Contents. List of Illustrations Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations About the Authors

Transcription

1 Contents List of Illustrations Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations About the Authors viii ix x xi 1 Introduction Is someone responsible? Overview 4 2 Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral Responsibility Human rights threatened by climate change Observed and projected climatic changes Human rights threatened by climate change Some critical considerations Assigning remedial responsibility for tackling climate change The burdens involved in tackling climate change Identifying and assigning remedial responsibility Common-sense morality: the central role of moral responsibility Two preliminary objections 26 DOI: / v

2 vi Contents Differentiating between subsistence emissions and luxury emissions Individual responsibility and moral agency A statist approach? Individual agency and moral disengagement Metaethics: internalism versus externalism and the role of moral disengagement 41 3 The Phenomenology of Agency in Climate Change First feature: the primacy of acts over omissions Climate change as a matter of omissions? First complication: the unintended effects of greenhouse gas emitting activities Second complication: the usualness of greenhouse gas emitting activities Moral disengagement Second feature: the primacy of near effects over remote effects Climate change as a matter of remote effects? First complication: uncertainty and risk Second complication: pure time preference and excessive sacrifice Moral disengagement Third feature: the primacy of individual effects over group effects Climate change as a matter of group effects? First complication: carbon dependence Second complication: social values and cultural expectations Third complication: duties of unilateral action or promotional duties? Moral disengagement 88 4 Understanding the Motivational Gap The origins of common-sense morality and the theoretical storm Competing motives influenced by the dominant social paradigm Competing sources of motivation 98 DOI: /

3 Contents vii The dominant social paradigm: the liberal-capitalist worldview The role of the restrictive conception of individual responsibility and moral disengagement Addressing the Motivational Gap and Tackling Moral Disengagement Increasing moral motivation Enhancing the moral judgement of emitters based on common-sense morality Invoking alternative moral values Addressing the underlying reasons for moral disengagement Addressing competing motives Addressing the perceived demandingness of moral precepts Tackling the propensity for moral disengagement Conclusion 118 Glossary 124 References 130 Index 145 DOI: /

4 1 Introduction Abstract: This chapter introduces the key issue addressed in this book, namely the fact that, even though climate change constitutes a severe threat to humankind, response to it is characterized by inaction at all levels. Hence, the severity of climate change and its consequences does not appear to sufficiently motivate people to tackle it. There are two complementary explanations for this motivational gap: first, our moral judgement system might be unable to identify the complex problem of climate change as an important moral problem; and second, people can employ psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement, which allow them to evade individual responsibility for the consequences of their materialistic pursuits. The main aim of this book is to expand upon the second explanation. Peeters, Wouter, Andries De Smet, Lisa Diependaele and Sigrid Sterckx. Climate Change and Individual Responsibility: Agency, Moral Disengagement and the Motivational Gap. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, doi: / DOI: /

5 2 Climate Change and Individual Responsibility 1.1 Is someone responsible? Climate change represents one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing humankind in the 21st century. The recent Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2013; 2014a; 2014b) has updated the scientific consensus regarding the impact of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on the climate. On the occasion of the publication of the Working Group I contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2013), the satirical news website The Onion (2013) carried the headline New report finds climate change caused by 7 billion key individuals. The article quotes IPCC lead author John Bartlett, suggesting that now that we ve done the hard work of identifying the key players responsible for this crisis, we can move forward with holding them accountable (The Onion 2013). The satire resides in its hyper-realistic representation of the main problem involved in identifying people as responsible for tackling climate change. The conditions (especially the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere) causing climate change and its harmful effects are clearly predominantly anthropogenic (see Section 3.1.1). Those seven billion individuals are indeed all culpable since every single one of them emits greenhouse gases. Some may only emit small amounts, simply by breathing and eating, but others emit substantially more by heating or cooling their houses, driving cars, consuming luxury products, flying and so on. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the harmful effects of climate change are outrightly denied or blamed on natural processes, scientific uncertainties are overly emphasized and it is alleged that it won t be that bad. Many claim either ignorance or that it is not their fault. 1 Regarding their engagement in greenhouse gas emitting activities, emitters maintain that it makes no difference whether they do it or don t and that any way, everybody does it. 2 They also claim not to have any alternative because their economy is completely dependent on fossil fuels, or because the social and cultural context in which they are embedded imposes values and expectations that inescapably influence their choices and actions. Finally, many people believe that addressing climate change is exclusively the job of others primarily the government and supranational institutions. Hence, holding everyone responsible for climate change appears to be less straightforward than The Onion suggests. 3 Interestingly, the conundrum has instead become that no one appears to be responsible for climate change. 4 DOI: /

