The Politics of Inequality Inequality by the Numbers Workshop CUNY Graduate Center June, 2017

Transcription

1 The Politics of Inequality Inequality by the Numbers Workshop CUNY Graduate Center June, 2017 Leslie McCall Professor of Sociology and Political Science Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality CUNY Graduate Center

2 Current Research and Public/Policy Discourse (1) Tolerance Perspective (e.g., Lipset 1996; Alesina & Glaeser 2004; Benabou & Tirole 2006; SJT, Jost et al.) (2) Ignorance Perspective (e.g., Bartels 2005; Norton & Ariely 2011) (3) Ambivalence Perspective (e.g., Hochschild 1981; Kluegel & Smith 1986; Bartels 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009) (4) Opportunity Model (McCall & Kenworthy 2009; McCall 2013; Newman et al. 2015; McCall 2016; McCall & Richeson, 2016)

3 Outline PART I: PART II: Beliefs about Inequality and Opportunity Political Implications of Beliefs about Inequality and Opportunity PART III: Political Participation and Representation

4 Primary Data Sources, Collaborators, and Students Social Inequality Modules International Social Survey Program (ISSP)/General Social Survey (GSS) 1987, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 Survey of Economically Successful Americans (SESA, 2011) Representative pilot survey of top 1% in Chicago area Benjamin Page, PI (Political Science, Northwestern) Fiona Chin (Sociology, Northwestern) New Survey Questions/Experiments (2014 GSS; 2014/2015 mturk; 2015 TESS) Arvid Lindh (SOFI, University of Stockholm, Sweden) Jonas Edlund (Sociology, Umea Univ., Sweden) Christian Larsen (Political Science, Aalborg University, Denmark) Jennifer Richeson (Psychology, Northwestern) Derek Burk, Ole Hexel, Marie Laperriere (Sociology, Northwestern) Funders: Russell Sage Foundation, National Science Foundation

5 PART I: Beliefs about Inequality and Opportunity L. McCall, Political and Policy Responses to Problems of Inequality and Opportunity: Past, Present, and Future. (I. Kirsch & H. Braun, eds., The Dynamics of Opportunity, Springer, 2016).

6 Americans Have Long Desired Less Income Inequality (GSS) 90# 80# Agreement # ###### and#strong# agreement####################################issp$median######################################### 70# Percent# 60# 50# 40# Income#differences#in#America#are#too#large# 30# 20# 10# 1987# 1992# 1996# 2000# 2008# 2010# 2012#

7 Media Coverage of Inequality also Lonstanding USNWR, 1988 Mortimer Zuckerman, Dreams, Myths, and Realities Refers to a CBO study that stunningly documents the growing inequality in American life [in which] most of our citizens have not benefited from recent U.S. prosperity, [I]n this election, the crucial judgment is who can reverse the trends toward inequality and bring more of our people closer to the American dream. Newsweek, 2006 Robert Samuelson, Trickle-up Economics Although Americans do not regard rich people with much envy, they believe that wealth should be broadbased, and trickle-up economics, with most benefits flowing to the top, seems un-american no one should be happy with today s growing economic inequality. It threatens America s social compact, which depends on a shared sense of wellbeing.

8 Trends in Beliefs about Income Inequality in the U.S. (GSS) 90# 80# 70# #Agree#and# #strongly#agree# ## ** 60# Percent# 50# 40# 30# 20# 10# 1987# Income#differences#are#too#large# Inequality#con?nues#to#exist#to#benefit#rich#and#powerful# Large#income#differences#are#unnecessary#for#prosperity# 1992# 1996# 2000# 2008# 2010# 2012# 2014# ** Note: the middle neither response category was omitted in the 2014 version of this question.

9 Trends in Media Coverage of Income Inequality weighted share of articles Newsweekly articles on Inequality (random sample of articles on the economy from Time, Newsweek, USNWR) 2-yr avg

10 US Public (GSS) Top 1% (SESA) Estimated pay & ratio Desired pay & ratio Estimated Desired 2000: 13/1 2010: 32/1 2000: 4/1 2010: 7/1 2011: 93/1 2011: 50/ ,250K K 2,000K 3,500 3,000 2,500 2, , K 18K 25K 100K 25K 200K 30K 35K 40K 1,

