On the Cutting Edge of Globalization, Before and After 9/11. James N. Rosenau The George Washington University Washington, DC

Transcription

1 On the Cutting Edge of Globalization, Before and After 9/11 James N. Rosenau The George Washington University Washington, DC David C. Earnest The George Washington University Washington, DC This paper is prepared for delivery at the 2004 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 18, 2004, Montreal, Quebec. Copyright by the International Studies Association. The authors acknowledge the invaluable contributions of Yale Ferguson and Ole Holsti; this paper is a product of their efforts as much as it is of ours. We also wish to thank a number of individuals for their assistance during this project. Dawn L. Moncrief and Sally Montague did most of the work in compiling the sample, processing the mailed questionnaire, and coding of the returned surveys. Without their efforts this project would never have been completed. William J. Kiamie, Einat Erlanger, and Christiane Busche also provided valuable help in coding the data. We are also grateful for the support of the Vice President of Academic Affairs at The George Washington University, the Research Council of Duke University, and the Center for Global Change and Governance at Rutgers University-Newark.

2 Rosenau and Earnest 1 Although there is extensive literature on the financial, technological, sociological and political processes that collectively constitute globalization, little is known about the elites who undertake, support, and sustain the boundary-spanning activities that constitute globalization. Complex as global processes are, elites participate in and perpetuate them: public officials frame policy choices about international relations for popular debate, and often balance the conflicting pressures of globalization and antiglobal sentiment; corporate executives sell products, develop markets, and transfer capital across sovereign borders with less regulation today than even a decade ago; technologists facilitate the digitization of knowledge and the nearly instantaneous communication of ideas, information, and property around the globe; pundits, celebrities, academics, and artists express support for or opposition to international issues in everexpanding media that facilitate public debate on a worldwide scale. And much the same can be said about the participation of ordinary folk: consumers purchase imported goods; immigrants bring new cultures, values and ideas; citizens protest against various aspects of globalization. To repeat, however, we know little about the relationship between the participation of elites in global processes and their orientations toward globalization as a present-day phenomenon. Are those who are most involved in globalization more likely to view it favorably? How does life on the cutting edge of globalization affect an individual s political behavior or orientations? Do Cutting-Edgers, as we choose to call the elites who are most involved in global processes, form coordinated networks, or do they mostly sustain global processes in individualistic ways? Does their participation in globalizing processes change their orientations toward their countries of citizenship or the world at large? Most importantly, does their participation in globalization affect their attitudes toward international relations and foreign policy? Answers to these questions have important theoretical implications. Most notably, they serve to clarify the underpinnings and durability of globalizing processes and the potential of the antiglobalization movement. Surprisingly, there has been little empirical effort to answer such questions. Systematic knowledge about elites on the cutting edge of globalization is extremely scarce. Two studies with which we are familiar sampled only elites from the business community and focused on economic issues, rather than looking at a broader population of elites or a variety of global issues. 1 Hence in November 1999 we undertook a project in which we sought to explore the role of American elites in, and their orientations toward, the broader processes, issues and orientations that we regard as 1 See Inside the Mind of the CEO: The 2000 Global Survey Report ( January 2000); and Leslie Sklair, Who Are the Globalisers? A Study of Key Globalisers in Australia, Journal of Australian Political Economy, 38 (December 1996).

3 Rosenau and Earnest 2 comprising globalization. The 9/11 terrorist attacks led us to distribute a nearly identical survey in January of Both administrations of the survey used a sample drawn from elites in the 1999 CD-ROM edition of Who s Who in America. In November 1999 we mailed surveys to 3,338 individuals, 889, or 27 percent, of whom returned our surveys. In January 2003, we mailed a revised version of the survey to the same individuals, though subject mortality reduced the total mailing to 2,924. In response to this second administration of the survey we received 830 completed questionnaires (28 percent). Since we asked subjects to respond anonymously, we could not conduct a panel study. 3 Given the large total number of surveys (1,719) and the random selection of subjects in 1999, however, we are confident that our findings in aggregate are reasonably representative of American elite opinions. Here we report on those aspects of our inquiry that involved changes in the behaviors and orientations of American elites between 1999 and We hypothesize that three developments between 1999 and 2003 may have changed the attitudes of American elites toward globalization. Most obviously, we speculate that the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terror is likely to have changed American elites perspectives on U.S. foreign policy and the merits of globalization. Second, the growing cohesion of anti-globalization protestors who first came together to articulate their opposition during Battle of Seattle at the World Trade Organization meetings in November, 1999 suggests that the anti-globalization movement now is well-organized and a more-or-less permanent feature of global politics. We hypothesize that the institutionalization of this movement may have altered or perhaps transformed the ways in which American elites assess the virtues and defects of globalization. Finally, between 1999 and 2003 the global economy experienced a downturn, which we speculate may have caused not just elites, but all citizens, to reconsider whether or not globalization is a good idea. Needless to say, these three developments are related, such that changes in elite orientations induced by 9/11 may reinforce the effects of the Battle of Seattle or the economic downswing. For these reasons, our interpretations of changes in the response patterns we have observed are necessarily tentative. We did include in the 2003 survey, however, questions that directly addressed the attitudes of the respondents toward the terrorist attacks, the global economy, and the anti-globalization movement, thus enhancing our confidence in the inferences set forth below. Generalizing beyond these three developments, we speculate that elites are likely to have viewed the world as a more threatening place in 2003 than they did in In addition to a preoccupation with the ever-present threat posed by terrorism, the lag in many national economies, and the agitation of anti-globalization protestors, other issues during this period arguably affected how Americans viewed the world including the 2 The two versions of the survey have 138 questions in common. The 2003 version included four new questions that accounted for changes in world politics in the intervening 39 months, one question was modified, and eight were dropped. 3 Over a quarter of the respondents in 2003 indicated, however, that they had received, completed and returned the questionnaire in While we have no way to identify specific respondents for panel tests, we are nevertheless confident that we have surveyed number of individuals twice.

