LEBANON S TRANSITION TO STABILITY AND OPENNESS. The American College of Greece-Institute of Diplomacy and Global Affairs

Transcription

1 LEBANON S TRANSITION TO STABILITY AND OPENNESS By: Alicia Parseghian * ( a.parseghian@acg.edu ) The American College of Greece-Institute of Diplomacy and Global Affairs *Alicia Parseghian serves her internship at the Institute of Diplomacy and Global Affairs of the American College of Greece. She holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from Deree College of the American College of Greece in Human Resources Management, International Business & European Affairs and is now an MBA student at the Graduate School of the American College of Greece. 1

2 Abstract Given its particular socio-political structure, Lebanon maybe ranked under the open albeit unstable countries, even though it has made considerable progress particularly in recent years, in order to complete successfully its transitional phases and to consolidate stability and openness. Lebanon s socio-political specificity with predominant characteristic, the allocation of governmental, parliamentary, military and social appointments based solely on religious criteria, has created an atmosphere of constant tension and social friction as well as a continuous polarization of social groups which on the one hand deprived Lebanon from forming a unified, free and sovereign country, on the other hand captivated Lebanon on a civil war for more than fifteen years as well as on a continuous external interference. Lebanon, with the Cedar Revolution of 2005, followed by the Doha Agreement of 2008, and the recent elections results of 2009, has entered a new page in its turbulent history. All the above indicate that Lebanon has at least managed to make some visible steps towards social cohesion which may gradually lead towards the establishment of political and social stability. A key success factor toward a successful completion of its transition is the complete abolishment of sectarianism in allocation of governmental, military, parliamentary and social appointments; and reform in security, economic and electoral matters. 2

3 Lebanon s Transition to Stability and Openness Introduction In attempting to assess whether Lebanon is a society in transition or not, it is perhaps wise to introduce the theme of transition and its fundamental principles and then apply them to the case of Lebanon. Transition refers to the process whereby a close but a stable country passes through a period of hazardous instability in order to become at the very end a stable and an open society. History has proven that some countries remained alive from this adventure, whereas some others seriously collapsed. 1 In his book, The J Curve, Ian Bremmer states the two most critical aspects that define the transition process: openness and stability. External openness can be measured in terms of a nation s broadness or narrowness related to the tendencies of globalization. In other words, a country is characterized as open, if it broadly accepts the economic, political, cultural and technological unification among countries in the world; the essential element of globalization. Besides external openness, internal openness also exists and is measured inside a nation s borders; in terms for example of the freedom of communication between a nation s citizens or in terms of its governmental transparency. 2 The critical determinants of stability are the: Shock, Democracy, Economic and Political Capital. Given that stability is a feature (an action) of a country s capability, adaptability and readiness to enforce the right government policy in any shock case, how could we determine shock? Usually shocks take any of the following three forms: physical, man-made or shocks that emerge from within the country s social and cultural characteristics. Thus, a country s stability is measured along three competences: The first competence has to do with a country s ability to prevent producing shocks, the second 1 Bremmer, Ian The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall.New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks: Bremmer, Ian The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall.New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:5-25 3

4 competence is closely related with a country s resistance to shocks and the third and most crucial one refers to a country s competence of deciding and implementing the right to reform strategy in any shock case. No country, however, no matter how stable or unstable it might be, has the capability to anticipate all shocks from occurring. Less stable states have more probabilities than stable ones not only to create their own shocks but also to encounter shocks coming from outside their borders. Overall, stability not only strengthens a country s ability to prevent political, economic and cultural conflicts, but also facilitates a nation to remain as such. If none of the above components exist within a country, then it can be characterized as unstable. 3 Democracy also plays a critical role in countries that are considered stable. However, we have to distinguish between the appearance of liberalization and democratization. Liberalization may be defined as a global process of establishing certain rights in order to safeguard human beings individually and collectively from illegitimate violence exercised by government or other private parties. In the individual level, liberalization encompasses the rulings of the liberal tradition, whereas in the collective level it includes the right to oppose the government without fear of punishment, to free speech, to enjoy free media as well as to have the right of free association with other citizens. On the other hand, democratization refers to the process of a country s transition from a completely authoritarian political system towards full democracy or from a semi-authoritarian regime towards a democratic one. In addition, democratization includes such rights as the right to vote and the establishment of fair elections. It is strongly determined by several implied factors like economic prosperity, societal development and the context of history. Democratic or not, countries in which stability is ambiguous are more exposed to unexpected crises, they are more likely to create their own conflicts as well as prone to suffer from the worst effects of political shock. 4 3 Ibid 4 Bremmer, Ian The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall.New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:10 4

