BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND AUTONOMY

Transcription

1 Japan 103 JAPAN BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND AUTONOMY Mike M. Mochizuki ABSTRACT While appearing to be more nationalistic and less reluctant to engage international security challenges, Japan continues to pursue a comprehensive strategy integrating its security and economic interests. It has recalibrated this strategy by expanding defense cooperation with the United States, becoming more assertive about defending its own territory, providing non-combat support in the war on terrorism, and promoting East Asian economic integration. Despite widespread public opposition to the U.S.-led war against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has so far minimized the political backlash against his support for the Bush administration s policies. By bolstering its alliance with the United States, Japan has also gained greater maneuverability to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy in Asia and beyond. Through a multifaceted approach, Japan seeks to cultivate an East Asian environment that is more hospitable to its long-term economic and security interests. Mike Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur and is Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the George Washington University s Elliott School of International Affairs. He would like to thank Jeffrey Hornung for research assistance, and Ashley Tellis, Michael Wills, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

2 104 Strategic Asia Introduction A new Japan appears to be emerging. Japan now seems more nationalistic, more willing to discuss openly and assert its national interests, and less reluctant to engage international security challenges. 1 The trauma of the Gulf War, uncertainties about America s security commitment in the post-cold War era, a decade of economic stagnation, the North Korean missile tests and abduction of Japanese citizens, the rise of China, and the global threat of terrorism have all contributed to this new Japanese orientation. As the post-world War II generation has assumed leadership positions in all sectors of Japanese society, Japan is becoming less burdened by memories of its militarist past in asserting its interests in Asia and beyond. Despite this profound change in Japanese attitudes and public discourse, however, what is remarkable is the continuity in Japan s basic strategic calculus. As in the early postwar period, Japan continues to pursue a comprehensive strategy of integrating its security and economic interests. 2 Concerning physical security, the alliance with the United States remains the foundation of its defense policy. There is little sign that Japan is shifting to a military posture or doctrine independent of or less reliant on the United States. Nor is Japan altering its defense policy to participate directly in combat operations overseas with or without the United States. But this reliance on the United States for military security does not mean that Tokyo blindly follows Washington in foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, the Japanese have always understood that while the U.S. alliance is essential to Japan s national security, it was by no means sufficient for making their nation more secure and prosperous. To enhance its commercial opportunities abroad and reduce its economic vulnerabilities, Japan has energetically pressed its national interests independent of the United States. 3 Indeed a constant challenge for Japanese foreign policy has been to minimize or even avoid a trade-off between its U.S.-centered security policy on the one hand and its global and regional economic interests on the other. Ironically, the more Japan has moved to bolster its alliance relationship with the United States, the more freedom of action Japan has gained to press its own national interests vis-à-vis the United States and to pursue diplomatic initiatives independent of the United States. Before the September 11 terrorist attacks, Japan was pursuing a multifaceted strategy. By incrementally relaxing its self-imposed domestic constraints on defense policy, Japan expanded its self-defense right, enhanced defense cooperation with the United States, and nurtured closer security relations with U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific, especially Australia and South Korea. At the same time, Japan encouraged and participated in various mul-

3 Japan 105 tilateral security dialogues to complement the U.S. alliance network. While adopting a tougher diplomatic stance toward North Korea, Japan kept alive the option of normalizing relations with Pyongyang. While softly balancing against China through a reinvigorated Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan also seized the commercial opportunities presented by China s economic ascendancy, worked to prevent a downward spiral in Japan-China relations, and promoted East Asian economic integration. The U.S.-led war on terrorism has only reinforced this basic strategic calculation. Japan s Security Policy After September 11 Normalization has often been the shorthand to characterize the recent trends in Japanese security policy. Japanese political leader Ozawa Ichiro first popularized the notion whilst reflecting on the inadequate Japanese response to the Persian Gulf crisis and war of Ozawa urged his country to shed its misguided one-country pacifism and become simply a normal or ordinary country. He was no doubt using this disarming language to reassure his fellow citizens that a Japan contributing more to international security does not imply a revival of pre-1945 militarism. 4 The normal country concept, however, is too vague to illuminate Japan s strategic trajectory. What is normal for a country? Should the United Kingdom with its willingness to fight side-by-side with the United States in overseas military operations and its possession of nuclear weapons be the standard for normalcy? Is a nuclear-armed France that frequently challenges U.S. foreign policy what constitutes normalcy? Or is post-cold War united Germany that participates directly in NATO-sanctioned and led combat operations while eschewing nuclear weapons and overseas military operations outside the NATO and UN frameworks a more appropriate model for Japanese normalization? Each of these types of normalcy have vastly different implications for Japanese foreign and security policy even as Japan remained formally tied to the U.S. alliance network. If normalization just means a shift away from its stridently anti-military pacifist culture, then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has simply built upon and to some extent accelerated the normalization process that actually began in the 1980s a decade before Ozawa promoted the notion of Japan becoming a normal country. During the 1980s when the Soviet-American military competition was heating up again after the collapse of detente, Japan took significant but modest steps to bolster its defense policy and security alliance with the United States. It articulated the goal of sea-lane defense out to 1,000 nautical miles, rescinded the 1 percent of GNP ceiling on defense expenditures, relaxed its prohibition of arms exports to permit defense technology trans-