4 Rosenau and Earnest 3 intensification of Israeli-Palestinian violence, the growing likelihood of military action in Iraq, the war on the Taliban and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the introduction of nuclear weapons into Indo-Pakistani tensions over Kashmir, the continuing spread of AIDS in Africa, corrupt business practices in the United States, and President Bush s identification of an axis of evil. These are only some of the developments that may have cumulatively deepened insecurities among Americans during the 39 months between our two administrations of the survey. One question in the survey indicates these anxieties. We asked respondents in 1999 and again in 2003 the degree to which they felt globalization was a threat to your well being. Significantly more respondents in 2003 indicated that globalization was a moderate to substantial threat than in 1999 (see Table 1), 4 thus affirming our expectation of uncovering significant differences between 1999 and 2003 in the respondents behaviors and orientations toward globalization. Since we look exclusively at American elites, we acknowledge that our findings do not speak to the question of whether or not globalization is merely just Americanization. There may be good reasons to suspect, for example, that elites in other countries may have orientations toward globalization that differ from their American counterparts. Our survey results are an important first step, nevertheless, in understanding whether or not an individual s participation in globalization affects his or her orientation toward international and global affairs. The Economic Downswing Has the economic downswing in the last three years affected American elites orientations toward globalization? We hypothesized that elites were likely to respond to the worsening economic climate in two ways. On the one hand, American elites could have become pessimistic about the benefits of global free trade and become more protectionist what might be called a skeptical orientation. Conversely, however, elites could have perceived an increasingly important role for international institutions in the management of the global economy. In other words, our respondents may have Table 1: Orientations toward globalization as a threat to the respondent s well being To what extent do you consider [globalization] a threat to your well-being? Year (n) substantial threat % (n) moderate threat % (n) mild threat % (n) not a threat at all % (n) not sure % (n) Pearson chisquare value 1999 (847) 4 (36) 6 (52) 17 (158) 68 (578) 3 (23) df = 4; χ 2 = (784) 5 (40) 16 (122) 18 (143) 57 (449) 4 (30) p < The abbreviation df in the tables stands for degrees of freedom. 4 For all chi-square tests, we use the most stringent test of significance: p The reported percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

5 Rosenau and Earnest 4 viewed the economic downturn not as a consequence of globalization, but instead as a result of insufficient globalization. If so, they could be expected to exhibit continued support for international economic institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, if not increased support for them. This might be labeled a favorable orientation. Several questions in the survey probe the respondents attitudes toward globalization and economic performance. Two such items offer somewhat contradictory conclusions. First, we asked respondents: On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on... and offered the creation of jobs, economic integration and capitalism as three choices from a menu of eleven options. As is evident from Table 2, a significantly larger number of respondents in 2003 viewed globalization as undermining job creation compared to the 1999 respondents (21 percent in 2003 to 10 percent in 1999). This suggests an increasing skepticism about the economic benefits of globalization among the elites we sampled. Yet there are no significant differences in respondents orientations toward the impact of globalization on economic integration and on capitalism. Similarly, when we asked questions about the global economy, our respondents exhibited no significant change in their orientations. We offered respondents a menu of items to check in response to the question, Which of the following do you regard as essential global issues that need to be addressed in the next decade? Two options are relevant for issues associated with the economic downswing: the stability of the world economy and global governance. It is interesting to note that in both 1999 and 2003 a majority of respondents indicated that the stability of the world economy is an essential global issue, while in both years only a minority indicated that global governance is an essential issue (see Table 3). Most importantly, however, the differences in the orientations of the leaders toward economic stability and global governance over time are not statistically significant. We also asked the respondents to indicate the importance they attach to specific Table 2: Comparison of respondents assessment of the impact of globalization on economic factors, 1999 and 2003 surveys. On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on: Undermining Having No Effect Enhancing Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value the creation 1999 (819) 10 (82) 5 (41) 85 (696) df =2; χ 2 = of jobs? 2003 (773) 21 (164) 8 (61) 71 (548) p < economic 1999 (840) 5 (45) 3 (24) 92 (771) df =2; χ 2 = 8.12 integration? 2003 (779) 9 (69) 2 (17) 89 (693) not significant capitalism? 1999 (831) 7 (59) 7 (61) 86 (711) df =2; χ 2 = (785) 10 (75) 5 (41) 85 (669) not significant

