Re-engagement with Pakistan to Lessen Nuclear Tensions and Advance Regional Security in South Asia
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1 ANDREI MARINESCU Re-engagement with Pakistan to Lessen Nuclear Tensions and Advance Regional Security in South Asia Andrei Marinescu Andrei Marinescu is an MA student at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs of Carleton University. In his BA (Honors) degree in History at Carleton University, Marinescu specialized in American national security policy in Asia Pacific and Canadian foreign policy under the Trudeau government. For his Master s, he has focused on international organizations that maintain global peace and security, including the International Atomic Energy Agency s role in nuclear non-proliferation. His current co-op placement is with the Tariffs and Goods Market Access Division of Canada s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. He was awarded the Canada Graduate Scholarship in 2013 as well as the Ontario Graduate Scholarship in Abstract Pakistan s nascent but rapidly developing nuclear weapons program poses perhaps the greatest threat to regional security in South Asia. The Pakistani leadership perceives India as an existential threat and their ongoing conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir has the potential to escalate into a nuclear exchange. Islamist terrorist groups, some of which seek to acquire nuclear weapons, are also prevalent in the region. Although American-Pakistani bilateral relations have been inconsistent, long-term regional security is of common interest and can serve as a foundation for restoring the partnership. Three options that may advance security in Pakistan are considered. The first seeks to strengthen Pakistani institutions to encourage a more moderate approach towards India. The second protects Pakistan s nuclear program against theft of nuclear INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW 103
2 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN material, its unauthorized use, and miscalculation during crises. The third is predicated on U.S. mediation of the Kashmir dispute. This last policy is endorsed since it strikes most directly at the dangerous dynamic involving state insecurity, nuclear weapons, and terrorist activities. Background Geopolitical Considerations Pakistan s source of chronic insecurity is India. The partition of British India in July 1947 into the countries of India and Pakistan became the root cause of antagonism between the newly formed nations. The formula used to achieve the division was by no means straightforward, resulting in disputed territories, mass population movements of Muslims and Hindus, and violence on a wide scale. 1 Historical animosity, ethnic tensions, religious divisions, and state-sponsored terrorism on both sides continue to impede a comprehensive approach to reconciliation. Pakistani army officers, who are politically dominant and shape Pakistan s national security policy, 2 perceive India as an existential threat because of its larger economy and military. These officers are convinced that India seeks to annihilate their nation through open war and by encouraging nationalist movements that challenge Pakistani sovereignty. 3 The core issue of the conflict is the disputed territory of Kashmir bordering Pakistan, India and China. The struggle over Kashmir began in October 1947, when its ruler opted for accession to India in spite of its predominantly Muslim population. A ceasefire line, now called the Line of Control (LoC), was established in January 1948 to carve out the areas to be controlled by India and Pakistan following the conflict. However, the referendum that was to decide the status of Kashmir, called for by the United Nations resolutions of , never took place as Pakistan and India failed to reach agreement over the withdrawal of their forces from the region. In practice Pakistan administers the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir, located northwest of the LoC, while India administers Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the central and southern portion. 4 China controls 104 VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
3 ANDREI MARINESCU the remaining northeastern portion of Aksai Chin, secured at the expense of India after China s victory in the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the Trans-Karakoram Tract. The Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement of 1963, in which Pakistan ceded the Trans-Karakoram Tract to China, is considered illegal by India. 5 Pakistan and India do not recognize each other s claims in Kashmir, and the latter rejects external mediation of the Kashmir dispute. 6 Figure 1: Disputed Boundaries in Kashmir 7 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW 105
4 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN Afghanistan plays a prominent role in Pakistan s national security calculus. Pakistani officials fear that close ties between the Afghan and Indian governments could enable the Indians to promote anti-pakistan sentiment among the Pashtun and Baloch ethnicities in the region. Straddling the Afghan-Pakistani border, these populations are not part of Pakistan s Punjabi majority and external influence could fuel pre-existing separatist movements to threaten the country s sovereignty. In case of a general war with India, Afghanistan would be critical to securing Pakistan s northwestern border against an Indian attack. For these reasons, Pakistan is concerned with cultivating a friendly Afghan government that can provide it with strategic depth in the face of Indian subversion or aggression. 8 Pakistan s national security depends heavily on maintaining its strategic balance with India in terms of conventional and nuclear weapons. In this regard, China has proven to be a reliable partner, supplying Pakistan with military assets and consolidating its nuclear development. The Chinese government provides nearly seventy percent of Pakistan s tanks, supplies the equipment and technology needed for the Pakistani missile program, and in May 2011 announced the sale of fifty fighter jets to its partner. 