NIGERIA S CRITICAL MOMENT

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1 NIGERIA S CRITICAL MOMENT Preventing Election Violence March 2015 Introduction Youth in Plateau disseminate non-violence messages during a peer-to-peer voter awareness event. Mercy Corps OVERVIEW Deep concerns about violence pervade the anticipation of Nigeria s critical 2015 national and state elections. Since the elections were postponed in early February, expectations around violence have fluctuated within a tense environment of mistrust, suspicion, and anxiety. Fear of insecurity has been further heightened by Boko Haram s recent threats to attack polling centers amid an uncertain future for Nigeria s Northeast region. While national-level power struggles featuring a win at all costs approach and limited democratic infrastructure frame this heightened anxiety, election-related violence has its roots at least partially in ongoing competition over natural and political resources, existing fault lines across identity groups, and perceptions of governance shortcomings. Recent Mercy Corps research in the North Central region highlights the deep divides in Nigeria that have laid the groundwork for an incendiary election season. This brief summarizes community perceptions of causes and triggers of election-related violence and recommends a path forward for international and domestic non-governmental actors to support peaceful engagement in Nigeria to stem violence now and prevent violence later. KEY FINDINGS Competition for scarce resources between identity groups is still the most pressing source of tension in many communities. 53% of community members, sampled from rural or semi-rural areas, cited either land access or crop destruction as the primary cause of conflict, even in the months immediately preceding the elections. Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 1

2 Limited confidence in government institutions and perceptions of social exclusion perpetuate deep grievances among communities. The perception, particularly among youth, that government leaders lack an interest in community challenges, the ability to address issues, or the legitimacy to enforce solutions is common across conflict-prone areas. Certain ethnic and religious groups report feeling marginalized from political processes and social services, further exacerbating tensions and setting the stage for electoral violence. State-level elections may be more violent than national elections. In rural or semi-rural communities identified as at-risk for electoral violence, 14% of respondents predicted violence in their community during or after the presidential and national assembly elections. Nearly 20% predict violence in their community during or after the state-level elections, reflecting tense local power struggles among identity groups. While the underlying causes of long-term conflict are complex, specific violence triggers have already emerged in the pre-election phase and may lead to far worse violence during and after the elections. These triggers include electoral misconduct, party competition, corruption and bribery, voter intimidation, and property destruction. KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Support, or in some places help to create, inclusive and accessible public forums or other processes for grievances to be resolved peacefully and transparently. We know already that community members will have grievances over the election process -- about the way polling was conducted, behavior of key actors, or clashes between groups. Donors should allocate funding now to help support or establish dialogue forums at local, state, and national levels to ensure that communities have platforms to process concerns after the elections. If community members feel they are part of a legitimate process of improvement, they may be less likely to participate in violence. Leaders across conflict lines jointly analyze election-related risks in Kaduna. Mercy Corps Connect leaders to one another across agencies and to communities. Dispute resolution and coordination mechanisms vary in effectiveness across locations. Investments should be made to support a coordinated network of leaders across communities and conflict systems to strengthen governance systems while drawing on the assets of traditional institutions in managing conflict. Engage the business community for advocacy related to electoral processes. The business community of Nigeria has considerable leverage among policy makers and can influence candidates to avoid using hate speech and encourage peaceful electoral processes. Donors can engage high-level business leaders while civil society organizations and NGOs can engage the business community on a local level. Allocate contingency funds now for badly hit states and react quickly to escalations in violence. Though select states are already identified as high-risk, violence is ultimately difficult to predict with certainty and will depend in part on the outcome of the elections. Donors should set aside resources that can assist the states most affected by electoral violence. These funds may be used to establish peacebuildling and postviolence trust-building activities, fund quick impact projects, or rebuild damaged infrastructure in states that need it most. Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 2