11 Americans Not More Likely to Be Duped by American Dream (GSS/ISSP 2010) Percent# 100# 90# 80# 70# 60# 50# 40# 30# 20# 10# 0# Hard)work#is#essenBal/very#important#for#geIng#ahead#(%)## ################################ 96# 92# Parent's) ) )))Coming)from)a ))))))))Knowing)the) educa6on...))))))))))))))))wealthy)family... ))))))))right)people...## 73# ##################### ##########is#essenbal/very#important#for#geing#ahead#(%)# US,#Public# US,#Top#1%# ISSP#Median# 50# 24# US,#Public# US,#Top#1%# ISSP#Median# 31# 31# 1# 13# US,#Public# US,#Top#1%# ISSP#Median# 46# 21# 39# US,#Public# US,#Top#1%# ISSP#Median#

12 Americans Optimism about Upward Mobility Fluctuates (GSS) 100" 90" "The"way"things"are"in"America,"people"like"me"and"my"family"have"a"good"chance" of"improving"our"standard"of"living."" Percent" 80" 70" 60" 50" 40" 30" 20" 10" 0" Agree"and"strongly"agree" Disagree"and"strongly"disagree" Neither"agree"nor"disagree"" 1987" 1992" 1994" 1996" 1998" 2000" 2002" 2004" 2006" 2008" 2010" 2012"

13 Opposition to Inequality Trend Affected by Mobility Pessimism (GSS; outcome = average of three inequality questions scaled from 0 to 1) Avg. discrete change from 1987 with 95% CI Model&includes&all&controls&except&focal&variable(s)&!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!plus!focal!variable:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&plus!focal!variables:&& &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&mobility&op8mism&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&poli8cal&ideology,&par8sanship&&&

14 Media Coverage: Inequality Connected to Opportunity USNWR, 1988 Mortimer Zuckerman, Dreams, Myths, and Realities Refers to a CBO study that stunningly documents the growing inequality in American life [in which] most of our citizens have not benefited from recent U.S. prosperity, [I]n this election, the crucial judgment is who can reverse the trends toward inequality and bring more of our people closer to the American dream. Newsweek, 2006 Robert Samuelson, Trickle-up Economics Although Americans do not regard rich people with much envy, they believe that wealth should be broadbased, and trickle-up economics, with most benefits flowing to the top, seems un-american no one should be happy with today s growing economic inequality. It threatens America s social compact, which depends on a shared sense of wellbeing.

15 Survey Experiments to Test the Opportunity Model (1) Manipulations: Treatment: Control: Short, descriptive, realistic article on trends in inequality, taken from CBO Similar format on unrelated topic (trends in MLB All-Star game wins) (2) First set of DVs: multidimensional battery of questions on perceptions of economic opportunity (i.e., individual and social factors in getting ahead ) (3) Second set of DVs: policy questions about government redistribution and labor market redistribution

16 Treatment Effect on Perceptions of Factors in Getting Ahead (TESS, 2015) 5.0% 4.5% Factors%that%are%essen>al%(5),%very%important%(4),%etc.,%for%geEng%ahead.%!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Structural!Factors!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Individual!Factors!!!!!!!!!!!Increase!in!Importance*!!!!Decline!in!Importance*!!!! %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%(N=1,518)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(N=1,518)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%%%% % Response%Scale%(1:5)% % 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% Control% 3.17% 3.45% 4.42% 4.25% Treatment% Control% Treatment%

17 The Opportunity Model of Beliefs about Inequality (1) Most Americans desire less inequality (60% plus since 1987, predating elite attention to issue, e.g., OWS) (2) Intolerance of inequality is increasing by some measures (3) Many Americans recognize barriers to opportunity (often more than in other countries and more than 1%) (4) Such perceptions vary, increasing over 2000 s (5) Desires for less inequality are associated with concerns about opportunity Concerns about opportunity à Desires for opportunity enhancing policies (i.e., for education/employment), in addition to traditional redistributive policies

18 PART II: Political Implications of Beliefs about Inequality and Opportunity

19 Implications for Policy Preferences (1) Limitations of dominant redistributive models, and elite partisan approaches that embed these models: Republicans/American Exceptionalism/SJT equalize opportunities, not outcomes (i.e., economic growth/jobs, education) Democrats/Median Voter Model/IGM equalize outcomes (i.e., taxing and diffuse social spending). (2) Labor market redistribution as an alternative: Civil Rights Model (gender/racial inequality) equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities (e.g., EEO, affirmative action, comparable worth, in education and labor market).