6 Introduction 3 The facts are such that, even though climate change constitutes a severe threat to humanity, the response to it is characterized by inaction at all levels. For this gap between the judgement that climate change is a moral harm and the observed inaction or lack of motivation to tackle it, two explanations come to mind. The first holds that our moral judgement system is not well equipped to identify climate change as an important moral imperative, since it is a complex problem that does not have the characteristics of a paradigm moral problem (Jamieson 2006, 475 7; 2010, 436 8; 2014, ). In his famous article If only gay sex caused global warming, Gilbert (2006) observes that climate change doesn t violate our moral sensibilities. It doesn t cause our blood to boil... Yes, global warming is bad, but it doesn t make us feel nauseated or angry or disgraced, and thus we don t feel compelled to rail against it. In other words, climate change fails to generate strong moral intuitions. Since it is a complex issue, it does not motivate us to act (Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 243). The second explanation for the widespread inaction is less well established, but is compellingly defended by Gardiner (2006, 407 9; 2011a, ). He asserts that people face strong temptations to pass the buck onto future people, the poor and nature, and that this is facilitated by the complexity of climate change (Gardiner 2011a, 301). Gardiner labels this moral corruption. We will instead focus on the propensity to employ psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement by which people reconstruct their moral judgement of climate change and their contribution to it in order to evade individual responsibility. In this book, we will argue that these two explanations are not mutually exclusive. The first explanation the apparent inability of our moral judgement system to identify climate change as an important moral imperative provides important insights into the problem of inaction. However, we will argue that the more specific arguments offered in support of this explanation cannot justify the quasi-complete inaction on the part of today s most obvious culprits. More specifically, at least regarding superfluous, frivolous and profligate greenhouse gas emissions, we will argue that our conventional moral framework, involving concepts of harm and moral responsibility, is adequate to identify those who are most responsible for tackling climate change. It is instead the case that the complexity of climate change facilitates moral disengagement. Although we will not ignore the implications of the first explanation, our main aim is to expand upon the second explanation namely, the evasion of responsibilities through moral disengagement. DOI: /

7 4 Climate Change and Individual Responsibility 1.2 Overview The aim of the following chapter, Chapter 2, will be to paint a clearer picture of the problem of climate change and the concepts involved in assigning responsibility for tackling it. We will discuss the threat observed and projected climatic changes pose to some key human rights. Subsequently, we will turn to the question of which principle(s) should guide the allocation of the responsibilities for tackling climate change and discuss the principle of moral responsibility that is central to common-sense morality. Moreover, we will explain that while much attention has focused on the responsibilities of states and supranational institutions, the role and responsibilities of individual emitters as moral agents have been underestimated. An important reason for this is that there are important doubts about the agency of individuals in complex global dynamics such as climate change. We will contrast this view with the observation that people psychologically reconstruct their contribution to climate change, in order to evade moral responsibility for it. In Chapter 3, we will critically assess some of the most pervasive doubts with respect to treating individual emitters as the primary bearers of responsibility in the case of climate change. The chapter is structured according to the three features of the dominant phenomenology of agency the way in which people experience themselves as agents with causal powers. We will describe how each of these features affects our thinking about individual responsibility for climate change. However, rather than exonerating emitters from moral responsibility for the contribution of their luxury emissions to climate change, we will show that these arguments turn out to facilitate strategies of moral disengagement. There is then a motivational gap reluctantly we may accept that there is a problem, but why should we take action to address it? In Chapter 4, building on the observations in the previous chapter, we will explore the two explanations for this motivational gap namely, the inadequacy of our moral concepts, and the temptation to evade responsibility through moral disengagement. We will argue that the doubts about individual agency in climate change have become overly emphasized, giving individual emitters a convenient opportunity to obscure their responsibilities. Moral disengagement enables them to act upon self-interested motives without having to face the inconsistency between such conduct and their moral standards. We contend that through the influence of the prevailing liberal-capitalist worldview self-interested pursuits have tacitly become DOI: /

8 Introduction 5 equated with the apparently socially desirable ends of wealth accumulation and consumption that are safeguarded from moral assessment. Chapter 5 will tentatively suggest some strategies to increase emitters motivation to accept moral responsibility for their contributions to climate change, and to accordingly acknowledge their responsibilities for remedying it. In view of the explanations for the motivational gap discussed in the previous chapter, we will submit that there are three broad directions in which our efforts to increase motivation might take us. The most obvious strategy is to increase emitters motivation by enhancing their moral judgement on the basis of common-sense morality, or by invoking alternative moral values. Second, the motivational force of the underlying reasons for deploying mechanisms of moral disengagement can be reduced by encouraging people to evaluate and redefine their self-interested motives or by addressing the perceived demandingness of morality. These strategies can already reduce the opportunity for deploying moral disengagement and the need thereto, but we will argue that the propensity for moral disengagement can itself be tackled as well. Finally, Chapter 6 will highlight the main points of our discussion. Notes 1 The title of Sinnott-Armstrong s 2005 paper reads: It s not my fault: Global warming and individual moral obligations. 2 In his 1994 book Everybody does it!: Crime by the public, Gabor explores justifications and excuses ordinary people provide for their transgressions. 3 As we will argue in Section 2.2, precisely the fact that everyone is responsible confronts us with a major problem. Moreover, we will argue that there are necessary qualifications for holding everyone responsible, qualifications that must be defensible from an ethical perspective. 4 This paraphrases the main title of Gardiner s important 2011(b) paper. DOI: /