6 Rosenau and Earnest 5 Table 3: Comparison of respondents assessment of global economic issues, 1999 and 2003 surveys. Which of the following do you regard as ESSENTIAL global issues that need to be addressed in the next decade? Checked Did Not Check Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) square value The stability of 1999 (876) 71 (676) 29 (250) df = 1; χ 2 = 9.94 the world economy 2003 (830) 64 (534) 36 (296) not significant global governance 1999 (876) 29 (254) 71 (622) df = 1; χ 2 = (830) 23 (188) 77 (642) not significant international economic institutions. The survey asked How would you rate the role the following can play in world affairs? and included the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund among the response items. Interestingly, as Table 4 shows, the 2003 respondents differed significantly from the 1999 respondents only on the World Bank: elites in 2003 appear to be significantly more skeptical of the importance of the World Bank. The 1999 and 2003 respondents did not differ significantly on the importance of the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund, however. Given the skepticism of 2003 respondents about the impact of globalization on the creation of jobs, these are somewhat surprising nonfindings. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the frame of reference for each question. While the respondents may have viewed the roles of the WTO and IMF as fairly distant from their daily lives, they likely regarded job creation as immediate and personal. Two other survey questions posed questions about the global economy in an Table 4: Comparison of respondents orientations toward international economic institutions, 1999 and 2003 surveys. How would you rate the role the following can play in world affairs? very somewhat not very Unim- not important important important portant sure Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value World 1999 (865) 62 (534) 31 (269) 5 (42) 1 (9) 1 (11) df=4; χ 2 =22.22 Bank 2003 (801) 51 (407) 41 (325) 7 (54) 1 (7) 1 (8) p < WTO 1999 (859) 53 (457) 38 (328) 6 (49) 1 (10) 2 (15) df=4; χ 2 = (795) 47 (373) 43 (339) 8 (62) 1 (9) 2 (12) not significant IMF 1999 (836) 45 (372) 38 (317) 7 (59) 2 (13) 9 (75) df=4; χ 2 = (769) 37 (282) 45 (349) 10 (74) 2 (13) 7 (51) not significant

7 Rosenau and Earnest 6 arguably more personal frame of reference. The survey asked the leaders, To what extent do you consider the following a threat to your well being? and included multinational corporations and gap between rich and poor as two response items. There were no significant differences between the 1999 and 2003 respondents on either item. As indicated in Table 5, in both years about half the respondents considered the rich-poor gap to be a moderate to substantial threat, while only about one-quarter to onethird of respondents considered multinational corporations to be a moderate or substantial threat. These results are surprisingly stable orientations toward the global economy, given the extent to which the U.S. economy suffered through the economic downturn. Our survey also asked, On balance, do you regard the diverse processes of globalization as... and included widening the gap between rich and poor nations and widening the gap between rich and poor individuals as response options. Here too the respondents exhibited no significant changes in orientations between 1999 and On both questions, approximately thirty percent of respondents in each sample indicated that globalization contributes to the gap between rich and poor nations, or rich and poor individuals (Table 6). As with other questions, the elites we surveyed exhibit a surprising stability of orientations despite the worldwide economic downswing. Likewise, we found no significant change in the orientations of the respondents toward free trade. We asked, How would you describe your views on trade issues? and offered four responses: pro-free trade, selectively protectionist, protectionist, and not sure. As Table 7 shows, there is no significant change in the responses of the 2003 respondents relative to those of the 1999 respondents. In sum, the leaders exhibited surprisingly little change in their orientations toward globalization and the economy in spite of the economic downturn in the United States and elsewhere. They consistently rate the management of the global economy as an essential global issue, but do not view globalization as undermining economic integration or capitalism. Likewise, their orientations toward most international economic institutions did not change significantly in the four years between surveys. Their Table 5: Comparison of respondents perceptions of threats to their well being from economic factors, 1999 and 2003 surveys. To what extent do you consider the following a threat to your well being? substant- moderate mild not a threat not ial threat threat threat at all sure Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value multinational corporations 1999 (851) 8 (70) 16 (134) 26 (223) 49 (413) 1 (11) df = 4; χ 2 = (790) 11 (83) 20 (157) 23 (185) 44 (350) 2 (15) not significant gap between rich and poor 1999 (858) 25 (217) 25 (216) 27 (228) 21 (183) 2 (14) df = 4; χ 2 = (807) 27 (214) 26 (206) 27 (219) 19 (155) 2 (13) not significant

8 Rosenau and Earnest 7 Table 6: Comparison of respondents assessments of the impact of globalization on poverty, 1999 and 2003 surveys. On balance, do you regard the diverse processes of globalization as... Checked Did Not Check Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) square value Widening the gap between 1999 (868) 28 (247) 72 (621) df = 1; χ 2 = 1.05 rich and poor nations 2003 (830) 31 (255) 69 (575) not significant Widening the gap between 1999 (868) 30 (260) 70 (608) df = 1; χ 2 = 0.77 rich and poor individuals 2003 (830) 32 (265) 68 (565) not significant attitudes about the gap between rich and poor nations or individuals also remained unchanged even as the global economy bordered on a recession. All these findings suggest that American elites remain consistently supportive of global economic integration despite the state of the economy. On only two issues did we uncover a significant shift in the respondents opinions: they were more concerned in 2003 about the impact of globalization on job creation than they were in 1999, and they viewed the World Bank as less important to world affairs in 2003 than they did in Conceivably the source of these changes was not the economic downswing, but the growing influence of anti-globalization protestors. The Anti-Globalization Movement Between 1999 and 2003, the anti-globalization movement arguably improved in its organization and capacities. Whereas the protestors during the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle in November 1999 were fairly disorganized, in the intervening years protestors have become a fixture at annual World Bank and IMF meetings as well as at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. As the protests have become institutionalized, however, protestors have focused on an increasingly broad range of issues related to globalization. In January 2004, for example, demonstrators in Davos focused not only on global economic issues but also on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear disarmament, and caste and gender discrimination questions (see Rai 2004). One consequence is that proponents and opponents of Table 7: Comparison of respondents orientation toward free trade, 1999 and 2003 surveys. How would you describe your views on trade issues? Pro-free Selectively trade Protectionist Protectionist Not Sure Pearson chi- Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value 1999 (856) 67 (574) 27 (231) 2 (14) 4 (37) df = 3; χ 2 = (792) 61 (484) 33 (262) 3 (22) 3 (24) not significant

