China s New Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. China Relations Taylor Fravel

Transcription

1 China s New Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. China Relations Taylor Fravel How has Chinese diplomacy changed in recent years, and what implications do the patterns of change hold for U.S. Sino relations? Where exactly is China headed in the twenty-first century, and how might its course likely affect world affairs? In a world that has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001, what is the state of the U.S. China relationship? The starting point for such an assessment is to note just how much the U.S. China relationship has improved in the last fifteen years. The change is indeed remarkable, especially when compared to the countries tumultuous ties throughout the 1990s in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. In 2000, for example, then candidate George W. Bush belittled the Clinton Administration s notion of a constructive partnership and referred to China as a competitor. Yet today, the buzzword around the U.S. State Department is of a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship with Beijing. In September 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed that the United States enjoyed the best relationship with China since President Nixon s historic visit to that country thirty years ago. This statement is perhaps a bit too optimistic. Still, relations are certainly the best they have ever been since In 2003, not only did President Bush stand beside Premier Wen Jiabao and laud both countries as partners in diplomacy, but when Vice President Dick Cheney visited China in March 2004, he too extolled the amazing relationship. One telling indicator of just how much relations have improved is that President Bush and Jiang Zemin, the previous general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, held four meetings within Bush s first thirteen months in 1

2 office, many more high level meetings than occurred in the Clinton Administration during a similar time span. What factors explain the relationship s surprising turnaround? One key factor was China s strategic decision to pursue closer, more stable ties with the United States. In late 2000 after the U.S. presidential election, China moved to pursue more cooperative and less combative relations with Washington. This decision grew out of a series of meetings held by China s political leaders and foreign policy elites that conducted a wide-ranging reassessment of China s international strategy. In the preceding eighteen months, U.S. China relations had grown increasingly tense, epitomized by the accidental 1999 American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Then, many Chinese debated whether their country faced not just a competitive, but also an increasingly adversarial relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, by late 2000 China s leaders had concluded that good relations with Washington were essential to maintaining China s domestic modernization and rising standards of living two factors deemed essential to maintain the Chinese Communist Party s hold on power. Good ties with the United States ensured access both to key markets for Chinese products and to foreign capital for domestic investment. Immediately following this course change, but before the EP-3 incident near Hainan Island, China dispatched a senior-ranking diplomat to Washington in March 2001 to take the first steps toward improving bilateral ties. This strategic decision is one factor that explains where we are today. A second factor in the turnaround of U.S. Sino relations is what might best be called the strategic reverberations of September 11. For U.S. China relations, September 11 constituted a tectonic shift in the international system. Before 9/11, U.S. strategic attention had focused increasingly upon China as a potential long-term threat. In the wake 2

3 of the EP-3 incident, for example, the Pentagon published its Quadrennial Defense Review, which contained a number of not-so-subtle references to security concerns in the Asia Pacific region and the need to deploy more American forces there to address them. September 11, however, changed the U.S. perspective. Once war began in Afghanistan and preparations were made to invade Iraq, Washington not only found a quasicontainment policy toward China less desirable, but also realized that such a strategy even if desired could not be achieved given the limitations of America s current military force structure and commitments elsewhere in the world. To prosecute the war on terrorism effectively, the United States not only needed Chinese cooperation, but would likely have a long-term focus in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, not East Asia. Thus, for Washington, good relations with China became a priority. On the Chinese side, 9/11 opened a window of opportunity to improve ties significantly with the United States. Seizing the moment, Jiang Zemin became one of the first world leaders to call President Bush and express condolences for the 9/11 attacks. These steps were unprecedented. Even five years ago, no Chinese leader would have used a telephone to conduct high profile diplomacy, much less as a tool to build a personal relationship with another world leader. In the year that followed, China supported the U.S. position in the United Nations, including Security Council resolutions #1573 (regarding use of force in Afghanistan) and #1441 (regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). Previously, China would likely have abstained from voting on these resolutions or even threatened to veto them. Instead, China voted affirmatively to support both U.S.- sponsored resolutions precisely to maximize the opportunity 9/11 had created to strengthen its ties with Washington. 3

