CONSENSUAL OR DOMINANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARLIAMENT? A COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND

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1 CONSENSUAL OR DOMINANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARLIAMENT? A COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY The study of administrations and ministers and their relationships with UK Parliaments has tended to focus on the issues of accountability and responsibility, levels of legislative dissent or broad performance indicators supported by anecdotal examples. This paper addresses the lack of systematic analysis of executive/legislative relations in the policy-making process by examining the dominance of different administrations and ministers in the Scottish Parliament. Two questions are addressed. First, is there any variance in the legislative dominance of different administrations in the parliamentary arena? Second, do individual ministers make a difference to the degree of policy dominance? Controlling for both initial authorship and quality of amendments to Executive policy, we analyse the nature and extent of Executive dominance during the legislative process of the First Session of the Scottish Parliament. We find some evidence to suggest that Executive dominance varies both by administration and by individual minister. While the existing political science literature tends to classify ministers according to their roles (Headey 1974; Norton 1998; Marsh et al. 2000), there is scant attention to the roles of ministers vis-à-vis Parliament. David Marsh et al. do briefly discuss this role in broad terms of good and poor performances in the House of Commons. When attention does focus on Parliament, the emphasis is on issues of ministerial responsibility and accountability (see, for example, Marshall 1989; Woodhouse 1994, 2001) and legislative dissent studies (see, for example, Norton 1978; Cowley 2002). Despite the occasional ministerial resignation and government defeat, it is widely presumed that in the UK ministers successfully steer policy through Parliament. Little attention is given to how effective administrations and/or individual ministers are in doing this. One of the main reasons why exploration of this role is largely ignored is the widely accepted wisdom that Parliament does not matter that much in the policy-making process. At worst, Parliament is viewed as not much more than theatre for tourists (Jordan and Richardson 1987). At best, Mark Shephard is Lecturer in the Department of Government, University of Strathclyde and Paul Cairney is Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen. Public Administration Vol. 82 No. 4, 2004 ( ), 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

2 832 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY Parliament is assessed in terms of the fulfilment of wider legislative functions such as legitimation and representation (Judge 1993; Norton 1993). In a study of four UK government departments from , Marsh et al. (2000) conclude that ministers matter. However, Marsh et al. provide little evidence of just how much ministers matter when it comes to their dealings with Parliament. The current limited focus on the parliamentary role of ministers minimizes the role of Parliament in the policy-making process and is at odds with more recent evidence that ministerial policy successes in the parliamentary arena are not always what they seem (Shephard and Cairney 2002). Building on the work of Marsh et al. (2000) as well as Shephard and Cairney (2002), we focus our analysis on the Scottish Parliament in order to explore in more detail ministerial policy roles vis-à-vis Parliament. In particular, we examine the success rate of administrations (where Labour is the main coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats the minor coalition partner) and individual ministers in steering legislation through the Scottish Parliament, and compare the success rates of opposition parties and Executive backbenchers in altering this legislation. According to ministerial convention, ministers are collectively responsible to the Scottish Parliament for their policy decisions. One practical example of this is that ministerial amendments to legislation may be proposed by one minister and defended by another. Consequently, it makes sense to analyse ministerial relationships with the Scottish Parliament according to a ministerial team (or administration ). This approach follows that common in the literature, focusing on differing stewardships of the Scottish Executive (and particularly team McLeish see Mitchell et al. 2001). In the case of Scotland, in the first four-year session of the Scottish Parliament ( ) there have been three administrations headed by Donald Dewar, Henry McLeish and Jack McConnell. However, building on the literature on UK ministers (see, for example, Norton 1998; Marsh et al. 2000), we also examine the extent to which individual ministers matter. At the extreme, collective responsibility should limit the actions of ministers, but as Marsh et al. (2000) argue, multiple roles, combined with the myriad of individual strategies for achieving divergent goals, means that there is some latitude for individual variation and interpretation of the rules. In Scotland, for instance, Mike Watson stretched the limits of collective responsibility when he retained his post as minister after publicly criticizing the Executive s policy on hospital reorganization. As Winetrobe (2003) indicates, this may demonstrate that a more flexible version of collective responsibility operates in Scotland. We therefore analyse the impact of individual ministers as well as the stewardship of different administrations on policy outcomes within the Scottish Parliament. Consequently, we address two primary research questions. First, is there any variance in the legislative dominance of different administrations in the parliamentary arena? Second, do individual ministers make a difference to the degree of policy dominance?

