When Crime Pays Money and Muscle in Indian Politics. Milan Vaishnav April 7, 2015

Transcription

1 When Crime Pays Money and Muscle in Indian Politics Milan Vaishnav April 7, 2015

2 From jail to bailing out the government

3 An Indian political success story

4 Percentage of Lok Sabha MPs Law-makers & law-breakers MPs with criminal cases MPs with serious cases 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 24% 12% 30% 15% 34% 21% 10% 5% 0% Lok Sabha Election Year Source: ADR

5 A widespread phenomenon Source: Vaishnav (2015)

6 Severity of charges is striking Source: Sastry (2013)

7 A puzzling coexistence

8 Key questions 1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere? 2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records? 3. Why do voters vote for them? 4. What are the resulting policy implications? 5. What are the lessons for democracy and accountability?

9 Preview Vibrant marketplace for criminal politicians exists in India As with any market, there are underlying supply and demand factors at work Existence of market does not mean that policymakers must meekly accept the status quo Have to change incentives, not just information

10 1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere?

11 Criminals in politics not novel

12 Supply of criminals into politics

13 Number of political parties Surge in political competition Source: ECI

14 Number of political parties Congress vote share The end of hegemony Number of parties Congress vote share 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Source: ECI

15 Percent of Hindi-belt MPs Silent revolution Upper/Intermediate Caste Other Backward Classes/Scheduled Caste Source: Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009) Year

16 Source: NCRB Institutional decay

17 Collapse of election finance regime Source: Indian Express

18 Vertical integration

19 Percent of MLAs facing criminal cases Criminals in UP assembly Year Source: India Today

20 2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records?

21 A new dataset

22 Parties as vital gate-keepers Source: Vaishnav (2015)

23 Probability of Winning Election Crime does pay! 25% 22% 20% 15% 10% 7% 5% 0% No Cases At Least One Case Source: Vaishnav (2015)

24 Probability of Winning Election Serious crime seriously pays 30% 25% 25% 20% 19% 15% 10% 7% 5% 0% No cases At least 1 case At least 1 serious case Source: Vaishnav (2015)

25 Average number of electors Growing electorate Year Source: ECI

26 Average Margin of Victory (%) Increasing competitiveness Year Source: ECI

27 Rising expectations

28 The costs of democracy Growing competition Parties want selffinancing candidates Increasingly costly elections Parties motivated by rents Finite party coffers

29 Probability of Winning Election Money talks 30% 25% 26% 20% 15% 12% 10% 5% 0% 1% 1% Bottom quintile 4% 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile Source: Vaishnav (2015)

30 From money to muscle Increasingly costly elections Criminal candidates have access to finance Finite party coffers Party elites prioritize selffinancing candidates Parties motivated by rents

31 Proportion with Criminal Cases The merits of money & muscle 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Source: Vaishnav (2015) 6% Bottom quintile 19% 13% 9% 7% 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile Candidate wealth quintile

32 Probability of Winning Election (%) Moving beyond money Not facing serious cases Facing serious cases 45% 42% 40% 35% 30% 25% 26% 24% 20% 15% 11% 11% 10% 5% 5% 4% 1% 2% 0% 0% Bottom quintile 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile Candidate wealth quintile Source: Vaishnav (2015)

33 3. Why do voters vote for criminal candidates?

34 Why is this man a success story? Anant Singh, three-time member of the Bihar state assembly from Mokama constituency and well-known strongman

35 Criminality as credibility

36 The Bihar case Source: Vaishnav (2015)

37 Chhote Sarkar

38 Mechanisms of credibility Redistribution Willingness and ability to bend rules to skew benefits to co-ethnic base Coercion Ability to use reputation to coerce rivals in context of multi-ethnic competition Social insurance Capability to act as de facto social safety net Politics of dignity Credibility grounded in politics of dignity and self-respect Dispute resolution Enhanced capacity to adjudicate disputes

39 Criminality as credibility - Anant Singh is not a murderer. He merely manages murder (Interview with JD(U) party worker) Source: Vaishnav (2015)

40 Uncovering support for criminal candidates Would you vote for a candidate who delivers benefits to you even if s/he faces serious criminal cases? 26% responded Yes Source: Lok Foundation

41 Detecting social biases Would you be troubled if a [Upper Caste/OBC/SC/other social group] candidate wins the election in your constituency? 38% responded Yes Source: Lok Foundation

42 Criminality & credibility Source: Sircar and Vaishnav (2015)

43 4. What are the resulting policy implications?

44 Paradoxical Indian state

45 Ease of Doing Business ranking Over-bureaucratized South Africa Russia China Brazil India Source: World Bank

46 Russian Federation Canada France United Kingdom Germany United States Italy Brazil China Australia Argentina Turkey Mexico Japan Saudi Arabia South Africa Indonesia India Public employees per 10,000 residents Under-manned Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)

47 Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges Prosecutors Police

48 Rule of law supply chain Laws

49 Outmoded laws Apprentices Act, 1961; Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966; Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986; Children (Pledging of Labour) Act, 1933; Cine-Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981; Cine-Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1981; Cine- Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981; Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948; Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970; Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948; Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986; Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952; Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; Employers' Liability Act, 1938; Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act,1959; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; Factories Act, 1948; Fatal Accidents Act, 1855; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Inter- State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Labour Laws (Exemption from Furnishing Returns and Maintaining Registers by Certain Establishments) Act, 1988; Limestone and Dolomite Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Mica Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1946; Mines Act, 1952; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Personal Injuries (Compensation Insurance) Act, 1963; Plantations Labour Act, 1951; Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976; Trade Unions Act, 1926; Weekly Holidays Act, 1942; Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955; Working Journalists (Fixation of Rates of Wages) Act, 1958; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 Source: Bibek Debroy (n.d.)

50 Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges

51 Pending Cases (Supreme, High, and District/Subordinate Courts) Slow wheels of justice 33,000,000 32,000,000 31,000,000 30,000,000 29,000,000 28,000,000 27,000, Source: Supreme Court of India

52 Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges Prosecutors

53 Politicized prosecutors????? March 2007: CBI files corruption case September 2013: CBI closes case July 2008: SP provides support to UPA December 2012: SP allows FDI retail bill December 2008: CBI withdraws case March 2011: CBI reverses withdrawal Spring 2011: seat-sharing spat for UP elections

54 Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges Prosecutors Police

55 Police shortfalls Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)

56 Opaque political finance Income from known donors Income from other known sources Income from unknown sources Source: ADR

57 Weeding out the rascals Criminal candidates make mockery of rule of law Proposals to disqualify candidates with serious cases Restricting candidate entry could violate the rule of law Hindering democracy to save it?

58 5. What are the lessons for democracy & accountability?

59 Bad politicians & accountability Access to information Ability to punish "bad" politicians Democratic accountability preserved Voters armed with information Provide support for "bad" politicians Success of "partial" accountability

60 The governance election

61 Source: ADR Is sunlight the best disinfectant?

62 The Robin Hood phenomenon

63 Thank