9 China also built two nuclear reactors in Pakistan in response to the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement of China s investment in the country, growing from $4 billion in 2007 to $25 billion in 2010, signals its support for the Pakistani army that is the de facto ruling force in Pakistan. 11 Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons Program To counter India s superiority in conventional and nuclear forces, Pakistan developed its own nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif authorized six nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998 to match the weaponization of India s nuclear program earlier that month. Sharif and the Pakistani army chose to forego the credibility, aid from international donors, and American F-16 planes that their country would have gained had they shown restraint. 12 Even though Pakistan has abstained from making public its official nuclear doctrine, high-ranking 106 VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
5 ANDREI MARINESCU Pakistani military officers have suggested that the use of nuclear weapons would be appropriate under the following circumstances: Indian conventional forces are about to destroy the army s defenses, Pakistan suffers unacceptable territorial losses, India fosters dangerous political upheaval, or India causes grave injury to Pakistan s economy. 13 It seems that the country s leadership is working towards maintaining a credible minimum deterrence. The apparent thinking is that, as India s capabilities grow, Pakistan can modify its nuclear force structure to retain the option of employing a nuclear strike against its adversary if necessary. Pakistan s arsenal expanded quickly from sixty warheads in 2007 to over one hundred by It originally relied on its uranium enrichment facilities at Kahuta to produce nuclear fuel, but has focused increasingly on reprocessing activities over the past decade. Spent fuel created by the heavy water reactors at Khushab is reprocessed to recover fissionable plutonium. In combination with Pakistan s development of cruise missiles, the plutonium allows it to diversify its arsenal, create lighter weapons, and deliver greater yields. 15 The army s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) exercises control over Pakistan s nuclear arsenal. 16 Although the SPD requires skilled technicians, a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) is in place to minimize the influence of Islamist ideas by recruiting from segments of society that are believed to be less radicalized. 17 Warhead cores, detonation devices and launch vehicles are apparently decoupled during peacetime. In a crisis, the various components are assembled in a stepwise process according to different stages of alert. Yet the country s nuclear program faces procedural and technical deficiencies. Open sources indicate that there may be significant overlap between Pakistan s conventional and nuclear command and control systems. Such a design could force the Pakistani leadership to order the early use of its nuclear weapons if it feared that the conventional system might be irreversibly damaged during hostilities. The absence of a second-strike capability, an early warning system, and the equipment needed to determine the location and magnitude of nuclear blasts constitute further security concerns. 18 After 9/11, the United States offered nuclear security assistance to Pakistan in the form of best practices 107 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
6 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN and technical measures designed to mitigate the possibility of unauthorized or accidental use. The United States also contributed physical security at storage facilities. This is an example of a collaborative effort carried out under strict conditions, without U.S. officials gaining access to Pakistan s facilities or its sensitive information regarding nuclear assets. 19 Conflicts and Negotiations over Kashmir Pakistan has a history of supporting Jihadist militant groups operating in Kashmir. 20 These terrorist organizations target the local Indian administration, putting pressure on India to accept a settlement that would be more favorable to Pakistan. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the Pakistani military s main intelligence agency, practices an unknown degree of control over proxies such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahadeen (HuM), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI). 21 Nevertheless, these groups redirected their aggression toward the Pakistani leadership itself after September With the complicity of low-level military personnel, Jihadist groups were implicated in assassination attempts on high-ranking officers who backed the Afghanistan War and sought to curb militant activities in Pakistan. 22 ISI also appears to have maintained its relations with and helped Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the terrorist group that injured and killed nearly 500 people in twelve coordinated attacks across Mumbai in November Aside from sponsoring Jihadist militants, the Pakistani state from time to time becomes directly embroiled in conflicts over Kashmir. In May 1999, the Kargil crisis broke out when the Pakistani army strategically occupied mountain peaks on the Indian side of the LoC. Military planners calculated that this move would allow Pakistan to isolate the northeastern portion of J&K from the rest of the Indian-administered territory. 24 As India mounted successful counter-operations and the U.S. forcefully condemned Pakistan s violation of the LoC, Prime Minister Sharif agreed to an unconditional withdrawal and the restoration of the LoC. 25 The CIA 108 VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