3 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 833 THE THREE ADMINISTRATIONS: TEAM DEWAR, TEAM McLEISH AND TEAM McCONNELL Donald Dewar headed the first Scottish administration from 1999 to There is some dispute in the literature over the degree of unity of ministerial colleagues under Dewar. While Pyper argues that the first year was characterized by genuine collective decision-making (Pyper 2000, p. 79), subsequent assessment by Mitchell et al. mentions Dewar s inability to stop the constant infighting in his Cabinet (Mitchell et al. 2001, p. 51). Discrepancies in analyses are partly explained by events. Mitchell et al. s take on this administration was influenced more by the intra-labour disputes that arose over the Executive s handling of public controversies such as the abolition of legislation that restricted local authorities from supporting activities that promoted homosexuality (commonly known as Section 28 or Section 2a in Scotland). Writing in the immediate aftermath of devolution, Pyper s analysis reflects the capacity of Labour and the Liberal Democrats to cement a working relationship and is characteristic of the high expectations of new politics at that particular time. Henry McLeish headed the second administration from 2000 to The literature is less divided about McLeish. From the outset, McLeish promised a more inclusive style of leadership. Responding to internal party dissent, McLeish initially offered Labour Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) access to civil servants (Mitchell et al. 2001, p. 54). Facing criticism from opposition MSPs that preferential partisan policy assistance would politicize the civil service, McLeish clarified his offer to mean greater co-operation between the party s research unit and its MSPs. McLeish was also seen as stressing a more populist, politically sensitive and consequently divergent view from that of London (Hassan and Warhurst 2002, p. 13). However, McLeish s lack of firm leadership contributed instead to a sense of incoherence in the Executive (Mitchell et al. 2003, p. 120). Winetrobe (2001) notes that McLeish himself admitted that he had had a shaky start as First Minister. McLeish s presentational style was acknowledged to be awkward. This, together with a penchant for gaffes (known as McLichés) contributed to a media hounding that reached fever pitch by the time of Officegate (constituency office lease accounting irregularities see Mitchell et al. 2003) and which culminated in McLeish s resignation. One of the problems for McLeish was that in trying to deliver on consensus: for example, the commitment to free personal care for the elderly (see Marnoch 2003), he opened himself up to intra-party criticism over policy divergence and the consequent financial pressures. Despite some policy successes under McLeish (Winetrobe 2001), team McLeish was widely perceived to be a team at war with itself (Mitchell et al. 2001, p. 53). Jack McConnell, who became the third (and last) First Minister of the First Session, replaced McLeish in The McConnell stewardship certainly represents a break from the Dewar/McLeish stewardships in the sense that

4 834 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY McConnell s political training was not in Westminster, but in Scotland itself. Nevertheless, assessments of McConnell s stewardship indicate a greater ability to work in parallel with London than McLeish (Mitchell et al. 2003, p. 125). McConnell s ministerial team also reflected a near complete reorganization of the Executive: only MSP Wendy Alexander was retained from the Labour side. McConnell also seemed more aware of the limitations of devolution and the need to lower damagingly high expectations as he promised from the outset that he would be doing less, better. Hassan and Chris Warhurst view McConnell as the bridge between the old and the new, stemming the high hopes and expectations of Dewar/McLeish with the practicalities of policy delivery in the era following post-devolution euphoria (2002, p. 13). What can we hypothesize about the likely relationships of ministers in their policy dealings with the Scottish Parliament from the various analyses of the three stewardships? First, since McLeish is widely viewed as the weaker, most populist, leader of the three, we hypothesize that the legislative dominance of the McLeish administration is likely to be lower than under either Dewar or McConnell. Second, since the Dewar administration was also prone to the high expectations as a result of devolution and since there is some evidence to suggest that Dewar operated more collectively, we hypothesize that the legislative dominance of the Dewar administration is likely to be lower than under McConnell. Since there is a wide consensus that the McConnell administration has focused most emphasis on delivery we hypothesize that the legislative dominance of the McConnell administration is likely to be higher than under either Dewar or McLeish. INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS The existing literature tends to categorize ministers according to their type (Headey 1974; Norton 1998; Marsh et al. 2000), as follows. Combining the policy and managerial roles of ministers, Norton modifies the Headey typology to distinguish between commanders, ideologues, managers, agents and team players. Sub-dividing Headey s policy initiator role, Marsh et al. distinguish between agenda setters, policy initiators, policy selectors and policy legitimators/minimalists. Marsh et al. also develop a more nuanced typology that further distinguishes between the policy roles, political roles, managerial roles and public relations roles of ministers (Marsh et al. 2000). Although the Marsh et al. typology is capable of addressing the diversity and overlap between ministers roles, attention to examples of the policy role of ministers in Parliament is fairly negligible. As a result, some roles such as the agenda setter, intending to change the broad policy agenda or policy line of departments, or the policy initiator operating at pre-legislative stages (Marsh et al. 2000, p. 307) are not directly applicable to the parliamentary arena. Other roles, such as policy selector and policy legitimator roles, are more relevant here.

