Amsterdam, globalisation and the EU in Group 04

Transcription

1 Amsterdam, globalisation and the EU in 2018 Group 04

2 ABSTRACT To what extent do socio-economic factors, innate demographic traits and subjective national and ideological identification affect people s opinion towards globalisation and European integration in Amsterdam? We explore the impact of socio-economic factors (education, income, employment status), demographic traits (age, gender, ethnicity and religion) and national and ideological identification (political position, trust in political institutions and importance of national identity) on people s attitudes towards social and economic globalisation and European integration as a subsection of this. PAGE 2 OF 65

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction... 4 Theory and Concepts... 6 Conceptualisations... 6 Literature Review... 7 Methodology Report a. The impact of socio-economic factors on public opinion towards European integration and globalisation b. The impact of demographic traits on public opinion towards European integration and globalisation a. The impact of subjective identity on public opinion towards European integration and globalisation Conclusion Bibliography Annexe one Annexe two PAGE 3 OF 65

4 INTRODUCTION The late 20th and early 21st Centuries witnessed a surge in globalisation and sub-/international integration. As the possibility for cultural exchanges expanded and the movement of populations became more commonplace, multiculturalism and new, integrated societies have had a significant impact on public opinion towards this concept. The new cleavages within the populations of Western democracies have led to the rise of opposing political movements: inspired by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), some scholars have embraced cosmopolitanism and liberal values, while others have strongly rejected them and advocated for more hermetic societies. In Europe, the formation and expansion of the European Union resulted in the concept of European integration - a phenomenon unlike anything in the European history and a development that has been greeted with different levels of public enthusiasm. Therefore, to understand this phenomenon better, this research project will aim to explore the opinion of the citizens of Amsterdam - an example of a cosmopolitan city - in order to interpret their attitudes towards European integration and globalisation and establish some of the factors responsible for these. The main concepts relating to European integration and its issues in the modern society have been explored by Hooghe and Marks (2009), where their research expressed the importance of identity within the formation of Eurosceptic parties, and which leads to the influence of identity on the general public opinion, populist party ideology, as well as regional integration of politics and economy. Furthermore, Hooghe and Marks assess the general issues of the general public - economic stability, levels of unemployment - and how this is reflected in strategic competition amongst political parties which benefit populist parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) had previously written of the relationship between sociocultural cleavages and party systems, viewing them as mutually dependent and therefore creating the framework for an analysis on how the territorial and functional dimensions of these cleavages translate into political oppositions and party systems. Lastly, as put forward by Hooghe and Marks (2017) more recently, a new cleavage has surfaced in European society, which is based on the winners and losers of globalisation. This new cleavage can take extreme stances on the issues of globalisation when combined with the lack of change within established parties. Therefore, this cleavage explains the rise of both rightand left-wing parties, as well as green parties. Building upon these main concerns expressed in former research, this paper will explore the public opinion towards globalisation and European integration among the citizens of Amsterdam. PAGE 4 OF 65

5 Considering the aforementioned, the following research was designed and executed in order to answer the following research question: To what extent do socio-economic factors, innate demographic traits and subjective national and ideological identification affect people s opinion towards globalisation and European integration in Amsterdam? Before further explaining the research question, the core conceptualisations necessary for our research are provided. This section is important as it clarifies the key issues discussed throughout this research. In order to achieve effective organisation, the project was conducted through the formation of three different thematic groups, each focusing on their respective aspect mentioned in the research question. The focus of our survey was divided into similarly, into the following sections: socio-economic factors, innate demographic characteristics, and subjective political and national identity of the residents of Amsterdam. The survey, formed collaboratively by the respective thematic groups, therefore allows for a comparison of respondent characteristics with their attitudes towards globalisation and EU integration. This report consists of an introduction to the topic with background information, followed by the conceptualisation of the main concepts discussed. Furthermore, the literature review explains the theoretical framework this research is based on, in addition to the methodology explaining the path to analysis and conclusions. This is followed by the analysis and exploration of thematic subtopics - demographics, identity and socio-economic characteristics. The paper is concluded with a conclusion reflecting upon the findings of the thematic subgroups and the introduced topics previously. The annexe consists of Annex One: Group organisation and student numbers, and Annex Two: the survey in English and in Dutch. PAGE 5 OF 65