4 106 Strategic Asia fers to the United States, and reoriented its defense forces for a northern strategy that would complement U.S. maritime strategy designed to contain the Soviet Union s growing naval power in Northeast Asia. 5 Although these measures were adequate to counter the Soviet military near Japan before the Cold War ended, they were not enough for Japan to meet U.S. expectations in the Persian Gulf crisis. Domestic politics and a restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution prevented Japan from providing the rear-area support, including air and sea lift, that the United States requested in preparation for the counter-attack against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The government with the advice of its Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau enunciated the doctrine of prohibiting actions that could be directly integrated with the use of force (buryoku koshi no ittaika) except in the case of individual self-defense. This doctrine allowed the transportation and supply of medical services, food, and other nonlethal items to non-combat zones only. 6 Japan s large financial contribution of $13 billion, which was raised by a tax increase, did not prevent widespread international criticism especially from Americans. 7 Kuwait s prominent omission of Japan from its list of nations it thanked for the liberation effort humiliated the Japanese. This trauma prompted Tokyo to do more in the international security realm. Soon after hostilities ended in the Persian Gulf, Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Middle East. It passed legislation to permit Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to participate, albeit under significant restrictions, in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 8 The North Korean nuclear crisis and the Chinese missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait motivated Japan to revise the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines that had been in effect in Among other things, the revised guidelines of 1997 mandated Japanese rear-area support for U.S. military operations during contingencies in areas surrounding Japan that would have a direct impact on Japanese security interests. This step probed the limits of the government s constitutional interpretation that prohibited the country from exercising the right of collective self-defense. Although legislation implementing these new guidelines could have been subject to a contentious constitutional debate, the August 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile launch over Japan alarmed the nation enough to give the government the necessary public acquiesence to win parliamentary approval of the guidelines legislation in Moreover, the North Korean provocation convinced the Japanese government to cooperate with the United States in the initial research phase of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) program. 10

5 Japan 107 Post-September 11 Adjustments in Security Policy Prime Minister Koizumi both benefited from and was constrained by policy inheritance in fashioning a Japanese response after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The option of using the guidelines law to authorize the dispatch of SDF troops for rear-area logistical support was closed because Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo had stated during the 1999 parliamentary deliberation for this legislation that the concept of areas surrounding Japan excluded the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Moreover, the 1999 guidelines law mandated Japanese rear-area support for U.S. forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, but not for British and other forces that might participate in military operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the end, the Japanese government opted for special anti-terrorism legislation. An intense debate both within the governing coalition and between the government and opposition yielded a compromise law that restricted the SDF to an offshore, non-combat role. 11 Under this twoyear anti-terrorism law which was passed at the end of October 2001 and extended for another two-year term in October 2003, Japan dispatched maritime SDF vessels to refuel and resupply not only U.S. and British ships, but also those from other European countries, Canada, and New Zealand. The operations conducted under the anti-terrorism law did push against the doctrine of non-integration with the use of force which was enunciated during first Gulf war. Arguing that the transportation of weapons and ammunition in non-combat zones would not constitute integrating Japanese SDF with the use of force, government officials left open the possibility of transporting ammunition from ship to ship or from port to port while stating there was no need to transport weapons and ammunition to foreign territory such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. The eventual deployment in February 2003 of Aegis-equipped destroyers to the Indian Ocean created the potential of becoming integrated with the use of force because of the formidable intelligence-gathering and information-processing capabilities of the Aegis system which could theoretically be linked to U.S. combat operations against Iraq. But the government framed the Aegis deployment in terms of a routine ship rotation to protect Japanese supply vessels in the region rather than a move to support directly U.S. combat operations against Iraq. It also argued that the intelligence that might be provided by the Aegis destroyer to U.S. forces would be just a routine exchange of intelligence between allies and would constitute an independent act not tied directly to U.S. combat operations. 12 In July 2003, two months after President George W. Bush declared military victory over Iraq, Japan passed a special measures law that provided the legal framework for the deployment of ground SDF to Iraq. The