9 Rosenau and Earnest 8 globalization not only regularly debate the merits and shortcomings of globalization, but also do so in an encyclopedic lexicon that includes economic, cultural, ethnic, human rights and ecological dimensions. Has this regularized and periodic contention over the consequences of globalization affected how American elites assess its merits? While we cannot say definitively that the anti-globalization movement has influenced elite opinion in the United States, we can say that in 2003 more leaders exhibited the concerns of antiglobalization activists than did their counterparts in Though our results are somewhat contradictory, we discern some interesting trends in elite opinion. As can be seen in Table 8, we found no difference in the elites orientations toward the effects of globalization on political behavior. We asked respondents On balance, do you regard the diverse processes of globalization as... and included making people more selfish among a menu of options. The 2003 respondents did not differ significantly from their 1999 counterparts on whether or not globalization sharpens the skills of individuals and sensitizes people to other cultures. A majority in both years responded positively to these alternatives, while only 12 to 14 percent indicated they regarded globalization as fostering political apathy. There were no significant changes in orientations on these issues, furthermore, between 1999 and 2003 (see Table 8). These findings suggest points of agreement and disagreement with the messages of the anti-globalization movement. While some leaders exhibited a concern that globalization makes individuals selfish, this view is held only be a minority of the respondents. A majority of the respondents expressed considerably more optimistic assessments of the benefits of globalization for individual responsibility. We conclude that overall our respondents were positively inclined toward the empowering and beneficial effects of globalization. The leaders also displayed a significantly greater concern for a number of issues Table 8: Comparison of respondents orientations toward globalization and political behavior, 1999 and 2003 surveys. On balance, do you regard the diverse processes of globalization as... Checked Did Not Check Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) square value making people 1999 (867) 12 (103) 88 (764) df = 1; χ 2 = 9.38 more selfish? 2003 (830) 17 (142) 83 (688) not significant sharpening the skills 1999 (867) 70 (606) 30 (262) df = 1; χ 2 = 6.28 of individuals? 2003 (830) 64 (532) 36 (298) not significant fostering political 1999 (867) 12 (104) 88 (764) df = 1; χ 2 = 1.17 apathy? 2003 (830) 14 (114) 86 (716) not significant sensitizing people to 1999 (867) 80 (695) 20 (173) df = 1; χ 2 = 6.13 other cultures? 2003 (830) 75 (623) 25 (207) not significant

10 Rosenau and Earnest 9 raised by the anti-globalization movement. We asked, On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on... and offered a menu of options including local communities, human rights, political democracy, cultural diversity, ecological sensitivities and ethnic identities. For each response item the respondent could indicate globalization was undermining it, enhancing it, or having no effect. In 2003, a significantly larger number of elites indicated that globalization undermines local communities, political democracy and ecological sensitivities than they did in 1999 (Table 9). Curiously, however, the 2003 respondents do not differ significantly from their 1999 counterparts on the impact of globalization on human rights, cultural diversity or ethnic identity. It is striking that American elites in 2003 shared many of the concerns held by anti-globalization protestors about globalization s effect on localities, democracy and the ecosystem. This suggests a plausible inference that the increasingly coherent anti-globalization message is finding an audience even among American elites. Whether or not elites give specific credence to the criticisms of the antiglobalization movement is a question for future research. It is important to note that the attitudes of the elites we sampled diverge in important ways from those expressed by elements of the anti-globalization movement. As is also evident in Table 9, the elites we surveyed did not exhibit any significant change in the orientations toward the effects of globalization on ethnic identities, human rights or cultural diversity. In fact, their attitudes appear to be moving in a direction opposite of those held by anti-globalization protestors. Rather than viewing ethnic Table 9: Comparison of respondents assessment of the impact of globalization on social, cultural, political and economic factors, 1999 and 2003 surveys. On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on: Undermining Having No Effect Enhancing Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value local 1999 (826) 26 (213) 25 (210) 49 (403) df = 2; χ 2 = communities 2003 (778) 32 (256) 27 (211) 40 (311) p = human 1999 (840) 8 (66) 6 (51) 86 (723) df = 2; χ 2 = 8.09 rights 2003 (796) 12 (96) 6 (46) 82 (654) not significant political 1999 (831) 9 (75) 7 (58) 84 (698) df = 2; χ 2 = democracy 2003 (780) 16 (121) 9 (72) 75 (587) p < cultural 1999 (832) 20 (164) 6 (46) 75 (622) df = 2; χ 2 = 1.14 diversity 2003 (784) 21 (168) 5 (37) 74 (579) not significant ecological 1999 (825) 17 (144) 14 (119) 68 (562) df = 2; χ 2 = sensitivities 2003 (775) 27 (211) 12 (93) 60 (471) p < ethnic 1999 (818) 42 (346) 16 (134) 41 (338) df = 2; χ 2 = 0.05 identities 2003 (769) 42 (322) 16 (125) 42 (322) not significant