5 Economic reform, particularly a transition from a centrally planned economy towards a free-market regime produces strains and social instability. Ineffective industries may close down or their labor force downsized. 5 However, the most critical moment for a so called emerging market, with its transition process risking failure, lies exactly at the inflection point between the two systems. Governments have therefore limited capital in hand to develop and retain a functioning state. For the above reasons economic reforms are usually destabilizing and expenditure of the economic capital is more than needed. 6 Political Capital, like economic capital is very precious. When a country decides to move from an authoritarian political system to full democracy, in other words to enter into a transition phase; this movement necessitates that the political capital has to be spent just like the economic capital. When a country s government attempts political reform, there is always a great risk of running into a political capital deficit. 7 On the other side, a great political scholar, Samuel Huntington portrays out his catalytic ideas and opinions about political reform and change that have been used as a reference point by many political theorists throughout the years. He illustrates reform as a modification in the direction of social or economic equality. In other words, a positive change can result in more equality as well as definitely reform can be a core ingredient of political change. In addition, political parties can be characterized as a very crucial instrument of political stability and are highly correlated with the concept of modernization. Political parties, therefore, can be defined as a form of political institution which is imperative for the overall stability of the system as a whole. To be more concrete, political parties constitute political participation and influence greatly the extent to which this participation can be expanded or not. 5 Bremmer, Ian The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall.New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:15 6 Bremmer, Ian The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fal l.new York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:16 7 Ibid 5

6 If political parties are absent, in order to constitute and mobilize the political participation, modernization is therefore altered. 8 The research paper at hand has three central aims: Firstly, to develop a clear and understandable framework towards the concept of transition and its emergence nowadays. Secondly, to investigate and analyze briefly the reasons that led Lebanon to enter into a long-lasting face of transition. Lastly, to suggest and specify some possible areas of improvement with main purpose to help Lebanon manage and complete successfully its transition. Thus, the main objective of the research paper is to prove whether or not Lebanon is a country that has been entered into a long-lasting phase and how it will manage to complete its transition successfully. In order to complete the objective of our research paper successfully we have developed a set of research and investigative questions in order to facilitate the purpose of our paper. Some of them are presented below: For which reasons Lebanon is characterized as a special case of transition? Which reasons led Lebanon to enter in a long-lasting phase of transition and how it will manage to cope successfully? Is there room for hope after the incidents of 2005 and 2009 respectively in order for Lebanon to be characterized as an open and stable country in the upcoming years? In which extent sectarianism affects the transition of Lebanon and how it can be successfully managed? To conclude with, the research design used in the paper at hand is a combination of exploratory as well as descriptive study. Exploratory study is used to develop hypotheses or questions for further research. In other words, at the very end of this paper scholars and scientists would be able to extract another set of investigative and research questions in order to conduct an even deeper analysis of Lebanon s transition. Descriptive study from the other hand tries to explain relationships among variables. In this particular paper, the dependent variable is the transition of Lebanon and is measured against independent variables such as the fifteen year civil war and the Lebanese 8 Huntington, Samuel Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press: 140 6

7 intra-political issues and treaties. In other words, the use of descriptive study is of vital importance for understanding whether or not the dependent variables are positively or negatively correlated with the independent variable. 7

8 The Case of Lebanon Lebanon demonstrates an interesting case of transition for many reasons; some of them will be presented, briefly due to lack of space, in the present paper. Lebanon is an open country, albeit unstable that struggles for many years to complete its transition towards overall openness and stability. It is therefore our working hypothesis, that Lebanon has entered a cycle of transitional phases. Political events seem to be the main forces of enactment for each cycle of transition. As political events we may consider assassinations, invasions, occupations and third-party interventions. In the brief analysis at hand, we will try to show how these cycles begin, how they may end and which forces sustain them. 1. Back and Forth between restricted liberalization and deliberalization: Although in Lebanon, significant developments have been achieved in the sector of political liberalization there still exist substantial restrictions due partially to local security issues. A Muslim-oriented nation in its majority, Lebanon still enjoys certain universal rights such as freedom of press, freedom of association, freedom of trade union creation as well as the right to strike; all of which render it as Democratic. This democratic tolerance signifies an initial step for Lebanon in achieving liberalization. It may also signify a step toward a successful transition phase and further democratization. These steps by themselves cannot guarantee a smooth transition process. Incremental changes, like a shift in the mentality of the Lebanese citizens in terms of the way they perceive, assess and judge political as well as religious matters may effectively contribute tothe democratization process. Also, the effective management of foreign affairs, economic and political stability and security, better communication between Lebanese governmental members and even quicker and more efficient resolution of all internal affairs seem feasible goals for the immediate future. I. Ineffective democratization: 8