5 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 835 According to Marsh et al., while the policy selector chooses from alternatives set out by officials, the policy legitimator/minimalist merely legitimizes the departmental line. This suggests that the former plays a more active and assertive role than the latter. However, we argue that the policy selector and policy legitimator roles have different meanings at the parliamentary stage. Viewed through a parliamentary lens, the emphasis of these policy roles is effectively reversed. The policy selector would choose between the executive s options for a bill going through Parliament and the parliamentary alternative, expressed during the amendments process. Meanwhile, the policy legitimator would defend the bill as presented by the Executive and be less likely to accept changes from non-executive sources. Policy legitimators defend the Executive position come what may, while policy selectors occasionally choose the line of Parliament over that of the Executive. The prevalence of one type of minister over the other provides an interesting insight into the power-sharing principle that has proved pivotal to the new politics versus old politics debate. Under Westminster-style old politics, the Westminster executive does not share much power with the Westminster Parliament and this is reflected in a variety of works on both Westminster power dynamics (see, for example, Griffith 1974 and Jordan and Richardson 1987) and Holyrood (the seat of the Scottish Parliament) power dynamics (see, for example, Mitchell 2000, 2001; Keating 2001). Under new politics, the Scottish Executive is perceived to share more power with Parliament and this is reflected in the tone and expectations for devolution in Scotland of some of the earlier works (see, for example, Brown 2000; Lynch 2001). If in our examination we find more evidence among individual ministers of policy (or amendment) selection than policy legitimation then this would support the new politics literature on the consensual working relationships between the Executive and Parliament. Conversely, should we find more evidence of policy legitimation than policy selection then this would reinforce the old politics literature on confrontational working relationships. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES In this paper we have focused our analysis on Scotland for three main reasons. First, in contrast to the Parliament in Westminster, there have been multiple administration changes in Scotland in a relatively short period of time (three First Minister teams in the first four years of devolution). Second, since Scotland has a unicameral political system with a lesser remit of powers than Westminster, analyses of impact are easier to measure (both in terms of the volume of amendments and in terms of not having to disentangle the direct and indirect influences of two legislative chambers). Third, access to data is easier in the case of Scotland than it is in Westminster. Unlike the case with parliamentary web sites in Westminster, the Scottish Parliament web site archives all amendments considered by parliamentary

6 836 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY committees. Consequently, we are able to analyse policy-making in its entirety for the first session of Parliament ( ). But how can we measure the nature and extent of Scottish Executive dominance over policy in the case of the Scottish Parliament? One way is to analyse the success rates of amendments to bills. Since we are interested in the policy-making role of ministers, our unit of measurement is an amendment to an Executive Bill considered by the Scottish Parliament. Our sample consists of the entire number of amendments to Executive Bills considered by Parliament in the first session (N = 9081 across the 44 Executive Bills that were passed with amendments). More specifically, we need to develop a means of distinguishing between consensual and dominant behaviour. To do this we break down the processing of amendments into measurable components. First we measure the frequency and then the success rates of amendments by author. Second we measure the frequency and success rates of amendments forced to a vote. Third we measure the frequency of withdrawn amendments. Finally we control for the quality and initial authorship of the amendments themselves. We would expect bills processed by more consensual administrations/ ministers to display: (1) more acceptance of MSP amendments (especially substantive amendments); (2) a lower proportion of amendments being forced to a vote; (3) more MSP withdrawals; and (4) a higher incidence of Executive amendments that were inspired by initial MSP amendments. Conversely, as well as less acceptance of MSP amendments (especially substantive amendments), we would expect bills processed by more dominant administrations/ministers to display: (1) a higher proportion of amendments being forced to a vote; (2) fewer MSP withdrawals; and (3) a lower incidence of Executive amendments that were inspired by MSP amendments. It should be noted here that issues of intra- and inter-coder reliability from the quantitative and qualitative coding of amendments were addressed by the subjection of a representative sample of the amendments to testing using Cohen s kappa test in SPSS. Measuring the extent to which the three administrations differ requires the demarcation of tenure. In analysing each of the three first ministerial teams we signify the end-point of an administration up to and including the day before the new appointment. Accordingly, Donald Dewar s administration ran from 13 May 1999 to 25 October 2000 and decisions on all amendments within this time period are considered under the Dewar administration. During the Dewar stewardship, Parliament considered 1730 amendments to Executive Bills. Henry McLeish s administration ran from 26 October 2000 to 21 November During this period, Parliament considered 1569 amendments to Executive Bills. For the First Session of the Scottish Parliament, McConnell s stewardship ran from 22 November 2001 to 31 March During this period Parliament considered 5782 amendments. Arguably, demarcation by administrative tenure may cause measurement problems for those Executive Bills that straddle administrations. A new

7 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 837 administration, for example, may feel relatively less committed to defending those bills that continue over from the former administration. Out of the 44 Executive Bills included in this analysis, only amendments to the Transport (Scotland) Bill straddled more than one administration (in this case the Dewar/McLeish administrations). Of the 361 amendments to the Transport Bill, the vast majority (N = 349) were considered under McLeish s stewardship. Consequently, the Transport (Scotland) Bill is largely a product of the McLeish administration. Moreover, not only did the Minister for Transport (Sarah Boyack) remain the same for this bill, but she also proposed and defended amendments for the Executive on this bill across both administrations. Consequently, we have no reason to believe that demarcation by administrative tenure raises measurement issues of differential commitment. As has been said, measuring the extent to which individual ministers matter is not as straightforward since it is commonplace for more than one minister to defend Executive amendments to a bill an example of collective responsibility in action. In addition, even when one minister solely defends amendments to a bill, in several cases many of these amendments are actually authored/proposed by another minister. In this analysis we control for the multiple defence of Executive amendments by focusing on those individual ministers who solely defend Executive amendments to bills (N = 13). We then distinguish those ministers who propose and defend all their amendments to bills (N = 6) from those who defend all amendments that a ministerial colleague has in large part or typically in whole proposed (N = 7). In the case of the latter, senior ministers typically propose amendments and junior ministers defend these. Given the differences in potential degrees of commitment between these two groups of ministers, we could hypothesize that ministers who both propose and defend amendments are more likely to engage in policy legitimation than ministers who defend what another minister has proposed. Alternatively, a reverse hypothesis could also be posited. Ministers who defend amendments may feel that they have to follow the line given by the proposer and so be more prone to policy legitimation than those ministers who both propose and defend. Either way, we are able to control for this distinction to examine the extent to which it matters. While our analysis excludes cases where a team of ministers are involved in the defence of the Executive line, it does still permit us to determine the relative dominance of 13 ministers across 22 Executive bills that include 2450 amendments in total. RESULTS BY ADMINISTRATION Table 1 reports the frequency of Executive and non-executive amendments that were considered by Parliament under each administration. Comparing percentages across each administration suggests that ministers dominated the amendments considered under McConnell, whereas MSPs dominated under McLeish. The reduced proportion of MSP amendments under McConnell might reflect a heightened sense of disillusionment among MSPs

