PSCI 5660 Seminar on Civil Wars Fall Wednesday, 6:30-9:20

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1 PSCI 5660 Seminar on Civil Wars Fall Wednesday, 6:30-9:20 David Mason Office: 152 Wooten Hall Office hours: MWF, 1-3 M or any time you find me in my office phone: address: masontd@unt.edu or David.Mason@unt.edu turnitin.com course code: (password: mason) TEXTS: Mason, T. David and Sara M. Mitchell, eds What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. nd Horowitz, Donald L Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 2 ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Lichbach, Mark I The Rebel s Dilemma. An Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. * Tilly, Charles From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill. (* pdf available on blackboard) Kalyvas, Stathis The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hudson, Valerie M.; Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill; Mary Caprioli & Chad F. Emmett Sex and World Peace. New York: Columbia University Press. Recommended: Skocpol, Theda States and Social Revolutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. COURSE OBJECTIVES Since the end of World War II, there has not been a single day in which there was not an armed conflict of some sort going on somewhere in the world. Of course, war has never been rare. What is different about the last half century is that, first, the most common form of armed conflict since 1945 has not been interstate war between two sovereign nations but terrorism and civil war within nations. Second, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, these wars had occurred almost exclusively in the nations of the Third World. Third, once a nation experiences a civil war, it is highly likely to experience another one. The purpose of this course is to give students some understanding of the forms, causes, and consequences of revolution, ethnic conflict, terrorism, and other types of civil violence. We will begin with a brief overview of the patterns of civil conflict over the last 50 years. We will then survey the major theoretical schools that have emerged to explain the causes of civil war. We will use these theoretical frameworks to make some sense of several forms of civil conflict peasant-based revolutionary insurgencies, ethnic conflict, and terrorism and the different phases of the civil conflict process: onset, duration and outcome, and post-civil war peace duration. COURSE REQUIREMENTS Your grade in this course will be based on class participation and presentations, a take-home exam and a research project. A. Class Participation: 15% of final grade A minimum of fifteen (15) percent of your grade will be determined by in-class participation, including attendance and a presentation of your research project at the end of the semester. Attendance is expected at all class sessions. You will also be expected to make presentations on assigned journal articles. Attendance, presentations, plus my estimate of your contributions to class discussions (in the form of informed participation in class discussion and attentive listening to the contributions of others) will determine your score on this portion of your final grade. "Informed" participation means that it is apparent from your comments that you have completed the assigned readings prior to class. -1-

2 B. Exam: 35% of final grade The final exam will be distributed at the end of the last class session (December 7), and it will be due December 14 (the final exam date for this class period). The purpose of the final exam is to get you to bring together the material we cover in the class in several integrative essays. The questions will be designed to help you prepare the sort of essays that you will have to do on your doctoral qualifying exams. The exam will be take-home and will consist of essay questions. You are free to use any books, notes, or journal articles that you have, but you are not to confer with other students on the test questions. Evidence of collaboration with other students or anyone else will be treated as an instance of cheating and dealt with according to University rules on cheating. You will receive a grade of "0" for the exam and an "F" for the course. There is a 3 point penalty for each day you are late turning in an exam. You are required to turn in a printed copy of your exam and to submit an electronic copy to The course code and password for tunitin.com are listed on the previous page. Please register with turnitin.com immediately. C. Research Project: 50% of final grade Each student is expected to complete a research paper on some topic in the general field civil war and political violence, including revolution, repression, ethnic conflicts, terrorism as well as conflict management, mediation and conflict prevention, failed states and civil violence, genocide and politicide, post-war reconstruction and reconciliation, sustaining the peace in the aftermath of civil conflict, or any related topic. You should approach this assignment as the first step in a research project that will lead to a conference paper and a refereed publication. Accordingly, the end product should be in the form of a research design that includes testable hypotheses derived from a well-articulated theoretical framework. Your design should be such that existing data sets could be employed to test the hypotheses you derived from your theory. If you can test your hypotheses with an existing dataset, that is even better (though not required); even a preliminary analysis will get you one step closer to the goal of a refereed publication. The purpose of this project is to develop your ability to conduct research, to think and write critically and analytically, and to formulate theoretical arguments that are innovative but still grounded in existing research, derive testable propositions from those theories, and develop appropriate research designs to test those propositions. This requires that you develop certain skills as well as familiarity with the research production process. Accordingly, you