6 THEORY AND CONCEPTS Conceptualisations Globalisation and European integration are often seen as synonymous, especially when discussing the European Union. In reality, these concepts complement each other and form a chapter-subchapter relationship when they are analysed. In order to better define the purpose of the report, the concepts of globalisation and European integration have to be defined. Globalisation, according to Hague & Harrop (2016), is understood as a mutual dependency of economies, as well as increased interaction and contact between the majority of the states in the world, which creates mutual understanding between them. As a concept, it also often refers to the attempt to eradicate inequality within and between countries, but the backlash has resulted in a resentment towards Western domination of the international political and economic arena. On the other hand, European integration (Rosamond, 2000:50) can be understood through the theory of neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism, theorised by Ernst B. Haas and Schmitter (Schmitter, 2005), is understood as the dynamic nature of institutions, where the four spillovers - functional, political, geographical, exogenous - cause expansion of integration from one area into another. It was assumed to be an attempt to bring unity to the European states in the post-war period, and therefore presents a technocratic and functionalist approach. Overall, there are seven steps which correlate to the process of the integration of European states, as mentioned by Rosamond (2000:51-52). These seven steps are: 1) Integrate modestly in areas of low politics but ensure these are key strategic economic sectors, 2) create a high authority without the distractions of national interests to oversee the integration process and provide the ability to act as a sponsor of further integration, 3) the integration of particular economic sectors across nations will create functional pressures for integration of related economic sectors, 4) social interests whose loyalty hitherto has been directed towards national forms of authority will begin to perceive a shift in the location of meaningful authority; and will transfer their loyalties and redirect their activities accordingly because they seek the most effective route for the fulfilment of their material interests, 5) deepening economic integration will create the need for further integration will require greater regulatory complexity, 6) political integration is an approximate inevitable side effect of economic integration, 7) it follows that this gradual economic integration accompanied by a degree of supranational institutionalization is an effective route to the creation of a long-term system of peace in Europe. PAGE 6 OF 65

7 Literature review Extensive reading into the current academic literature on public opinion towards European integration and globalisation as a whole finds various factors to be influential. Hobolt (2012) writes that public satisfaction with European Union democracy correlates mainly to individual s knowledge about European institutions, economic satisfaction, personal identification, and trust and support for domestic regimes against their trust and support for the EU. Other factors discussed include the cleavages within gender and ideological and/or political positions. Firstly, the literature referring to the influence of economic factors on globalisation and European integration, and its influence on the attitudes surrounding these concepts will be discussed. Since Rodrick (2002), there has been a growing debate surrounding the tensions between globalisation, democracy, and national sovereignty (interpreted instead by some as exclusive national identity: see for instance Nicoli (2017a)), forming a political trilemma. Rodrick (2002) argues that with this trilemma, all three can never be achieved; global markets without global governance are unsustainable. Therefore, it is not feasible to have both national sovereignty and a global market. Hellwig and Samuels (2007) elaborate further on this government constraint hypothesis, addressing how market integration has had an impact on representative democracy and how open economies influence electoral accountability. Being involved in a world economy weakens connections between economic performance and support for politicians/political regimes which means that voters perceptions and vote-seeking politicians are influenced by the politics of globalisation. This tension has led scholars to postulate that a link exists between economic performance and support for globalisation. Nicoli (2017b) supports this utilitarian understanding of support for globalisation - observing a correlation between economic crisis and a rise of Euroscepticism. On the other hand, several scholars have found contrasting evidence. Kayser (2007) argues that international economic integration (seemingly) influences domestic political processes. Hence, economic, cultural and political systems have been becoming increasingly globalised, establishing that the ideological foundation of the debate between globalists and statists exists in the situations in which political cleavages are becoming less prominent (Zuern and de Wilde 2016). Lobo & Beck (2012) established that in Southern Europe when the EU s responsibility for the national economy is seen to be higher, there is less evidence of economic voting. Burgoon (2009) addresses the benefits of integration and globalisation in light of the danger of autarky. Social policies and international economic policies can help to avoid a rise of support for autarky and autarchy. The higher social protection, the less likely a result of autarky and autarchy is. However, according to Burgoon (2009), capital openness, flows and net migration usually increases the likelihood of party platforms to support net autarky and net nationalist autarchy, but this only applies when social protection is low. PAGE 7 OF 65