9 2 Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral Responsibility Abstract: This chapter sketches the problems of climate change and allocation of the responsibility for tackling it. In view of the threats to key human rights posed by observed and projected climatic changes, climate change is conceptualized as a moral harm. We explore how the burdens involved in remedying the problem should be allocated, focusing on the principle of moral responsibility that plays a central role in common-sense morality. The responsibilities of individual emitters have been underestimated because important doubts exist about the agency of individuals in complex global dynamics such as climate change. We contrast this view with the observation that people can psychologically reconstruct their contribution to climate change, in order to evade moral responsibility for it. Peeters, Wouter, Andries De Smet, Lisa Diependaele and Sigrid Sterckx. Climate Change and Individual Responsibility: Agency, Moral Disengagement and the Motivational Gap. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, doi: / DOI: /

10 Climate Change, Rights and Responsibility 7 Our aims in this chapter are threefold: we will substantiate the view that climate change poses a threat to human rights; explain our theoretical framework regarding the identification and assignment of responsibility for climate change; and discuss who can be held responsible. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarizes observed and projected climatic changes, demonstrates that these impacts threaten to violate some key human rights and discusses some of the challenges to the application of a human rights framework to climate change. In the second section, we will describe the burdens involved in remedying climate change and explore how these remedial responsibilities should be allocated. Because it has a central role in common-sense morality, we will focus on the principle of moral responsibility to assign remedial responsibility, and clarify necessary qualifications. In the third section, we will explain our focus on individual emitters as moral agents, and situate them in relation to the collective level. Subsequently, we will discuss the difficulties that arise when treating the individual agent as the primary locus of responsibility in complex global dynamics such as climate change. While these issues indicate that our moral framework is inadequate to capture climate change, people can and do psychologically reconstruct climate change in order to rationalize their contribution and evade their moral responsibility for it. 2.1 Human rights threatened by climate change Observed and projected climatic changes Over the period 1880 to 2012, data show an average warming of the global temperature of 0.85 (0.65 to 1.06) C (IPCC 2013, 194). This warming of the climate system is unequivocal and many of the observed changes since the 1950s are unprecedented compared to previous decades and even millennia (IPCC 2013, 4). We mention some of the observed changes for which confidence is highest in the IPCC s Fifth Assessment Report. For most regions, consistent with overall warming, warm days and nights have become more frequent, cold days and nights have become less so, and hot temperature extremes and heatwaves have become more common (IPCC 2013, , 218). Moreover, temperature increase has already led to observed changes in precipitation patterns and substantial DOI: /

11 8 Climate Change and Individual Responsibility increases in heavy precipitation events (IPCC 2013, 201 8, ). The IPCC (2013, 217) also reports a virtually certain increase since the 1970s in the frequency and intensity in the North Atlantic of the strongest tropical cyclones. The temperature and heat content of the oceans have increased over the last four decades, the global mean sea level has risen by 0.19 ( ) metre over the last century (with a marked acceleration in the last two decades) and the oceanic uptake of carbon dioxide has increased from 1994 to 2010, resulting in a gradual acidification of the oceans (IPCC 2013, chapter 3), posing risks to marine ecosystems and organisms. Over the past three to four decades, Arctic sea ice and the Greenland Ice Sheet have been declining at dramatic rates and whereas the Antarctic sea ice shows a small increase, the Antarctic ice sheet is currently losing mass (IPCC 2013, , ). Finally, glaciers are sensitive climate indicators, and over the past five decades considerable glacier mass losses and reductions in length and area have been observed (IPCC 2013, ). These and other climatic changes are expected to worsen in the nearand long terms, but future impacts also depend on the mitigation pathway that will be chosen (see Section 2.2.1). Over the 21st century, driven by past and future increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, the global surface temperature will further increase (IPCC 2013, 980 4, ). Global precipitation over the 21st century is forecast to increase approximately linearly with global temperature increases (IPCC 2013, ). Regional differences, however, imply increasing aridity in already dry areas and the possible expansion of deserts (IPCC 2013, 1084). Heavy precipitation patterns will increase in the near term (IPCC 2013, 992), but will occur less frequently over the longer term, producing two seemingly contradictory effects: more intense downpours, leading to more floods, yet longer dry periods between rain events, leading to more droughts (IPCC 2013, ). Moreover, it is considered very likely that, towards the end of the 21st century, heatwaves will become more intense, more frequent and last longer (IPCC 2013, 990). The arctic sea ice cover will continue to shrink and thin all year round (IPCC 2013, 995 6, ). Ocean temperatures are projected to rise further over the early 21st century, in response to both present-day atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and projected future surface temperature increases (IPCC 2013, 993, ). Furthermore, several components of the climate system may possess critical thresholds (tipping points) beyond which abrupt or nonlinear DOI: /