11 Rosenau and Earnest 10 conflict as an increasingly important issue, significantly fewer of the elites in 2003 indicated ethnic conflict as an essential global issue than did in the 1999 administration of the survey (Table 10). The standard of living in less developed nations also was less important to our 2003 respondents than to our 1999 respondents. We asked subjects to attach a degree of importance ( very, moderately, slightly, or not at all ) to helping to improve the standard of living in less developed nations as a possible goal of United States foreign policy. As Table 11 reveals, in 2003 significantly fewer respondents indicated development was very or moderately important than they did in These findings suggest that American elites share some of the concerns about globalization that protesters have articulated but not others. It is intriguing to note that anti-globalization activists have expressed concerns about the democratic deficit, the impact of global markets on local communities, and ecological degradation, traces of which we found in our data. While we are tempted to attribute these changes in elite orientations to the persistent and organized protests of anti-globalization activists, there are nevertheless important differences between elite orientations and the message of the anti-globalization movement. An important area for future research therefore is, first, whether or not the orientations of American elites are changing in response to the message of the anti-globalization movement and, second, why American elites appear to share some criticisms of globalization with the movement but not others. September 11 th It is no surprise that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a profound impact on the sense of personal security expressed by the leaders. We asked them, To what extent do you consider the following a threat to your well being? to which they could indicate whether the option was a substantial, moderate, mild threat or not a threat at all. Three items relevant to the terrorist attacks uncovered significant changes in their orientations. Significantly more respondents in 2003 indicated that they considered certain individuals to be a moderate or substantial threat to their well being, in all Table 10: Comparison of respondents assessment of ethnic conflict, 1999 and 2003 surveys. Which of the following do you regard as ESSENTIAL global issues that need to be addressed in the next decade? Checked Did Not Check Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) square value ethnic conflict 1999 (876) 76 (664) 24 (212) df = 1; χ 2 = (830) 67 (556) 33 (274) p < 0.001

12 Rosenau and Earnest 11 Table 11: Comparison of respondents orientation to the improvement of standards of living as a goal of U.S. foreign policy, 1999 and 2003 surveys. Turning to more general considerations, here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal. Importance Not Very Moderately Slightly Not at all sure Pearson chioption year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries 1999 (873) 44 (387) 38 (335) 15 (129) 3 (22) 0 (0) df = 4 χ 2 = (803) 35 (282) 35 (285) 25 (203) 4 (31) 0.25 (2) p < likelihood a reflection of the association of Osama bin Laden with the 9/11 hijackers. 5 Likewise, significantly more respondents in 2003 indicated that they perceived certain countries as a threat, perhaps reflecting the public debate in the United States at the time of the survey two months before the war in Iraq. Most striking is the respondents perception of terrorist groups as a threat: 88 percent of respondents in 2003 considered terrorist groups a moderate or substantial threat, a significantly greater proportion than the 72 percent who answered similarly in 1999 (Table 12). Given the psychological impact of the terror attacks as well as the growing crisis in Iraq when we administered the survey in January 2003, one might expect that the leaders would exhibit a significant increase in their perception of all threats, not merely those posed by terrorist groups or individuals. Yet, our results show that our respondents did not necessarily exhibit an across-the-board increase in their sense of insecurity. While the 2003 respondents did feel significantly more threatened by globalization, they exhibited no significant changes from 1999 on questions of social movements, professional competitors, multinational corporations, the gap between rich and poor, or nationalism (see Table 12). Rather than a wholesale change in perceptions then, we infer that the terrorist attacks and the crisis in Iraq had a fairly narrow, issue-related impact on the orientations of our respondents. As highlighted by the disagreement between the United States and its allies over policy toward Iraq, the September 11 th attacks may also mark the beginning of a unilateralist U.S. foreign policy. Did the attacks alter elites perceptions of how the United States should participate in the management of the international system? Several survey items show significant changes in the respondents orientation toward U.S. foreign policy. We asked our respondents, How would you rate the role the following can play in world affairs? and asked them to rate the United Nations, World Bank, 5 This finding may also reflect the public debate over U.S. policy toward Iraq. At the time of the survey (January 2003) the United States was within two months of going to war with Iraq. Given the Bush Administration s emphasis on Saddam Hussein as a threat to U.S. interests, it is no surprise that our respondents were significantly more likely to consider certain individuals a threat.