8 The importance of identity in forming attitudes towards globalisation and integration cannot be overlooked and is addressed by several scholars. Serricchio et al (2012) argue that the economic crisis did not cause the economy to be a source of Euroscepticism but was increased in the countries that were most affected by the crisis. Instead, he considers national identity and political institutions to be more important. With regards to Euroscepticism, Hooghe and Marks (2009) have identified identity to play a role in the formation of Eurosceptic parties. Identity influences general public opinion, populist parties and regional integration of politics and economy. The general issues of the public, such as economic stability and levels of unemployment are reflected in strategic competition amongst political parties which benefit right-wing populist parties rather than left-wing extremists. A large component of identity, less closely linked to the questions of European integration and globalisation, is party identification. Lipset and Rokken (1967) determined that the relationship between sociocultural cleavages and party systems is mutually dependent and created a framework to efficiently analyse how the territorial and functional dimensions of these cleavages translates into political oppositions and party systems (for example, alliance formation, electoral systems, binary oppositions) within countries. They note the impact that extending suffrage to the working class had on the relationship between cleavages and party systems, and the importance of the relationship between cleavage bases as developed through national revolutions (religion) and industrial revolutions (class, territorial divides). Fligstein et al. (2012), argues that European integration finds support mainly among the socio-economical higher classes and educated populations, presenting a civic view of identity - Euroscepticism relating to not profiting from European integration - and an ethnic view of identity - the fear of losing national sovereignty, lower education and economic hardship. According to Risse (2005), much research exists to refute the notion that shifting loyalties to the EU (either by the logic of consequentialism or appropriateness) and identifying with a European identity can only be achieved when one overcomes their national identity. In other words, one cannot have a national and a European identity. However, Thomas Risse (2014) does not agree with the either-or stance and proposes that a majority of European citizens have developed dual identities, and so identify with both their nation-state and with the European identity. Nowadays, there is an ongoing process of Europeanisation of national-identities. The Europeanisation of national-identities sustains policies at a European level. The Euro Crisis led to an increase in the politicisation of national public spheres and overall its Europeanisation. One element within Rodrik's trilemma is national sovereignty. A debate frequently derived from this involves the tradeoff between sovereignty on a national level and on a European one. Franceschet (1998) writes that Immanuel Kant s cosmopolitan framework of all rational beings PAGE 8 OF 65

9 as part of one moral community anticipates the tension between national sovereignty and transnational integration. However, trust on a national level and on an EU level seem to have a positive relationship. A relation between political trust in national government is reflected in trust with the EU as mentioned by Anderson (1998). The relation between trust in national government and mistrust in the EU as mentioned by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) cannot be observed. Zapryanova and Surzhko-Harnet (2015) discard the presence of such a relationship, arguing that there is no link between individuals levels of supranational identification and their attitudes towards morally contested issues in the national realm. Moreover, the magnitude of such effects appears greater on more controversial issues such as support for LGBT rights. According to Nicoli (2017b) identity issues on a national level contribute to the increasing problem of functional legitimacy. In an era of fiscal integration, the kind of legitimacy required is seen as focused on the redistributive or non-redistributive nature of the function under observation. De Wilde and Raunio (2015) discuss how important decisions about economic policies since the Euro crisis been taken by the European Council even though these are traditionally national decisions. Researchers conclude that we should direct national resources away from prominent matters and should not intervene by using the Early Warning System. The debate regarding opposition to globalisation is also important as much literature refers to the emergence of anti-systemic, populist parties which supposedly embody such anti-globalist sentiment. In particular, the European manifestation of this phenomenon has taken the form of Euroscepticism. According to Hooghe et al (2002), right and left extreme parties are more skeptical toward European integration, and the support between left- and right center parties can be divided into subgroups (such as environment etc.) This was confirmed by the economic crisis in In countries strongly affected by the Eurozone crisis, the link between opposing EU integration and left-wing economic values is much stronger than in countries unaffected by the crisis (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). To build upon this, Hernandez & Kriesi (2015) discover that the ensuing economic hardship of the 2008 financial crisis allowed populist radical left and rightwing parties to benefit at the expense of incumbent mainstream and more central parties in Western Europe. Hooghe and Marks (2017) expand on Lipset and Rokkan to discuss the newer cleavages in European society - based on the winners and losers of globalisation. This cleavage, combined with the lack of change within established parties explains the rise of both right- and left-wing parties as well as green parties, which take extreme stances on the issues of globalisation, demonstrating a different approach on the matter. Scholars have frequently attempted to associate individual s attitudes towards particular issues with their political persuasion. By analysing data from the Eurobarometer surveys, Gabel (1998) suggests that the most influential features of governing with regards to public PAGE 9 OF 65