8 838 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY TABLE 1 Frequencies of Executive and non-executive amendments by administration ( ) Amendments moved by Total number of amendments Amendments under Dewar Amendments under McLeish Amendments under McConnell N % N % N % N % Executive Non-Executive Total about the value of proposing amendments under a more dominant administration. While the findings are in line with our earlier hypotheses (most power-sharing under McLeish, least under McConnell), care has to be taken in interpreting degrees of dominance from this data. Increases in the proportion of amendments moved by non-executive MSPs could indicate heightened levels of controversy over the content of Executive Bills. The more controversial the content of legislation is, the more MSPs will try to change it. Consequently, the reduced activity of MSPs under McConnell might indicate a higher level of consensus between his administration and Parliament prior to a bill s introduction. More importantly, analysis of frequencies says nothing of the relative success rates of each administration in relation to that Parliament. Table 2 reports the frequency and proportion of successful amendments disaggregated by administration and by party. It suggests that each administration has been consistently successful. There is also no significant difference if we analyse the Executive amendments moved by Labour and Liberal Democrat ministers. However, the non-executive success rate shows more signs of variation. Success rates are not only much lower than they are for the Executive, but there appears to be more of a range of success rates by administration and by party. By administration, non-executive success ranges from a low of 10.5 per cent during the McLeish stewardship to a peak of 15.5 per cent during the Dewar stewardship. Much of this success during Dewar s period of office can be found in the relative success of Liberal Democrat (31 per cent) and Scottish National Party (SNP) (20 per cent) amendments. This may suggest a period of relative consensus in the first 18 months of the Scottish Parliament, reflecting an initial desire of the Executive to be more accommodating of non-executive coalition and opposition amendments. This effect is particularly marked if we analyse subsequent success rates. During the McLeish term, the success of Liberal Democrat (under 10 per cent) and SNP (3 per cent) amendments dips dramatically, and even though both parties recover some degree of influence under team McConnell (most notably the Liberal Democrats), relative success rates are highest under team Dewar. Meanwhile, the relative success rates of non-executive Labour MSPs is

9 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 839 TABLE 2 Success of amendments by administration and party ( ) Amendments moved by Total successful ( ) Total successful under Dewar Total successful under McLeish Total successful under McConnell N % N % N % N % Executive (Labour) (3488) (99.7) (319) (99.4) (513) (99.0) (2656) (99.8) (Lib. Dem.) (2202) (98.9) (626) (98.6) (130) (100.0) (1446) (99.0) Non-Executive (coalition) (191) (21.5) (46) (21.8) (44) (19.0) (101) (22.7) (Labour) (119) (22.6) (22) (16.4) (34) (26.4) (63) (23.9) (Lib. Dem.) (72) (19.9) (24) (31.2) (10) (9.7) (38) (21.0) (opposition) (224) (9.1) (74) (13.1) (53) (7.7) (97) (8.0) (SNP) (128) (8.8) (59) (20.3) (15) (3.4) (54) (7.4) (Cons.) (91) (11.5) (15) (6.3) (38) (22.6) (38) (9.9) (Other) (5) (2.3) (0) (0.0) (0) (0.0) (5) (4.9) Total NB: For success of amendments that went to a vote, Cohen s K = +0.98** (inter-coder test) and +1.0** (intra-coder test). ** p <.001. For amendments of more than one author, disaggregation by party is based on the lead author s party. significantly higher under McLeish and McConnell than it is under Dewar. Despite increases in relative success rates of the Conservatives under McLeish and of other MSPs (Tommy Sheridan (Scottish Socialist Party), Dennis Canavan (Independent) and Robin Harper (Green Party)) under McConnell, overall the non-executive opposition parties fared significantly better under Dewar than they did under McLeish and McConnell. Honing our analysis, we next consider the fate of amendments that were forced to a vote. Table 3 reports by administration and by party both the proportion of amendments that went to a vote as a percentage of those moved and the proportion of successful amendments going to a vote. Results show some evidence that MSPs decreased their challenges to Executive amendments over time. Whereas nearly 7 per cent of all Executive amendments were challenged to a vote during the Dewar term, vote challenges have dropped with each subsequent administration to just over 2 per cent under team McConnell. While the proportion of Executive amendments pushed to a vote has dropped over time, the proportion of non-executive amendments pushed to a vote has increased from around 1 in 5 under Dewar to around 1 in 3 under McLeish and McConnell. While degree of success for those non- Executive amendments pushed to a vote did not increase commensurately under McLeish, it did under McConnell. While any Executive failure is significant (since it is so unusual), the trend towards relatively more Executive Labour failure under McConnell is exaggerated by that fact that there were two rejections and yet only 12 votes took place (representing 0.5 per cent of those amendments moved). Both

