggests that the youths are prosecutors of percent of violent conflicts in Nigeria (Omeje, 2007). Granted, a situation where the youths are the main prosecutors of violent conflicts is not peculiar to Nigeria alone. However, the anxiety over the Nigerian situation is as a result of the sheer magnitude, complexity, frequency, ramifications and seeming intractability of most violent conflicts the country has witnessed since the advent of democracy in 1999 especially during the various elections as was the case in Gombe State. The history of electoral violence in Nigeria dates back to the 1960s of which one of the root causes of the first military intervention in Nigeria was the massive electoral violence that erupted in the western region during the first republic (Maduagwu, 2012:41). The trends of electoral violence in Nigeria has been overwhelming ranging from the electoral violence in Oyo and Ondo states after the 1983 general elections, through to 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 general elections. These elections were marked with violence, characterized by rioting, burning of houses, vehicles and other properties. The upsurge of electoral violence especially in Northern Nigeria, which has led to massive loss of lives, internally displaced persons, suspicion and revenge and general distortion of the sociopolitical and economic wellgovernance particularly as manifested in electoral violence is a complex linkage between the 77

2 state and the youth, who are the prosecutors of the violence. According to Bangura, (1997), structural adjustment program resulted in the alienation and marginalization of the youth, thereby exacerbating the whole phenomenon of youth restiveness in general. However, with the advent of civil rule in 1999 and the rise of electoral violence, and youth restiveness in general, a lot is yet to be done in understanding the nexus between the youth and electoral theoretical underpinnings of electoral violence in Nigeria, and examples of the situations in some states in North Eastern Nigeria namely Bauchi and Gombe states, this paper is an investigation of the role of the state in youth involvement in electoral violence and the impact on internal security. To this end, the paper poses the following research questions: - What are the linkages between the State, youths and electoral violence in Nigeria? - What is the impact of youth involvement in electoral violence on internal security in Nigeria? - How can the problem of electoral Conceptual and Theoretical Issues The State A state perhaps in the most common context is seen as an organized political community within a definite territory that possesses sovereignty. In this context, the state possesses such attributes as: government, population, a defined territory and sovereignty, and is recognized in international law as a legal entity. However, a state may also refer to that political organization comprising the individuals and institutions authorized to formulate public policies and conduct the affairs of a country. Here the state is seen as a system comprising the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, military and other key institutions that co-ordinate the daily affairs of a country. Thus, while the former describes a fixed and somewhat permanent entity, the latter conception of the state is one that is particularly fluid and dynamic. For the purpose of this paper, the state is particularly seen from the latter perspective given the fact that electoral violence (as shall be demonstrated later) is a phenomenon perpetuated by the youths working in tandem with the elected officials of the state. Youth The concept of youth has been subjected to diverse interpretations and flexible usage. At one level the youth are conceptualized in terms of their futuristic role as leaders of society. It is a state of being young, and the period of life immediately following childhood; connotes a Dictionary, 1998; 1994). Youth is also defined as young men and women between ages of 15 and 24 (Soldiers 1996; Diouf 1999). Looking at the Nigerian reality, Torimiro and Laogun (2001) defined youths as young men and women between the ages of They based their argument on the expected age of entry into post-primary education or vocational apprenticeship training and 30 years being the terminal age for participation in the National Youth service Corps (NYSC). However, Obi (2006: 5) in his categorization of the youths, aptl leaders assumes the non-integration of the existing power relations in society and is a recipe for preparing the youths to perpetuate a particular mode of power relations that suggest a permanence of structures of dominance and interests, but with the entry and exit of -ordination of youths to the power structure controlled by elders in order to facilitate system stability, cohesion and continuity. Political time then becomes a conveyor belt that takes the loyal and disciplined youth into future power, when the elders pass into myth and history (Obi; 2006: 78