are expected to develop your research paper in three cumulative installments. The due dates and the percent of your final research project grade that is determined by each installment are as follows: 1. Problem Statement & Annotated Bibliography (15%) - September 26 (Monday) 2. Literature Review and Research Design (25%) - October 31 (Monday) 3. Final Draft (60%) - December 5 (Monday) COMPLETING EACH OF THESE INSTALLMENTS IS NOT OPTIONAL! You may NOT pass the course by turning in nothing but a final draft. Failure to complete one of the installments will result in a grade of "0" for that portion of your research project grade. You will be penalized three (3) points for every day you are late with any one of the installments. You are required to turn in a printed copy of each installment AND submit an electronic version to turnitin.com. PART 1: Problem Statement and Annotated Bibliography (15%) Due: September 26 In the first installment you are expected to: a. choose a research topic: you may choose a research puzzle that will define the central research quesiton of your project. If you do not already have a topic in mind, look through the topics in the syllabus. You should try to identify a puzzle in of the phases of the civil conflict process (1) preconditions and onset, (2) conflict dynamics, duration, outcome, (3) post-civil war peace duration/peace failure/civil war recurrence. While you may use case studies to illustrate your theoretical arguments, I would prefer that you develop a comparative research design (e.g., cross-nation/cross national time series) that is amenable to empirical tests. For example: What pre-conditions are -2-

3 conducive to different forms of civil conflict? Are democracies less likely to experience civil war, more likely to end them sooner and with an outcome more favorable to the government or the rebels? Is the post-civil war peace more likely to last under certain conditions? What conditions determine whether civil war will occur in an ethnically divided society? Are ethnically based civil conflicts more likely to last longer than non-ethnic conflicts, to end in outcomes more favorable to government or rebels? What factors determine whether outside actors will intervene in a civil war, and what effects does intervention have on the outcome of civil war? b. identify and read (10) scholarly journal articles on your topic: for this installment, confine your research to scholarly journals or chapters in scholarly anthologies. Do NOT include in your annotated bibliography articles from newspapers, news magazines, opinion magazines, government documents, or material available on the web. You should list your 10 articles (using the correct citation format) in a List of References at the end of your annotated bibliography (on a separate page). c. prepare a 1/2-1 page summary for each of six (6) of the articles and a 1-2 page problem statement: The problem statement should spell out the research question you are addressing and the major aspects of the research question that need to be explored in some detail. It should also reference the relevant articles that you summarize, and what they contribute to the elaboration of your research question and research design. The article summaries should spell out the themes, hypotheses, and findings that are relevant to your research question. Each article summary should spell out the major issues addressed by the authors, the theoretical approach they used, and their analysis, methods, and findings. This problem statement should provide me with a road map of what you plan to do in your research paper and an explanation of why this issue is important. It should be the equivalent of a paper proposal submission to a conference: interesting enough to persuade the program committee that it should be included in the conference programs and informative enough to allow them to assess the merits and potential of the research and determine under what panel topics it would fit. The problem statement should also make the case that this is a do-able project that can be completed by the end of the semester. PART 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework (25%) Due: October 31 For the second installment you should develop your annotated bibliography into a literature review in which you spell out the major themes found in the relevant literature and detail what each article has to say about each theme. By this time, you should have identified and read additional sources on the subject (beyond the original ten articles in Part I). The literature review should lead you to the development of a theoretical framework that you will use to explain the phenomenon that is the subject of your paper. You should also describe in more detail the plan by which you will explore this research question, to include a detailed statement of the research question or puzzle that will be the focus of your research paper, what major themes you have gleaned from your review of the relevant articles you have read, and how you plan to approach your analysis of the research question. PART 3: Final Draft Research Design, Analysis and Presentation (60%) due December 5 Drawing on the literature review and theoretical framework you developed in Part 2, articles you summarized in Part 1, you should prepare a final draft of your research design. The research design should spell out testable hypotheses and explain how they are derived from the theoretical framework. You should also spell out what data would be required to test these hypotheses and what statistical technique you would used to test them and then generate findings and interpret them. Part 4: Class Presentations December 5 We will reserve the last class session and the exam day for this class for students to present their research projects, and you will be expected to make a presentation (with powerpoint slides) comparable to what you would do at a conference. The keys to writing a good paper are thorough research, careful writing and frequent REWRITING. At each stage you should carefully edit, revise, elaborate and reorganize the parts of the paper that -3-