10 840 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY TABLE 3 Amendments that went to a vote (%) and success of amendments that went to a vote (%) by administration and party ( ) Amendments moved by Total under Dewar under McLeish under McConnell to a vote vote success to a vote vote success to a vote vote success to a vote vote success % % % % % % % % Executive (Labour) (2.5) (96.6) (17.1) (100.0) (3.9) (95.0) (0.5) (83.3) (Lib. Dem.) (4.4) (100.0) (1.6) (100.0) (0.8) (100.0) (5.9) (100.0) Non-Executive (coalition) (17.3) (26.0) (13.3) (10.7) (17.2) (10.0) (19.3) (38.4) (Labour) (11.6) (29.5) (11.9) (6.3) (5.4) (14.3) (14.4) (42.1) (Lib. Dem.) (25.8) (23.7) (15.6) (16.7) (32.0) (9.1) (26.5) (35.4) (opposition) (34.5) (5.5) (23.0) (4.7) (41.5) (5.2) (35.8) (6.0) (SNP) (32.8) (4.0) (28.0) (6.2) (44.4) (2.6) (27.8) (4.4) (Cons.) (32.0) (10.3) (15.4) (2.7) (25.0) (23.8) (45.4) (8.6) (Other) (54.1) (1.7) (33.3) (0.0) (59.5) (0.0) (56.3) (3.4) Total NB: For success of amendments that went to a vote, Cohen s K = +0.98** (inter-coder test) and +1.0** (intra-coder test). ** p <.001. For amendments of more than one author, disaggregation by party is based on the lead author s party. rejections were substantive and occurred during the Local Government in Scotland Bill. Following stage 1 (general principles, usually in committee) at stage 2 (detailed consideration, usually in committee) the Local Government Committee rejected a new provision in the Bill because it was introduced too late. However, this rejection owed more to procedure than content because the same provision was passed without vote at stage 3 (Parliament s consideration of the Bill). The more significant rejection on fire service reform required Labour and Liberal Democrat rebellion, as well as the convention that the Presiding Officer s casting vote maintains the status quo in the event of a tied vote. In terms of non-executive success, three figures seem particularly significant the Conservatives had most success under McLeish and the Liberal Democrat and Labour MSPs had most success under McConnell. However, we should exercise caution when interpreting success rates. The data in Tables 2 and 3, above, do not disaggregate amendments according to their salience. Quantity of success says nothing about the quality of that success. While some amendments merely correct printing errors or are consequent upon this process, others deal with more substantive policy matters. Consequently, we should attempt to qualify our findings. We do this by distinguishing between: (1) typological and consequential amendments; (2) clarity and detail amendments; and (3) substantive amendments. Typographical/consequential amendments are those that correct spelling and grammatical mistakes/repetitive follow-through amendments to ensure bill

11 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 841 consistency. Detail/clarification amendments are those that provide necessary detail to complement existing substance/amendments that clarify meaning and emphasis. Substantive amendments are those that alter the existing substance or tone of the bill. Reporting by administration and by party, Table 4 on page 842 disaggregates success by these amendment types. Table 4 also shows that while the Executive may dominate successful amendments, most of these relate to drafting, clarity and small detail changes. Comparing one administration with another we find that under McConnell the Executive passed a particularly low proportion of substantive amendments (2.5 per cent). Two explanations seem likely. First, the bills processed under McConnell may have been subject to a relatively consensual process. Fewer substantive amendments may have been required to ensure the bill s passage because broad agreement existed over the principles of bills. Indeed, the Mental Health (Scotland) Bill, which accounts for 1930 (47 per cent) of all successful Executive amendments under McConnell, was based on the Millan Committee Report which was warmly received by most parties. However, this argument is in part undermined by our second explanation that the bills processed under McConnell were particularly complex or perhaps less well drafted, requiring a high number of typographical, consequential, detail or clarity amendments. Again, this may be influenced by the particularly high number of consequential amendments passed by Mary Mulligan (Labour Executive) during the Mental Health (Scotland) Bill (N = 1222 over half of all consequential amendments under McConnell). Further, while there were proportionately more consequential amendments passed during Dewar s term, there were far fewer amendments relating to detail and clarity. Indeed, the average number of successful Executive amendments per bill rose sharply under McConnell (from approximately 86 and 80 under Dewar and McLeish respectively to 178 under McConnell). This may be down to the technical nature of bills and the need for precision, or to the nature of the drafting process itself, including the lack of adequate preparation or poor timing. In Westminster, the competition for parliamentary time also affects the quality of bills as introduced. As Griffith (1974, p. 88) argues, some ministers may have little choice concerning the timing of their bill s introduction. The time pressures on bill drafting may therefore affect the number of amendments required to make the bill work. Addressing the Presiding Officer over the Mental Health Bill, Shona Robison suggests the latter: We have had over 2,000 amendments in total, with over 500 amendments being submitted on the very last day for amendments at stage 3. I ask you to reflect on whether that is the way for the Parliament to make good legislation. (Scottish Parliament, Shona Robison, SNP MSP, Official Report, 19 March 2003, col ) However, speaking on behalf of the Executive, Malcolm Chisholm presents a different perspective:

12 842 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY TABLE 4 Successful amendment types (%) by party and administration ( ) Amendments moved by Typographical/Consequential Clarity/Detail Substantive Total % Dewar % McLeish % McConnel % Total % Dewar % McLeish % McConnell % Total % Dewar % McLeish % McConnell % Executive (Labour) (59.5) (62.7) (49.9) (60.9) (36.7) (28.8) (41.5) (36.7) (3.8) (8.5) (8.6) (2.3) (Lib. Dem.) (58.5) (62.5) (60.8) (56.6) (37.6) (32.1) (31.5) (40.5) (3.9) (5.4) (7.7) (2.9) Non-Executive (coalition) (33.5) (50.0) (13.6) (34.8) (53.4) (35.6) (77.3) (51.5) (13.1) (15.2) (9.1) (13.9) (Labour) (22.7) (31.8) (14.7) (23.8) (59.7) (40.9) (76.5) (57.1) (17.6) (27.3) (8.8) (19.0) (Lib. Dem.) (51.4) (66.7) (10.0) (52.6) (43.1) (29.2) (80.0) (42.1) (5.6) (4.2) (10.0) (5.3) (opposition) (55.8) (82.4) (77.4) (23.7) (41.5) (13.5) (20.8) (74.2) (2.7) (4.1) (1.9) (2.1) (SNP) (50.0) (84.7) (26.7) (18.5) (47.7) (10.2) (73.3) (81.5) (2.3) (5.1) (0.0) (0.0) (Cons.) (65.9) (73.3) (97.4) (31.6) (30.8) (26.7) (0.0) (63.2) (3.3) (0.0) (2.6) (5.3) (Other) (20.0) (0.0) (0.0) (20.0) (80.0) (0.0) (0.0) (80.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) Total NB: Cohen s K = +0.68** (inter-coder test) and +0.77** (intra-coder test). ** p <.001. For amendments of more than one author, disaggregation by party is based on the lead author s party.

13 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED people ought to realise that many of the amendments are the result of what I would regard as our superior legislative process I say that as someone who has been at Westminster. Most of the substantive amendments have been lodged in response to points that the committee made, on which we undertook to lodge amendments. Many consequential amendments have had to be lodged because of changes made by the committee at stage 2. (Scottish Parliament, Malcolm Chisholm, Labour MSP, Official Report, 19 March 2003, col ) In terms of the non-executive, Labour MSPs dominate substantive amendment successes under Dewar and McConnell. Under McLeish, a higher proportion of the Liberal Democrat successful amendments was substantive. Under Dewar, most of this substantive success can be explained by analysing one bill Standards in Scotland s Schools. However, under McConnell, substantive successes by Labour backbenchers are spread more evenly across a number of bills. This is interesting as it suggests that under McConnell there has been an increased willingness of the Executive to help Labour MSPs redraft and resubmit substantive amendments in their own name. An example of this is the assistance that was given to Scott Barrie MSP during amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. In this case, Barrie had proposed two amendments at stage 2 that were designed to meet recommendations that local authorities should have statutory powers to deliver strengthened through-care services to prisoners. The Executive expressed initial concern that these amendments went beyond the spirit of the recommendations but agreed to work with Barrie to find the right wording for a new amendment. As the minister, Hugh Henry, noted in relation to Barrie s new amendment at stage 3: I undertook to ensure that any amendment to the provision met with the intention behind the recommendations of the tripartite group s report and with the agreement of the agencies involved. I am pleased to inform the committee that that is the case in both instances. I thank Scott Barrie for his work on the issue...(scottish Parliament, Hugh Henry, Labour MSP, Official Report, 19 February 2003, col ) The increased success rates of non-executive Labour MSPs are extremely interesting because these MSPs tend to be the most willing to withdraw their amendments, and so not test the Executive (see table 5 on page 844). MSPs withdraw amendments for a number of reasons: for example, the Executive has either allayed MSPs fears or promised subsequent action. The proportions of amendments withdrawn (or, more accurately, not forced to a vote or rejected) provide an indication of the state of consensus between the Parliament and the Executive. While the aggregate figures show that coalition MSPs are much more likely to withdraw their amendments (78 per cent), opposition MSPs are just as likely to withdraw (48 per cent) as press their amendments (48 per cent). Breakdowns by administration are