3 6). Thus, the danger with the categorization of the youth in terms of their futuristic role as leaders is that it implicitly relegates the role of the youth as social agents. At another level, the youth may also be categorized as the younger generation associated with protests, social revolutions or violent change. In this case, the youth become associated with energy, activism, sacrifice and ever ready to work for social transformation as a guarantee for a better and secure future (Obi, 2006: 6). This conceptualization of the youth captures the popular youth movements the United States, the pro-democracy demonstrations of June 1989 at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China and the more recent anti- globalization movements which have all been at the vanguard of the movement for change. On the one hand, the youth can be engaged in violence or criminality particularly in the context where they are victims of social decay, manipulation or exclusion from the distribution of resources and opportunities in society. In other contexts, the place of youths within a given mode of production and their access/nonvery fact of survival is embedded in conflict, then the struggle for survival for the future is ambushed by more violence that sucks in young people into the vortex of class, ethnic, In any case, it is also important to dwell on the concept of youth beyond the United Nations range of people between 18 and 24 years of age. While the United Nations has placed the age of 24 years as the upper limit, an organization like the Commonwealth has put it at 29. The emerging trend in some communities in Africa is that people in thei still see themselves as youths when they should normally be considered adults. Increasingly, youth identity in contemporary Africa has become synonymous with unemployment and poverty, in which young people continue to depend on their parents or relatives; making them be exploited by older people to act as perpetrators and victims of the production of violence. Referring to this social category as extended youths Gore and Pratten (2003: 216) perceive them as being defined irrespective of actual age, through economic and social circumstance and little prospect for future advancement. For the purpose of this paper, youths are seen as young people of ages between years of age, full of energy and readily available to engage in socio-economic and political reality that seeks to define their means of survival. Electoral Violence In recent times nations of the world have experienced myriad of violent situations ranging from electoral violence, tribal conflicts, religious violence etc. As a result violence has been used by political parties, groups seeking power to secure political control and maintain dominance over socio-economic resources. Considering its diverse nature, violence has been defined differently by different scholars while noting it is an all-encompassing phenomenon. Violence is defined as an act against an individual or group with the intent to cause injury or death with the purpose of achieving a desired goal. In thesame vein, Kolawole, (1988:125), defined violence as an illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will of or desires of others. Electoral violence is perceived as all forms of violence that emanate, at any stage from differences in views, opinions and practices during the process of elections. Furthermore, Balogun(2003:1) argues that electoral violence is the employment of violence by political parties or their supporters to intimidate opponents and threats in a democratic regime and has often accounted for seizure of political power by the use of undemocratic means such as force, noting that in some instances, violence is used to intimidate opponents in order to force them not to freely choose their candidates: whilst in 79

4 others violence is in reaction to rigging of election. Albert (cited in Nwolise, 2007:159) defined electoral violence as all forms of organized acts or threats physical, psychological, and structural aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying or otherwise influencing an electoral process. The term electoral violence has been used generically in two strands of research. In the first instance, electoral violence is seen as a sub-set of activities in a larger political conflict. In this context, electoral violence has been studied as part of the trajectory of ethnic or communal violence in heterogeneous societies such as Kenya, Sri-Lanka and India - where it has been noted that violence tends to cluster around election times (Hoglund: 2006:5). In a second approach electoral violence is seen as the ultimate kind of electoral fraud (Hoglund, 2006: 5); and electoral fraud has been defined as clandestine efforts to shape election results (Lehoueq, 2003: 223, in Hoglund, 2006:5). In another submission, (Schwartz, 2000:2) notes that electoral violence is simply violence aimed at the electoral process and is geared towards wining political competition or power through, subverting the ends of the electoral and democratic process. Mwagiru, (cited in Schwartz, 2000:3) notes that its tool of trade is the intimidation and disempowerment of political opponents. Thus, electoral violence takes place not just at election periods but also in the periods leading up to elections, during the election, and in the period immediately following elections such as during counting of ballots. In her analysis of electoral violence in conflict societies, Hoglund (2006) identifies three areas in which the precipitants of violence with regard to polling can be found. These are: firstly, the nature of conflict societies whereby the stakes involved in wining or loosing elections are sometimes fundamental to the wellbeing of entire communities. Secondly, the conflictive dimension of democracy, in which a prevailing assumption both within theory and practice has been that peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing. Finally, the third precipitant of electoral violence is the design of electoral systems and administration. The electoral