12 Climate Change, Rights and Responsibility 9 transitions and irreversible changes will ensue, such as ice sheet collapse, dieback of tropical and boreal forests, overturning of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation and long-term droughts (IPCC 2013, ). Although the IPCC (2012, 122, 458 9; 2013, 1115) has low confidence in projections of any such specific extreme, it states that the abrupt and large-scale impacts associated with the crossing of these poorly understood climate thresholds cannot be excluded. Future people will suffer most from the harmful impacts of unabated climate change, but its effects are already impacting human life today, exacerbating chronic environmental threats and constraining livelihood opportunities (see also IPCC 2014a, ; UNDP 2013, 95). Unless action is undertaken, climate change is projected to halt or even reverse decades of human development (UNDP 2007, 79; 2013, 95). Particularly worrisome is that climate-related hazards exacerbate other stressors, especially for people living in poverty, since they are most vulnerable to climate change (IPCC 2014a, ) Human rights threatened by climate change Recent literature has drawn attention to the impact of climate change on human rights. An important contribution has been provided by Caney (2010b, 73), who defines human rights as minimum moral thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply by virtue of their humanity, and which override all other moral values. He focuses on three key rights: the right to life; the right to health; and the right to subsistence. Employing a modest and minimal conception of human rights, Caney (2009b, 2010b) demonstrates that anthropogenic climate change violates these rights. In 2008, expressing concern about the threat climate change poses to the enjoyment of human rights, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted Resolution 7/23 on Human rights and climate change, requesting the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to prepare a study on the relationship between climate change and human rights (HRC 2008, recital 1; OHCHR 2014). The report submitted by the OHCHR (2009) was presented and discussed at the tenth session of the HRC on 15 January Subsequently, the HRC adopted Resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change, noting that: Climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights including, inter alia, the DOI: /

13 10 Climate Change and Individual Responsibility right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation. (HRC 2009, recital 7) 1 The OHCHR report describes the influence of climate change on several human rights codified in the International Bill of Human Rights consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966b) as well as other relevant UN treaties and conventions. Arguably, the OHCHR report interprets the human rights issue in a broader way than Caney s minimal conception. Let us therefore proceed to consider the similarities and differences between both accounts. First, Caney (2009b, 230 1; 2010b, 76 8) mentions the right to life. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966a, article 6.1) states that every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her] life. 2 Caney employs a minimal conception of this right as a merely negative right, not making the more contentious claim that persons have a positive right to have their life protected against all kinds of threats. Nonetheless, in its discussion of the impacts of climate change on the right to life, the OHCHR refers to the general comments of the Human Rights Committee (1982, paragraph 1), which state that the right to life has too often been narrowly interpreted, and that its protection requires positive measures. Accordingly, the right to life should be interpreted as the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation (Human Rights Committee 1982, paragraph 1). The OHCHR (2009, paragraph 24) states that the protection of this right, especially in the context of climate change, is closely related to measures for the fulfilment of other rights, such as those relating to food, water, health and housing. In any case, a number of the observed and projected impacts of climate change clearly pose a substantial threat to the right to life. Climate change will result in an increase of the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as storms, heatwaves and floods. Since these disasters already have devastating effects on mortality, their increased frequency and intensity will jeopardize many people s enjoyment of the right to life, particularly in the developing world (Costello et al. 2009, ; IPCC 2014a, 720 2; McMichael and Lindgren 2011, 406 7). DOI: /

14 Climate Change, Rights and Responsibility 11 Climate change poses a significant threat to human security in general, but of specific relevance here is the observation that some of the factors that increase the risk of violent conflict are sensitive to climate change, and also to policy responses (IPCC 2014a, 771 5). Second, climate change will have a detrimental impact on the effective enjoyment of the right to health. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966b, article 12.1) recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 3 The full realization of such a right requires inter alia provisions for the reduction of infant mortality, the improvement of environmental and industrial hygiene, the prevention and treatment of diseases, and the assurance of medical service and attention in the event of sickness. The wording in the report of the OHCHR (2009, paragraph 31) indeed implies a broad interpretation of the right to health. In contrast, Caney s (2010b, 79) minimal account affirms only a negative right that other people do not act so as to create serious threats to their health, since he considers the conception of the right to health as mentioned in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (aspiring the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health) as maximalist and therefore open to objections by critics. Nonetheless, both accounts agree that human-induced climate change clearly results in a variety of different threats to the right to health, affecting millions of people, especially those with a low adaptive capacity (Caney 2010b, 78 80; OHCHR 2009, paragraphs 32 4). The IPCC (2014a, ) distinguishes three basic pathways by which climate change affects health. First, the increases in the frequency of extreme weather will not only raise mortality (as mentioned earlier), but also directly impact human health in general. Second, there are effects mediated through natural systems. Temperature, precipitation and humidity have a strong influence on the spread and transmission of vector-borne diseases (such as malaria and dengue fever), water- and food-borne diseases (such as cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases) and allergic diseases (Costello et al. 2009, ; IPCC 2014a, ; McMichael and Lindgren 2011, 407 8). The health impacts of climate change encompass shifts in the patterns, spread and transmission of these diseases. Third, some health impacts that are heavily mediated through human institutions include nutrition and water insecurity (see below), occupational health concerns (such as heat strain and heat stroke), mental health problems (in terms of increasing stress as a result of harsher weather conditions) and DOI: /