10 opinion towards European integration are partisan context of integrative reforms and the utilitarian consequences of integrative policy as opposed to individual political or social values. Hence, according to Gabel, the public that is for European integration is in favour of anything which acts to benefit the whole society, thus maximising utility, whilst the opposition is in favour of acting from an individualistic standpoint. According to Hooghe et al (2002), instead of using the left/right comparison, the GAL (green, alternative, liberal) vs. the TAN (Traditional, authoritarian, nationalism) allows for an explanation into the different ideas behind the support, or lack of thereof, towards European integration across the spatial model and ideologies to form a more linear line. Furthermore, they discuss the electorate s voting behaviour as based on the new divide (green and radical-tan parties) and the structure of new preferences these supporters have the volatility and structure of party preferences based on the cleavage and neocleavage theory and the dealignment principle (Hooghe et al. 2018). In fact, Kriesi (1998) had already discussed cleavages (based on three core elements), and how their structure and composition had changed (partial dealignment): Claiming that traditional cleavages did not end after World War II, a new social division merely emerged (division between 2 segments of the middle class). Finally, the new political structure is made up of a new set of values combined with traditional cleavages, and this new cleavage within Western Europe between the winners and losers of globalisation changes the structure of national politics as well as positions of national parties (Kriesi, H., Grande, e., Lachat et al. 2006). Other scholars have taken further elements into consideration when considering what factors influence attitudes towards globalisation and European integration. For example, gender is often identified as influential when forming attitudes towards these concepts. Nelsen and Guth (2000) sustain that a modest gender gap exists in public attitudes toward European integration with women being more skeptical than men as a result of the role of gender towards individual s knowledge about integration, values, ideology, economic vulnerability, and their national tradition. More women than men admit that they know little about the EU, and this appears to affect their attitudes towards European integration as they are also more likely to distrust things that they don t know. Further, women appear to support an international economy far less than men, preferring protectionism and clear barriers to international trade established to further domestic trade capabilities. However, distinct or obvious reasons for this divide within male and female attitudes remain unclear (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004). Findings by Hartveld et al (2017) illustrate that Euroscepticism and distrust towards national government have risen during the refugee crisis as a result of increasing numbers of refugees and the amount media attention, but it mostly affected the attitude of right-leaning citizens. They also found that citizens are able to differentiate between levels of government (national and EU level). Therefore, not only the PAGE 10 OF 65

11 economic crisis of 2008 has been identified to give rise to Euroscepticism but also the more recent refugee crisis. PAGE 11 OF 65

12 METHODOLOGY This paper aims to establish whether a relationship is observable between our given variables and the public opinion towards European integration and globalisation of the residents of Amsterdam. The preparatory theoretical research was conducted through extensive readings of publications relevant to the research problem posed in this report. In order to apply the theories and concepts explored in these readings, empirical data collection through surveying the residents of Amsterdam was determined to be the most effective and efficient method of gathering data to support our developed hypotheses. In order to obtain the largest amount of surveys within our relatively short period of time allocated for the production of this paper, we created an online for people to respond to in addition to distributing the survey through fieldwork. The survey was comprised of a total of eighteen questions relevant to the research. Four questions produced per thematic subgroup responsible for exploring their division of the main research question. All of the survey questions have been formulated in order to reply to each group s sub-questions, each group had four sub-questions each which aim to reply from different points of view to the main research question stated before. The first thematic division explored the socio-economic factors - education, income, employment - and their influence on opinion towards globalisation and European integration. The second thematic division focused on identifying any correlations between demographic characteristics - age, gender, religion, and ethnicity - and opinions towards globalisation and European integration. The third thematic division, discussed the relationship between subjective ideological and national/international identity and opinions towards globalisation and European integration, as well how trust in political institutions affects attitudes towards the concepts. Therefore, the questions of the survey were designed in order to gather all of the relevant information on the socio-economic status, demographic traits and ideological and national/international identity of respondents, along with three final questions to gather information which would allow insight into participant s attitudes towards globalisation and European integration. The answers to surveys questions then provided a sufficient basis to perform an analysis on the correlations between different factors of influence and public opinion. The group is divided into eight groups of two or three students in order to collect the surveys manually. Each group is allocated to a designated region of Amsterdam and performs field work for the duration of a week (5 working days). Some of the regions include Jordaan, Zuid, Noord, Bijlmer, Indische Buurt, etc. These surveys are entered into a collective data log in Excel, where they then are coded and joined with the results of the online survey into a single datalog. Our datalog can be accessed through our website: PAGE 12 OF 65