mechanisms i.e. electoral administration and electoral system design are central to understanding the attractiveness of violence in some societies and among certain actors. However, Schwartz, (2000:5) contends that violence is part of nature meaning that certain human beings are so bad that they are inherently violent. Hence the only way to deal with the problem is to get rid of them. Again he maintains that, violence is seen as a result of the prevailing environment surrounding the individual. In this case it is clear that there is room to change the situation and hence alleviate or totally eliminate the violence. Hence, this view encourages political dialogue and negotiations between competing parties. National Security In every democratic society, the need to ensure law and order as well as guarantee the general safety of the citizenry is imperative. Therefore, Bellany (cited in Barry Buzan, 1991 p.81) opines that security that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur. On the same note, Nwolise (2007) states that security refers to safety, freedom from danger or risk, protection from espionage, infiltration, sabotage, theft etc. On this note, national security can therefore be defined as the measures, methods, facilities and mechanisms put in place by a state or nation to secure its citizens and resources from attacks, dangers, and infiltrations. State, Youth and Electoral Violence The history of political violence in Nigeria dates back to 1950s during the House of assemblies and general elections and subsequently the 1965 election crisis. According to 80

5 Ocheche (1997:179) elections in Nigeria have been characterized by severe violence, from 1960s general elections, till date. Ocheche (1997) argued that elections in Nigeria have not been free and fair. To this effect, Ogundiya, (2000) stated that elections in Nigeria have failed procedurally to produce legitimate governments, as elections are juggled, inflated or annulled. It can therefore be concluded that violence has been plaguing the Nigerian elections ) and have their roots from the inception of the first republic, and has been persistent. According to Nnoli, (1980:122) The elections in 1951 in Kano State saw diverse discriminations as opposition candidates were not allowed to hold public meetings, intimidations and victimization of marred with violence due to the formal address of the emir and Chiefs of the Northern region authority were increasing in number. Apart from the electoral violence which took place in the 1950s, major electoral violence took place in 1960s particularly, the 1964 federal elections, in which the main political parties constituted themselves into two main grand alliances namely the Nigerian National Alliance(NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). On the election day, supporters of UPGA were directed to boycott elections because some of their leaders were arrested and detained. This led to violence during the political season in the country. The same political violence repeated itself 1965 in the Western region. According to Bangbose, (2010:209) the struggle between the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) and Action Group (AG) to determine the leadership of the electorate, led to party agents counter-signing their own identity discs, absence of electoral officers and disappearance of ballot papers from police custody. Further, On the election day, electoral officers and two polling station agents were shot dead in the electoral office in Ibadan. (Bangbose, 2010: 210). This led to violent uprising in the west as youth went on rampage, burning of houses and other valuable properties, large scale killings as scores of Common Wealth delegates were killed in Lagos. (Bangbose, 2010:210). This situation deteriorated to the extent that the military staged a coup in January 1966 to salvage the Nigerian State. The 1983 elections was marred by severe violence as well. The presence of the military during the 1979 elections orchestrated a violence free election. The contending parties during the 1983 elections failed to accept results and the ruling party the National Party of Nigeria(NPN) was not willing to accept defeat. The immediate cause of the violence was the reaction against rigged gubernatorial and presidential elections. These reactions led to demonstrations, mass killings of politicians and their entire families and burning of houses and properties. Again the military in a coup in December 1983 took over government. However, the military stayed in power until 1993 when General Babangida annulled the presidential elections and plunged the country into another round of killings and political instability. In 1999, the military handed over to a civilian regime and another set of elections was conducted in 2003 by the Obansanjo regime. It is worthy of note that the linkage between the state, youth and electoral violence in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. The weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement apparatuses during elections have often led to a complete devastating electioneering atmosphere. This usually reflects itself in the ill-preparedness of the security agencies to offer effective security during elections. More so, some agencies like the electoral body make room for ruthless changes on voters lists thereby ensuring rigging at the polls. These conditions often lead to complete breakdown of law and order during elections. According to Kinge and Suleiman (2011:55) the rigging of elections are usually facilitated by members of the electoral board. This they maintained is done via disenfranchising eligible voters by 81