4 you completed in earlier installments. Revising drafts is especially critical for the final draft. All three installments should be TYPED (single spaced, no more than one-inch margins on all four sides, no larger than 12pt or 12 cpi font) and you should use the citation format in the style sheet that will be distributed in class. ACADEMIC INTEGRITY - CLASS POLICY ON PLAGIARISM AND CHEATING You are expected to do your own work for this course, and it must be original work for this course. Unfortunately, some students cheat and some students plagiarize other people's work. If you plagiarize or turn in as your own work something that someone else did either in its entirety or in large part, or if you turn in work that does not properly cite the sources from which you got your material (thereby creating the impression that the work is your original work), you will receive a grade of "F" for the course, and you will be referred to the appropriate student judicial authorities for violation of the University's academic honesty policies. If you do not understand what constitutes cheating or plagiarism, ask me. Specifically, the following are unacceptable and will be treated as instances of plagiarsm: 1. You may not turn in a paper that someone else wrote either in whole or in part. That includes papers written in whole or in part by a friend, relative, classmate, roommate, or any other human being. 2. You may not turn in a paper that you have turned in for another class, regardless of whether that other class is this semester or some previous semester. 3. You may not quote or paraphrase long passages from books, journals, or web sites without attribution. Even with proper citation, it is not wise to turn in a paper that is largely a collection of quotes. 4. Plagiarism also includes using passages from the works of others without citing the source. Any time you use more than ten consecutive words from a source, you should put that passage in quotation marks and cite the source (including the page number where the quoted passage is found). When you paraphrase a source (so that quotation marks are not needed) you still need to cite the source (including the page number). When in doubt, provide a citation. Otherwise, you may be guilty of plagiarism, and I consider that a very serious offense. If you are unsure whether you need to cite a source, cite it. You will not be penalized for having too many citations. You will be penalized for failure to cite sources. Plagiarism of any form will not be tolerated. If you have any doubts about whether what you are doing amounts to plagiarism, see me. Turnitin.com provides me with a report on the percent of each paper that is lifted verbatim from other sources, and it provides the citation of the source. Plagiarism will be detected, so avoid it. IMPORTANT DATES Paper installment 1 due - September 26 (Friday) Paper installment 2 due - October 31 (Friday) Paper installment 3 due - December 5 (Monday) Final exam distributed - December 7 Final exam due - December 14 CLASSROOM ETIQUETTE All students must treat the instructor, the other students, and the classroom setting with respect. This includes arriving on time and staying for the entire class (or notifying the instructor in advance if this will not be possible), turning off cell phones and similar devices during class, and refraining from reading, passing notes, talking with friends, and any other potentially disruptive or distracting activities. This also means showing respect for alternative opinions and points of view, listening when either the instructor or a fellow student is speaking to the class, and refraining from insulting language and gestures. Repeated or egregious instances of classroom disruption will result in referral to the Center for Student Rights and Responsibilities to consider whether the student's conduct violated the Code of Student Conduct. The Code of Student Conduct can be found at OTHER RULES: 1. As a courtesy to your fellow students (and the instructor) get to class on time every day and remain in the classroom for the duration of the class. -4-

5 2. Make your bathroom and food/drink visits BEFORE class. It is disruptive and distracting to get up and wander in and out of the room while class is in session. If you must leave early for some reason, let me know ahead of time and sit near the door so that you can leave with a minimum of disruption. 3. Turn off your cell phone and if you use an electronic device to take notes, refrain from using it for activities that might be distracting to other students. University of North Texas -- Department of Political Science POLICY ON CHEATING AND PLAGIARISM The UNT Code of Student Conduct and Discipline defines cheating and plagiarism as the use of unauthorized books, notes, or otherwise securing help in a test; copying others' tests, assignments, reports, or term papers; representing the work of another as one's own; collaborating without authority with another student during an examination or in preparing academic work; or otherwise practicing scholastic dishonesty. Normally, the minimum penalty for cheating or plagiarism is a grade of "F" in the course. In the case of graduate departmental exams, the minimum penalty shall be failure of all fields of the exam. Determination of cheating or plagiarism shall be made by the instructor in the course, or by the field faculty in the case of departmental exams. Cases of cheating or plagiarism on graduate departmental exams, theses, or dissertations shall automatically be referred to the departmental Graduate Studies Committee. Cases of cheating or plagiarism in ordinary coursework may, at the discretion of the instructor, be referred to the Undergraduate Studies Committee in the case of undergraduate students, or the Graduate Studies Committee in the case of graduate students. These committees, acting as agents of the department Chair, shall impose further penalties, or recommend further penalties to the Dean of Students, if they determine