3 Background WHAT S AT STAKE After Nigeria s 2011 elections, riots in 14 Northern states left businesses, churches, and houses looted and destroyed. Over 1,000 people died and more than 74,000 were displaced. 1 Since then, communities, civil society, government, and security forces have feared a reprise of a similar or greater magnitude. The stakes are high: the ruling People s Democratic Party, led by southerner President Goodluck Jonathan, is threatened by the plausible specter of its first loss since Nigeria s return to democracy in Meanwhile, the All Progressives Congress has coalesced around third-time presidential candidate and northerner General Muhammadu Buhari, who has rallied massive support largely on a platform of improved security and reduced corruption. While political allegiance is not strictly ethnic- or religious- based, the contest has reignited tensions around zoning rotating power between the largely Christian south and the largely Muslim north and the closeness of the race begets concerns that whichever party loses will claim foul play, either inciting or condoning violence. Tussles over both logistics (ie. the use of Permanent Voter Cards and electronic card readers) and legitimacy (ie. the credibility of the Independent National Electoral Commission, INCEC ) have heightened tensions since the initial election postponement, which was announced one week before Nigeria s elections were first scheduled to take place on February 14. Already, the long pre-election phase has featured an uptick in political violence. Violence levels have increased in the four states included in this study in the last ten weeks: between January 1 and March 15, 2015, there were at least 65 different violent conflict events in Benue, Kaduna, Plateau and Nasarawa States alone, resulting in 200 recorded conflict-related deaths. 2 MERCY CORPS APPROACH TO PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT AROUND THE ELECTIONS Through the Promoting Peaceful Communities around the Elections (PPCE) program, funded by the U.S. State Department s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Mercy Corps has worked on preventing electoral violence in Plateau and Nasarawa states since Mercy Corps has also integrated electoral violence prevention into all of our conflict management work, including Conciliation in Nigeria through Community- Based Conflict Management and Cooperative Use of Resources (CONCUR), funded by UK Department for International Development (DFID) and operating in Plateau, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Benue states, and the Plateau-based Inter-Religious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (IPNN) program, funded by the GHR Foundation. 3 Youth in Nasarawa lead a non-violence rally through neighboring communities. Mercy Corps 1 International Crisis Group. Lessons from Nigeria s 2011 Elections. Africa Briefing No. 81, 15, Sept Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED), updated 14th March The findings of this research and recommendations in this report reflect Mercy Corps views and do not reflect the opinions and views of the U.S. State Department, UKAID, or the GHR Foundation. Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 3

4 Our work is grounded in the following approaches: Facilitating joint risk assessment and problem-solving: Over the past year, we have brought together opposing groups to analyze risks and plan for ways they can jointly prevent electoral conflict. Projects include voter education campaigns led by Muslim and Christian leaders in hard-to-reach communities; joint documentation and complaint filing of issues related to Permanent Voters Cards; the establishment of a security hotline to report fraud at polling stations; and joint peace messaging by religious leaders. As one youth leader said, There has never been a time when massive awareness was held this way, more so at places of worship, markets, hospitals, and so on. Strengthening relationships between government and communities: Through multi-stakeholder forums hosted at the local government houses, key actors local government officials, security personnel, INEC officers, religious leaders, youth leaders, traditional leaders, and women leaders have shared information and coordinated around security and peacebuilding activities. These forums will also serve as a badly needed platform for coordination if fighting breaks out after the elections, and for violence prevention when the elections are long over. Putting youth at the center of violence prevention: In three months, we have engaged more than 1600 youth to educate and encourage their communities around nonviolent participation in elections. Youth leaders have joined together across conflict lines to create violence prevention plans they are implementing before, during, and after the elections. As one youth leader said, I have been one of those involved in violence, but since engaging in the program, I have been an advocate for peace and it has given me a feeling of importance. METHODOLOGY The findings presented in this brief are based on the PPCE baseline survey of 906 randomly selected community members across six Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Nasarawa and Plateau, conducted in October and November 2014, as well as 35 key informant interviews of local traditional and religious leaders. These LGAs were selected on the basis of their relatively high risk of election-related violence. 4 Additional information has been gathered through ongoing monitoring of PPCE, CONCUR, and IPNN. 5 This research is intended to complement the sizeable body of articles, analysis, and opinions concerning Nigeria s elections and the potential for violence. This study is not intended to be comprehensive; rather, we present key findings from quantitative and qualitative research conducted with local community members and grassroots leaders those most likely to be affected by election-related violence. Finally, Mercy Corps engages frequently with the Nigeria government and coordinates around violence prevention activities. This research brief specifically targets the community of international donors and operational implementers working to support the people and government of Nigeria in order to help advance our collective efforts to mitigate election-related violence. 4 The target states and rural communities are outside of the widely known hotspots such as Kano, Kaduna, Rivers, and Lagos states, where urban violence may escalate. 5 The full PPCE baseline report is available upon request. Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 4