6 in favour of the ruling party, in connection with the violent youths, they facilitate thuggery and harassments. No doubt those involved in the hijacking of ballot boxes are often youths recruited by politicians/ political parties while those responsible for changes on voters registers are members of the electoral body, though the violent youths may seize the registers and effect changes, most times members of the electoral board effect these changes at a token. These conditions in Nigeria set the stage for violent elections. f the 2003 elections, the president had warned that politicians were raising private militias that could make the 2003 elections bloody (Bangbose, 2010:211). The April National Assembly and the presidential and gubernatorial elections were marred by large scale rigging, fraud and intimidation in many parts of the country (Lewis, 2003:142). This led to violent situations in some parts of the country like in Kaduna. Assuring Nigerians that the 2007 elections would be a time for war, the president stated the elections would be as mass killings occurred in various states including, Rivers State, Anambra, Ekiti, Nassarawa, and Bauchi state. Generally the 2007 elections were very bloody as the supporters of the ruling and oppositions parties brought mayhem to ordinary Nigerians. In view of the scandalous violent situation of the 2007 general elections, Adebayo and Omotola, (2007) stated that: The 2007 state and federal elections cannot have fallen short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud particularly during collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence. As a result the elections have not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigeria people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible According to Torimiro, (2005:85) the perpetrators of the acts of electoral violence are mostly youths: who are unemployed, underdeveloped, isolated, disenchanted and disgruntled at their status and bleak future. This situation is exacerbated by the nature of die-hard Nigerian politicians whose mission in government is not to render services but to make money and use this money to perpetuate themselves in power in an endless process of primitive accumulation, (Alkasum, 2008:189). Alemika (2004:5) argues that electoral violence has continually characterized Nigerian elections due to the perception of politics and political office as investment and as an avenue for the acquisition of extraordinary wealth through corruption, which is otherwise not possible through any form of legitimate vocation and enterprise. As a result, Nigerian politicians turn electioneering and elections into war fare in which violence and ethnic, religious and other forms of primordial sentiments and prejudice are employed. The 2011 elections however followed the trend of the preceding elections in Nigeria. Political campaigns and rallies were violent and bloody across the country, leading to violent polls, and particularly in Gombe State, 100 suspects of electoral violence were arrested, 71 people were severely injured, and over 300 people were attended to by the Red Cross (Sabiu et al, 2011:53). In addition, houses were burnt down, forces of law and order clashed with angry mobs, rigging, political thugs physically harassed civilians etc. However, the political thugs 82

7 used to perpetuate these atrocities during elections are the youth. For the particular case of Northern Nigeria, Haurna and Ahmadu(2011:1) stated that: the activities in the North Eastern geo-political region of Nigeria have become worrisome since the return to democracy in It has become a fashion for politicians to sponsor these thugs financially and morally in order to achieve their personal, political interest. Most of the times they mobilize these thugs from the beginning to the end of electioneering campaign/election period. It is worthy of note that, thugs used are mostly illiterate and jobless and who fall prey to desperate politicians who sponsor them as thugs. These youths are poor and desperate to earn a living therefore are always ready to serve them in any capacity. Moveh (2011) crowned it all when he stated that the fourth republic is the spate of youth violence that Moveh further observed that the Nigerian economic crisis of 1980s resulted in the alienation and marginalization of Nigerian youths hence political violence and youths become inevitable since the return to democracy in 1999 to date. More so, Umar, (2001:207) process is the main cause of political violence in most Nigerian states. Notably therefore, at the expense of the future leadership of the Nigerian state, the Nigerian politician enrich themselves financially through the state and aid massively the destruction of the lives of millions of Nigerian youths. To this effect, Ogunsawo (1994:141) observed that the drive towards primitive accumulation the chance or opportunity to plunder with abandon and without accountability the resources of the country, thus creating multi- According to Owoeye (2000:250), electoral violence is on the rise in the country as well as ethnic militias and politically motivated mobs because political elites capitalize on the existence of vast unemployed youths who are angry, hungry and willing and able to fight for dirty causes. In the particular case of Gombe State, innocent lives have been lost, properties destroyed, as a result of youth involvement in electoral violence. It is wor