9 Lebanon demonstrates a distinctive democratic system, the so-called confessional democracy. Confessionalism is a model of consociationalism. Political scholars define a consociational country as a country which acts despite its major internal divisions in terms of ethnicity or religion in which no sub-group is able to demand majority role. Common-known examples of countries that demonstrate confessionalism are Belgium, Switzerland, India, Spain, Lebanon and the Netherlands. In other words, confessionalism is a type of consociational government which gives out political as well as institutional power proportionally among its religious sects. Confessional democracy as it functions in Lebanon, distributes in each of its religious sects various parliamentary, governmental and public service appointments. Appointments are allocated to religious sects according to their numbers in Lebanese society. There exist seventeen different religious sects in Lebanon. Confessional democracy becomes further complicated since religious dominance is apparent everywhere. 9 Theoretically, the confessional type of democracy in Lebanon facilitates the harmonious co-existence of all different religious and ethnic sects by allocating power to each of them based on their demographic weight. However, Lebanon s vulnerable confessional equilibrium within a society of many large minorities makes it excessively delicate to manage in cases of internal rearrangements and external intervention. Every time changes occur they seem to energize instability and uncertainty. Thus, the confessional democracy of Lebanon finally produces instability rather than stability. 10 When considering Lebanon s instability as a consequence of its confessional democracy we may notice the following : 1. Demographic Change: The inflow of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon during the early 70 s was whole -heartedly accepted by the Lebanese Sunni Community as they regarded the Sunni Palestinians as an expansion of their own demographic weight. Other religious communities, particularly the Maronite, felt threatened by the Palestinian entry Understanding the Lebanese Confessionalism. Available from 10 Ibid 11 Lebanon. Available from 9

10 2. Political and Demographic Control: During the early 50 s, Lebanon s Maronite President Camille Chamoun gave approval to Palestinian Christians to apply for the Lebanese citizenship, thus attempting to increase the number of Lebanese Christians. The same action was repeated in This time however lead to an increase of the Muslim population Foreign Intervention: Foreign intervention played a great role in Lebanon s instability. Countries such as Israel, Syria, the United States and Iran with their intervention in Lebanon s internal as well as external politics, contributed to its internal instability while promoting their own interests Militia Equilibrium: One of the reforms that the Taif Accord, attempted to bring, was the prohibition of arms to all other militia except the Lebanese Army. However, Hezbollah continued to be armed and this action was considered by many as one of the impetus of Lebanon s instability El Khazen, Farid Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 10, No Lebanon. Available from 14 Ibid 10

11 2. Lebanon s fifteen year civil war ( ) Almost twenty years after its conclusion, the Lebanese civil war remains rather enigmatic and complicated not only due to its devastating consequences, but also due to its fundamental causes. Three central theses help establish the controversial views concerning the nature and the causes of the Lebanese Civil War. One concentrates on the basis of the conflict and the downfall of the local sociopolitical and economical Lebanese structures. Another presents the role of foreign leverage as dominant and claims that it was the interaction of parochial events and local politics that led towards the complete functional breakdown of the Lebanese government. The latter blames the origin, intensity and violence of the civil war on foreign intervention, apart from internal religious matters. 15 Foreign intervention has reinforced and extended the clash, but it seems rather unrealistic to blame solely foreign intervention as the one major cause. Lebanon is constituted on a pluralistic, multi-communal basis and the core causes of the civil war may be deeply found mostly within the complete transformation of the Lebanese sociopolitical structure that aroused specific behavioral patterns which in turn triggered oppositional tendencies within the system. These oppositional tendencies enhanced the presence of a fragmented sociopolitical structure. Thus, collective barriers were solidified and factional loyalties were boosted in the Lebanese society. As the structure of the Lebanese society became more strict and static, Lebanon became unable to manage effectively neither internal demands rising from socioeconomic change nor external demands coming from local political conflicts. Some internal as well as external factors are presented here Latif, Abdul-Husn The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. Lynne Rieener Publishers:54 16 Ibid 11