that the case warrants it. In all cases, the Dean of Students shall be informed in writing of the case. Students may appeal any decision under this policy by following the procedures laid down in the UNT Code of Student Conduct and Discipline. University of North Texas -- Department of Political Science POLICY ON ACADEMIC INTEGRITY The Political Science Department adheres to and enforces UNT's policy on academic integrity (cheating, plagiarism, forgery, fabrication, facilitating academic dishonesty and sabotage). Students in this class should review the policy (UNT Policy Manual Section ), which may be located at: Policies on academic dishonesty: Violations of academic integrity in this course will addressed in compliance with the penalties and procedures laid out in this policy. Students may appeal any decision under this policy by following the procedures laid down in the UNT The UNT Policy Manual Section "Student Standards of Academic Integrity Department Statement of ADA compliance The University of North Texas makes reasonable academic accommodation for students with disabilities. Students seeking accommodation must first register with the Office of Disability Accommodation (ODA) to verify their eligibility. If a disability is verified, the ODA will provide you with an accommodation letter to be delivered to faculty to begin a private discussion regarding your specific needs in a course. You may request accommodations at any time, however, ODA notices of accommodation should be provided as early as possible in the semester to avoid any delay in implementation. Note that students must obtain a new letter of accommodation for every semester and must meet with each faculty member prior to implementation in each class. For additional information see the Office of Disability Accommodation website at You may also contact them by phone at Acceptable Student Behavior: Student behavior that interferes with an instructor's ability to conduct a class or other students' opportunity to learn is unacceptable and disruptive and will not be tolerated in any instructional forum at UNT. Students engaging in unacceptable behavior will be directed to leave the classroom and the -5-

6 instructor may refer the student to the Center for Student Rights and Responsibilities to consider whether the student's conduct violated the Code of Student Conduct. The university's expectations for student conduct apply to all instructional forums, including university and electronic classroom, labs, discussion groups, field trips, etc. The Code of Student Conduct can be found at: COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS Reading assignments are indicated in the course outline that follows. You are expected to keep up with the readings in the sense of having them completed by the time we begin the corresponding section of the course. Class discussion counts 10% of your grade, and informed discussion requires careful reading of the assignments. 1. AUGUST 31: DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA We begin the course with an overview of the extent and forms of civil violence in the post-world War II era. Over the last 60 years, some important trends are evident in the patterns of armed conflict in the world: (1) civil war has surpassed interstate war as the most frequent and deadly form of conflict, (2) the Third World (Asia, Africa, Latin America) has replaced the major power system as the primary locus of conflict, (3) about half of the nations that have one civil war experience a relapse into renewed conflict at a later date. With these patterns in mind, we will conclude with a review of the Sambanis article that identifies some critical measurement issues in building datasets to test theories on aspects of the civil conflict process. Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Erik Melander; and Henrik Urdal Introduction Patterns of Armed Conflict since 1945, Chapter 1 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Sambanis, Nicholas "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6): Forsberg, Erika Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, Chapter 5 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Cunningham, David; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch; and Idean Salehyan Geography, Organization, and Events. Chapter 15 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Suggested Collier, Paul; V. L. Elliott; Håvard Hegre; Anke Hoeffler; Marta Reynal-Querol; Nicholas Sambanis Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank. Overview, Mack, Andrew, ed Human Security Brief Vancouver: University of British Columbia. Chapter 1 Mack, Andrew, ed Human Security Report Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, Chapters 5, 6 2. SEPTEMBER 7: GRIEVANCES, GREED AND CIVIL WAR In this section we shall examine several of the major theoretical frameworks that contemporary social scientists have developed to explain mass-based revolution. We will begin with individual-level explanations by focusing on Ted Gurr and James Davies' relative deprivation theory (RD). Along with RD theory, there developed a research tradition centered around the relationship between various forms of inequality as a source of grievances that contribute to revolutionary violence. The Mason chapter presents a review of the major theoretical schools on civil war onset. The last two articles are empirical tests of greed versus grievance based theories of civil war onset. Young, Joseph K Antecedents of Civil War Onset: Greed, Grievance, and State Repression, Chapter 2 in in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? -6-