political landscape and electoral processes have been marred by different forms of violence, Nigeria in its most recent elections (March 29 and April 11, 2015 general elections) experienced a wind of change. The general elections experienced the use of electronic machines (similar to the regular pos machines), so many Nigerians easily adapted to the change. These machines were used during the accreditation processes across the country. Despite some challenges faced, the process was highly commendable by majority of Nigerians who saw the technological innovation as a boost to credible elections in Nigeria. It is worthy of note, that the most anticipated bloody elections ushered in the first president from opposition party in the country and most importantly, the most peaceful elections Nigeria has ever experienced since independence. Prior, to the elections, there were massive movements of Nigerians relocating to their hometowns, some moving abroad not mindful of the risks involved. Many Nigerians lost their lives in the course of the movements as well as properties. Some fell into the hands of unwanted robbery scenario and life threatening situations. At the end, the elections were peaceful and widely accepted by contending parties and for the first time in sub Saharan Africa, and incumbent president conceded defeat more so to opposition candidate. This is a landmark in the Nigeria electoral process, with scholars attributing this to increased level of political awareness among Nigeria youths and the unrestrained drive towards primitive accumulation by Nigerian politicians. 83

8 State, Youth and Electoral Violence In North Eastern Nigeria numbers of young men ostensibly to protect their votes from attempts at rigging by rival parties. However, according to community leaders, civil society activists and other residents of Gombe state interviewed by the HRW (2007), the youths were used to help rig the PDP to victory that year by stealing and stuffing ballot boxes, chasing away voters and intimidating the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officials. This was the origin of a continuing wave of violence that had by the time of Nigeri entirely out of control. According to Human Right watch in 2003, Gombe state like the rest of Nigeria is home to large numbers of unemployed youths who have little opportunity for legitimate employment or socio economic advancement. The number of unemployed youth stands at 1,537,267 and this situation renders them vulnerable (National Population Commission, 2006). As is also true across many parts of Nigeria. In Gombe state some of these youths have formed loosely organized criminal gangs and turned to violent crime to make a living. Residents of Gombe generally refer to the member of these gangs collectively as kalare or kalare boys. In parallel with other situations in the country, the kalare boys have proven easy prey for politicians who offer them small amount of money, drugs, alcohol and weapons in exchange for engaging in acts of intimidation and assault or simply to accompany their campaigns in a demonstration of muscle (HRW, 2007: 95). Since have committed not only politically related crimes but also other forms of violent abuses with complete impunity. From politically motivated attacks in 2003 their activities have degenerated into assault, rape, harassment and extortion of ordinary civilians alongside their continuing political role, most notably during the election period of During the 2007 elections campaigns and on election day, kalare thugs played a significant role; committing acts of violence and intimidation on behalf of major political parties. However, observations by the Human Rights Watch indicate that the clear majority of the (cited in HRW, 2007: 94), the PDP youth leader in Gombe sta recruitment was due largely to the fact that the ruling party had more resources to spend on hiring them. The violence perpetuated by kalare members has not been confined to election violent crime these political activities spawned. From the foregoing discussions, electoral violence is characterized Gombe state during the cannot be overemphasized. It has been observed that state institutions through their acts of commission or omission promote electoral violence. They include the police, election management bodies and the judiciary. In cases where police aid and abate the rigging of elections as well as the intimidation of voters, it means the institution that should protect the electorate is ineffective. The situation in Gombe state reveals that youths are negatively used during the election processes in the state and they constitute the political thugs as well and are often armed to perpetuate violence and ensure victory for their political Godfathers. It further reveals that though most of the political thugs are considered to be illiterate, a good number of them are literate and get involved due to joblessness. It is worthy of note that the political landscape in 84