6 108 Strategic Asia subsequent dispatch of the initial troop contingent to Sawana, Iraq, in January 2004 represented the first time since World War II that Japanese ground forces were sent to an overseas country with ongoing military action. As bold as this move to put boots on the ground has been, the Japanese government has strained to preserve the fundamental parameters of its defense policy. The Iraq special measures law explicitly stated that the Japanese mission is to provide medical and humanitarian support for the Iraqi people and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq, and framed this mission in terms of a request of the UN member states according to the UN Security Council Resolution It also clearly prohibited the use of force. In response to opposition questions in the National Diet that challenged the constitutionality of the deployment, Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru stressed that Japanese forces were not going to a combat zone (sento chi-iki) but simply an area where security was poor. 13 By splitting hairs, the Japanese government preserved its constitutional doctrine of nonintegration with the use of force. The passage of UN Security Council resolution 1546 on post-war Iraq and the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq at the end of June 2004 prompted Prime Minister Koizumi to announce that the SDF will participate in a multinational force. But even in this case, Japan will limit SDF activity to humanitarian and reconstruction support in non-combat areas and rear-area support like the transport of supplies to U.S. and British forces. The SDF will not be involved directly in establishing and maintaining security in Iraq. As Prime Minister Koizumi has stated emphatically in the National Diet, Japanese personnel will not participate in a multinational force that has the mission of using force. 14 In addition to mobilizing the SDF for operations in the Persian Gulf region, Japan relaxed the existing legal constraints on SDF participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). An amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law passed in 2001 made it possible for the SDF to participate in core PKO activities such as monitoring the cessation of armed conflict and patrolling buffer zones. In the original 1991 International Peace Cooperation Law, Japanese PKO units were restricted to logistical support activities. The law was also revised to permit Japanese peacekeepers to use weapons not only to protect themselves, but also those who come under the supervision of SDF personnel as they carry out their duties. 15 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Japan also took steps to buttress defense of its own territory. First, it enhanced its ability to deal with maritime intrusions. The embarrassing inability of the Japanese Coast Guard to apprehend two suspicious ships believed to be from North Korea that approached Japan s coastline in March 1999 prompted a review of its rules

7 Japan 109 of engagement regarding maritime intrusions. 16 The existing law had prohibited the Japanese Coast Guard or Maritime Self-Defense Forces from firing shots at intruding vessels except only after they were fired upon; the only way to stop such an intruder was to spray water, block its path, or ram the vessel itself. As part of the anti-terrorism legislative package, the Japanese Diet in November 2001 revised the Coast Guard Law to permit firing warning shots at first and then shots to disable the intruding boats. This new policy was tested a month later against a suspicious ship of North Korean origin that had entered Japan s exclusive economic zone off of Amami Oshima. When the vessel refused to stop, the Japanese Coast Guard fired warning shots; and when the intruder then began to flee, the Japanese fired directly at the boat to stop it. The vessel eventually sank because of an explosion unrelated to the shots fired by the Japanese Coast Guard. Subsequently, Japan decided to upgrade the Coast Guard s ability to respond to maritime intrusions by allocating funds for higher-speed and longer-range patrol boats including one with a helicopter capability. 17 Second, the Japanese Diet through an overwhelming cross-partisan majority enacted a package of three bills in June 2003 to improve the Japanese government s ability to deal with armed attacks. This legislation established the legal framework for defining the responsibilities of the national and local governments to deal with actual and potential armed attacks and eliciting the cooperation of citizens. It clarified and strengthened the role of the cabinet-level Security Council, including the addition of ministers in charge of domestic-oriented agencies such as those dealing with home affairs, posts and telecommunications, transportation, and land and infrastructure. Finally, the legislation established the institutional mechanism for the emergency mobilization of the SDF and the provision of necessary equipment and supplies. 18 Finally, Japan decided in December 2003 to move beyond joint research with the United States regarding ballistic missile defense to actual plans for acquiring BMD systems. Referring to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and to major technological advances, the Koizumi cabinet announced its plan to procure a two-layered ballistic missile system involving a sea-based Aegis system and the advanced land-to-air PAC-3 Patriot missile system. While noting the need to cooperate further with the United States both technologically and operationally, it stressed that these systems would be used only to defend Japan based on an autonomous judgment and not to protect a third country. In another words, acquisition of BMD capabilities would not violate the existing Japanese constitutional doctrine prohibiting the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. 19