7 Mason, T. David The Evolution of Theory on Civil War and Revolution, pp in Manus Midlarsky, ed. Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Davies, James C. (1962). "Toward a Theory of Revolution" American Sociological Review 27: Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American Political Science Review 97 (1): Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): Suggested Readings Regan, Patrick M. and Daniel Norton "Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(3): Gurr, Ted R "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." World Politics 20: SEPTEMBER 14: THE REBEL S DILEMMA Rational actor models (RA) represent a reaction to the deficiencies of RD theory. Specifically, RA theories focus on the rebel s dilemma : why would a rational individual participate in violent collective action when the benefits of such activity (the public goods of regime change) will be available to that individual whether or not s/he participated in the collective action? This variant of Mancur Olson s classic collective action problem is especially acute in the case of revolutionary collective action, given the low probability of revolutions succeeding (and producing the public goods) and the extreme risks that participation in a revolution entails. We will read most of Lichbach s seminal book on the rebel s dilemma and then explore some works on possible solutions to the rebel s dilemma. Lichbach, Mark I The Rebel's Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, especially chapters 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10. Van Belle, Douglas A "Leadership and Collective Action: The Case of Revolution." International Studies Quarterly 40: Suggested Will Moore, "Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem", Political Research Quarterly 48 (June 1995): Kuran, Timur "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution." Public Choice 61: Taylor, Michael. 1988b. "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action." Pp in Michael Taylor, ed. Rationality and Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1994a. What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? World Politics 46: Kuran, Timur "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989." World Politics. 44: Norman Frohlich; Joe A. Oppenheimer I Get by with a Little Help from my Friends. World Politics 23: SEPTEMBER 21: MOBILIZING REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Resource mobilization theory arose out of a concern with the tendency of rational actor models to underpredict the occurrence of revolutionary violence. Charles Tilly (1978) pointed to the importance of revolutionary leadership and revolutionary organization in mobilizing discontented populations for violent collective action. In the absence of effective mobilization, deprived populations suffer in silence. We will discuss Tilly s classic work as well as some other works from this school. Tilly, Charles From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill, Chapters 1,3,4,5,6 Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly "Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution." In Comparative Politics, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -7-

8 Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. International Security 33(1): Suggested McAdam, Doug; Sidney Tarrow; and Charles Tilly "To Map Contentious Politics." Mobilization: An International Journal 1 (1): Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan Why Civil Resistance Works. New York: Columbia University Press. Tarrow, Sidney Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chong, Dennis Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hardin, Russell Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hardin, Russell One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goldstone, Jack A "Is Revolution Individually Rational? Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action." Rationality and Society 6(1): SEPTEMBER 28: STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS A third group of scholars, led by Theda Skocpol (1979), argued that both deprived actor models and resource mobilization theory implicitly discount the role of the state in generating the crises that sometimes degenerate into revolutionary violence. Skocpol and her colleagues "brought the state back in" to the analysis of revolution by pointing out the ways in which actions by the state are critical in determining whether discontent will arise and whether revolutionary elites will succeed in mobilizing discontented populations for revolt. Readings DeRouen, Jr., Karl and David Sobek State Capacity, Regime Type and Civil War, Chapter 3 in in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Skocpol, Theda (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch Hendrix, Cullen S "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 47(3): Hegre, Håvard; Tanja Ellingsen; Nils Petter Gleditsch; and Scott Gates Towards a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, American Political Science Review 95 (1): Fjelde, Hanne "Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, " Conflict Management and Peace Science 27(3): Suggested Readings Goodwin, Jeff "State-Centered Approaches to Social Revolutions: Strengths and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition," in John Foran, ed. Theorizing Revolutions. London: Routledge. Stanley, William The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Goodwin, Jeff No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, Cambridge: Gurses, Mehmet and T. David Mason "Weak States, Regime Types, and Civil War," Civil Wars 12(1): OCTOBER 5: PEASANT-BASED REVOLUTIONS In this section we will explore the dynamics of rebellions among rural populations of Third World nations. This requires that one first gain some understanding of traditional social structure in rural societies, including the dynamics of patron-client politics. We will then explore the conditions and forces that erode these structures, freeing up peasant populations for mobilization by opposition movements. Finally, we will explore the question of what conditions must prevail before an otherwise cautious peasant, who is -8-