13 Rosenau and Earnest 12 Table 12: Comparison of respondents perceptions of different threats to their well being, 1999 and 2003 surveys. To what extent do you consider the following a threat to your well being? Substantial Moderate Mild Not a threat Not threat threat threat at all sure Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value social 1999 (839) 8 (71) 20 (168) 28 (235) 41 (343) 3 (22) df=4; χ 2 = 1.93 movements 2003 (786) 8 (61) 21 (166) 30 (237) 38 (300) 3 (22) not significant professional 1999 (847) 5 (45) 21 (180) 28 (234) 45 (381) 1 (7) df=4; χ 2 = competitors 2003 (790) 5 (38) 17 (135) 35 (277) 42 (335) 1 (5) not significant multinat l 1999 (851) 8 (70) 16 (134) 26 (223) 49 (413) 1 (11) df=4; χ 2 = corps (790) 11 (83) 20 (157) 23 (185) 44 (350) 1 (15) not significant gap between 1999 (858) 25 (217) 25 (216) 27 (228) 21 (183) 2 (14) df=4; χ 2 = 1.24 rich & poor 2003 (807) 27 (214) 26 (206) 27 (219) 19 (155) 2 (13) not significant certain 1999 (832) 14 (118) 20 (166) 31 (259) 29 (241) 6 (48) df=4; χ 2 = individuals 2003 (783) 25 (196) 22 (176) 26 (201) 21 (164) 6 (46) p < certain 1999 (845) 19 (162) 32 (268) 29 (248) 17 (143) 3 (24) df=4; χ 2 = countries 2003 (790) 41 (321) 32 (253) 18 (143) 7 (57) 2 (16) p < terrorist 1999 (863) 41 (356) 31 (267) 23 (201) 4 (37) 1 (2) df=4; χ 2 = groups 2003 (808) 68 (546) 20 (165) 10 (81) 2 (13) 1 (3) p < nationalism 1999 (850) 11 (94) 25 (210) 32 (271) 30 (252) 3 (23) df=4; χ 2 = (785) 11 (86) 32 (252) 27 (213) 27 (210) 3 (24) not significant WTO, Amnesty International, the IMF, NATO, the European Union, and the United States. The respondents could indicate that each institution was very important, somewhat important, not very important, or unimportant. The results presented in Table 13 show little change in the orientations of the 2003 respondents compared to those in Only one item shows significant change: the 2003 respondents viewed the World Bank as less important than their 1999 counterparts did, a finding that may have been fostered by the protests against the Bank. Interestingly, the data reveal that in January 2003, as the Bush Administration was considering unilateral military action in Iraq, the elites we surveyed did not exhibit any growing support for a unilateral American foreign policy. Just the opposite: their support for the United Nations was as strong in 2003 as it was in Though the United States went to war with Iraq outside of the United Nations framework, we found no evidence of support for such an action in the orientations of the elite sample. Of course, while elites may have favored multilateralism as a principle, their orientations toward specific goals of U.S. foreign policy may have changed in response to

14 Rosenau and Earnest 13 Table 13: Comparison of respondents orientations toward international actors, 1999 and 2003 surveys How would you rate the role the following can play in world affairs? very somewhat not very unimpimportant important important ortant not sure Pearson chi- Option Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value UN 1999 (870) 50 (439) 36 (312) 11 (92) 3 (23) 1 (4) df=4; χ 2 = (808) 58 (472) 27 (221) 10 (80) 4 (30) 1 (5) not significant World 1999 (865) 62 (534) 31 (269) 5 (42) 1 (9) 1 (11) df=4; χ 2 =22.22 Bank 2003 (801) 51 (407) 41 (325) 7 (54) 1 (7) 1 (8) Pr < WTO 1999 (859) 53 (457) 38 (328) 6 (49) 1 (10) 2 (15) df=4; χ 2 = (795) 47 (373) 43 (339) 8 (62) 1 (9) 2 (12) not significant Amnesty 1999 (858) 19 (165) 38 (329) 28 (238) 9 (81) 5 (45) df=4; χ 2 =7.30 Intl 2003 (793) 21 (169) 34 (266) 31 (244) 11 (84) 4 (30) not significant IMF 1999 (836) 45 (372) 38 (317) 7 (59) 2 (13) 9 (75) df=4; χ 2 = (769) 37 (282) 45 (349) 10 (74) 2 (13) 7 (51) not significant NATO 1999 (856) 46 (394) 42 (363) 9 (74) 2 (14) 1 (11) df=4; χ 2 = (797) 43 (340) 44 (354) 11 (87) 1 (7) 1 (9) not significant EU 1999 (859) 53 (456) 38 (328) 5 (44) 1 (8) 3 (23) df=4; χ 2 = (793) 52 (414) 39 (307) 7 (52) 91 1 (11) not significant United 1999 (871) 82 (715) 17 (146) 1 (6) 1 (1) 1 (3) df=4; χ 2 =10.55 States 2003 (808) 87 (706) 11 (91) 1 (7) 1 (1) 1 (3) not significant the 9/11 attacks. Our survey probed the orientations of respondents with a question: Turning to more general considerations, here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal. The respondents could indicate a given goal was very, moderately, slightly important, or not at all important. We included in the 2003 survey three possible goals of U.S. foreign policy that were listed in the 1999 survey: combating world hunger, strengthening the United Nations, and helping to improve the standard of living in less developed nations. On only one of these the improvement of standards of living did the respondents exhibit a significant change in orientation in 2003: only 35 percent indicated this goal was very important, compared to 44 percent in 1999 (see Table 14). Since this change in orientation is more likely a result of the economic downturn in the global economy than the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we find no evidence that the attacks affected our elites orientations toward U.S. foreign policy goals. While we found considerable evidence that the terrorist attacks changed our respondents perceptions of their personal safety, the respondents orientations exhibited a degree of consistency from 1999 to 2003 that belies the psychological impact of the attacks. When we surveyed them in January 2003, American elites remained committed to multilateral management of the international system and continued to view the United Nations and other international organizations as very important. Of course, elite