8 110 Strategic Asia A Possible Breakout in Japanese Security Policy? Over the years, Japanese public support for the Self-Defense Force and its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations has increased steadily. For example, in a public survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in May 2004, 67 percent had a positive impression of the Self-Defense Force, compared to only 36 percent in Public opinion polls taken by the Cabinet Secretariat indicate that Japanese public approval of SDF participation in international peacekeeping operations rose from 45.5 percent in February 1991 to 79.5 percent in January But even as Japanese citizens have embraced their country s incremental expansion of the SDF s role, the government has taken pains to preserve existing constitutional doctrines not to exercise the right of collective self-defense and not to use force or become directly integrated in the use of force except for strict selfdefense purposes. To what extent is it possible that Japan might modify these constitutional constraints in the near future? While gauging public support for the recent SDF deployments in Iraq, Japanese policymakers are now considering a legal framework that would move beyond the ad hoc special measures legislation currently mandating the SDF s international security activities in the war on terrorism. Both the anti-terrorism law of 2001 and the Iraqi reconstruction support law of 2003 have sunset clauses. A general and permanent law that would establish the criteria and the operational rules for the overseas deployment of the SDF is being examined. 22 The Japan Defense Agency and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are also considering a revision of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) which defines the basic parameters of defense policy. Under examination is a change in the current NDPO (last revised in 1995) so that participating in international operations becomes one of the main missions of the SDF along with repelling external aggression. To deal with new threats (e.g., those posed by ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, cyber attacks, and special operations units), proponents of NDPO revision argue that Japan should shift from the existing basic force concept (which is focused on defending against external aggression on Japanese territory) to a flexible and mobile force concept. Such a change would entail the creation of rapidresponse units, the acquisition of greater transport capabilities, and the specification of procedures for BMD operations. 23 Also on the defense policy agenda is the notion of ocean-peacekeeping (OPK) which Defense Minister Ishiba articulated in May 2003 at the Singapore Asian Security Conference. The OPK concept derives from Japan s keen interest in the security of sea lanes (especially the Malacca and Taiwan straits), the management of exclusive economic zones under

9 Japan 111 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the protection of Japan s sovereignty claims in various territorial disputes as well as its territorial waters. While concerned about China s ambitions to develop a blue-water navy, Japanese defense policymakers are interested in developing a multilateral framework to patrol maritime areas in the Asia-Pacific to deal with threats from piracy and the shipment of illegal and dangerous materials. The Japanese would presumably provide its destroyers and P3-C patrol planes for this mission. 24 All of the above issues will feed into the current debate about revising and/or reinterpreting the constitution. More than ever before, political leaders are seriously discussing constitutional revision. Numerous public opinion polls now indicate that a majority of Japanese favor revision. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll in March 2004 indicated that 65 percent of those questioned supported constitutional revision. 25 Even a survey conducted by the progressive Asahi Shimbun (which tends to be less favorable about constitutional revision) in April 2004 revealed that 53 percent of the Japanese feel that revision is necessary. But when asked about Article 9 which restricts Japan s defense policy, 60 percent replied that it would be better not to revise this so-called peace article, while only 31 percent favored amending it. 26 In other words, while there may be a public consensus to debate and even revise the constitution, there is no clear consensus about how the constitution should be revised, much less about altering Article 9. Nevertheless, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has pledged to draft a proposal for a new constitution by November 2005 and has established a constitutional revision project team chaired by former Defense Minister Nakatani Gen. Among the items being discussed are explicit recognition that Japan possesses the right of both individual and collective self-defense, the transformation of the SDF into an actual armed force for which military law would be established and applied, and provisions for Japanese participation in collective and regional security activities and for the use of force in the context of international contribution. 27 The adoption of such ideas would indeed remove many of the critical constraints on Japanese defense policy. Under such a new constitution, Japanese forces would be able to fight shoulder-to-shoulder in coalition with allied forces even in overseas missions that are not directly tied to the defense of Japan or mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. Moreover, future Japanese and U.S. BMD systems could become more integrated so that Japan could contribute directly to the defense of U.S. territory against ballistic missile attacks. It remains to be seen whether these ideas will be incorporated in a formal LDP proposal for constitutional revision to the National Diet. Even