5 Key Findings 1. In many communities, competition for scarce resources between identity groups is still the most pressing source of tension. Violence around elections is a recurring phenomenon across the Middle Belt and other regions in Nigeria, but election-related violence should be seen as part of wider instability in the region. Broadly, disputes between pastoralists and farmers arise from disagreements over the use of land around farmland, grazing areas, stock routes, and access to water points for both animals and households. Many inter-communal conflicts take on ethnic and religious hues a majority of farmers are Christian and a majority of pastoralists are Muslims and are exacerbated along identity lines. Almost half (44%) of survey respondents cited disputes related to land and trespassing as a major cause of tension between communities. When asked about the main causes of conflict, there was considerable consensus among key informants that Most times [the conflict is] between communities and it s about land. In addition to the broad category of land disputes, nine percent of survey respondents cited crop destruction, a closely related issue, as a major cause of tension between communities. Furthermore, lack of trust may both contribute to and stem from resource-based conflicts, forming part of an erosion of social cohesion that leaves communities less equipped to prevent violence. Thirty-six percent of respondents reported that they did not trust members of the other group at all, with a further 38% reporting they trust them only to a small or very small extent. Only 15% of respondents reported trusting members of the other community to a great or very great extent. Low rates of trust also correspond to low rates of interaction between communities: for instance, when respondents were asked whether they had interacted with people from the other group in the past six months, sites with lower levels of interaction also showed lower rates of trust between communities. Only 6% of survey respondents identified political causes, including elections and political competition, as the top source of tension between communities, although these rates did vary across LGAs, and reached levels as Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 5

6 high as 16% in one LGA. One in five community leaders interviewed referred to political tensions explicitly when asked about the triggers of violent events within the last six months. The fact that elections are not themselves a key driver of violence does not mean the political process is unrelated to the escalation of conflict. Elections are pivotal junctures in the ongoing competition between communities supporting rival candidates and the politicization of competition over resources. 2. Limited confidence in government institutions and perceptions of social exclusion perpetuate deep grievances among communities. Low levels of perceived political legitimacy and high levels of perceived corruption and self-interest feed into conflict, with communities often perceiving political leaders as either unconcerned with their challenges or unwilling to address them. As resource-based conflicts polarize communities, they also deepen the divide between people and their government officials. Political leaders contributions to peace were contrasted with those of other community leaders, as one focus group reported: Both the religious and the traditional leaders work together in the same way to resolve conflict. They always call gatherings to address peace issues, unlike the political leaders who are more interested in their votes and not the peace of the people. Another group attributed poor political responsiveness to conflict to a lack of interest by politicians in communities: The politicians don t even show up at that point [of conflict] because maybe they don t care about their people. One respondent group reported that Politicians do not keep to their words; they are not at all important in the community. Another said that they faced challenges in raising issues with their representatives: It is difficult to access a politician because they only come to our community during election periods. Combined, these responses point to a lack of legitimacy among political leaders and democratic deficiencies that undermine the ability of community members to peacefully and constructively address and resolve issues, such as access to resources. Youth in Nasarawa spread messages of peace in their area. Mercy Corps Because of complex and varied histories of the political participation of different ethnic, religious, and geographical groups, different communities have unique grievances as well. One pastoralist youth said, Previously our ballots papers were torn and we were told that our population is insignificant. These sources of frustration over long-term exclusion may also erupt at election times. One community member said, We have been here for more than a century yet the people see us as visitors, and government does not recognize us. No indigene certificates are issued to us. This is also a source of conflict. 6 Other groups feel excluded at different points of political processes, which may lead to violence aimed either at the group perceived to have more power or at political figures. 6 Issues over indigene and settler status vary across states and localities and have practical implications over access to political office and other resources. Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 6