13 The code consists of number-coded answers. For example, question two has been coded so that if the answer is Female, it correlates to a score of 1 as it is the first answer out of three). Since the data had to be transferred into a combined spreadsheet on Google Docs, the utilisation of IF was not possible, therefore the document was coded through the function of replacing a particular wording to a symbol of choice (in our case, numbers). Simultaneously, data from the online survey is collected and processed through the online host service Qualtrics, whose services are provided by the university. The results are automatically collated by the software but responses are not instantly coded, so Microsoft Excel is used to code the answers of the respondents so that the data can be included equally with that which was collected through fieldwork. From there on, each thematic subgroup utilised the data for their own analysis; forming separate data sheets for each region or criteria relevant to their analysis - for example, age or income. Finally, this raw data is processed through Excel by each group with the use of different functions, in order to combine and collate the data and present it in aesthetically pleasing - and useful - graphs. We can then begin to apply the theory and concepts studied to our empirical research. PAGE 13 OF 65

14 THE REPORT To what extent do socio-economic factors, demographic traits and national and ideological identification affect people s attitudes towards globalisation and European integration in Amsterdam? a. The impact of socio-economic factors on public opinion towards European integration and globalisation. This thematic chapter focuses on the discussion of how the socio-economic status of the residents of Amsterdam correlates to their opinion on European integration and globalisation. An exploration of established research was conducted in order to gain a basic understanding of the topic before starting our own investigation. This research demonstrates the importance and relevance of the role of socio-economic factors in forming an opinion on the matter. According to Hooghe and Marks (2009), identity plays a role in the formation of Eurosceptic parties. They emphasise that identity is influential in the forming of general public opinion, the popularisation of populist parties, and the political and economic regional integration. Furthermore, Kayser (2007) poses an argument claiming that international economic integration influences domestic political processes. Züern and de Wilde (2016) emphasise Kayser's findings. They point out that the economic, cultural, and political systems have become increasingly globalised. Additionally, their analysis provides an understanding of the positions of political actors in relation to their socio-economic standing on globalisation and other related issues. When assessing European integration specifically, Serricchio et al (2012) pose that Euroscepticism during the economic crisis of 2008 increased in the countries that were affected the most by the crisis. In fact, he considers national identity and political institutions to be more important than the specific occurrence of the 2008 economic crisis. Therefore, it is important to consider the implications proposed by Fligstein et al. (2012), where it is argued that European integration finds support mainly among the higher socio-economic classes and higher educated populations. Euroscepticism refers to fear of European integration as a result of not profiting from it. It is often linked to an ethnic view of identity, the fear of losing national sovereignty, lower education, and economic hardship. PAGE 14 OF 65

15 This chapter aims to answer the following sub questions: 1.1 How does education affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 1.2 How does income affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 1.3 How do employment prospects affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? This chapter provides an investigation of the implications mentioned in the literature review, by drawing parallels between socio-economic factors and the public opinion of Amsterdam s residents. These phenomena will be analysed in further detail as we explore the relationship between education level, income, and employment prospects and public opinion towards globalisation and European integration. The collected surveys feature a series of questions that aim to measure the respondent s view on European integration and globalisation. The average of the answers to these questions will be used to then determine a relationship with socio-economic status of respondents and the relevant data analysed in order to discover in what manner these different phenomena are connected to each other. 1.1 How does education affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? Figure 1.1 First, we analyse the relationship between citizens level of education and their opinions towards globalisation by interpreting the graph shown in figure 1.1. Here, the majority of respondents can be seen to be either strongly or somewhat in favour of globalisation. Notably, the people who are most strongly in favour of globalisation appear to be those whose highest level of education is either PhD or primary education. HBO/university and PhD graduates mostly responded they are somewhat in favour, while MBO/vocational education graduates were mostly PAGE 15 OF 65