12 Internal Factors a. Rich versus poor: While Christians were classified among the wealthy class with their dominance in all business sectors being noticeable, Shii Muslims represented the poor and working classes which regarded themselves as marginalized from all business and industrial sectors. Due to the deregulation and privatization of the Lebanese economic system, great discrepancy in terms of wealth became apparent in the Lebanese society. Great contradictions concerning social inequality and its power distribution constituted every sect. 17 b. Unequal distribution of political power and governmental authority: The Lebanese National Pact of 1943 gave the highest political positions according to religious sects and also riveted parliament representation at a 6 to 5 ratio of Christians and Muslims respectively based on the doubtfulcensus of The National Pact became the base of the subsequent establishment of the Lebanese Confessional type of Democracy that has been analyzed previously in this paper. It would be rational to assume that in political power and authority would be distributed according to population size. Since Muslims traditionally represented the majority of the Lebanese population, Christians always challenged their power. 18 c. Lebanon s Identity: Basically, three troublesome questions arise when examining Lebanon s identity. Is Lebanon an indispensable part of the Arab world which would therefore encourage Arab unity and Arab nationalism as the majority of Sunni Muslims believe? Is Lebanon an internal part of the Muslim world as many Shii groups claim? Or is it a distinctive nation of minorities with a history and sovereignty that is uniquely Lebanese as the majority of Lebanese Christians seem to believe? Julie, Denney and Martha, Wenger Lebanon s Fifteen Year Middle East Report 162: Ibid 19 Ibid 12

13 d. Christians versus Muslims: Divergent value perceptions, behavioral patterns and intentions have been altering Christians-Muslims relations. Muslims regard themselves as marginalized as they acquired minor positions in terms of power, status and rewards systems in a Christian- dominated country. On the other hand, Christians perceived Muslims as detached from the fundamental value system an independent Lebanese nation. To be more specific, Maronites, regard Muslims as a continuous threat not only to their political power supremacy, but also to the independence of Lebanon. These conceptions are greatly affected by economic and educational asymmetry as well as by political discrepancy. 20 External Factors f. The Palestinian Factor: Palestinians came to Lebanon in 1948 as refugees.during their early diaspora, the Palestinians started successively forming their own society struggling to capture their own identity. Wealthy Palestinians were being accepted more easily by Lebanese society since money was a crucial factor for the Lebanese societal acceptance but not the most determinant one. Money symbolized half of the equation towards Lebanese full societal acceptance. The other half is represented through strong family bonds and political affiliations that tailored the Lebanese life for centuries. 21 All together (money, political affiliations and family bonds) are the driving forces that have activated and shaped the close and rigid Lebanese society and its relevant perceptions, norms, behavioral patterns, beliefs and attitudes. Therefore, this rigidness cultivated societal polarization, sense of mistrust, lack of diversification, lack of crossborder communication and ineffective use of conflict management and resolution tactics throughout Lebanese society and its political means. 20 Latif, Abdul-Husn The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. Lynne Rieener Publishers:55 21 Mackey, Sandra Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. New York: W.W Norton and Company:

14 Apart from the societal reasons that Lebanese viewed Palestinians suspiciously, there is a political reason, too. The Lebanese Sunni political parties found in Palestinians a strategically promising ally towards their conflict for political parity with Christians. The Maronites, in contrast regarded Palestinians as a continuous threat to the confessional balance in Lebanon and more specifically to their nebulous hold on political supremacy. Thus, a powerful triangle comprised of Maronites, Sunnis and Palestinians always threaten Lebanese stability. 22 g. The Syrian Factor: Syria, like Iraq can be described as a collection of adverse communities surrounded by borders specified by others. Strategically located on the route from the Nile to Euphrates, Syria has always attracted invasion but was always vulnerable in terms of natural defenses. Thus, Damascus regarded as its protective belly the mountains of Lebanon which constitute an issue of natural security. Syria intervened for the first time in Lebanon in 1976 in an attempt to end the civil war and since then it became Lebanon s shadow and major influence affecting all its internal and external decision-making since the complete withdrawal of the Syrian troops in In retrospect, the era in which the interests of the West were tremendous both in economic and strategic terms becomes more and more intense and Lebanon offers a considerable stage on which to see an enigmatic play performed by multiple actors (Syria, Palestine, Israel, United States, and Iran). 23 This particular play has a still long way to go because Lebanon is regarded not only as a crucial geographic prize but also as an attractive site for wars specified by third parties. The true cause of the Lebanese Civil War never came from the Lebanese people themselves. It came from the Palestinians and the Israelis.It also came from Syria s effort to establish its hegemony over Lebanon, as well as from United State s double role as Israel s guardian and as the protector against Soviet Union s presence into the region and from Iran s desire to export the power of the Islamic Revolution. 22 Ibid 23 Mackey, Sandra Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. New York: W.W Norton and Company:

15 Lebanon offers an appropriate place for all of them to go after their own interests and ambitions, at the expense of a fragile state. These reasons create instability in the Arab World form Beirut to Baghdad. 24 h. The Israel Factor: Throughout the civil war, the government of Israel had already showed its intentions for Lebanon. The downfall of the Lebanese government in 1975 and the consequential termination of the Lebanese army, provided for Israel the favorable circumstance to introduce itself as the guardian of three Christian areas inside Lebanon. From 1975 till 1982, Israel intervened militarily to strengthen its interests, and in 1982 Israel took the opportunity to invade Lebanon. All Israeli actions aimed on the one hand to destabilize even more fragile Lebanon and to establish its hegemony. Three main pillars constituted Israeli policy: protection of the Jewish state, occupation of the Arab territories and gradual transformation of the Arab world. Such great intentions hide unexpected surprises till their completion. Hezbollah s growing influence and power in Lebanese internal as well as external affairs emerged even more. As a consequence, Israel for the first time in its short history regarded Lebanon s occupation as not so vital to its survival. Secondly, for a country accustomed to short-term wars and impressive achievements, fifteen years evolved until the Lebanese turmoil came to an end were more than enough. Lebanon and the Palestinian Indifanda in the occupied territories challenged Israelis. Israel realized that it could longer govern neither its neighbors nor the Palestinians by the use of force. By 2000, Israel recognized deeply that the cost of staying in Lebanon (in economic terms along with military terms) was tremendous and decided to voluntarily withdraw from Lebanon. 25 i. The United States Factor: The U.S. interests in Lebanon are derived from the following reasons such as from the Lebanese-American Community as the majority of Arab-American 24 Mackey, Sandra Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. New York: W.W Norton and Company: Ibid 15

16 are of Lebanese origin, the Lebanese appeals to United States for support and Lebanon s role as a trustworthy counselor among Arab nations. 26 j. The Iranian Factor: For Iran, Lebanon provided a main channel of communication with a major Shia community in the Arab World. Consecutively, this channel granted Tehran not only a focal basis from which to plan its religious influence and proselytism into the Arab center but also a local role it had never before obtained. Taking the advantage from conditions in Lebanon, Tehran inspired many Shia Muslim groups in Lebanon. Therefore, Iran financed new mosques for clerics, constructed militia bases, and recruited Revolutionary Guards who were responsible to train armed fighters Clyde.R.Mark Lebanon. Available from 27 Mackey, Sandra Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. New York: W.W Norton and Company:

17 3. Lebanese Intra-Political Issues and Treaties 1. The National Pact of 1943 Like any political system used to a pluralistic and multi-communal society, the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 aimed at achieving two goals: Creating a just society and constituting a fundamental mechanism for nation building. To succeed on this, it had firstly to approach the two dominant fields of altercation between Lebanon s communal blocs: the confessional allocation of governmental rewards and the country s foreign policy. 28 The pact intended to convert the conflict in these domains into controllable levels by making a first attempt to determine a balance for attaining social justice as well as an ideological adjustment between Lebanism and Arabism. In addition, it developed the ground for power sharing not only between the two fundamental religious parties in Lebanon, the Christians and the Muslims but also among many sects within each party. It also specified the framework for Lebanon s external and Arab policies. Even though that this agreement remained unwritten it was recognized as fundamental for Lebanese political life for more than thirty years, until the 1975 civil war burst. 29 Furthermore, the pact was concentrated on allocating government posts, parliament seats as well as bureaucratic, military and judicial positions among the various distinctive communities on a proportional basis according to the 1932 census. The census computed the Christians as the preponderant community. As a consequence, under that census the Presidency of Lebanon was given to the Maronite sect; the Speaker of the House of Representatives was to the Shiite Muslim; and the position of the Prime Minister was distributed to the Sunni Muslims; as for the remaining sects, their ministerial portfolios would be given and assigned according to their numerical superiority. The parliamentary, civil and judiciary composition were organized 28 Latif, Abdul-Husn The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Ibid 17