10 112 Strategic Asia more uncertain is whether such a proposal would garner the two-thirds majority necessary for parliamentary approval before submission to a national referendum as required by the current constitution. Although there are numerous Diet members in the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) who favor constitutional revision in some form, many of them are likely to oppose such a sweeping proposal to transform Japan s security role into something akin to that of Britain. And they will probably find allies among doves in the ruling LDP and its coalition partner the Komeito. If a constitutional amendment regarding defense policy were to eventually win Diet and public approval, it is likely to be a compromise that embeds Japan s international military role in the context of the United Nations or some form of multilateral legitimacy. Quite apart from revising or reinterpreting the constitution, Japan could still dramatically change its defense posture. For example, during March 2003 parliamentary deliberations regarding the North Korean threat, Defense Minister Ishiba asserted that Japan could launch a strike against a clear and imminent threat of armed attack as an exercise of its right of individual self-defense. 28 But at this point, Japan does not have the capability to discern beyond a reasonable doubt such a threat and to launch a pre-emptive or retaliatory military strike against a foreign adversary even one as close as North Korea. Rather than acquiring such an offensive strike capability, the Japanese government has opted to buttress deterrence through a strengthened alliance with the United States and acquiring BMD systems as well as enhancing its ability to deal with maritime incursions. 29 These options have much more political and public support than the radical notion of pre-emptive attacks. In other words, discussions about preemption are more theoretical than real. A similar assessment applies to current discussions in Japan about nuclear weapons. When Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo noted in 2003 that Japan could acquire nuclear weapons even under the current constitution, he was simply reiterating previous government interpretations of the constitution that date back to the 1950s. 30 The periodic statements by some politicians and commentators on behalf of nuclearization are nothing new. Such statements were made in the 1970s and 1980s as well. And with its plutonium stockpile and advanced defense industrial base, Japan certainly possesses the capabililty to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in short order. 31 To be sure, North Korea s clandestine nuclear weapons program and China s modernization of nuclear forces have provoked a close look at the threat environment and Japan s appropriate response. But even putting aside Japan s so-called nuclear allergy resulting from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, the mainstream

11 Japan 113 view is that Japanese nuclearization will on balance undermine rather than promote Japan s security interests. 32 In summary, the possibility of Japan breaking out militarily by acquiring offensive capabilities and nuclear weapons and by adopting a doctrine of pre-emption is slim. While a reinterpretation or revision of the constitution is more likely, even such a change would not mean that Japan will engage in unilateral military action overseas. The only way a constitutional amendment permitting the use of force in international security activities and the exercise of the collective self-defense right will win public acquiescence is one that also requires such military activities to have clear international legitimacy either through the United Nations or another multilateral mechanism. Put differently, Japan will remain unwilling to participate in the use of force as part of a controversial preventive war like the U.S.-led attack on Iraq. Koizumi s Support for Bush s War on Terrorism Prime Minister Koizumi s diplomatic support for the U.S.-led military campaign to topple the Taliban regime is not all that remarkable. Japanese citizens were killed in the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center, and the invastion of Afghanistan had UN legitimacy. Koizumi framed his support in terms of Japan s national interest and its membership in the broader international community, rather than simply in terms of his country s alliance with the United States. Moreover, despite his energetic diplomatic support for the Afghanistan war, Japanese military support for that war was modest compared to other U.S. allies like Australia and South Korea even though Japan s contribution might appear path-breaking in light of its past behavior during the Persian Gulf conflict. 33 But Koizumi s strong and unequivocal support of George W. Bush s war against Iraq does require explanation since the United States was unable to win a UN Security Council resolution to legitimate the war, and most Japanese disagreed with Bush s policy. For example, Asahi Shimbun public opinion surveys conducted right before the U.S. military attacks against Iraq began indicated that 78 percent of the Japanese opposed a war against Iraq and 70 percent felt that the Bush administration s policy was either arrogant or destabilizing. 34 The strong opposition of France and Germany should have given Koizumi some room at least to distance himself from Bush on Iraq. Instead Koizumi boldly backed American and British efforts to get a UN Security Council resolution authorizing force against Iraq and deployed the SDF to postwar Iraq. Why did Koizumi choose such a course, and why did he not pay a political price for supporting Bush on Iraq until the July 2004 Upper House elections?

12 114 Strategic Asia Part of the answer is Koizumi s interest in avoiding the national humiliation of when Japan was criticized for just writing checks and refusing to send Japanese personnel in harm s way. Koizumi himself both benefited from and mobilized Japan s new nationalism. Appealing to national pride, he emphasized that the deployment of SDF units to Iraq was a test of the very spirit of the people of Japan. Invoking the preface to the Japanese constitution with its reference to national honor, Koizumi argued that Japan cannot merely provide money and refuse to make personnel contributions because the situation is too dangerous. 35 This approach resonated with the Japanese public as suggested by the popular reaction to the three young Japanese who were taken hostage in Iraq in April According to an Asahi Shimbun survey, most Japanese supported Prime Minister Koizumi s refusal to withdraw the SDF from Iraq as demanded by the kidnappers even though an overwhelming majority of the public believed that Bush s policy toward Iraq was wrongheaded. 36 The episode also revealed a dark side of Japanese nationalism. Rather than welcoming the young Japanese after they were released, a number of politicians and conservative media outlets sharply criticized them for their reckless behavior and harming national interests. While U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell praised the young Japanese for taking risks for a greater good, for a better purpose, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo criticized them for causing so much trouble. 37 Nationalism by itself, however, does not provide a sufficient explanation for supporting the United States. Koizumi could have also appealed to Japanese nationalism by demonstrating greater independence from the United States. Critical to Japan s calculations was its national interests regarding North Korea. While questioning Bush s policy toward Iraq, numerous Japanese opinion leaders stressed that Japan had to support the United States because of North Korea. A Yomiuri Shimbun survey taken in March 2003 right after U.S. military operations against Iraq commenced suggests the presence of this logic in the Japanese public. While only 12 percent of those polled believed that the government had every reason to back the U.S. military action, 64 percent indicated that the government had no choice but to do so. The same survey revealed that 92 percent felt anxious about North Korea. 38 This linkage between Iraq and North Korea did not mean that Japan feared U.S. abandonment in the face of the North Korean threat. With George W. Bush taking a tough policy toward North Korean nuclear programs, such abandonment was improbable. More important for Koizumi and Japanese domestic politics was U.S. willingness to support Japan on the North Korean abduction issue. On this point, Koizumi s embrace of Bush