9 largely indifferent to the intra-elite struggles for power at the national level, would take up arms against the incumbent regime and, in the process, assume the extreme risks that such behavior entails. Mason, T. David Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning: Is Land Reform a Remedy for Peasant Unrest? Journal of Politics 60: Mason, T. David and Krane, Dale A "The Political Economy of Death Squads. International Studies Quarterly. 33 (2): Popkin, Samuel L Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam. Pp in Michael Taylor, ed., Rationality and Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Joshi, Madhav and T. David Mason "Land Tenure, Democracy, and Patterns of Violence During the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, ", Social Science Quarterly 91: Joshi, Madhav and T. David Mason "Between Democracy and Revolution: Peasant Support for Insurgency versus Democracy in Nepal", Journal of Peace Research, 45 (6): Suggested Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1994a. What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? World Politics 46: Scott, James C Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Journal of Peasant Studies 13 (January): Paige, Jeffery M Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World. New York: Free Press. Ch. 1 Migdal, Joel S Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Towards Political and Social Change in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Popkin, Samuel L The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press. Scott, James C The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Scott, James C Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wolf, Eric Peasant Revolts of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper and Row. Mason, T. David Caught in the Crossfire: Revolution, Repression, and the Rational Peasant. Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mason, T. David. 1986a. "Land Reform and the Breakdown of Clientelist Politics in El Salvador. Comparative Political Studies. 19: OCTOBER 12: PATTERNS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT One source of group identity and sub-national social organization is ethnic identity. Ethnic identity and ethnic conflict are especially prevalent in many regions of the Third World because the formal boundaries of the nation-states (especially in Africa and parts of Asia) were drawn by European powers during the colonial era, and they were drawn with little or no regard for the geographic distribution of nations of people who shared a common language, religion, culture and heritage. Thus many Third World nations are characterized by multiple ethnic groups coexisting (uneasily) as citizens of a single nation state and/or identifiable ethic groups being divided between two or more nation states. In this section we will examine the ethnic dimension of politics in the Third World. Seymour, Lee J. M. And Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham Identity Issues and Civil War: Ethnic and Religious Divisions, in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Ch. 1-6 Wimmer, A., Cederman, L.E., Min, B Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Global Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set. American Sociological Review 74 (2): Cederman, L.E., Wimmer, A. & Min, B Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis. World Politics 62 (1):

10 Suggested Gurr, Ted R. and Will H. Moore Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessment for the 1990s. American Journal of Political Science 41 (4): Gurr, Ted Robert People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System, International Studies Quarterly 38: Kaufman, Stuart J "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War. International Security. 21 (2): Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict. International Security 21 (2): Cederman, L.E, Girardin, L. & Gleditsch, K.S Ethnonationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars. World Politics 61 (3): Cetinyan, R Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention. International Organization 56 (3): Kaufmann, Chaim "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. International Security. 20 (4): Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict. International Security 21 (Fall): Ellingsen, Tanja Colorful Communities or Ethnic Witches Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (2): Cederman, L.E., Weidmann, N.B. & Gleditsch, K.S Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison. American Political Science Review 105 (3): Walter, B.F Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede. International Organization 60 (1): Cederman, L.E., Gleditsch, K.S., Salehyan, I. & Wucherpfennig, J Transborder Ethnic Kin and Civil War. International Organization 67 (Spring): Forsberg, E Do Ethnic Dominos Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups. International Studies Quarterly 57 (2): Jenne, E A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia. International Studies Quarterly 48 (4): OCTOBER 19: TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND CIVIL WAR The events of September 11 brought home to the U.S. the destructive potential of terrorist violence. Terrorist violence has been used by opposition groups and by states for centuries. During the Cold War, it became a favored tactic of ethnonationalist groups that lacked the capacity to mount a full-scale revolutionary challenge. With the end of the Cold War it has become a favored tactic of transnational groups opposed to U.S. hegemony. In this section we will examine the types of terrorist groups, their motives, why they choose terrorist violence, and how terrorist violence serves their goals. Terrorist violence is a favored tactical choice of dissident groups prior to, during, and after civil wars. In this section we will explore the linkages between terrorist violence and the civil conflict process. Sandler, Todd The Analytic Study of Terrorism: Taking Stock, Journal of Peace Research 51(2): Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Walter "The Strategies of Terrorism" International Security 31(1): Findley, Michael G. And Joseph K Young "Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem," Perspectives on Politics 10(2): Walsh, James I. and James A. Piazza Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism, Comparative Political Studies 43(5): Chenoweth, Erica Terrorism and Democracy, Annual Review of Political Science 16:

11 Suggested readings Chenoweth, Erica Democratic competition and Terrorist Activity, Journal of Politics 72(1): Young, Joseph K. And Michael G. Findley Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism Research, International Studies Review 13: Asal, Victor and R. Karl Rethemeyer. The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. Journal of Politics, 70(2): Piazza, James A Do Democracy and Free Markets Protect Us From Terrorism? International Politics, 45: 72 91). Piazza, James A Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages, Terrorism and Political Violence 18: Piazza, James A Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism? International Studies Quarterly 52, OCTOBER 26: WOMEN AND CIVIL WAR Until recently, the role of women in civil conflict has been largely ignored. Recent research has revealed a number of important reasons for us to examine the role of women more closely. First, those nations where the status of women in society is better are less likely to experience civil war. Second, women have been involved in civil wars, and not just as victims or in support roles as keepers of the home fires. Women have played leadership roles in a number of revolutionary movements, and large numbers of women have served as combat soldiers in a number of revolutionary movements. In this section, we will examine how women get mobilized as participants in civil conflicts and how the status of women in a society affects that nation s risk of civil war. Hudson, Valerie M.; Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill; Mary Caprioli & Chad F. Emmett Sex and World Peace. New York: Columbia University Press. Ch. 1-4 Melander, Erik Gender and Civil Wars, Chapter 12 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Melander, Erik "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict." International Studies Quarterly 49: Mason, T. David "Women's Participation in Central American Revolutions: A Theoretical Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 25: Suggested World Bank World Development Report: Gender Equality and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank, Chapters 1, 3. Caprioli, Mary Gender Equality and Civil Wars. New York: World Bank. Caprioli, Mary Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict. International Studies Quarterly 49: Tetreault, Maryanne, ed Women and Revolution. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 10. NOVEMBER 2: CIVIL WAR ONSET We have already explored theories of civil war onset and reviewed some of the most prominent efforts to model civil war onset. In this section, we will examine some of the other factors that have been invoked to model civil war onset more precisely. Among the factors considered here are the resource curse, the status of women, and alternative conceptions of state weakness vs. democracy. Readings Young, Joseph K "Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War", Political Research Quarterly 66(3): Smith, Benjamin Exploring the Resource-Civil War Nexus, Chapter 13 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? -11-

12 Hendrix, Cullen; Scott Gates; and Halvard Buhaug The Environment and Conflict, Chapter 14 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Davenport, Christian. 2007a. "State Repression and Tyrannical Peace." Journal of Peace Research 44(4): Dixon, Jeffrey "What Causes Civil Wars: Integrating Quantitative Research Findings," International Studies Review 11: Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede & Andrea Ruggeri Political Opportunity Structure, Democracy, and Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 47(3): Suggested Regan, Patrick M. and Daniel Norton "Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(3): Humphreys, Macartan Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): Gurses, Mehmet and T. David Mason "Weak States, Regime Types, and Civil War," Civil Wars 12(1): Ross, Michael L What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of Peace Research 41(3): Ross, Michael L The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics 51(2): Ross, Michael A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War." Annual Review of Political Science 9: Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Hegre, Håvard; Strand, Håvard Democracy and Civil War, pp in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 11. NOVEMBER 9: REBELS AND GOVERNMENT IN CIVIL WAR When faced with an opposition challenge, the state can respond with accommodative reforms or repression. Which strategy a state chooses is in part a function of regime type and the resources available to the state. If the state chooses repression, the question then becomes does repression work? in the sense of suppressing that challenge. The readings in this section address this question by examining how mobilized opposition groups respond to varying levels of state repression. Kalyvas, Stathis The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1-7 Weinstein, Jeremy Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): Salehyan, Idean Transnational rebels: Neighboring states as sanctuary for rebel groups. World Politics, 59(02), Wood, Reed M. and Jacob D. Kathman "Too Much of a Bad Thing? Civilian Victimization and Bargaining in Civil War," British Journal of Political Science 44: Suggested Readings Lichbach, Mark Irving "Deterrence or Escalation in Repression and Dissent." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 31: Rost, Nicholas "Human Rights Violations, Weak States, and Civil War." Human Rights Review 12: Gates, Scott Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1): DeMerritt, Jacqueline. (Forthcoming) "Delegating Death: Military Intervention and Government Killing." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Kalyvas, Stathis N "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars," Perspectives on Politics 1 (3):