16 impartial towards globalisation. Of secondary education graduates, most were found to be in favour of globalisation. People with primary education however were also those with the highest level of being strongly against globalisation. The graph also shows that 10% of MBO/vocational education graduates are somewhat against globalisation. Therefore, a small relationship between level of education and support of globalisation is observed as those with the lowest level of education (primary education) were less in favour than those with the highest level (PhD). Figure 1.2 As regarding attitudes towards the EU in relation to education, we can observe another graph. According to figure 1.2 the largest amount of people feeling impartial towards European Union were those who had completed primary education as their highest level of education (46%). The largest spike of respondents being strongly against European Union comes from MBO/vocational education graduates (3%), who also displayed the smallest percentage of respondents of their category who are strongly in favour (15%). The largest amount of survey respondents answered that they are somewhat in favour of European Union. Those who had completed HBO/university (46%) and PhD (45%) as their education formed the highest amount of respondents answering they are strongly in favour of European Union. Therefore, a relationship between being more in favour of European Union and a higher level of education is observed. PAGE 16 OF 65

17 Figure Primary/secondary education To elaborate on these results, we compared the impact of education on perceived impacts of European integration on the job market, as determined by asking surveyees how positively they feel the EU has been in benefitting their employability. Figure 1.3 demonstrates that out of the respondents whose highest level of education reached was primary school, a majority (55% on European integration and 59% on globalisation) saw European integration and globalisation as somewhat positively impacting their employability. A change is observed amongst those who signified their highest level of education reached as secondary school. Amongst this group, a larger amount of people (30% and 32% versus 9% and 8% between primary education) perceived the effects of European integration and globalisation as positive. However, the majority of this group responded: somewhat positively. Therefore, it can be deduced that higher levels of education contribute towards a more positive attitude towards European integration and globalisation with regards to perceived employability. PAGE 17 OF 65

18 Figure MBO/HBO/University/PhD Furthermore, among MBO graduates, a large plurality of impartial respondents can be observed. As seen in Figure 1.4, 39% and 45% of answers respectively state impartiality towards the issue. HBO/University students and graduates had a larger response of very positively towards European integration and globalisation, with 32% in both issues answering this particular option. However, the largest plurality responded feeling somewhat positively impacted by European integration and globalisation with regard to employment prospects; both aspects having 42% of respondents answering that particular option. PhD graduates and students also responded positively towards the impacts of European integration and globalisation on employment prospects, with a plurality of 40% answering that the impacts are very positive. This shows that the higher the education achieved, the more positive the attitude towards the affect that European integration and globalisation has upon people's employability prospects. PAGE 18 OF 65

19 Figure 1.5 In addition, we also created the graph shown on figure 1.5. This combines the results from questions six and fifteen to create an average score concerning identification as European citizens, and trust and satisfaction towards the EU and compare this score with the highest education level reached in order to explore the potential correlation between education and the public s identification as Europeans. The findings indicate no correlation, which can be explained by the fact that most of the survey respondents were university students or graduates (62%) compared to, for instance, citizens in the category of primary education (2%). In addition, 58% of the surveyees were from the age of 18 to 24 which influenced the data, as there is no diversity within the answers of the surveyees. Furthermore the average of EU identification and opinion is of 6.2, which shows a positive attitude towards EU integration and globalisation for the city of Amsterdam. Additionally, we used a formula to create an average score concerning identification as European citizens, and trust and satisfaction towards the EU. The result showed an almost nonexistent correlation. This can be explained by the fact that in Amsterdam the education levels do not correlate with the opinion on European identification as most of the interviewers were between the age of 18 to 24 (366 out of 622 surveyees). Also, the average of European identification is a value of 6,5 out of 10, thus generally indicating a positive identification with the EU and its integration process. PAGE 19 OF 65