20 More Simply Put: Do People Prefer. Equal Access to Government Services and Transfers? (i.e., a Social Wage) OR Equal Access to Economic Prosperity? (i.e., a Fair Market Wage)

21 Expanding Educational Opportunities (i.e., equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities ) Raises tax on household income at and above $250,000 (and $125,000 for individual filers). Reduces income taxes on unemployment benefits in Provides funds currently budgeted for education, health care, public safety, other services. Oregon Ballot Measure 66/67 Passed, 54% of vote, January, 2010 Temporary Taxes to Fund Education. Guaranteed Local Public Safety Funding. Initiative Constitutional Amendment. California Proposition 30 Passed, 55% of vote, November, 2012

22 Other Examples: Expanding Educational Opportunities (i.e., equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities ) (1) Mayor Di Blasio: Raise taxes on rich to fund universal pre-k (2) Millionaire taxes : New Jersey (2004), California (2005), Maryland (2008), Hawaii (2009), Wisconsin (2009), New York (2009), Connecticut (2010) (see Young and Varner) (3) Social Investment and Inclusion strategies in Europe e.g., UK Commission on Social Mobility and Child Poverty (Reeves; Morel, Palier & Palme; Larsen) (4) Focus on IGM definition of opportunity in US (Chetty et al.) (5) Apprenticeships and Training Partnerships (e.g., Lerman; Center on Wisconsin Strategy)

23 No Increase in Desire for Government Redistribution Government Should Reduce Rich/Poor Gap (%) Avg. discrete change from Model&excludes&inequality& a1tudes&index&(but& includes&controls)&

24 Increase in Desire for Spending on Education Supports more Spending on Education (%) Avg. discrete change from Model&excludes&inequality& a1tudes&index&(but& includes&controls)&

25 Examples: Labor Market Redistribution: Anecdotal Evidence (i.e., equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities ) (1) Say-on-pay laws (Switzerland, Dodd-Frank) (2) Disclosure of executive/median worker pay (Dodd-Frank) (3) EU caps on banker bonuses (4) B Corp, CSR, and Inclusive Capitalism movements (5) Employee Stock Ownership Plans (Blasi, Kruse & Freeman) (6) Anti-Wal-Mart campaigns (Ingram, Qingyuan & Rao) (7) Minimum/living wage/wage theft campaigns (8) Fast food worker strikes for higher pay (9) Predictable scheduling campaigns (10) Family leave campaigns (Milkman & Appelbaum) (11) State anti-de-unionization battles (Ohio, Wisconsin) (12) Ban-the-box and other anti-discrimination efforts (13) Wage targeting: A Triple Mandate for the Fed

26 Traditional Question on Government Redistribution General Social Survey (GSS), 2014; Swedish ISSP, 2014 TESS, 2015 Some people think that the government ought to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and poor What comes closest to the way you feel? 7= Government should do something to reduce differences... 1= Government should not concern itself with such differences

27 New Parallel Question on Labor Market Redistribution General Social Survey (GSS), 2014; Swedish ISSP, 2014 TESS, 2015 Some people think that major companies ought to reduce pay differences between employees with high pay and those with low pay, perhaps by reducing the pay of executives or by increasing the pay of unskilled workers. Others think that major companies should not concern themselves with reducing this pay difference What comes closest to the way you feel? 7= Major companies should do something to reduce differences... 1= Major companies should not concern themselves with such differences

28 Comparing Support for Different Kinds of Redistribution (GSS and ISSP, 2014; TESS control group, 2015) US Sweden Diff Government Responsible: 47% 67% 20 pts (top 3 of 7 categories) (TESS: 45%) Major Companies Responsible: 56% 58% 2 pts (top 3 of 7 categories) (TESS: 51%) Government or Major Companies Responsible: 66% 75% 9 pts (top 3 of 7 categories) (TESS: 61%) Government Cap Executive Pay: 35% 50% 15 pts (top 3 of 7 categories)

29 Comparing Support for Different Kinds of Redistribution (GSS, 2014; by Party Identification) Percent# 100# 90# 80# 70# 60# 50# 40# 30# 20# 10# 0# 24# Gov,#GSS,#'14# Support#for#government#and#business#to#reduce#income/pay#differences#(%)#!!!!!!!Republicans!!!!!Independents!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Democrats############ # 42# Bus,#GSS,#'14# Gov,#GSS,#'14# 50# 52# Bus,#GSS,#'14# 62# Gov,#GSS,#'14# 68# Bus,#GSS,#'14#