13 Japan 115 paid off handsomely. The United States has been the only country besides Japan to raise the abduction issue repeatedly during the six-party talks regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. Moreover, the U.S. State Department s April 2004 report on terrorism mentioned the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens for the first time. This inclusion implied that Pyongyang would have to continue to make progress in dealing with the abduction issue before North Korea could be removed from the U.S. list of state-sponsors of terrorism. 39 Another reason that Koizumi did not suffer politically for backing Bush was because the actual costs of this policy for Japan have been modest. Although Japan earmarked $5 billion for humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Iraq, this amount paled in comparison to the $13 billion that Japan contributed to the war against Iraq. Moreover, a large amount of the $5 billion in Iraqi aid will be in the form of loans. As historically significant as the deployment of the SDF to Iraq has been, Japanese personnel have been sent to a relatively secure area with much protection from other national forces; and the humanitarian and reconstruction mission of the SDF has been within Japan s constitutional parameters. So far SDF personnel have not suffered any casualties in Iraq. Finally, not only have the Japanese costs of supporting Bush on Iraq been relatively low, but Japan might also reap some commercial benefits. Although the actual international distribution of reconstruction contracts and oil rights in Iraq is a closely guarded secret, the Bush administration s practice of shutting out French and German enterprises from contracts in Iraq suggests conversely that there may be economic rewards for backing the United States. Some Japanese analysts have indeed argued that Japan should be shrewder in getting the commercial benefits of Japanese SDF deployments to Iraq. 40 In other words, the SDF dispatch to Iraq should not be viewed solely in terms of Japan s interest in bolstering its alliance with the United States and enhancing its international reputation through greater international contribution (kokusai koken). If these were Japan s two sole objectives, then Tokyo should have volunteered to send ground SDF units to Afghanistan as well as Iraq. But given its huge oil reserves, Iraq is of much greater importance to Japan from the perspective of comprehensive security than Afghanistan. Despite extensive conservation and diversification measures, Japan still depends upon petroleum for about half of its energy needs. It must import all of this oil 80 percent which comes from the Persian Gulf region. 41 Japan s policy toward Iran also clearly demonstrates that it has not neglected its economic security interests while backing the U.S. war on terrorism. Despite Bush s inclusion of Iran in the axis of evil, Tokyo has

14 116 Strategic Asia been eager to develop its economic relationship with Tehran. Faced with U.S. opposition, Japan initially decided to allow the expiration in June 2004 of its preferential negotiating rights for developing southern Iran s Azadegan oil field one of the world s largest untapped petroleum reserves. But as soon as Washington s tough stance toward Iran softened slightly after Tehran agreed to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facility, Tokyo signed an agreement to develop the Azadegan oil field for an estimated $2.8 billion. Although the Bush administration was not happy about the deal, it refrained from blocking the Japanese move. Japan could not have been so bold in testing U.S. tolerance if it had not supported Bush on Iraq. 42 Despite the benefits that Japan received from backing the United States on Iraq, public support for Koizumi began to fray by June Without much political preparation at home, Koizumi informed President Bush at a pre-g-8 summit meeting in Georgia that the SDF would participate in the multinational force in Iraq after the restoration of sovereignty. Although the SDF s mission would remain essentially the same but take place under a different umbrella, growing public skepticism about the postwar situation in Iraq made Koizumi vulnerable to strong criticism in the National Diet. An Asahi Shimbun survey conducted a few weeks before the July 2004 House of Councillors election showed a sharp drop in public support for the Koizumi cabinet. Moreover, 58 percent opposed the decision to participate in the multinational force, while only 31 percent supported it. 43 In the November 2003 House of Representatives election, Koizumi led his party to victory by evading the issue of Iraq and delaying his decision to deploy the SDF until after the election was over. But such evasion was impossible during the House of Councillors election. The opposition DPJ attacked Koizumi for his hasty pledge to Bush on Iraq as well as his mishandling of the pension reform issue. Although the ruling LDP-Komeito coalition managed to preserve its upper house majority, the DPJ won more votes and seats than the LDP. The LDP and DPJ appear to be headed for a political showdown in the next election for the more powerful House of Representatives, which must be held by This vote could become a referendum on the constitutional issue of exercising the right of collective self-defense as well as the government s policy of strengthening the security alliance with the United States. 44 The July 2004 electoral setback, however, should not compel Koizumi to shift course on Iraq policy. But if a major tragedy were to strike the SDF such as a bombing that killed and injured several Japanese defense personnel, the public could turn even more against Koizumi. 45 Insofar as public acquiescence to the SDF deployment is predicated on these troops operating under tight security and great protection, such an incident would