7 ANDREI MARINESCU asserted that the Pakistani military had prepared its nuclear-tipped missiles during the Kargil crisis. 26 Despite the potential for violence and distrust surrounding Kashmir, Pakistan and India have made strides toward achieving a peaceful settlement. Of the two states, Pakistan is relatively more interested in effecting a Kashmir settlement that would alter the status quo while India is satisfied with the existing territorial divisions. 27 Bilateral negotiations at the foreign secretary level were reopened in March 1997, and a separate working group was tasked with resolving the Kashmir problem. The discussions were interrupted by the nuclear tests of May 1998, but back-channel talks continued. 28 In 2007, these talks produced bilateral support for a soft border solution, which would make the Pakistani and Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir semi-autonomous and permit the free movement of people and goods between them. 29 Although the talks broke down after the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan had moved away from its traditional demand for a Kashmir referendum and India had modified its stance on converting the LoC into a hard international border. 30 History of Terrorism in Afghanistan The situation in Afghanistan further complicates Pakistan s security calculus. Pakistan and the United States backed the Afghan Mujahadeen against the Soviet Union forces that invaded Afghanistan in December The Mujahadeen were an assorted group of Islamist fighters mainly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 31 The ISI served as the primary conduit for providing them with weapons, advisors, and funding. It also cultivated and promoted the Islamist militant doctrine in Afghanistan, radicalizing the different factions that remained once the Soviets were expelled. To control the region after the Soviet Union s withdrawal, the ISI supported the Afghan Taliban. 32 This group of Islamist extremists, composed predominantly of Pashtun tribesmen, continues to maintain close ties with the ISI. At the same time, Pakistan is an ally of the United States in the Afghanistan War. Recent interviews with over a dozen senior Taliban leaders have revealed that the ISI provides training, arms, and money to the Taliban. 33 Furthermore, in the 109 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
8 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN past the ISI has detained Taliban militants who have negotiated with President Hamid Karzai s government in Afghanistan independently of Pakistan. 34 U.S. Interests and Options U.S.-Pakistani relations have been inconsistent and characterized by a lack of trust on both sides. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage noted, We didn t have a policy for Pakistan, we had a policy with Pakistan directed at something else. 35 The irregular alliance between the United States and Pakistan was initially designed to counter the Soviet threat in Afghanistan and is now directed against Islamist terrorists in that same country. After Pakistan accused the United States of violating its territorial sovereignty in the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 and a cross-border incident resulted in the death of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers in November 2011, 36 U.S.-Pakistani relations have become even more tenuous. However, in order for the United States to advance its goals on the subcontinent, it must seek a bilateral relationship [with Pakistan] that is enduring, strategic, and clearly defined. 37 The U.S.-Pakistani partnership can be advanced best by building long-term security in Pakistan, a common interest that is predicated on resolving Pakistan s concerns as they relate to India. Increased stability in South Asia would facilitate the expansion of markets for trade and investment, benefiting the American, Pakistani, and global economy. Attempts to foster security cannot ignore the most urgent challenge: the risks of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. These risks are perhaps greatest in Pakistan, where the precarious nature of the country s nuclear weapons program intersects with its long-standing rivalry with India and the prevalence of Islamist extremism. While a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would not harm the United States directly, certain terrorist organizations would be inclined to target the United States if they were able to obtain nuclear weapons. Three major courses of action are proposed to lessen nuclear risks and promote security in Pakistan: 110 VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
9 ANDREI MARINESCU A. Civilian Assistance: The United States could continue to provide Pakistan with aid that strengthens its civilian authority by financing institutional capacity-building. 38 Assistance would depend on the Pakistani leadership s efforts to limit conflicts with India and sever its ties to terrorist organizations. B. Improving Nuclear Program Protection: The United States could assist Pakistan in procedural and technical matters related to the security of its nuclear arsenal. 39 U.S. equipment and expertise would reduce the possibility of a miscalculation or unauthorized and accidental use of nuclear weapons. C. Improving Indo-Pakistani Relations Addressing Kashmir: The United States could dedicate time and diplomatic energy to mediating the Kashmir dispute. 40 A breakthrough in this area would mitigate Pakistan s reliance on nuclear weapons as well as terrorism. Assessment of Options A. Civilian Assistance By advancing the development of government institutions in Pakistan, U.S. aid could drive the steady formation of a strong public sector in the long run. Civilian officials could slowly increase their political clout at the expense of the army, with the new power structure opening the way for better relations with India and a fresh approach to settling the Kashmir problem. The civilian authority could also prove to be less inclined to sustain a credible minimum deterrence compared to the army, whose branches depend on the nuclear program and conflict with India to validate their existence. Nevertheless, the major weakness of this option is that it underestimates the extent to which both Pakistani military and civilian leaders are trained to think of India as their nation s primary threat. Negative perceptions of India extend well beyond the army, making it unlikely that powerful 111 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