15 12 Climate Change and Individual Responsibility compounded health risks as a consequence of increased human movement, social disruptions and conflict (resulting inter alia in the spread of infectious diseases and malnutrition) (IPCC 2014a, 730 3, , 771 5; McMichael and Lindgren 2011, ). The third human right under consideration is the right to subsistence. According to Caney s (2009b, 232) minimal conception, all persons have a human right that other people do not act so as to deprive them of the means of subsistence. The OHCHR (2009, paragraphs 25 and 28) refers to the right to adequate food and the right to water codified inter alia by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966b, article 11), which explicitly sets out the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself [or herself] and his [or her] family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger. Climate change will compound existing food insecurity, particularly threatening smallholder and subsistence farmers (Costello et al. 2009, ; McMichael and Lindgren 2011, 408; UNDP 2007, 27). Although impacts will occur unevenly, overall, higher temperatures and changes in precipitation will reduce both the quantity and quality of global food yields, result in shifts of fish populations, affect livestock and possibly lead to food-price shocks. The IPCC (2014a, 731) concludes with high confidence that climate change will have a substantial negative impact on (1) per capita calorie availability; (2) childhood undernutrition, particularly stunting; and (3) on undernutrition-related child deaths and DALYs [disability-adjusted life years] lost in developing countries. Moreover, climate change will exacerbate water insecurity in many regions, an insecurity that already impairs hygiene, reduces farm yields, increases infectious diseases and can become a source of conflict (Costello et al. 2009, 1705; McMichael and Lindgren 2011, 407 8; UNDP 2007, 27). Not only changing temperatures and precipitation patterns, but also changing run-off patterns, glacial shrinkage and increasing floods and droughts will substantially compromise flows of water for irrigation and human consumption. In addition to these three fundamental rights, climate change will also impact the effective enjoyment of other human rights. Caney formulates a right not to be forcefully evicted (2009b, 233; 2010b, 83). The OHCHR (2009, paragraphs 35 8) similarly describes the harmful effects of climate change on the right to adequate housing, codified by the International DOI: /

16 Climate Change, Rights and Responsibility 13 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966b, article 11.1). Climate change threatens this right in several ways, not only through the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, floods and landslides, but also because many people will become displaced as food yields falter, freshwater supplies decline and coastal inundation occurs (Costello et al. 2009, ; IPCC 2014a, ; McMichael and Lindgren 2011, ). Moreover, rising sea levels in general will be a major contributing factor to permanent population displacements, since a third of the world s population lives within 60 miles of a shoreline and at low altitudes (Costello et al. 2009, 1708; IPCC 2014a, 770). Again, these impacts will hit poorest people hardest, as they tend to live in the most vulnerable locations and have no adequate resources to adapt. Additionally, Caney mentions the right to development (2010b, 83) and the right to property as being under threat by climate change (2009a, 167). Furthermore, the OHCHR (2009, paragraphs 39 41) also suggests that climate change jeopardizes the right to self-determination, which includes the right to freely determine one s political status and to freely pursue one s economic, social and cultural development. According to the OHCHR (2009, paragraph 40), the right to self-determination is a collective right held by peoples rather than individuals, but its realization is an essential condition for the effective enjoyment of individual human rights. Noticeable risks imposed by climate change on this right are, for example, the threats that sea level rise and extreme weather events pose to the habitability and, in the longer term, the territorial existence of lowlying island states (AOSIS 2012; OHCHR 2009, paragraphs 40 1; UNDP 2014, 127). Moreover, even though indigenous peoples have historically had a high capacity to adapt to variable environmental conditions, rapid climate change jeopardizes their culture and threatens to deprive them of their traditional territories and livelihoods (IPCC 2014a, 765; OHCHR 2009, paragraph 40). In addition to the analysis of the effects of climate change on existing fundamental human rights, Nickel (1993, 290) defends a right to an adequate environment on the basis that its protection serves interests in life, health and a minimal level of welfare. Similarly, Hayward articulates a right to an environment adequate for human health and well-being (2005, 29) as well as a right to a fair share of ecological space (2007, 445 8). Vanderheiden (2008, 252) advocates a right to an adequate environment, and argues that it includes a claim to climatic stability. However, Vanderheiden s account has been criticized by Bell (2013, 163 5), who DOI: /

17 14 Climate Change and Individual Responsibility concludes that the right to a sufficiently stable climate might be best understood as a composite right that is derived from other rights, such as those described above. Text box 2.1 presents an overview of the human rights threatened by climate change. In the following section, we will make some brief comments that are particularly relevant for the purposes of this book, although we do not have the space to fully do justice to these questions. text box 2.1 Human rights threatened by climate change Key rights threatened by climate change: The right to life The right to health The right to subsistence/the right to adequate food and water Whereas Caney s minimal conception interprets these as only giving rise to negative duties, the 2009 OHCHR report advocates a broader interpretation. Additional established human rights under threat: The right not to be forcefully evicted/the right to adequate housing The right to development The right to property The right to self-determination New human rights threatened by climate change: The right to an adequate environment The right to a fair share of ecological space Some critical considerations Gardiner (2013a) formulates some pervasive challenges to the application of a human rights framework because climate change is a perfect moral storm, involving global as well as inter-temporal justice issues, theoretical difficulties and moral corruption. First, human rights are often defended by appealing to the fundamental and vital human interests they protect (Bell 2011, 103; Caney 2006, 259; Shue 1996, 8). Gardiner (2013a, ) argues that vital interests can be conceptualized in other terms than human rights, such as basic needs or capabilities. We agree that the human rights approach is not the only way to frame DOI: /