15 Japan 117 convince most citizens that the SDF can no longer perform the purported mission of providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Under such circumstances, dissipation of Koizumi s personal popularity could weaken his base in his own party enough to force him to resign. Japan s Relations with Its Asian Neighbors Japan s balancing of alliance management and the pursuit of autonomy in the context of its comprehensive economic and security strategy is evident in relations with its Asian neighbors. Since the 1980s, Japan has increasingly turned its attention to East Asia. The steep appreciation of the yen relative to the dollar after the 1985 Plaza Accord, the intensification of trade conflicts with the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s, and the breath-taking growth of the East Asian economies steered Japan to deepen its commercial interactions with its regional neighbors. 46 Many Japanese business and political leaders talked openly of re-entering Asia. The security implications of the end of the Cold War in 1989 reinforced this economic re-orientation. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised concerns in Tokyo about the longevity of America s security commitment and military presence in East Asia. Therefore, while moving to lock in the United States through enhanced bilateral defense cooperation, the Japanese utilized multilateral as well as bilateral approaches to nurture a more benign regional security environment. 47 Moreover, Japan sought to cultivate Asian understanding and even support for its growing international security role. The Asian financial crisis and its negative economic impact on many regional economies did not lead Japan to turn away from East Asia because of declining commercial opportunities. Japan had invested too much in the region to abandon it economically. In fact, the U.S. veto of the Japanese proposal to develop an Asian Monetary Fund to prevent and deal with future financial instability prompted Japan to quietly but methodically promote East Asian regionalism as a check on the so-called Washington consensus and U.S. market fundamentalism. 48 Today, the North Korean problem and the rise of China have become Japan s primary strategic challenges in the region. Japan has addressed these twin challenges by upgrading the alliance with the United States while pursuing a regional policy that is autonomous from the United States. Relations with the Two Koreas Through much of the post-world War II period, Japan s relations with South Korea had been problematic for obvious reasons of history. Memories of Japan s harsh treatment of Koreans during its colonial rule sustained the

16 118 Strategic Asia South Korean public s negative view of the Japanese. But beginning in the mid-1980s, Japan-South Korea ties began to improve gradually. With the active encouragement of the United States, the Japanese and South Korean defense policy communities initiated regular dialogues to promote mutual understanding and build trust regarding each other s defense policy and strategic intentions. Japan s assistance to South Korean in the wake of the financial crisis also helped to improve Japan s image among South Koreans. These factors as well as South Korea s democratization laid the groundwork for President Kim Dae Jung s historic visit to Japan in October During this Japan-South Korea summit, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo provided an unequivocal written apology for the suffering Japan had caused in the past, and President Kim in turn praised Japan for its postwar accomplishments and emphasized a future-oriented approach to bilateral relations. Subsequently, economic interdependence between the two countries has deepened, and cultural exchanges especially in pop culture have taken off after South Korea lifted its ban on cultural imports from Japan. These trends have worked to strengthen the societal underpinnings for more positive relations at the state-level. As a consequence, frictions over Japan s approval of a conservative history textbook or Prime Minister Koizumi s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have not derailed the general improvement in bilateral relations. Moreover, joint security exercises between Japan and South Korea have led some analysts to talk about an emerging virtual alliance. 49 Regarding North Korea, a predominant Japanese interest has been to reduce the danger of a second Korean war. Even as Pyongyang has pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program and developed ballistic missiles capable of striking Japan, most Japanese share former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro s view that North Korea should be brought into the community of the Asian-Pacific states as fast as possible. 50 Few favor risking war by either launching pre-emptive military strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities or squeezing North Korea through tight economic sanctions to provoke a regime change. Prime Minister Koizumi s bold day trip to Pyongyang on September 17, 2002 to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il demonstrated Japan s interest in developing its own channel with North Korea and keeping diplomacy alive. Facing the Bush administration s stubborn refusal to talk bilaterally with the North Korean regime, Kim Jong Il welcomed Koizumi and in a remarkable reversal from previous denials, acknowledged and apologized for the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s. Kim also reacted positively to Koizumi s proposal