4 China s New Diplomacy The central question, of course, is whether this turnaround in relations will endure. Here, several factors point to continuity. To begin, China s ability to continue its economic reform program depends heavily upon a cooperative relationship with Washington. China s leaders realize that their long-term domestic legitimacy turns on continued rising standards of living, and that the best way to ensure this is to perpetuate the reforms that began in 1979, which redirected China from a socialist economic system toward an essentially market-based one. In the process, China has come to rely on the United States and other advanced industrialized nations as markets for its products, capital sources to fuel domestic investment, and suppliers of critical technologies. A second factor that suggests the continuity of improved U.S. China relations is the new style of diplomacy that China has exhibited in recent years. Foreign policy is always designed to serve a political leader s domestic priorities. China s leaders prize four basic goals, of which the first and most important is to stay in power. Simply put, the leadership would rather not see power devolve to someone else. To avoid this fate, China s leaders pursue three ancillary goals. This first is to ensure China s security and territorial integrity especially in the face of countervailing pressures from ethnic minorities, many of whom reside along China s frontiers with bordering states and do not necessarily see themselves as being part of China. The second is to deepen economic modernization and reform to maintain annual growth rates of 8 or 9 percent. The third ancillary goal is to achieve unification, specifically with respect to Taiwan. 4

5 None of these goals, of course, are new in and of themselves. Whether it is establishing a peaceful environment to support economic modernization, ensuring greater flows of trade and foreign direct investment, or securing the unification of Taiwan with the mainland, these are basically the same goals that Deng Xiaoping established when he started China s reform drive in What is new, however, is how China s leaders have pursued these priorities, especially since Put simply, China has become a much more nimble, sophisticated, and, at times, more constructive player on the international stage. This new behavior stems in large part from new thinking about China s role in the world. Throughout much of the 1970s, 80s, and even the early 1990s, China saw itself as a victimized developing country, which had been suppressed by Western imperialist and capitalist powers. Today, China views itself much more as a great power, and one consequence of this self-perception is that Beijing now accepts greater obligations to maintain the existing international order and work within this order as a cooperative member. China s new thinking is epitomized by a slogan that has yet to acquire official status within the Chinese Communist Party, but which has become increasingly common in Beijing. That slogan is the idea of a peaceful rise or peaceful ascendancy. On the one hand, it reflects the sense that China is now much more of a great power than simply the aggrieved leader of the developing world. On the other, it also reflects an acceptance of U.S. power in the region. Given the role that rising powers in Europe played in the origins of the two world wars, China s new slogan embodies a welcome realization that Beijing needs to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions and that its ascendance to prominence will neither jeopardize international stability nor promote international 5

6 conflict. Cast in this light, China s new behavior is almost unprecedented among rising great powers. We can see evidence of this new diplomacy in many different areas. One is China s greater willingness to take the lead on issues of mutual interest among states and, here, the nuclear crisis in North Korea is a useful example. During the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis, China basically waved its hands and played a largely passive role. The big concern, then, was whether China would veto any UN Security Council resolutions designed to address the problem (a strategy that the International Atomic Energy Agency was considering at the time). Fast-forward to 2002, and what we see is China taking a lead role in trying to manage the current crisis. First, China promoted and supported a multilateral solution and agreed to host talks in Beijing (in April 2003, August 2003, and most recently in February 2004). Then, to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table, China twice cut oil shipments to North Korea. China also mobilized troops along its border to signal that it was serious about keeping nuclear weapons off the peninsula. Finally, China s senior diplomats engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Pyongyang and Beijing. Taken together, these steps represented tactics rarely seen in Chinese diplomacy in the past twenty years. Another example of China s new diplomacy is its more pronounced focus on regional diplomacy, especially in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. In both areas, China s leaders have engaged the region not as a great power craving specific bilateral relationships, but as a great power acting within multilateral institutions. To be sure, China has been a member of many such institutions since the 1970s and 80s, but usually it was not an active participant. Typically, China sought merely to hang its name on the 6