18 Climate Change, Rights and Responsibility 15 the climate debate, and does not include all relevant ethical concerns (e.g. interspecies justice) (see also Bourban 2014, 43). However, these profound questions are aimed more broadly at the theoretical underpinnings of the human rights framework as such, rather than being specific to the application of the human rights framework to climate change. The conceptualization of the threats of climate change in terms of human rights nonetheless makes sense. A human rights approach adopts a discriminatory approach to the impacts of climate change: only those effects that violate rights should be taken into account, rather than those that reduce preference satisfaction or merely lead to less economic growth (Caney 2010b, 86). In this way, the application of the human rights framework enables us to conceptualize climate change as a moral harm in the strict and narrow sense implied by Feinberg s (1984, 65) harm principle: it indicates that climate change not only entails a setback to people s interests, but that it does so in such a manner as to violate people s rights. Hence, employing the human rights framework increases the urgency of climate change, conducive to gathering as much as possible support for undertaking action to tackle it. A related concern mentioned by Gardiner (2013a, 222) pertains to the identity of the rights invoked, and especially the problem that focusing on some rights rather than others can make serious differences to policy. Indeed, in the previous section, we have listed the threats that climate change poses to key rights, additional established rights with international standing and to some newly proposed rights (see Text box 2.1). We have also compared Caney s minimal account with the broader approach of the OHCHR. Caney s (2010b, 83) aim is to identify absolutely fundamental human rights that can enjoy ecumenical support from a wide variety of different ethical perspectives. Caney (2009b, 229, footnote 12; 2010b, 76, footnote 24) explicitly acknowledges that this strategy is influenced by Pogge s (2008) methodology in defending the view that global poverty constitutes a violation of people s rights. Caney s strategy is also in line with Gardiner s (2011a, 5; 2013b, 123 4) own methodological minimalism, the aim of which is to specify climate change in broadly acceptable terms, so as to keep distractions from the imperative to act to a minimum, while acknowledging that potential solutions to the global environmental tragedy will presumably have to rely on more controversial claims. In our view, Caney succeeds in demonstrating DOI: /

19 Index Ability to Pay Principle, 26 adaptation, 19, 68, 92n3, 116, 124 advantageous comparison, 39, 58 9 agency, 4, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 29, 30, 36, 51, 56, 69, 88, 95 7, 103, 104, 109, 120, 122, 124 individual, see individual agency moral, see moral agency phenomenology of, see phenomenology of agency allocation problem, 19, 20, 23 4, 78, 97 argument from excessive sacrifice, 64, 67 9, 111 Arrhenius, S., 51 attribution of blame, 40, Bandura, A., 38, 39, 43, 56, 69, 70 Barry, C., 25 basic human rights perspective, 16, 28, 45n7, 64, 96, 112, 119 behavioural wedge, 31 2, 80 see also low-hanging fruits Belgium, 33, 49, 53, 56, 61, 92n7, 93n11 Bell, D., blameworthiness, 21, 22, 24, 25, 36 7, 48, 52, 53, 56, 69, 88, 95 7, 103, 104, 111, 120 1, 128 Caney, S., 9 16, 25, 26, 29, 30, 92n8, 108, 115 causal responsibility, 20 1, 22, 25, 28 9, 34, 92n4, 125 capitalism, 101, 106n5, 121 claiming ignorance, 40, 57 climate change anthropogenic, 2, 9, 36, 48, 63, 66 7, 73, 74, 89, 104, 119 burdens involved in tackling, complexity of, 3, 36 7, 48, 59, 61, 66, 73, 91, 95, 96, 103, 119 denial, 53, 70 and human rights framework, 9 17 impact on human rights, 9 14 impact on the poor, 9, 11, 13, 63, 65 6, 72, see also stratified remoteness as a matter of group effects and individual effects, 74 9 as a matter of omissions and acts, 50 2 as a matter of remote effects and near effects, 61 4 and moral disengagement, 56 9, 69 73, 88 91, 103 5, 120, see also moral disengagement observed impacts, 7 8 DOI: /