30 Comparing Support for Different Kinds of Redistribution (GSS, 2014; by Race/Ethnicity) Percent# 100# 90# 80# 70# 60# 50# 40# 30# 20# 10# 0# Support#for#government#and#business#to#reduce#income/pay#differences#(%)#!!!!!!!Whites!!!!!!!!!!Blacks!!!!!!!!!!La.no/as!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Others############ # 41# 56# Gov,#GSS,#'14# Bus,#GSS,#'14# 64# Gov,#GSS,#'14# Bus,#GSS,#'14# 53# 51# 57# Gov,#GSS,#'14# Bus,#GSS,#'14# 53# 67# Gov,#GSS,#'14# Bus,#GSS,#'14#

31 Treatment Effects on Preferences for LM Redistribution (TESS, 2015) Outcome: Major Companies Responsible (OLS of 7-point scale; 7=Major companies are responsible; All respondents) Model 1 Model 2 Treatment 0.395** (0.105) 0.184# (0.105) Structural Factors 0.518** (0.068) Individual Factors ** (0.084) Constant ** (0.076) ** (0.465) R RMSE N=1,518 # p <=.10; * p <=.05; ** p <=.01

32 Treatment Effects on Preferences for Govt. Redistribution (TESS, 2015) Outcome: Government Responsible (OLS of 7-point scale; 7=Government is responsible; All respondents, N=1,518) Model 1 Model 2 Treatment 0.441** (0.120) 0.205# (0.121) Structural Factors 0.534** (0.077) Individual Factors ** (0.090) Constant ** (0.086) ** (0.495) R RMSE N=1,518 # p <=.10; * p <=.05; ** p <=.01

33 New Forced-Choice Question on Agents of Redistribution (TESS control group, 2015) 60# 50# Which#of#the#following#groups#has#the#greatest#responsibility#for#reducing## ##differences#in#income#between#those#with#high#and#low#incomes?#(%)#!!!!!republicans!(2014!gss:!33%)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!democrats!(2014!gss:!46%!share) ############ # Percent# 40# 30# 29# 27# 33# 34# 20# 10# 0# 19# Don't#Reduce# Low#Income#Ind# 4# 7# 14# Chari?es# High#Income#Ind# Government# Major#Companies# 8# 11# 1# Don't#Reduce# Low#Income#Ind# Chari?es# 13# High#Income#Ind# Government# Major#Companies#

34 Treatment Effects on Preferences for LM Redistribution (TESS, 2015) Outcome: Major Companies Most Responsible (Average marginal effects from logistic regression; All respondents) Model 1 Model 2 Treatment 0.055* (0.026) 0.047# (0.027) Structural Factors 0.037* (0.015) Individual Factors (0.019) R Mean N=1,518 # p <=.10; * p <=.05; ** p <=.01

35 Treatment Effects on Preferences for Govt. Redistribution (TESS, 2015) Outcome: Government Most Responsible (Average marginal effects from logistic regression; All respondents) Model 1 Model 2 Treatment 0.060* (0.025) (0.026) Structural Factors 0.047** (0.016) Individual Factors ** (0.016) R Mean N=1,518 # p <=.10; * p <=.05; ** p <=.01

36 PART III: Political Representation

37 Policy Preference Gaps Between Elites and the Public Page, Bartels, and Seawright (Perspectives on Politics 2013).

38 Preferences Gaps by Class for Govt. Redistribution are Wide McCall and Manza (Oxford Handbook 2011).

39 Preferences Gaps by Class for Govt. Spending are Narrower McCall and Manza (Oxford Handbook 2011).

40 Unequal Representation (Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014)

41 Challenges: Coincidental Representation P. Enns (Perspectives on Politics 2015).

42 Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien (2015). Disagreement on only 10% of policies (top and middle preferences correlate at r=.78).

43 Effect of Inequality on Voter Turnout in the U.S. States R. Solt (Political Behavior 2010).

44 Endogeneity of Individual Political Decision Making PUBLIC --VOTER Individual Policy Preferences Aggregate Policy Preferences Party Identification Turnout Vote Choice Effect of class status on political outcomes increases. POLITICAL ELITES --PARTY --CANDIDATES --INCUMBENT GOVT. Individual Policy Platform Aggregate Left-Right Orientation Position in Electoral Institutions Track Record ( changeability ) èinformation

45 Conclusions and Questions No elite discourse to match public preferences. Economic inequality is a relatively new economic and political issue and political-economic discourses and solutions are still fragmented (e.g., Trump AND Sanders). Civil rights model of redistribution could fill that void. Focus on equalizing outcomes in order to equalize opportunities, in education and in the labor market. Are public preferences viable? For instance, via government regulation of business or norms to alter pay setting practices (Atkinson 2015), as well as a social investment model of the welfare state, which prioritizes access to human capital development rather than redistributive transfers.