18 on the basis of a 6 to 5 Christian-Muslim ratio. The latter distribution emerged a source of internal conflict as described earlier in the paper. 30 Moreover, the great dispute around Lebanon s external policy was also a major source of conflict between the two main distinctive communities, the Christians and the Muslims. The Maronites were struggling for an independent Lebanon with powerful attachments with France, while the Muslims (particularly the Sunnis), never hid their devotion towards a union with the Arab world. The pact provided to both communities a balanced agreement by which they could protect their interests within an independent and sovereign Lebanon. This was accomplished through a trade-off in which Muslims abandoned their demand of making Lebanon a part of the extensive Arab and Islamic state by recognizing Lebanon s independence and sovereignty whereas Christians alternated equally by approving the Arab character of Lebanon. 31 Even though that the pact pursued to modify a multi-communal society into a nation-state with the use of political processes it failed to do so since the power within the Lebanese nation was distributes between two distinctive groups and the state. Although the state was assumed to preserve the balance between the groups, in reality Christians were closer to the authority than the Muslims. As a result, Christians were always the most powerful allies of the state. On the other hand, Muslims regarded the state not as a neutral negotiator of the conflict, but as a Christian entity and thus the major source of conflict and division in an unstable situation. 32 As a consequence, the state had become central point of efforts towards integration because it could function as equilibrium to the dual polarization of the Lebanese society. By integrating the various groups that exist in the Lebanese nation within a single structure and by matching their diverse interests under a distinct policy, it was believed that social structure would evenly be integrated. Although the pact failed in providing a strong integrative mechanism towards stability, unification and openness it managed to bring arguments on national 30 Ibid 31 Ibid 32 Ibid 18

19 identity and power sharing at least at a controllable level. All hopes after the end of the civil war were left to the Taif Accord, but at least a first effort towards unification, stability and openness had already be done even though it failed at the very end Ibid 19

20 2. The Taif Accord of 1989 All political processes no matter in which country they are used, have their advantages, accountabilities and disadvantages. So, Lebanon seems not to be the exception of the rule. Two decades prior to the 1975 civil war, various Western scholars mentioned in their publications that Lebanon were the only state with the most stable democracy among all states in the Arab world. 34 Nevertheless, the Lebanese political system failed of being democratic, since as a political system can be characterized as having abundant freedom but was ailed from being democratic deficient. That is to say, that the Lebanese democratic system even though it offered equal opportunities for all Lebanese citizens, the political accountability and responsibility of Lebanese officials and institutions was seriously lacking. 35 After the failure of the National Pact s integrative mechanism towards stability, unification and openness, the Taif Accord of 1989, was a second attempt to determine the fundamental keystone towards the end of civil war as well as towards the recovery to political balance. Below, some key reforms that the Taif Accord brought to Lebanon are presented. First of all, the Taif Accord was definite in demonstrating the Arab identity in Lebanon, concentrating mainly on the fact that Lebanon is an Independent, Sovereign and Free State. Secondly, the Accord ratified the unity of Lebanon. Thirdly, it established the nation s political system as a parliamentary democracy, derived from the use of principles of separation, cooperation and balance among the various Lebanese governmental mechanisms Salem, Paul Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays. American University of Beirut : Ibid 36 Salem, Paul Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays. American University of Beirut :

21 Moreover, the Accord determined the socio-economic system of Lebanon as a free-economy facilitating individual s initiative and the right of property. Last but not least, the Accord declared clearly that the abolishment of the political sectarianism represents a core national aim that would be accomplished only under a progressive course of action. 37 Furthermore, this specific Accord represented the start-up of a new round of negotiations concerning the Lebanese-Israeli relations and particularly concerning the end of the civil war; as well as it also represented a step ahead toward the distinctive Lebanese-Syrian relationship with major goal the gradual withdrawal of Syrian intervention away from Lebanon. To conclude with, the Accord supported the gradual reduction of the use of weapons in all national and non-national militia. However, Hezbollah continued to use weapons against Israel, as a resistant force and not as militia. 38 The Taif Accord was signed on October 22 nd, 1989 in Taif, Saudi-Arabia and ratified on November 4 th, Overall, this agreement can be characterized by great contradiction apparent through the sectarian mentality on the one hand; even though it declared that the abolishment of political sectarianism represents Lebanon s core aim, it didn t provide a specific deadline framework in achieving that aim. As long as sectarian allegiances are stronger than patriotic allegiances and allegiances to a state, then the roots of conflict will always be there and can be easily stoked. On the other hand, the Accord provided a vision towards revolutionary, democratic, nonconfessional and stable Lebanese state. However, after the ratification of the agreement Lebanon has experienced a long peace period till the late 90s as a consequence of the national institutions re-establishment as well as of the Lebanese national army unification Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 21