9 Gombe has been very violent since the return to democracy in 1999 until the recent elections process. The non-violent elections in Gombe state during the 2015 general elections owes its credits to the increased level of sensitization and awareness programs that youths in the state are exposed to. This is down via the media and religious and cultural associations. Further, most youths in the daily affairs of the state.. Among the youth empowerment programs is the state. According to Mela (2015) a total 1,197 youths were successfully completed the threeweek rehabilitation in the first batch. After they were trained, the are now serving as ward, traffic and environmental marshals in the state. These marshals have so far made tremendous impact in the areas of ferreting information, sanitation, traffic control, maintaining orderliness and lots more. A good number of them were part of those selected from the state during the last army recruitment exercise. Further, 330 of the marshals were selected and trained at the Citizenship and Leadership Training Institute in Shere Hills, Jos-Plateau State. After their training, they now serve as supervisors and Monitors of the marshals. Preceding the rehabilitation programme was the empowerment of 320 youths through trainings in seven different trades from four skills acquisition centres across the state at the cost of well over N480,000 each. The graduate trainees were resettled with tools of the trades they learnt while the governor approved that an interest-free loan of N200,000 be given to each of them after fulfilling some conditions to enable them set up businesses. Another programme which the state government has embraced to alleviate poverty is the Condition Cash Transfer (CCT) scheme in collaboration with the Federal Government. As a programme under the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), the state enrolled 1,500 beneficiaries, comprising the poorest of the poor, the disabled and other less privileged persons in the state. It is worthy of note that most restive youths in the state are now gainfully employed by the state government and this has gone a long way to dissuade them from involving in criminal activities as well as electoral violence. Implications for National security It is widely accepted that electoral violence leads to insecurity as its main characteristic is loss of lives and property. Therefore the implications of youth involvement in electoral far reaching effects on the youths themselves. The nature of political activities by political political thugs, who have gained significant relevance during such periods. Youths are often engaged by politicians during elections to help secure victory for them by hook or crook. The politicians at this juncture are responsible for providing all necessary materials needed for the process of securing their victories. This no doubt has led to massive smuggling and use of arms and ammunition which they equip the thugs with for the purpose of achieving their goals and desires. What is worthy of note here is the fact that after their victory is attained, they do not remember to retrieve distributed arms, more so these young men who are in possession of these arms and ammunitions are well trained on how to use them. The resultant effect of this is that a large portion of unemployed and desperate young men are being armed, political opponents are intimidated or killed out rightly, and at times civilians are cut in the crossfire thereby constituting considerable portion of illegal arms into the hands of unauthorized persons, who use them to commit crimes against humanity. Some of these crimes have manifested themselves in the rise of insurgency in Nigeria with its base in North Eastern Nigeria. Dissatisfied with the outrageous level of corruption of 85

10 government officials and politicians in the country, the Boko Haram group perceives a nation where the poor will have social justice smile at them against a socio-economic and political order in which the poor get poorer and the rich politicians and government officials get richer. This has led to a wide spread campaign against westernization and the grouping of young school pupils, unemployed youths to rebel against the government with the zeal to institute a political system which would be free of corruption and ensure fairness as well as religious sanity. Violent electoral activities scare away a good number of the electorate from participating in the process. Apathy is one of the worst negative experiences of a democratic experiment. It gives the few evil political gladiators the opportunity to vote or declare their unpopular candidates winners where the opposite should have been the case thus leading to the election of the wrong persons which would be dangerous to the entire polity. The election of the wrong people into political offices in Nigeria leads to poor leadership that cannot drive home the visions of the country leading to destruction and underdevelopment. Electoral violence is also capable of launching the country into more chaos or total anarchy or lawlessness as a result of wanton deaths and destruction of private and public property. This situation can lead to severe perception of high level of insecurity in the country, as this situation scares many away from participating in the political process in the country. Example is the nature of political campaigns and rallies which took place in the run-up to the 2015 elections, like the situation in which a serving President was attacked in Katsina and Bauchi states and bomb detonated in an APC rally arena in Port Harcourt (On the eve of the National Assembly elections held on 9 April 2011, a bomb attack at the INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, killed at least 10 people and injured several others (Ploch 2012: 7). There were also bomb explosions in the Northern city of Maiduguri, Borno State, where the Boko Haram Islamic militant group is most active (Bekoe 2011). A few months before the 2011 general elections, over 200 persons had lost their lives in communal unrests in Plateau State (Amnesty International 2011: 