20 1.2 How does income affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? Figure 1.6 For the question concerning the variable that is income, we first take a look at globalisation. As demonstrated in figure 1.6, where it can be observed that 19% of respondents in the first tax bracket responded that they were strongly against globalisation, while 35% and 55% of respondents in the last tax bracket responded they were strongly and somewhat in favour of globalisation respectively. The respondents whose income falls into the second tax bracket had the highest percentage of people reporting as being somewhat in favour of globalisation (52%), while also having a reasonable amount of respondents saying they were impartial (20%). No other tax bracket respondents but the first chose to answer they were strongly against globalisation, leading to a conclusion that a relationship between having higher income and being more in favour of globalisation exists. Figure PAGE 20 OF 65

21 With regards to the relationship between income and opinions towards the EU, we can make new observations. Figure 1.7 indicates that the first tax bracket was found to be 48% strongly in favour of the European Union, followed by 42% of their respondents answering they were somewhat in favour. A very small part of the first tax bracket respondents answered they were impartial, somewhat against or strongly against the supranational institution. Furthermore, the last tax bracket with the highest income were found to have 59% of their respondents being strongly in favour of the European Union, as well as 21% being somewhat in favour. A relatively large amount of respondents in the last tax bracket also answered they were somewhat against (15%), however, no one was strongly against. Those respondents whose income falls within the second tax bracket (20,000-34,000) mostly chose to be strongly or somewhat in favour, with a small proportion being somewhat (2%) or strongly against (3%). The third tax bracket was mostly strongly in favour (58%) of the European Union, however, a large part of these respondents felt impartial towards the EU (28%). Therefore, a relationship between the higher level of income and higher support towards European Union is present, however, the lowest tax bracket proves to be highly in favour as well. Figure 1.8 continued overleaf PAGE 21 OF 65

22 When level of income is then analysed against how positive people view the globalisation and the EU to be towards their employment prospects, as in figure 1.8, we can observe even more trends. As seen here, the lowest income bracket maintains its trend of being the relative majority to answer that they feel that European integration and globalisation somewhat positively or very positively impacts upon their employment prospects. However, a substantial section (approximately 30% in both categories) express attitude towards European integration and globalisation to be very positive. The second bracket responded that European integration has less positive effects on their employment prospects. The amount of somewhat negatively and very negatively falls in the 14th percentile. Only 10% of the respondents in this bracket responded that globalisation negatively impacts their employment prospects. The third bracket had a similar situation but to a lesser extent - 12% responded negatively towards the effects of European integration, while 10% answered globalisation was perceived as having the same negative effect. The highest bracket had the highest negative feelings towards the effects of European integration on their employability prospects - 21% answered either somewhat or very negative. A similar trend is observed when it comes to globalisation, where 18% have been observed to feel negative towards the process of globalisation. Therefore, we move up the income scale, opinion regarding the effects of European integration and globalisation on employability becomes increasingly negative. Although the majority supports the processes of European integration and globalisation and considers the ideas to positively affect employment prospects, a minority of those PAGE 22 OF 65

23 responding their feel negatively towards the impact of European integration and globalisation on their employment prospects, indicating that the percentage of negative responses grows as the income of the surveyee increases. Figure 1.9 By comparing European identification to income, this paper intended to explore the correlation between incomes and identification with the European Union, as determined by an average of question six and fifteen. As shown in the above graph, very limited correlation between income and EU identification has been identified. The findings can be explained with a general positivity towards the EU and its identity with an average of 6.2 out of 10. In this research, the x-value is the income group whereas European identity is the dependent variable with the y-value. According to this research, there is a minor positive relationship between European identification and income, but it is not sufficient enough to be relevant for the larger research. According to the equation to calculate an individual's European identity, the average feeling will increase by (on a scale of 1.0 to 10,0) when an individual goes from one income group to the income group above it. The equation is y=0.0456x Yet, due to the low coefficient of determination, it cannot be stated that there is any correlation between the European identity and an individual's annual income. This is in direct contrast to the initial hypothesis that stated the following: The higher the income, the more in favour the individual will be for globalisation and European integration. Therefore, based on the data gathered in this investigation, which is displayed in the above graph, it can be concluded that the hypothesis is incorrect. PAGE 23 OF 65