7 door of these organizations and gain whatever benefits that membership might provide, but it neither led nor invested heavily in developing their capacity. However, today in Southeast Asia especially, China has embraced multilateralism through its engagement of ASEAN and its member states. In 1997, for example, Beijing initiated a summit dialogue between the Chinese premier and the prime ministers of ASEAN states called the 10+1 (Ten ASEAN states and China). China then developed the 10+3 mechanism that includes Japan, South Korea, and China in an annual dialogue of ASEAN states. Beijing also signed a declaration that promulgated a Code of Conduct for the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, thereby signaling that while it had not dropped its claims to the islands, China was willing to backbench this issue to help improve relations with the region. Most importantly, in 2003 China signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, including its subsidiary clauses that govern how ASEAN states will handle their mutual relations in a peaceful manner. Clearly, China s embrace of ASEAN s rhetoric of cooperative regional relations bodes well for the future. At times, China also has seized the initiative to further develop and deepen multilateralism in the region. In the fall of 2002, for example, Premier Zhu Rongji announced his country s desire to sign a free trade agreement with ASEAN, thereby facilitating closer regional economic integration. China also was the driving force behind the establishment of another multilateral organization the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which convenes states in central Asia, specifically Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. Here, China s leading role is quite clear it is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not the St. Petersburg 7

8 Cooperation Organization and Beijing has used this institution to: (1) help demilitarize the borders which had become militarized during China s cold war with the Soviet Union, (2) settle territorial disputes between China and these states, (3) address issues of terrorism, and (4) deepen interstate trade. Recently, Chinese diplomats even broached the subject of creating a security institution specifically for Northeast Asia. What is most remarkable about these developments is that ten years ago no academic or U.S. official would have predicted that China would work proactively to establish multilateral institutions or employ them to regularize regional interstate relations. Implications What implications does China s new diplomacy hold for U.S. China relations? One of the most important is that China s new diplomacy reinforces the status quo in the international system and the existing rules of the game. Unlike past rising powers that challenged the existing order, China s new diplomacy is reinforcing it. Interestingly, it is the status quo itself especially the U.S.-led economic and financial institutions that facilitate global trade and investment which has greatly facilitated China s rise. By deepening economic modernization and engaging these multilateral institutions, China is helping to consolidate the current order in East Asia. This constitutes a very positive trend in terms of averting war, preserving regional peace, and strengthening the U.S. Sino bilateral relationship. A second implication is that China s new diplomacy has created a diplomatic buffer along its periphery. Because China has one of the longest land borders in the world, historically it has always sought to be omni-directional in improving ties or 8

9 managing threats to its borders. Now that China has engaged its periphery through the multilateral mechanisms discussed earlier, a diplomatic buffer zone has emerged that, to date, has come largely at the expense of the United States. Because U.S. diplomacy has focused intensely upon prosecuting the global war on terrorism since September 11, whenever American officials visit the region, their principal discussion topic is progress in counter-terrorism efforts. Most governments in the region acknowledge the reality and significance of the terrorism problem (and the horrific bombing in Bali is a powerful reminder). Yet, it is not the sole issue these governments must address. Asian states are equally concerned with finding ways to sustain economic modernization, i.e., maintaining their central banks solvency, their industries competitive position, and other economic issues. Through its engagement with the region, China speaks directly to these concerns. By contrast, because the United States has focused primarily upon the single issue of terrorism, its appeal as a strong modernization partner much less as a strong leader has declined. Consequently, China is beginning to fill a vacuum in the region created by Washington s preoccupation with the threat of global terrorism. A third implication is that for the United States, the greater diplomatic influence China derives from its new diplomacy can cut both ways. As noted, China is now a much nimbler, more active player on the diplomatic stage. This is a welcome development when Washington wants to cooperate (i.e., a resolution of the nuclear crisis in North Korea). However, this also means that China is better positioned to protect and pursue its interests when they conflict with U.S. goals. One example comes from human rights diplomacy. Recently, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) held a vote on a U.S.-sponsored resolution designed to censure China for its human rights practices. To 9

10 Washington s dismay, however, the UNCHR rejected its resolution by a large margin. Why? Largely because of China s new diplomatic savvy. China is quite familiar with how the UN system operates, and its diplomats closely monitor the UNCHR s activities. Thus, when the resolution was offered, Chinese diplomats quickly mobilized an effective campaign to persuade other Commission members to reject it. To be sure, human rights is not at the core of the U.S. China relationship; still, this episode aptly demonstrates how China s new diplomatic ability can frustrate U.S. foreign policy objectives. Future Scenarios Given these implications, what might the future hold for U.S. China relations? Four plausible scenarios give us some purchase on where Chinese policy is headed, and what this could mean for the United States. The first is the eventual democratization of China and the idea of the democratic peace. Democracy certainly would be great for China and the Chinese people. A democratic China might also promote peace in the region, as democracies rarely fight each other. However, the process of transitioning from an authoritarian regime to democracy can be quite messy, especially given the potential for competitive nationalism to develop along the way. For example, during such a transition, a Zhirinovsky-like political challenger might appear on the scene, promoting assertive foreign policies to whip up nationalism and increase his own domestic political standing. Should this type of leader emerge, he might actually pressure the government into adopting such policies, even though they may not serve China s national interest, and most likely would increase instability. 10