22 3. The Cedar Revolution of 2005 The great impact followed the assassination of the Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14 th 2005, was the Cedar Revolution. The reasons of the Cedar Revolution were obvious. Lebanon is a country where the Syrian domination was supreme for a period of fifteen years. That is to say, in its simplest way, Cedar Revolution represented Lebanon s break-out of the Syrian shackles of control. When Harriri showed his clear resistance towards Syrian control by decreasing their control, he was killed and Lebanon was revolted. 40 Even though, the reasons that led to the Cedar Revolution were obvious, the most complicated part seems to be that of portraying out the deeper meanings of the Cedar Revolution. Cedar Revolution spread out two principal meanings: the meaning of the non-violence and the meaning of political and judicial accountability. Out of the two meanings, the meaning of non-violence seems to be more crucial. 41 Lebanon s enhancement to non-violence is apparent. Non- violence as a determining characteristic of the Cedar Revolution is the most important, since all non-contemporary as well as contemporary events of the Middle East have attenuated the basic right to personnel security from harm which has been firstly stated as a fundamental human right by the French revolutionaries. In contemporary history, particularly in the Middle East massive violence which can be characterized as the inverse coin of security is the only prevailing characteristic that isolates Middle East from the rest of the world. For the first time in its History in 2005, Lebanon battled with non violence, battled to guarantee the fundamental human right to be secure; that is to say, to be free of violence. All street demonstrations that held in 40 Mallat, Chibli March Available from :66 41 Mallat, Chibli March Available from :15 22

23 Lebanon in 2005, had a fundamental message to pass by: Another way, the non-violent one also exists in conducting politics and it can be achieved. 42 Moreover, the second crucial meaning that Cedar Revolution attempted to portray out the need for judicial as well as political accountability. Judicial accountability constitutes the basis for any country that wants to stay on solid foundations. As you will find out in the conclusion of this paper at hand, one of the key reforms that would drive Lebanon towards stability and openness is an independent and fully competent judicial system. In terms of political accountability, the Cedar Revolution even though it succeeded in the aims presented below, it fell short of renewing the political leadership; that is to say, it fell short of holding politically accountable a number of leaders who were supportive towards a revolutionary Lebanon. 43 The Cedar Revolution succeeded first of all, by achieving the complete withdrawal of the Syrian troops away from Lebanon as well as by achieving the substitution of the current government at that time, which was greatly influenced by Syrian intervention by a government characterized by more independent leadership. Syria was always till the Cedar Revolution Lebanon s last world in internal as well external political issues. 44 In addition, the Cedar Revolution succeeded on the creation of an international commission responsible for a more trustworthy investigation of Hariri s assassination; on the complete resignation of the Lebanese security officials of that time in order to confirm the guarantee of that plan as well as on the settled establishment of free parliamentary elections. 45 Mallat, on his book March 2221 argues that one of the failures of the Cedar Revolution was the fact that it didn t achieving on investigating deeply and on proposing solutions over the debate on at least reducing sectarianism away from governmental, parliamentary and public office allocations since 42 Mallat, Chibli March Available from :16 43 Mallat, Chibli March Available from :17 44 Walker, Edward Jr. Emerging Lebanon Available from 45 Ibid 23

24 sectarianism governs Lebanon and keeps it isolated from stability and openness. 46 Overall, the Cedar revolution consisted of its vulnerabilities and its advantages, portrays out Lebanon s first time of change towards democracy. Lebanese people in their majority youth ones didn t abandoned their nation and demonstrated their aspirations with the Lebanese national flag held in their hands. It was the first time in Lebanon where flags representing political and religious parties did not feature. All these young people that participated in this revolution represented Lebanon s future which is clearly distinctive and away from sectarian and political mentalities that had imprisoned its identity and its democracy all these years prior to the Revolution. 47 The aftermath of Hariri s assassination brought to Lebanon a sense of unification, a government completely Lebanese (after the resignation of the pro Syrian prime minister and his cabinet ), and when the question came out on Lebanon s identity, all Lebanese people answered that they have Lebanese identity since they didn t consider anymore themselves neither of Muslim nor of Arab identity but they considered themselves as having an identity exclusively Lebanese The Doha Agreement of 2008 The Agreement signed and ratified on May 21 st 2008, in Doha, Qatar brought another set of reforms which seemed to be a continuation of those started with the Cedar Revolution. To be more specific, the Doha Agreement led the way towards the constitution of a unity government where the opposition has the power to veto in all major decisions whether internal or external ones as well as towards the complete official prohibition of the use of weapons. The latter decision was a response to Hezbollah s intervention and 46 Mallat, Chibli March Available from : Walker, Edward Jr. Emerging Lebanon Available from Ibid 24