14 844 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY TABLE 5 Disaggregation of unsuccessful non-executive amendments* by administration and by party ( ) Amendments moved by Total Under Dewar Under McLeish Under McConnell Rejected Withdrawn Rejected Withdrawn Rejected Withdrawn Rejected Withdrawn % % % % % % % % Non-Executive (coalition) (18.8) (78.2) (20.0) (73.3) (21.8) (76.6) (16.6) (81.4) (Labour) (13.0) (83.1) (20.5) (71.4) (6.3) (92.6) (11.9) (85.1) (Lib. Dem.) (27.0) (71.3) (18.9) (77.4) (37.6) (60.2) (23.1) (76.2) (opposition) (48.4) (48.6) (31.7) (65.4) (53.9) (43.7) (52.6) (44.1) (SNP) (47.0) (49.7) (40.7) (54.1) (50.7) (46.4) (46.7) (50.3) (Cons.) (44.6) (54.1) (21.3) (78.2) (46.9) (51.5) (58.8) (39.4) (Other) (70.2) (23.7) (39.4) (57.6) (81.0) (17.9) (71.4) (17.3) * Excludes amendments that are superseded. Cohen s K = +0.98** (inter-coder test) and +1.0** (intra-coder test). ** p <.001. For amendments of more than one author, disaggregation by party is based on the lead author s party.

15 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 845 quite revealing. Since Dewar s administration, opposition MSPs appear to be much more likely to press their amendments to a vote. Consequently, behaviour under Dewar suggests a more trusting period of consensus between the Executive and Parliament. Change in behaviour since Dewar has been particularly pronounced for Conservative MSPs and for the others : Sheridan (SSP), Canavan (Independent) and Harper (Green Party). Not playing the left-of-centre game not only makes most ideological sense for these players, it also helps stir media interest and thereby increases much needed opportunities for agenda setting and electioneering. Indeed, such behaviour appears to have played a part in improving the 2003 electoral fortunes of the SSP and Greens, and to some extent the Conservatives. Again, care should be taken when analysing these findings. The data in tables 4 and 5 do not control for the effects of the initial authorship amendments (see Malcolm Chisholm, quoted above). We expect levels of withdrawal to be related to the willingness of the Executive to readdress the issue and present subsequent amendments in the spirit of the original. However, we cannot control for initial authorship on a party-by-party basis because the Executive often attributes the initial impetus for an amendment to committees rather than to individual MSPs. In addition, we do not account for all Executive concessions to Parliament since some Executive promises relate to future legislation and so are more difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, table 6, which controls for initial authorship, reports amendment success that is discernible from the debates for each bill. Again, the results suggest a honeymoon period of consensus under Dewar in which amendments presented and inspired by the non-executive account for almost half (48 per cent) of all substantive amendments passed under Dewar. Further, the fact that amendments inspired by the non-executive are more than double the direct substantive amendments, arguably reflects the implicit understanding that Parliament devolves decision-making responsibility to the Executive, which in turn responds to parliamentary TABLE 6 A qualitative assessment of successful amendment types controlling for original author ( ) Author Detail/clarity amendments Substantive amendments Total Dewar McLeish McConnell Total Dewar McLeish McConnell % % % % % % % % Executive Non-Executive (non-executive (8.3) (9.7) (10.4) (7.7) (24.8) (33.8) (16.9) (23.3) inspired) (non-executive presented) (8.5) (8.2) (15.1) (7.4) (12.4) (14.1) (8.5) (13.3) NB: Cohen s K = +0.68** (inter-coder test) and +0.77** (intra-coder test). ** p <.001.

16 846 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY concerns. This process appeared to suffer under McLeish, with non-executive substantive amendment successes falling both in terms of direct effect (a fall of 31 per cent) and original authorship (a fall of 51 per cent). However, there is also a relatively high propensity for the Executive to accept detailed changes to bills under McLeish and so the question of dominance under McLeish is more a question of dominance over quality than it is over quantity. Compared with McLeish, under McConnell there is an improvement in balance with an increase in the substantive influence of MSPs, albeit accompanied by a marginal decline in influence over detailed policy changes. RESULTS BY MINISTER As discussed above, viewed through a parliamentary lens, parliamentarians stand to achieve relatively fewer concessions under the policy legitimator type than they would uner the policy selector type. Adapting our framework for the analysis of administrations, we expect bills processed by consensual (policy selector) ministers to display: (1) more Executive acceptance of MSP amendments; (2) a lower proportion of amendments being forced to a vote; (3) more MSP withdrawals; and (4) more Executive amendments based on the initial authorship of MSPs. We should of course bear in mind that these results may be subject to other influences, such as the policy area and its salience. Since it is difficult to disaggregate individuals from ministerial teams, our analysis focuses on those ministers who engaged singly with Parliament during the amendments process. We also compare results for those ministers who singly propose and defend amendments with results for those ministers who singly defend amendments that a colleague has proposed to see whether this has any impact. Since we find no evidence of any significant differences between these two groups of ministers across any of our measures, we make no further reference to this in the discussion that follows. Table 7 reports a face value level of dominance typology according to the success rates of MSPs and ministers. The first column shows those ministers under whom the Executive was 100 per cent successful and Parliament was 100 per cent unsuccessful and is indicative of ministers as policy legitimators. The second column shows those ministers under whom the Executive was 100 per cent successful and Parliament was sometimes successful. The final column shows ministers under whom the Executive was not always successful and Parliament was sometimes successful and is the most suggestive (albeit in small part) of ministers as policy selectors. While the Executive is 100 per cent successful under most of the ministers included in this analysis, Parliament s experience under the vast majority of ministers is one of at least some parliamentary leverage. Moreover, when we control for the quality of amendments, we find that for half of the ministers studied, Parliament managed to secure at least one of its substantive amendments. However, despite some evidence of policy selection, in most cases the balance of evidence is weighted towards policy legitimation over policy selection.