10 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN government administrations would adopt a different strategy. Pakistan s leadership is convinced that nuclear deterrence has prevented Indian aggression in the past 41 and the civilian authority would most likely continue relying on the nuclear arsenal. In this sense, even if U.S. aid changed Pakistan s power structure, which is difficult to imagine since the army has traditionally been the dominant institution, assistance alone would probably not alter national security thinking in the country. Institutional capacity-building does not tackle the conflict with India and the dispute over Kashmir directly. There is also no evidence suggesting that Pakistan s leaders would accept limiting their policy options in return for aid. Prime Minister Sharif gave up economic and military assistance in 1998, choosing instead to heighten tensions with India by demonstrating his country s nuclear capability. Clearly, the establishment of a strategic balance with India took precedence over all other considerations. 42 Although the United States could cut off its aid if Pakistan were not meeting its obligations, China would most likely continue to supply Pakistan with military equipment and nuclear reactors. Regardless of a civilian assistance program, the Pakistani leadership s enduring perception of India as an existential threat, coupled with on-going Chinese support, would prevent Pakistan from curbing the expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal. B. Improving Nuclear Program Protection Pakistan s nuclear arsenal is immature, increasing the likelihood of theft of nuclear material, unauthorized use, and miscalculation. By sharing its methods and knowledge of best practices, the United States could contribute to the physical security of nuclear weapons components. For example, as these components are stored separately and assembled when a crisis builds, their transport makes them more vulnerable to theft by nuclear terrorists. Similarly, Pakistani officers need help in establishing an independent command and control system for their nuclear arsenal. Their reliance on the conventional structure, which is more liable to be targeted than a dedicated nuclear system during a conventional war, may lead to the early or unauthorized use of the weapons. In addition, Pakistan 112 VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
11 ANDREI MARINESCU requires an early warning system, which the United States can provide. With more information about its adversary s nuclear forces, Pakistan could avoid miscalculation and early use of its weapons. 43 Nuclear security assistance can only be provided within carefully defined boundaries that guarantee U.S. recognition of Pakistan s complete control over its own nuclear assets and information. The most significant problem with this option is that it fails to modify Pakistan s perception of the existential threat. Even though procedural and technical aspects of its nuclear arsenal would be improved, this does not change the fact that Pakistan is determined to increase its nuclear capabilities to balance increases in India s forces, nuclear or otherwise. By adding to its stockpile to maintain dynamic parity with India, Pakistan contributes to the nuclear build-up in South Asia. 44 The country would also continue to rely on the ambiguous nature of its nuclear doctrine, which represents an asymmetric strategy for dealing with Indian superiority. Pakistan s leaders seek to deter aggression through unclear motives and intentions, which are meant to instill fear in their Indian counterparts. 45 In essence, an improved nuclear program does not address the Indian threat directly. Without a settlement between Pakistan and India on major issues of contention, such as Kashmir, even small confrontations could escalate into nuclear war. In the case of the Kargil crisis, the two states possession of nuclear weapons did not encourage caution. On the contrary, this may have emboldened the Pakistani leadership if it ordered the operation because it had faith in its deterrence capacity. As the conflict intensified, Pakistani officers began to prepare for the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, U.S. nuclear security assistance cannot prevent Islamist terrorists from gaining access to nuclear material by virtue of their connections with the ISI and other military branches. The ISI collaborates with the Afghan Taliban and the LeT. 46 Extremists infiltration of the military establishment is an unknown variable, but the prospect itself poses serious threats to regional security. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW 113
12 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN C. Improving Indo-Pakistani Relations Addressing Kashmir Pakistan s nuclear arsenal and Islamist militants are geared toward countering the Indian threat. If trust could slowly be established between the two countries and relations were normalized, Pakistan s security concerns would be reduced. It would certainly not abandon its nuclear weapons program, but increased confidence in its neighbor s actions and intentions would encourage Pakistan to slow down the rapid development of its volatile program. Under these circumstances, a clear and well-articulated nuclear doctrine could be envisioned as an additional confidence-building measure. Improved relations with India would also decrease the Pakistani state s support for the Taliban and Jihadist extremists. Pakistan would be less likely to interfere in Afghanistan in order to protect its rear area or put pressure on India through terrorism if fears of its neighbor were mitigated. As the Afghanistan War draws to a close, less Pakistani intervention would not only enhance Afghanistan s internal security but that of the region in general. A settlement on a significant challenge like Kashmir would be a key step to normalizing Indo-Pakistani relations, and unlocking the dangerous and synergistic dynamic that involves state insecurity, nuclear weapons, and Islamist extremists. The United States could play a mediatory role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Although the task is extremely difficult, events suggest that there may be opportunities for engagement. Pakistan and India have demonstrated greater flexibility in modifying their traditional positions. From 2004 to 2008, back-channel talks were moving toward a solution as the two states contemplated making the LoC a permeable frontier between their portions of Kashmir, which would have been self-governed. 