15 Rosenau and Earnest 14 Table 14: Comparison of respondents orientation to possible goals of U.S. foreign policy, 1999 and 2003 surveys. Turning to more general considerations, here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal. Importance very moderately slightly not at all not sure Pearson chioption Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value combatting 1999 (869) 58 (505) 27 (235) 12 (106) 3 (23) 0 (0) df = 4; χ 2 = 4.45 world hunger 2003 (808) 55 (442) 31 (250) 12 (97) 2 (18) 1 (1) not significant strengthening 1999 (871) 30 (259) 38 (334) 19 (168) 12 (105) 1 (5) df = 4; χ 2 = the UN 2003 (798) 34 (274) 31 (245) 19 (153) 15 (116) 1 (10) not significant Helping to improve the standards of living in less developed countries 1999 (873) 44 (387) 38 (335) 15 (129) 3 (22) 0 (0) df = 4; χ 2 = (803) 35 (282) 35 (285) 25 (203) 4 (31) 0.25 (2) p < orientations may have changed during or after the war in Iraq in Our findings about the impact of 9/11 suggest, however, that future research may find an impressive degree of stability in the foreign-policy orientations of American elites. Does Participation in Globalization Matter? No doubt our sample of American elites include many who travel abroad several times a year, who interact frequently with professional colleagues in other countries, and who routinely engage in and sustain the myriad processes of globalization. Our sample may have included, however, some elites who participate infrequently in global processes. Does the participation (or nonparticipation) of elites in globalization affect how they view U.S. foreign policy or the merits of globalization? There are good reasons to suspect that globalization transforms elite attitudes and orientations. We have already noted that, each time we administered the survey, a majority of the respondents indicated they believe globalization makes individuals more selfish, more skillful, and more sensitive to other cultures (Table 8). On the other hand, our surveys may also suffer from selection bias: those elites who participate broadly and regularly in global processes are arguably more likely to respond than those who engage only minimally in borderspanning activities. For both substantive and methodological reasons, therefore, we sought to measure participation in global processes as a possible factor in elite orientations toward the merits of globalization. We developed an index of each respondent s involvement in global processes using 23 survey questions about their self-perceptions of their participation in global processes, their travel abroad, experiences living abroad, interactions with professional

16 Rosenau and Earnest 15 colleagues overseas, and facility with languages other than English (see Appendix A). Factor analysis led us to drop eight items that loaded negatively on the factor (Appendix B), giving us a 15-point index of high reliability (α = ). Using this Index of Involvement, we designated the 354 respondents who scored in the top quartile of the index the Cutting-Edgers, while labeling the remaining 952 respondents as the Other Leaders. We anticipated that by virtue of their participation in global activities, the Cutting-Edgers were likely to have reported considerably different orientations toward globalization than the Other Leaders did. Earlier we argued that elite orientations toward the global economy did not change significantly between 1999 and 2003 despite the economic downturn in the United States and elsewhere. We found no significant changes in attitudes toward capitalism, economic integration, management of the international economy, free trade, the rich-poor gap, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. We found only two significant changes in elite orientations: toward the impact of globalization on job creation, and the role the World Bank can play in global affairs. Do Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders diverge in their orientation toward questions about the global economy? The results in Tables 15 and 16 illustrate of the utility of measuring the respondents involvement in global processes. On the question of the impact of globalization on job creation, the Cutting-Edgers did not exhibit any significant change between 1999 and By contrast, in 2003 significantly more of the Other Leaders responded that globalization undermines job creation than they did in Responses to the question about the role of the World Bank in global affairs exhibit a surprising converse effect: while Other Leaders orientations did not change from 1999 to 2003, Cutting-Edgers were significantly more skeptical about the role of the World Bank in 1999 than they were in 2003 (see Table 16). This suggests that those less involved in global processes drove the observed changes in attitudes on the job creation question, Table 15: Comparison of cutting-edgers and other leaders assessment of the impact of globalization on job creation, 1999 and 2003 surveys. On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on: Undermining Having No Effect Enhancing Pearson chi- Option Group Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value the creation Cutting (819) 6 (10) of jobs? Edgers 2003 (773) 15 (22) 94 (167) df = 1; χ2 = (127) not significant Other 1999 (529) 11 (59) 6 (33) 83 (437) df = 2; χ2 = Leaders 2003 (384) 23 (88) 9 (35) 68 (261) p < Because fewer than five cutting-edger respondents checked the having no effect option in 1999, we dropped that category and calculated the chi-square value only on the enhancing and undermining options.