7 3. State-level elections may be more violent than national elections. Contests for power and competition between groups, communities and different stakeholders rage at the local, state and national levels. While similar conflict drivers affect each of these processes, the risk of violence, and corresponding vulnerability of communities to conflict, differs considerably across states and LGAs. An average of one in five (19%) survey respondents reported that violence during or after the state gubernatorial and house elections was either somewhat or very likely in their communities, while a smaller, but still significant 14% reported this for national presidential and house elections. Where geographic and identity groups feel they are not adequately represented in government, particularly at local and state levels, and groups perceive that resources are distributed along identity lines or based only on political relationships, communities may be likely to participate in violence. Communities or identity groups also tend to vote candidates that they feel will represent their interests in terms of community development and resource distribution. These overlapping cleavages of ethnicity, religion, and politics can reinforce a sense of mutual distrust, hostility, and competition between communities, which can be manipulated by politicians. And when certain groups are disenfranchised, they may resort to violence. When youth were asked if violence is expected in their communities during the elections, one respondent said, There will be violence in our LGA if pastoralists are denied their voting rights. The importance of addressing these local power struggles while building coalitions across identity lines is paramount. Furthermore, targeted political assassinations on a local level have already occurred in the pre-election period and risk inciting further violence each time. Since January 2015, at least 15 incidents of targeted political killings, abductions or assaults on candidates and their supporters in orchestrated attacks have been recorded in Benue, Kaduna, Plateau and Nasarawa states alone. These events are particularly destabilizing when an ethnic or religious group is perceived as targeted. Perpetrators are rarely identifiable in reports of violence, and even more rarely prosecuted. In addition to presenting a challenge for the successful identification and trial of perpetrators, unattributed violence of this nature may also have a damaging effect on voter confidence in the political process and elite accountability in a context of escalating tensions. 4. Specific violence triggers have already emerged in the pre-election phase and may lead to far worse violence during and after the elections. In key informant interviews, community leaders identified a number of issues that could cause violence in their communities in the run-up to, during, and after elections. These trigger events were echoed in the Mercy Corpsled election risk assessment and joint action planning sessions across communities: Perceived electoral misconduct. Respondents expressed concern that violence may be triggered by perceived failures to coordinate and conduct elections fairly, including electoral misconduct, vote rigging, forging ballots, and ballot snatching. Related issues include hoarding of election materials, the establishment of polling booths in areas where a particular party or candidate has high political support, multiple voting by some voters, and disenfranchisement of other eligible voters. Party competition. A related category of issues listed by key informants as potential drivers of electoral conflict was the political process itself: party support, party differences and the imposition of candidates were all cited as potential causes of violence, and concern the internal coordination and organization of party bureaucracies, alongside intra- and inter-party hostilities. One leader said, Imposition and open support of candidates by government officials, or imposition of unpopular candidates, is a big challenge. Corruption and bribery. Among secondary causes cited in key informant interviews, the theme of bribery featured prominently, further indicating that community leaders have a low rate of confidence in the transparency and credibility of at least some electoral proceedings. When asked about the biggest gaps in Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 7

