Economic Development. Government. November 2010

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1 Economic Development Government November 2010

2

3 Governments by type

4 De nition (Government) The system used for controlling a country ccambridge Dictionary

5 Role of Government Adam Smith (1755) Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.

6 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures

7 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains

8 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains Public goods

9 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains Public goods national security, non-excludable and (non-)rivalrous

10 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains Public goods national security, non-excludable and (non-)rivalrous Externalities

11 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains Public goods national security, non-excludable and (non-)rivalrous Externalities (Pigouvian) taxes, environmental Kuznets curve, education

12 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains Public goods national security, non-excludable and (non-)rivalrous Externalities Monopolies (Pigouvian) taxes, environmental Kuznets curve, education

13 Role of Government Property rights and coordination failures ownership, side of driving, production chains Public goods national security, non-excludable and (non-)rivalrous Externalities (Pigouvian) taxes, environmental Kuznets curve, education Monopolies Redistribution ( Robin Hood?)

14 Taxation

15 Size of Government Fact (Wagner s Law) The size of government tends to increase as countries become wealthier

16 Rule of Law A public good that does not need (much) taxation E ects the economy in myriad ways e.g. Somalia

17 Rule of Law and Accumulation

18 Rule of Law and Usage

19 Quality of Government Policy and Governance Good policy and good governance Bad policy and good governance Good policy and bad governance Bad policy and bad governance Fact (Failed State) A state in which the government has minimal capacity to pursue policies, or lacks e ective authority over a signi cant part of its internationally recognised teritory.

20 Quality of Government Corruption Kleptocracy Self-preservation

21 Corruption De nition Misuse of public o ce for private gain.

22 Kleptocracy De nition (Kleptocracy or Ruling Thieves) Situation in which government is used to enrich country s rulers. Fact (Roving Bandits vs. Stationary Bandits) Mancur Olson s theory of state.

23 Kleptocracy and Self-Preservation ncreasing the pie (Trujillo s plantations) Self-preservation Example (Mobutu to Rwandan President) told you not to buid any roads... Building roads never did any good. have been in power in Zaire for thirty years, and have never buit one road. Now they are driving down them to get you. Example Russian Czar, ndustialisation and Urbanisation, Crimean War, 1917 Revolution Example Ras Tafari Haile Selassie and popular education

24 Competition in Government Europe vs. China (Zheng He vs. Columbus)

CHAPTER 12 Government

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