20 146 Index climate change Continued phenomenology of agency in, see phenomenology of agency projected impacts, 8 9 and the right to adequate housing/ not to be forcefully evicted, and the right to health, 11 12, 119 and the right to life, 10 11, 119 and the right to self-determination, 13 and the right to subsistence (food and water availability), 12, 119 and risk, 64 7, 71 as a threshold effect, 76 7 climate threshold, 8 9, 65 Cohen, G., 104 collective action problem, 40, 86 7, 88 9 see also diffusion of responsibility collective duty, 19, 78, 85, 89 Colombia, 49, 58 9, 72 3, 90, 93n11, 93n16, 104 common-sense morality, 16, 23 5, 26, 27 8, 36 7, 42, 50, 60, 67, 74, 95 8, 102 3, , 119, 120, 121, 125 communicators, , , , 123 compensation, 19, 125 consumerism, 80 4, 99, 100, 122, 125, 127 consumption elites, 30, 32, 33, 58 9, 62, 63, 69, 72 3, 90 1, 93n16, 100 5, 121, 125 contribution principle, 25 conventional morality, see commonsense morality Conway, E., 53 Cripps, E., 75, 78, 84 7 dehumanization, 40, 71 3 delegated authority model, 35 6, 46n12 demandingness objection, 27 8, 68 9, , 125 depersonalization, see dehumanization diffusion of responsibility, 40, 88 9 discrediting evidence of harm, 40, 71 dispensable emissions, 30, 81, displacement of responsibility, 40, 57 8, dissonance, 38, 57 see also inconsistency between moral standards and self-interested conduct drought, 8, 9, 12, 62 emitters Belgian, 58 9, 72 3, 90 1 Colombian, 58 9, 72 3, 90 1, 93n16, 104 competing motives of, 38, 43, 98 9, 113 5, 121 individual, 16, 28, 31, 32, 36, 48, 52, 55, 64, 79, 87, 90, 96, 103, 104, 110, 119 luxury, 37, 46n12, 48, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 60 1, 69, 72, 78, 86, 88, 90, 103 4, 108, , US, 31, 58 9, 72 3, 90 1 see also greenhouse gas emissions euphemistic labelling, 39 40, 70 externalism, 41 4 Feinberg, J., 15 Feinberg s harm principle, 15, 128 Fifth Assessment Report, 2, 7 8, 51, 127 floods, 8, 10, 12, 13, 62 3 Gardiner, S., 3, 14 17, 35 6, 37, 41 4, 46n10, 63, 90, 93n16, 96 7, 99, 105n1 Gilbert, D., 3 global warming, 3, 7 8, 18, 49, 51 2, 53, 57, 61, 68, 70, 71, 77 8, 92n6, 109, 126 Goodin, R., 115 greenhouse gas emissions anthropogenic, 2 3, 18, 28 9, 30 1, 45n8, 45n9, 51 2, 54, 61, 62, 65, 74 6, 78 9, 109, 119 and carbon dependence, 79 80, dispensable, see dispensable emissions and impact on global warming and climate change, 2, 18, 51 2, 77 8 individual and household, 31 2, 35, 74 6, 78, 80, 86, 91 DOI: /

21 Index 147 greenhouse gas emissions Continued influence of social values and cultural expectations on, 80 4, luxury, see luxury emissions from reasonable ordinary consumption, 30, 125 6, see also dispensable emissions subsistence/survival, see subsistence emissions unintended effects of, 52 5 usualness of, 55 6, 58 greenhouse gases, 126 atmospheric concentration of, 8, 18, 68, 124 emissions, see greenhouse gas emissions guilty biases, 39, 41 see also moral disengagement Harris, P., 34 Hayward, T., 13, 46n10, heatwaves, 7 8, 10, 62, 66 Hiller, A., 109 human rights minimal conception of, 9 16 right to adequate housing/not to be forcefully evicted, right to an adequate environment, right to development, 13 right to fair share of ecological space, 13 right to health, 11 12, 45n3 right to life, 10 11, 44n2 right to property, 13 right to self-determination, 13 right to subsistence, 12 threatened by climate change to, 9 14 inconsistency between moral standards and self-interested conduct, 4, 38 9, 43 4, 98 9, 105n1, 117, 121, see also dissonance individual agency/agents, 7, 17, 19, 21, 29, 30, 33, 35 6, 41, 51, 61, 75, 96, 102, 111, 119, 121 doubts about, 4, 33, 36 7, 59, 73, 91, 104, 119 and moral disengagement, 36 41, 56 9, 69 73, see also agency; phenomenology of agency individualism, 85 6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2, 7 9, 11, 12, 18, 19, 31, 45n5, 51, 52, 54, 62, 64, 66, 68, 127 interpersonal test, internalism, 41 4, International Bill of Human Rights, 10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10, 44n2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10, 11, Jamieson, D., 37, 41 4, 53 4, 64, 76, 97, 102, 110, Johnson, B., 84 6 Kagan, S., 76, 93n13 Kant, I., 99, 105n1 liberal-capitalist worldview, 4 5, , 105, 113, , 121, 127, 129 Lichtenberg, J., 80 3, 97 Lomborg, B., 67, 68 low-hanging fruits, 31 2, 86, 116 see also behavioural wedge luxury emissions, 3, 16, 28 33, 37, 46n10, 48, 54 5, 56 7, 65 6, 69, 79 80, 81, 84, 85, 88 9, 96 7, 103, 110, , 127 Markowitz, E., 39, 41, 61, 105 materialistic freedoms, 101, 102 3, 110, 115, 121 2, 127 McKinnon, C., 29 30, 77 methodological minimalism, 15 16, Miller, D., 20 4, 26 7, 46n11, 89 minimal conception of human rights, 9 16 minimizing consequences, 39, 70 DOI: /