13 12. NOVEMBER 16: INTERVENTION, CIVIL WAR DURATION AND OUTCOME One promising trend in recent years has been that the number of civil wars on-going at any given time declined. This is largely a matter of the number of wars being brought to an end exceeding the number of new civil war onsets. And this trend in civil war termination is largely a function of an increase in the number of civil wars have been brought to an end by negotiated settlement. In this section, we will explore the conditions -- characteristics of the conflict and of the government and rebel organizations involved in the conflict -- that make negotiated settlement more of less likely compared to military victories. Finally, we will examine some of the outcomes of revolutions: do they often deliver what they promise? Is the new order after the revolution all that different from the pre-revolutionary status quo? why does the new order so often stray from what the leaders promised their followers to get them to take up arms? Readings Linebarger, Christopher and Andrew Enterline Third Party Intervention and the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars, Chapter 6 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Brandt, Patrick T.; T. David Mason; Mehmet Gurses; Nicolai Petrovsky & Dagmar Radin, When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars, Defence and Peace Economics 19(6): Regan, P.M. 1996, "Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 40, no. 2, pp Cunningham, D. E Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars. Journal of Peace Research 47(2): DeRouen, Jr., Karl R. and Sobek, David The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome. Journal of Peace Research 41: Suggested Readings Shelton, Allison M; Szymon M. Stojek; and Patricia L. Sullivan "What Do We Know About Civil War Outcomes?", International Studies Review 15: Balch-Lindsay, Dylan; Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle Joyce Third Party Intervention and the Civil War Process. Journal of Peace Research 45(3): Regan, Patrick M Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Regan, P.M. 1996, "Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 40, no. 2, pp Cunningham, David E., Veto Players and Civil War Duration, American Journal of Political Science 50(4): Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew J. Enterline "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, " International Studies Quarterly 44: Cunningham, David E Barriers to Peace in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Buhaug, H., S. Gates, and P. Lujala "Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): Cunningham, David E.; Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): Mason, T. David and Patrick J. Fett How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 40 (4): Mason, T. David; Joseph P. Weingarten; and Patrick J. Fett Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars. Political Research Quarterly 52 (2): Cunningham, D.E. Gleditsch, K.S. & Salehyan, I It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): Gleditsch, K.S Transnational Dimensions of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 44 (3):

14 Gleditsch, K.S., Salehyan, I. & Schultz, K Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (4): Salehyan, I Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups. World Politics 59 (1): NOVEMBER 23: BROKERING PEACE AGREEMENTS: HOW CIVIL WARS END While civil war protagonists may come to prefer a negotiated settlment to continued conflict, getting to an agreement is impeded by credible commitment problems: how can you be sure that your rival will abide by a peace agreement and not use that opportunity to gain through deception a military victory they could not achieve on the battlefield. In this section, we will examine mechanisms for resolving credible commitment problems, including third party mediation, power-sharing elements in peace agreements. Readings Kathman, Jacob and Megan Shannon Ripe for Resolution: Third Party Mediation and Negotiating Peace Agreements, Chapter 7 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Hartzell, Caroline Negotiated Peace: Power-Sharing and Peace Agreements, Chapter 8 in Mason and Mitchell, What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Greig, J.M., and P. Regan When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars. International Studies Quarterly 52(4): Hartzell, Caroline, & Matthew Hoddie, Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post- Civil War Conflict Management, American Journal of Political Science 47(2): Svensson, Isak "Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace." Journal of Peace Research 44: Joshi, M., & Quinn, J. M Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict. British Journal of Political Science, Suggested Readings Walter, Barbara F The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization 51: Gurses, Mehmet; Nicolas Rost, and Patrick McLeod "Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace," International Interactions 34: Svensson, Isak "Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution (53): Walter, Barbara, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hartzell, Carolyn & Matthew Hoddie Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. DeRouen, K., and J. Bercovitch Introducing the Civil Wars mediation (CWM) dataset. Journal of Peace Research 48(5): Harbom, Lotta; Stina Högbladh, and Peter Wallensteen "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements." Journal of Peace Research 43: Bapat, Navin A "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes", Journal of Peace Research 42(6): Mattes, Michael and Burcu Savun "Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design." International Studies Quarterly 53(3): Rothchild, Donald and Philip G. Roeder Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy. In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, eds. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pp Stedman, Stephen John Spoiler Problem in Peace Processes. International Security 22 (2):