11 A second scenario is heightened competition among major powers. East Asia is a neighborhood crowded with major powers, and China is not the only player in town: there is Russia to the North, India to the Southwest, Japan to the East, and the United States in the maritime Pacific. It is worth noting that China rose to prominence over the past decade at the same time these states were distracted by various economic and political challenges, and that now, these states are setting their houses in order. The Russian economy, for example, nearly imploded after the Cold War, but now appears to be on the mend. Japan, meanwhile, experienced zero growth for several years, but continues to search for ways to restart its economy; and recently India has begun to experience rapid rates of economic growth that suggest it may be only a bit lower on the same upward curve as China. The more these powers consolidate, grow, and progress, the greater potential there is for friction. If the current situation of one rising power on the Asian mainland and the United States as the dominant maritime power gives way to a situation of many rising land-based and maritime powers, interstate tensions could spike dramatically. Chinese Japanese relations are especially worrisome. Many Chinese still resent Japan for the trauma it inflicted during the WWII occupation. Some time ago I observed first-hand just how deeply this antipathy toward Japan permeates Chinese society. About a month after the United States mistakenly bombed China s embassy in Belgrade, I traveled to Beijing and, given this incident, I was not really sure how I an American would be treated. The test came at the airport when my cab driver asked me where I was from. Jokingly, I replied that I was from the United States a country that occasionally bombs other embassies. To my relief, the cab driver merely laughed. At least you re not Japanese, 11

12 he said. The lesson? While the United States might take actions that irritate (or enrage) China, the United States remained respected as a superpower; by contrast, the Japanese were just evil. Especially in the context of nationalism and security concerns, this kind of mindset suggests that in the coming decades the China Japan relationship could develop more friction, tension, and hostility than the United States and China experienced during the tumultuous 1990s. A third scenario concerns the outstanding territorial conflicts China still has with some of these major powers. China and Japan dispute ownership of the Senkakus Islands in the East China Sea, while China and India still contest the entire length of their border. Territorial conflicts are among the leading causes of war between states. Should competitive nationalism develop between China and Japan, and their territorial dispute become volatile, the United States would have more than a passing interest in this development. The fourth scenario concerns Taiwan. Having democratized in the last few decades, Taiwan no longer sees itself as a part of China and would like to be independent. Both the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the history of U.S. relations with China commit Washington to help Taiwan defend itself. The degree of obligation is contested, but the TRA does stipulate that the United States will provide Taiwan with defensive arms and help resist any coercive action that would jeopardize its security. The election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan s president in March 2004, and in particular Chen s campaign pledge to change the constitution via national referendum, have heightened tensions across the Strait. China views any constitutional change as a red line it is compelled to oppose. Thus, if Chen s efforts go forward they run the risk of sparking war 12

13 across the Straits a war that almost certainly would involve the United States. In short, despite the overall positive assessment of U.S. China relations outlined above, there is a real potential for the relationship to deteriorate, and what transpires in the next two years will be pivotal to peace and stability in the region. Such deterioration, though, is not inevitable, and currently several positive signs offer hope. In December 2003, the Bush Administration announced that it would not tolerate any unilateral change in the status quo. Washington s message to Taiwan and China was two-fold. On the one hand, the United States would not support Taiwan, should it declare independence or change its constitution via referendum; on the other, it would confront (and likely fight) China, should it attack Taiwan to compel reunification. This policy stance strikes me as the right course of action. Washington is a critical player in the Taiwan China dispute and, like it or not, changes in Taiwan inevitably involve the United States. Personally, I remain cautiously optimistic that his situation will improve with time, yet despite all that has been achieved in the past few years Taiwan is one issue that certainly can upset the U.S. China relationship. 13