22 148 Index mitigation, 8, 18, 45n5, 67, 68, 80, 92n9, 116, 127 moral agency, 38, 44, 46n14 moral corruption, 3, 14, 37, 98, 105n1 moral disengagement, 3, 36 9, 44, 128 by advantageous comparison, 39, 58 9 by attribution of blame, 40, Bandura s taxonomy of mechanisms of, by claiming ignorance, 40, 57 in climate change, 56 9, 69 73, 87 91, 103 5, 120 by depersonalization/ dehumanization, 40, 71 3 by diffusion of responsibility, 40, 88 9 by discrediting evidence of harm, 40, 71 by displacement of responsibility, 40, 57 8, by euphemistic labelling, 39 40, 70 and metaethics, 41 4 by minimizing consequences, 39, 70 psychological mechanisms of, 3, 37 41, 121, see also moral disengagement, strategies of by social and moral justification, 39, 56 7 strategies of, 39 41, see also moral disengagement, psychological mechanisms of tackling the propensity for, moral harm, 3, 15 17, 36, 119, 128, 129 moral judgement, 3, 37, 41 4, 96, 105, enhancement of, , 119, 128 moral mathematics ignoring imperceptible effects, 78, 86, 89, 93n13 ignoring the effects of sets of acts, 75 7 moral motivation, 41 4 enhancement of moral judgement to increase, invoking alternative moral values to increase, moral responsibility, 3, 21, 24 8, 37, 42, 45n6, 48, 96 7, , , 128 moral standards, 37 40, 43 4, 97, 98, 105n1, 113, 117, 121, 128 motivational gap, 37, 97, 119, 121 3, 128 and competing motives, 38, 43, 98 9 and the liberal-capitalist worldview, and moral disengagement, strategies to address, , neutralization techniques, 39 see also moral disengagement Nickel, J., 13 Nolt, J., 45n9, 109 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 9 14, 15 The Onion, 2 Oreskes, N., 53 outcome responsibility, 21, 25, 52, 64, 79, 128 paradigm moral problem, 3, 17, 37, 41 2, 96 97, 129 Parfit, D., 67, 75, 92n8, 93n13, 95, 97 particularism, 33 4 phenomenology of agency, 24, 36, 39, 48, 95 6, 104, 119, 120, 129 and moral disengagement, 36 41, 56 9, 69 73, see also agency; individual agency; primacy of acts over omissions; primacy of individual effects over group effects; primacy of near effects over remote effects Pogge, T., 15, 87, 97 Polluter Pays Principle, 25, 26, 30 precipitation patterns, changes in, 7 8, 11, 12, 62, 72 DOI: /

23 Index 149 primacy of acts over omissions, 24, 36, 48, 50 60, 129 and climate change, 50 2 and moral disengagement, 56 9 and unintended effects of greenhouse gas emitting activities, 52 5 and usualness of greenhouse gas emitting activities, 55 6 primacy of individual effects over group effects, 24, 36, 48, 74 91, 129 and carbon dependence of emitters, and climate change, 74 9 and duties of unilateral action or promotional duties, 84 8 and moral disengagement, and social values and cultural expectations, 80 4 primacy of near effects over remote effects, 24, 36, 48, 60 73, 129 and climate change, 60 4 and moral disengagement, and pure time preference and excessive sacrifice, 67 9 and uncertainty and risk, 64 7 promotional duties, 84 8 pure time preference rationale, 67 9 rationalization, 38, 39, 41, see also moral disengagement rationalizing ideologies, 39 see also moral disengagement Remainder, 26 remedial responsibility, 20 8, 32 3, 36, 45n6, 97, 116, 119, 120 principles for assignment of, 20 3, 25, 26 responsibility assignment of, 20 3, 25, 32 3, 45n6, 97, 120, 124 backward-looking principles of, 22, 26 and benefit principle, 21 and capacity principle, 21 2, 26, 34 causal, see causal responsibility collective, 19, 35, 75, 78, and community principle, 22 forward-looking principles of, 22, 26 identification of, 2, 16, 20 3, 45n6, 126 individual, 3, 33 6 moral, see moral responsibility outcome, see outcome responsibility remedial, see remedial responsibility responsibility-bearer, 16, 23 4, 26 8, 115, 129 fairness, 23 4, 26 8, 69, 125, 129 Scheffler, S., 24, 46n11, 96, 102, 103, 129 self-regulatory system, 38 see also moral agency Shariff, A., 39, 41, 61, 105 Shue, H., 16, 25, 28 30, 45n7, 46n10, 54, 66, 88 sink enhancement, 18, 127 Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 55 6, 58 9, 75, 84 6, 93n12 Smith, A., 81 social and moral justification, 39, 56 7 social paradigm, , 127, 129 Soper, K., 83 4, 115 statist approach, 33 5 stratified remoteness, 63, 65 6, 72 see also climate change, impact on the poor subsistence emissions, 28 33, 46n10, 54, 69, 79 80, 81, 120, 129 substantive approach to people s rights and duties, 16, 26, 28, 64, 68, 96, 112, 119, 126 theoretical storm, 96 8 Traxler, M., 30 uncertainty, 61, 64 7, 70 1 unilateral action, 84 8, 110 United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 18, 33 6 DOI: /