47 The Indo-American strategic partnership is currently stronger than it has ever been 48 and Pakistani officials have sought U.S. mediation in the past, believing that U.S. intervention would neutralize Indian power. 49 Nevertheless, the talks have a history of breaking down when crises, such as the Mumbai attacks, cause Indo-Pakistani relations to 114 VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
13 ANDREI MARINESCU deteriorate. Progress greatly depends on sustained dialogue and discreet communication, especially during the most difficult periods. India would have to agree to the involvement of the United States and China, the latter being a key regional player. This is difficult to envision given that the status quo favors India, which has resisted third-party involvement for decades. 50 The United States could take advantage of its excellent relations with India following the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement of 2008 to slowly but forcefully persuade the Indian government to make concessions. As China is responsible for administering a portion of Kashmir and has a large stake in regional security, it would seek to become actively involved in the negotiations. In this respect, a Sino-Indian agreement on the long-disputed Trans-Karakoram Tract, possibly facilitated by growing economic ties between India and China, could prove crucial to driving multilateral negotiations. China could take advantage of its broad support for Pakistan and improved relations with India following such an agreement to play a significant role as an intermediary between the two countries. 51 Recommendations Unlike the proposals to strengthen Pakistan s public institutions and protect its nuclear arsenal, a Kashmir settlement would tackle the state s security concerns most directly, confronting the existential threat that is India. If carried out successfully, this option would reduce Pakistan s reliance on nuclear weapons and terrorism, thus lessening nuclear tensions and promoting security on the subcontinent. It is essential that the initiative be led in a discreet and informal manner by the Obama administration. 52 Back-channel talks are an ideal forum for avoiding all of the politicization surrounding Kashmir, which has imperiled the negotiation process in the past. 53 American leadership would demonstrate the U.S. s determination and commitment, lending credibility to its role as an honest broker in an arena of mistrust. 115 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
14 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN Low-key consultations with Pakistani and Indian officials involved in the dialogue on Kashmir are critical to assessing where the talks stand and setting the tone for future negotiations. Pakistan should be dissuaded from supporting terrorist groups whose violent acts have disrupted the Indo-Pakistani dialogue in the past. The state must, first and foremost, be willing to abandon sponsorship of organizations like the LeT. 54 As some terrorist organizations have recently turned against Pakistan s government, it may be more open to combating these groups. Most importantly, India s willingness to participate in the negotiations will be contingent upon assurances that the status quo on the subcontinent, favoring it rather than China or Pakistan, 55 will be preserved. In particular, the United States should support the LoC as the ultimate border with Pakistan, an outcome considered positive by India. 56 Endnotes 1 Dennis Kux, India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue? (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), Schaffer and Schaffer, Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), , Kux, Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), University of Texas, The Disputed Area of Kashmir, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: Kashmir Maps, kashmir_disputed_2003.jpg (May 11, 2014). 8 Schaffer and Schaffer, Amitai Etzioni, Rethinking the Pakistan Plan, National Interest 117 (2012): 59, ; Michael Tkacik, Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons Program and Implications for U.S. National Security, International Relations 24, no. 2 (2010): at 209, Etzioni, Ibid., VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
15 ANDREI MARINESCU 12 Schaffer and Schaffer, Tkacik, Etzioni, Tkacik, , Schaffer and Schaffer, Tkacik, Ibid., Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., August 8, 2011), 17-19, pdf 20 C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 15; Riedel, Fair and Chalk, Ibid., Riedel, Malik, Ibid., Riedel, Kux, Malik, Etzioni, Schaffer and Schaffer, ; Kux, Malik, Tkacik, Riedel, Ibid. 35 Malik, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Pakistan, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: Fact Sheet, (May 11, 2014). 37 Ibid. 38 Etzioni, Tkacik, 192, Etzioni, 61-62; Riedel, Tkacik, Schaffer and Schaffer, Tkacik, Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), Tkacik, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW 117
16 RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN 46 Riedel, Schaffer and Schaffer, Riedel, Schaffer and Schaffer, Ibid., Kux, Riedel, Schaffer and Schaffer, Riedel, Ibid. 56 Ibid., VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
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