25 kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July 2006 which led on a new short war between Israel and Lebanon on 2006 which emerged instability once again in Lebanon. Lebanon had the Lebanese army to intervene in military terms and Hezbollah was considered a resistance force and not as a militia, the use of weapons should be prohibited. Overall, the Doha Agreement promoted stability by the reforms it implemented and provided a way towards the successful completion of the Lebanese transitional issue The Elections Results of 2009 Although elections had been held the previous June, no government has been formed till Saturday 18 th of November 2009 when Lebanon appointed the son of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Saad Hariri as Lebanon s Prime Minister. As already announced, Saad Hariri would assemble a unity government which would include members of the oppositions which have gained the power to veto all major decisions, either internal or external ones, after the Doha Agreement of However, a point that has been ambiguous till nowadays is whether Hezbollah continues to be Lebanon s most strengthened force in political and military terms and its minority alliance would hold the power to veto as it did with the previous government Daaboul, Christofer. The Doha Agreement, Lebanon and the Near Future. Available from 50 Slackman, Michael. Lebanon Chooses Saad Hariri as Premier. Available from

26 6. Conclusion There is still room for hope that Lebanon would successfully complete its transitional phases. Although some essential steps as described above have already been taken, their correct formulation, integration and implementation still remains. The most critical barrier that Lebanon faces and has to overcome it in order to achieve stability and openness, is the absence of a coherent central authority with the effective decision-making system that would strive towards the complete abolishment of the Lebanese sectarianism as well as the development of social and political cohesion. Sectarianism divides Lebanon into many religious sub-groups, each of them struggling on achieving its personal interests rather than struggling on reaching a consensus agreement that would benefit Lebanon as a country, far and foremost and not all different religious sub-groups. Reform should be implemented in three main areas in order for Lebanon to achieve stability and openness. Apart from the complete abolishment of confessionalism in Lebanon, there is an ultimate need for a fully independent and fully competent judicial system. The Lebanese judiciary system is extremely vulnerable and accused of bias and sometimes corruption. The development of a strong, independent and fully competent judicial system is the basis for any country that wants to stay on solid foundations. The first area that needs reform is the security domain. Lebanon suffers from a deficient accountability in terms of security and a powerful solution to that would be the integration of all security forces, into one. A single obstacle to security unification is the fact that Hezbollah is recognized as a resistance force rather than militia, and so refuses complete disarmament. Another important point that has to be mentioned here is that Hezbollah is a strong political party that has the power of veto in all major internal and external decisions according to the Doha Agreement of The final 26

27 decision of Hezbollah for the case of its disarmament is still ambiguous, but as a political party gives great attention to public opinion. 51 Furthermore, the two other main areas that need reform are the electoral and the economic. In terms of the electoral area, there is an ultimate need for judicial and political accountability as well as a more precise reexamination of the existing electoral law. Until now, all electoral appointments were allocated based on the disputed 1932 census. A rather effective solution would be the proportional distribution of appointments and not the sectarian one. In the area of economic reform, privatization, if managed and implemented correctly would provide sustainable solutions to many problems that the Lebanese society currently faces. All these issues should be resolved if Lebanon is to achieve stability and openness. Since all these reforms entail fundamental structural changes all results, successful or otherwise, will inevitably appear and could be assessed - in the long-run Choucair-Vizoso, Julia et al Lebanon s Uncertain Democratic Prospects. Available from 52 Ibid 27

28 8. Bibliography and References Bremmer, Ian The J Curve; A new way why to understand why nations rise and fall. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks: 5-25 Choucair-Vizoso,Julia et al Lebanon s Uncertain Democratic Prospects. Available from Clyde, R.Mark Lebanon. Available from Daaboul, Christofer. The Doha Agreement, Lebanon and the Near Future. Available from Denney Julie, and Wenger Martha Lebanon s Fifteen Year War , Middle East Report 162: El Khazen, Farid Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 10, No. 3. Huntington, Samuel Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press: 140 Latif, Abul-Husn The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. Lynne Rieener Publishers: Lebanon. Available from Mackey, Sandra Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. New York: W.W Norton and Company: Mallat, Chibli March Available from 28

29 Salem, Paul Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays. American University of Beirut: Slackman, Michael. Lebanon Chooses Saad Harriri as Premier. Available from Understanding the Lebanese Confessionalism. Available from Walker, Edward Jr. Emerging Lebanon Available from 29