17 Japan 119 for six-party talks. The historic Koizumi-Kim summit produced the Pyongyang Declaration in which Japan apologized for the tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past and the two sides referred to the provision of Japanese economic assistance in the context of bilateral normalization. Moreover, the declaration confirmed that Pyongyang would comply with international law and all related agreements to resolve the nuclear issue. 51 Although the declaration provided a promising framework for promoting Japan-North Korea normalization, critics charged that the document failed to specify the international agreements with which North Korea would have to comply in addressing the nuclear issue. 52 The potential positive effect of Kim Jong Il s apology for the abductions was immediately smothered by North Korea s declaration that eight of the acknowledged abductees had died. Shocked by this announcement, the Japanese public became incensed that Pyongyang was still not telling the whole truth about the abductions. By the time five of the surviving Japanese abductees were allowed to visit Japan in mid-october 2002, Japanese animosity toward North Korea had become so intense that the Koizumi government refused to return these five Japanese to North Korea as originally agreed during the Koizumi-Kim summit and demanded that their families be allowed to leave North Korea as well. 53 Although his diplomatic initiative had failed to improve Japan-North Korea relations, Prime Minister Koizumi skillfully rode the wave of anti-north Korean sentiment in Japan to bolster his domestic support. In this political context, Japan decided to cooperate more fully with the United States on acquiring missile defense systems and to pass legislation that could block financial remittances to North Korea. It also joined ten other nations in becoming the initial participants of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by President Bush in May Although the PSI involved interdiction measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles, and related items, the initiative did not explicitly name North Korea as one of the target countries. In fact, concerned about provoking Pyongyang, Japan reportedly asked that the target ship in the first PSI interdiction exercise held in the Coral Sea in September 2003 not be a simulated North Korean vessel as the Pentagon had originally wanted. 54 The renewed Japanese antipathy toward North Korea did steer Tokyo to support Washington s tough posture in the six-party talks. But the Bush administration s reluctance to test North Korean intentions by presenting serious proposals in these discussions troubled the Japanese, as well as the South Koreans. To help break the impasse in the six-party talks and Japan-North Korea relations as well as to deflect attention from the do-

18 120 Strategic Asia mestic political controversy regarding pension reform, Prime Minister Koizumi traveled again to Pyongyang in May 2004 to meet with Kim Jong Il. Koizumi succeeded in getting Kim to allow the family members of the abductees to leave for Japan. During the summit, Koizumi pressed Kim to dismantle nuclear weapons completely and accept international inspections, arguing that North Korea would receive much more international economic assistance by dismantling nuclear programs than by maintaining them. He also announced that Japan would provide 250,000 tons of food aid and $10 million in pharmaceutical supplies to North Korea via international organizations, and that Japan would not impose sanctions against North Korea as long as the latter abided by the September 2002 Pyongyang Declaration. In response, Kim confirmed the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, agreed that the first step to nuclear dismantlement would be a verified freeze, denied that deterrence is something that would never be relinquished, and reconfirmed the moratorium on missile firings. 55 Despite sharp criticisms from nationalistic pundits and media organizations in Japan that Koizumi had been too soft with Kim Jong Il about the nuclear issue and had failed to press more energetically about the fate of other abductees, the Japanese public generally applauded Koizumi s diplomacy. 56 Koizumi s second summit with Kim did not openly strain Japan s relations with the United States, but it did prod the United States to be somewhat more flexible in the six-party talks. The Japanese prime minister reportedly told President Bush himself that because Kim Jong Il was no longer resisting in the multilateral discussions, it was time to test him by putting something forward. 57 During the June 2004 round of the six-party talks in Beijing, the Bush administration responded by offering a more specific proposal of fuel aid and provisional security assurances in exchange for a North Korean freeze and disclosure of all its nuclear programs and a promise to dismantle these programs with international verification. 58 Koizumi clearly used his warm personal relationship with President Bush to give Japan a significant voice in shaping U.S. policy toward North Korea. Moreover, under Koizumi s leadership, Japan was acquiring what one Japanese scholar of Korean affairs has called a bigger stick and a bigger carrot in pursuing its two-pronged policy of pressure and diplomacy. 59 On the one hand, the Japanese government now possessed the legal tools to block financial remittances and shipping to North Korea; and on the other hand, Japan was putting forth the positive incentive of largescale economic assistance to entice North Korea to terminate its nuclear programs. By partially liberating Japanese politics from the fixation on the abduction issue, Koizumi prepared the ground for a more effective Japanese role in mediating between the United States and North Korea.