17 ADMINISTRATIONS AND MINISTERS IN SCOTLAND COMPARED 847 TABLE 7 Level of dominance typology according to the success rates of MSPs and ministers ( ) Policy legitimators Ministers who realize all Executive amendments and under whom no MSP amendments are successful Ministers who realize all Executive amendments and under whom some MSP amendments are successful McConnell (1) Brankin (2) Chisholm* (2) Jamieson (3) Simpson* (3) McNulty (3) McAveety* (1) Gray (2) Mackay (1 and 2) Policy selectors Ministers who do not realize all Executive amendments and under whom some MSP amendments are successful Boyack* (1 and 2) Wilson* (3) Stephen (1 and 3) Peacock* (3) * Ministers under whom at least one of the successful non-executive amendments was substantive. Data only includes those ministers who singularly engaged in the movement of amendments in one or more legislative stages. Numbers in brackets denote the administration(s) the minister served under for the data analysed: 1 = Dewar; 2 = McLeish; 3 = McConnell. Table 8 reports, again for all ministers singularly engaged with Parliament, a level of dominance typology according to the proportion of non-executive amendments forced to a vote. Results illustrate that there is considerable variance by minister in the proportion of non-executive amendments forced to a vote. The proportion was lowest under Malcolm Chisholm (4 per cent during the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Bill) and highest under Richard Simpson (52 per cent during the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Bill). To simplify communication, we divide ministers into three broad groups ranging from those who experience least backbench resistance (10 per cent and less going to a vote) to those who experience most TABLE 8 Level of dominance typology according to the percentage of non-executive amendments forced to a vote ( ) Policy legitimators Ministers under whom more than 20% of non- Executive amendments were forced to a vote Brankin (2) Boyack (1 and 2) Simpson (3) Wilson (3) Stephen (1 and 3) Peacock (3) Ministers under whom between 11 and 20% of non-executive amendments were forced to a vote McConnell (1) McAveety (1) Policy selectors Ministers under whom between 1 and 10% of non-executive amendments were forced to a vote Chisholm (2) Jamieson (3) Gray (2) McNulty (3) Mackay (1 and 2) NB: Data only include those ministers who singularly engaged in the movement of amendments in one or more legislative stages. Numbers in brackets denote the administration the minister served under for the data analysed: 1 = Dewar; 2 = McLeish; 3 = McConnell.

18 848 MARK SHEPHARD AND PAUL CAIRNEY backbench resistance (21 per cent and higher). Clearly, when interpreting these findings it is difficult to separate the effects of Minister/MSP relations from the effects of the salience of bills. However, in the case of Chisholm and Simpson, both dealt with controversial bills. One difference of note for both Chisholm and McNulty was that they were strong supporters of the committee system before becoming ministers. This initial period of socialization appears to have had a lasting effect on their subsequent ministerial actions when processing amendments. In general, the lower the proportion of non-executive amendments that are pushed to a vote, the more this is likely to signify that ministers are behaving more like policy selectors (exhibiting more consensual and less dominant behavioural types). Conversely, the higher the proportion of non- Executive amendments that are pushed to a vote, the more this is likely to signify that ministers are behaving more like policy legitimators (exhibiting less consensual and more dominant behavioural types). Interestingly, there are significant differences in levels of non-executive behaviour depending upon whether backbenchers are dealing with ministerial teams or individual ministers. Overall, Table 3, above, shows that on average 30 per cent of all non-executive amendments ( ) were forced to a vote. However, when we single out those occasions when ministers defend bills on their own and not in teams, we find that on average 24 per cent of non-executive amendments were forced to a vote. While we need to exercise caution when interpreting this finding (for example, the caveats of individual bills), it does suggest that MSPs are more likely to force their amendments to a vote when they are dealing with ministerial teams (approximately 1 in 3) than individual ministers (approximately 1 in 4). We speculate that this difference might be explained in part by the discontinuity in ministerial arguments that are likely when the number of ministers involved in defending the Executive line is greater than one. In short, discontinuity in ministerial defence creates greater opportunities for dissent. Table 9 reports, for all ministers who engaged singly with Parliament, a level of dominance typology according to the proportion of non-executive amendments that were withdrawn. To recall, we argued that MSPs would be more willing to withdraw their amendments if they felt that ministers had acted consensually (for example, promising to consider policy options at a later stage). Again, results illustrate that there is some variation among ministers. The highest proportion of non-executive amendments that were withdrawn occurred under Malcolm Chisholm (85 per cent during the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Bill) and the lowest proportion withdrawn occurred under Margaret Jamieson (2 per cent during the Protection of Children (Scotland) Bill). Again, care has to be taken when interpreting these findings. In the case of Jamieson, the low level of withdrawals is mainly explained by the preponderance of consequential amendments that became redundant following lead