6). Furthermore, there were reports of election-related assassinations of political candidates and their supporters, and clashes between party supporters ( Orji & Uzodi, 2012). The implication of electoral violence on national security is overwhelmingly despicable. These has displayed itself in the massive dislocation of persons who most times are forced to migrate to other places as refugees both within and outside the country. Furthermore, electoral violence ensures the usage of valuable resources both human and natural meant for developmental purposes in combating crimes. Conclusions and Recommendations This study has attempted to show that there is a complex linkage between the state, youth and state machinery in the scramble for appropriation of state resources is what has facilitated the spate of electoral violence and youth restiveness in general. With evidence from Gombe state the study has shown that in addition to the parasitic nature of the dominant class, unemployment and poverty have been major factors facilitating the spate of electoral violence thugs to subvert the electoral process in the state. Considering the gains that come with their association with politically related criminal activities, youth recruitment into political thuggery since the return to democracy in Gombe State has been very hypnotizing with more youths getting recruited by the day. This high level of youth unemployment ensures their vulnerability to political thuggery in exchange of some gifts in terms of cash or kind while the general public suffer the consequences. Until these underlying issues are addressed the campaign against electoral violence and youth restiveness cannot yield positive results. 86

11 That Nigeria has not had a comprehensive nationally coordinated youth empowerment programme is not an overstatement. Especially in the light of the fact that efforts at developing the youths have been superficially represented as part of broader economic development blueprints. Indeed, only recently has the role of youths as social agents become recognized. It is therefore proposed that to arrest the negative trend of electoral violence and youth restiveness a specialized agency with the necessary legal backing independent from the government should be established at the national, state and local government levels; particularly for the task of empowering the youth. This is imperative because in a situation where the youths are gainfully engaged they are likely to evade being subjected to the manipulations of the political class. There is also the need for the establishment of sustainable electoral reforms and political orientation and awareness mechanism for the electorate as well as increased capacity and skill of the electoral officers. This will help equip them with system. The need to increase manpower capacity particularly of the security agencies to save life and properties during elections is not an understatement as well. References Ake, C. (1996), Is Africa Democratizing?; Lagos Malthouse Press: States, Politics And Elections in Nigeria: The example of the Northern Allen, J (2013) "The Catholic Church: What Everyone Needs To Know", Oxford University Press London. Amnesty International, (2004) "Keep away from Schools or We ll Kill You: Education Under Attack in Nigeria. Amnesty In The 2011 Post Elections Violence Page 6. Bangura.Y. (1994): The Search for Identity: Ethnicity, Religion and Political Violence, Mimeo. Bekoe D. Run, But Most Violent Institute of Peace: Peacebrief Access 16 Nov, 2015 Bellany Jan ( International Security in Post-Cold War Agenda for Gore.C. and Pattern. D. (2003): The Politics of Plunder: The Rhetoric of Order and Disorder in Southern Nigeria, African Affairs, Vol. 102, No 407. Guttschuss Eric (2001) IRIN News, "Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals", IRIN News, Nairobi, 18 July Hoglund.K. (2006): Electoral Violence in War Ravaged Societies: The Case of Sri-Lanka, A Paper Prepared for the Workshop on Power Sharing and Democratic Governance in Divided Societies, Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, Sweden. Niger: (The case of 2007 general elections in Borno State. Jorunal of Social Sciences. Kaduna State University. Vol. 3,#2 Kolawol D. (1988) Political Violence- A case study of Ondo State, in V Ayeni and K. 87

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13 Reif.M. (2005): Electoral Violence as a Political Strategy: How Institutions Define and Have been defined by Electoral Conflict in Mature and Emerging Democracies. Dissertation Summary, Unpublished Paper. 2011;Ibadan. ntial election fallout: 43 killed, 4500 displaced, Nigerian tribune, Samuel A. Ekanem, Jacob A. Dada and Bassey J. Ejue, "BOKO HARAM AND AMNESTY: A PHILO-LEGAL APPRAISAL" International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 4, New York [Feb 2012] Schwartz, B. (2000). Self-determination: The tyranny of freedom. American psychologist, 55(1), 79. Snyder.J. (2000): From Voting to Violence, New York and London W.N. Norton and Company. Journal of Agriculture. Wyn.J. and White (1997): Rethinking Youth, London, Sage. factors associated with youth Yau.Y. (2000), The Youth, Economic Crisis and Identity Transformation: The Case of Yandaba in Kano, in Jega (ed), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Nordic Africa Institute and Center for Research and Documentation, Uppsala and Kano. Letters to INEC National Chairman, Maurice Iwu, from ANPP Gombe State Secretariat, Gombe, April 14 th and 16 th 2007, copies on file with Human Rights Watch. 89