8 violence prevention and response around elections, one key informant said, The biggest gap is that politicians are very corrupt; they come and bribe everyone and this causes violence. Voter Intimidation: Leaders and community members anticipate that political thugs will continue to be employed to intimidate people and spark unrest at the polling centers. In interviews, the insufficient provision of security during elections was cited by multiple key informants as a top issue of concern. Property Destruction. Political party operatives and hired supporters routinely engage in tearing and destroying opposition billboards and posters to give their party an edge. Youth focus group discussion respondents reported that this action can trigger violence, especially in situations where tensions already run high. Finally, and expectedly, when the winning candidates are announced, and the verdict is seen as unjust or fraudulent for one of the parties, the likelihood of an outburst of violence is high; this is particularly likely given the widespread rumors of rigging, on both sides, that have characterized the pre-election period. Recommendations Through the primary research presented in this brief, consultation with local partners, and years of connecting with local communities, we recommend the following actions for international donors and NGOs, as well as Nigeria-based NGOs and civil society organizations working to help prevent election-related violence in Nigeria. Tailor policies, responses, and programming to particular sites and systems of conflict. Findings from our surveys and qualitative interviews suggest that the most significant determinations of the fear and likelihood of violence are location-specific. Donors, policy makers and practitioners should recognize the uniqueness of each site in its conflict and political dynamics and should approach electoral violence prevention activities in a highly tailored, community-specific way. Nigerian and international NGOs working in Nigeria should be consulted frequently from now until April to provide updates on situational changes and recommend program and policies adjustments accordingly. Support public forums or other existing processes for grievances to be discussed and resolved peacefully and transparently with broad community support. Regardless of the outcome, we know already that community members will have grievances over the election process, about the way polling was conducted, behavior of key actors, or clashes between groups. Donors should allocate funding now to establish dialogue forums at local, state, and national levels to ensure that communities have a platform to share concerns. If community members feel they are part of a legitimate process of improvement, and if they know that their concerns will be heard, they may be less likely to participate in violence. Leaders in Kaduna develop joint conflict prevention plans for the pre-election period Mercy Corps Connect leaders to one another across agencies and to communities. Dispute resolution and coordination mechanisms vary in effectiveness across locations, and can be unstructured and inconsistent. However, specific types of leaders, such as traditional and religious leaders, were perceived to be very effective in resolving disputes while others were Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 8

9 not, including representatives of more formal institutions such as security services and political institutions: for example, 64% of survey respondents cited traditional leaders as always successful in resolving conflicts nonviolently, compared with a 24% rate for government, and fewer than 5% for security forces. Investments should be made to support a coordinated network of leaders across communities and conflict systems to strengthen governance systems while drawing on the assets of traditional institutions in managing conflict. Engage the business community for effective, sustainable advocacy related to electoral processes. The business community of Nigeria has considerable leverage among policy makers and can influence candidates to avoid using hate speech, encourage peaceful electoral processes, and support peaceful concessions. Mercy Corps knows through other advocacy work that the business community can be a strong voice for change. Donors can engage high-level business leaders while civil society organizations and NGOs can engage the business community on a local level. Elevate stakeholders who may be excluded from the process, including women and youth leaders. Mercy Corps research suggests that the perceived effectiveness of different stakeholders in conflict prevention and dispute resolution varies considerably, both across roles, and in the eyes of different respondents. Donors, policy makers and practitioners should seek to build the capacity of community leaders with strong, established roles in conflict resolution, while targeting funding and assistance specifically toward increasing the capacity of youth and women who may not presently be well-integrated into conflict resolution processes. Allocate contingency funds now for badly hit states and react quickly to escalations in violence. Though select states are already identified as high-risk, violence is ultimately difficult to predict with certainty and will depend in part on the outcome of the elections. Donors should set aside resources that can assist the states most affected by electoral violence. These funds may be used to establish peacebuilding and postviolence trust-building activities, fund quick impact projects, or rebuild damaged infrastructure in states that need it most. Ensure adequate security at polling stations and in high-risk communities during elections and announcements. This study finds that a lack of security around the elections is perceived as a significant risk factor among community members. Recent threats by Boko Haram of specifically targeting polling stations increase this risk. Heightened coordination across security actors and with INEC will be critical to ensure that polling units are protected and key high-risk areas are more secure when the national and state winners are announced. Continue to fund long-term stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. Our research reinforces the understanding that political tension often exacerbates existing, longstanding conflicts across Nigeria. Donors should take this opportunity to think through long-term strategies and assistance structures that will contribute to peacebuilding efforts and improved governance across the country, particularly in the conflictaffected Northeast, Middle Belt, and Niger Delta regions. As risk of election violence and the highprofile insurgency in the Northeast have increased focus on Nigeria s prospects for stability, the time to support long-term security in Nigeria is now. Leaders in Kaduna discuss violence prevention activities. Mercy Corps Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 9

10 45 SW Ankeny Street Portland, Oregon mercycorps.org CONTACT LISA INKS Director of Conflict Management Mercy Corps Nigeria BEZA TESFAYE Research and Learning Advisor Mercy Corps MADELINE ROSE Policy and Advocacy Advisor Mercy Corps Nigeria s Critical Moment: Preventing Election Violence MERCY CORPS 10