17 Rosenau and Earnest 16 Table 16: Comparison of respondents orientations toward international economic institutions, 1999 and 2003 surveys. How would you rate the role the following can play in world affairs? very somewhat not very important important important Pearson chi- Option Group Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value World Cutting 1999 (185) 68 (126) 25 (47) 6 (12) df = 2; χ 2 = Bank Edgers 2003 (165) 44 (72) 45 (74) 11 (19) p < Other 1999 (535) 62 (333) 32 (173) 5 (29) df = 2; χ 2 = 7.12 Leaders 2003 (392) 54 (210) 40 (158) 6 (24) not significant Because fewer than five respondents checked the not sure and unimportant categories, we dropped the not sure responses and combined unimportant responses with not very important when calculating the chi-square value. while those more involved in globalization drove the change in orientation toward the World Bank. Such a conclusion is not surprising: those more removed from globalization appear to be more concerned about its local consequences, while those deeply implicated in globalization are more concerned about the performance of international institutions. What may be surprising is that the Cutting-Edgers, not the Other Leaders, appear most receptive to the anti-globalization movement s criticism of the World Bank. Earlier we noted that the elites we surveyed increasingly share some of the concerns articulated by the anti-globalization movement (globalization undermines local communities, political democracy and ecological sensitivity) but not others (human rights, cultural diversity or ethnic identity). Our data suggest that the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders differ in their receptivity to the criticisms of the anti-globalization movement. Although we uncovered an overall increase in the number of respondents who view globalization as undermining local communities, the change arises from the Other Leaders, not the Cutting-Edgers. As Table 17 shows, in percent of the Other Leaders responded that globalization undermines local communities, up from 26 percent in 1999 (compared to 24 percent of the Cutting-Edgers in 1999 and 29 percent in 2003). Likewise, in 2003 significantly more Other Leaders expressed concern about the ecological consequences of globalization (32 percent) than they did in 1999 (17 percent), whereas the 2003 Cutting-Edgers differed from the 1999 Cutting-Edgers by less than three percent. On the impact of globalization on democracy, by contrast, both the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders were not significantly more concerned in 2003 than in 1999, but their responses reflected pronounced tendencies in this direction. The Cutting-Edgers also may be significantly more optimistic about the beneficial effects of globalization. While we found no overall significant differences from 1999 to 2003 in the respondents assessment of whether or not globalization sensitizes people to other cultures, significantly fewer Other Leaders checked this option in 2003 than in 1999 even as Cutting-Edgers exhibited no significant change in orientation during this period (see Table 18).

18 Rosenau and Earnest 17 Table 17: Comparison of Cutting Edgers and Other Leaders assessments of the impact of globalization on social, cultural, political and economic factors, 1999 and 2003 surveys. On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on: Under- Having Enhanmining No Effect cing Pearson chi- Option Group Year (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) square value local Cutting 1999 (182) 24 (43) 23 (42) 53 (97) df = 2; χ 2 = 2.53 commun- Edgers 2003 (161) 29 (46) 27 (43) 45 (72) not significant ities Other 1999 (529) 26 (136) 26 (138) 48 (255) df = 2; χ 2 = Leaders 2003 (384) 34 (132) 28 (108) 38 (144) not significant human Cutting 1999 (187) 7 (14) 7 (13) 86 (160) df = 2; χ 2 = 0.15 rights Edgers 2003 (163) 9 (14) 7 (11) 85 (138) not significant Other 1999 (535) 8 (42) 5 (29) 87 (464) df = 2; χ 2 = 8.45 Leaders 2003 (389) 14 (53) 6 (23) 80 (313) not significant political Cutting 1999 (182) 8 (14) 5 (9) 87 (159) df = 2; χ 2 = 9.55 democ- Edgers 2003 (161) 14 (22) 12 (19) 75 (120) not significant racy Other 1999 (530) 9 (48) 8 (40) 83 (442) df = 2; χ 2 = Leaders 2003 (385) 17 (64) 8 (30) 76 (291) not significant cultural Cutting 1999 (182) 24 (44) 5 (9) 71 (129) df = 2; χ 2 = 0.05 diversity Edgers 2003 (165) 24 (39) 5 (9) 71 (117) not significant Other 1999 (533) 17 (91) 6 (32) 77 (410) df = 2; χ 2 = 5.20 Leaders 2003 (383) 22 (85) 4 (15) 74 (283) not significant ecological Cutting 1999 (180) 21 (37) 12 (21) 68 (122) df = 2; χ 2 = 1.42 sensitiv- Edgers 2003 (160) 23 (37) 15 (24) 62 (99) not significant ities Other 1999 (531) 17 (88) 15 (82) 68 (361) df = 2; χ 2 = Leaders 2003 (381) 32 (120) 10 (39) 58 (222) p < ethnic Cutting 1999 (178) 43 (77) 13 (23) 44 (78) df = 2; χ 2 = 3.24 identities Edgers 2003 (162) 44 (72) 19 (31) 36 (59) not significant Other 1999 (526) 42 (222) 17 (92) 40 (212) df = 2; χ 2 = 0.73 Leaders 2003 (377) 44 (165) 15 (58) 41 (154) not significant All these findings suggest that even among the elites we surveyed, those who participate extensively in globalization tend to be less concerned about its negative effects. The Cutting-Edgers concern about the World Bank notwithstanding, to the degree we find that respondents in 2003 expressed considerably more concern about the consequences of globalization than they did in 1999, these significant changes arise from those respondents who participate less frequently in global processes.