24 1.3 How do employment prospects affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? Figure 1.10 Further to the other sub-questions discussed, figure 1.10 shows the relationship between two factors: the perceived impact of European integration and globalisation on employment prospects, and the general attitude towards European integration and globalisation. Whilst the graph does show a limited positive correlation (indicated by R2) between general satisfaction and perceived employment prospects, this correlation is not of enough significance to allow us to conclude that the two phenomena are strongly related to each other. Conclusion and evaluation As described in the literature review, a correlation between income and opinion on European integration exists. Our findings also indicate a correlation between income and support of the European Union. The graphs show that higher incomes tend to be in favour of globalisation and European integration. However, an anomaly has been observed where the lowest tax bracket (0-20,000) were strongly in favour of European Union, but not globalisation. Hooghe and Marks (2009;2018) mention a correlation between government trust and trust in the EU, and our studies showed that the opinion on European integration is, generally speaking, positive with an average of 6.2 out of PAGE 24 OF 65

25 In addition, Kayser (2007) argues that international economic integration, such as globalisation and EU integration, influences the domestic political process. Amsterdam can be viewed as a cosmopolitan city where immigration and economic cooperation have been of benefit to the city, while taking a more leftist approach to their policies (Municipality of Amsterdam). Zürn and de Wilde (2016) discuss this process as a reduction of political cleavages. In addition, Hooghe and Marks (2009) mention how identity influences public opinion. Amsterdam considers itself a multicultural city. As mentioned above, the response towards globalisation and the EU is favourable. While benefiting from international economic cooperation, Eurosceptic parties cannot use the argument of economic stability and unemployment issues to promote their political agenda. Furthermore, Nicoli (2017) shows findings of a correlation between economic crises and the rise of Euroscepticism. In addition, Serricchio et al. (2012) add that regions of countries that are affected by crisis situations are more likely to be Eurosceptic. Fligstein et al. (2012) also mention a relationship between income, education, and identification with the EU and globalisation. PAGE 25 OF 65

26 b. The impact of demographic traits on public opinion toward European Union integration as a result of globalisation This section concerns the relationship between selected innate demographic traits and attitudes towards economic and social globalisation and European integration as a subsection of this. The first relevant aspect we focus on is age and how life stages affect opinion towards European integration and globalisation; creating age groups to be able to differentiate between young people and senior citizens, but mostly to differentiate between the various stages in life. The second aspect this paper will be exploring is gender and how that might play a role in the shaping of their opinions and attitudes. The third aspect we are looking at is ethnicity, focusing on integrated minorities and the effects this has on their views of globalisation. For this paper we have purposefully chosen to not include race or nationality, assuming those are traits that do not determine one s attitude towards the relevant issues, whereas ethnicity includes one s culture and thus might influence opinions. The fourth aspect this section will explore is religion as a possible influence on citizens opinions. Hereby we are not focussing on specific religions, but rather on the extent of their religious beliefs, as in how fundamentalist or secular someone is. We are not exploring whether particular religions affect attitudes but how being religious has an impact. This chapter intends to explore the ways in which these demographic aspects influence the citizens of Amsterdam in forming their attitudes towards globalisation and European integration as a subsection of this. We address the following sub questions: 2.1 How does age affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 2.2 How does gender affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 2. 3 How does ethnicity affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 2.4 How does religion affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? PAGE 26 OF 65

27 All of the figures included in this chapter were obtained through the following process: Each subquestion has a corresponding question on the survey. The responses to those questions are offered against corresponding responses to the three general questions in order to form an idea of the attitudes of surveyees on the matter of EU integration, globalisation and national/international institutions. Then, the percentage is taken by dividing that number by the total number of participants within that demographic group. For example, the number of participants in the age group of strongly in favour of globalisation is divided by the total number of participants within the age group, and is then multiplied by 100 to get the percentage. This means demographic groups can be compared equally irrespective of absolute number of respondents. 2.1 How does age affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? This paper hypothesizes that there is a negative relationship between the increase in someone s age and their positivity towards European integration and globalisation. This will be explored within the context of age groups and life stages and whether increased exposure to those of a similar age similarly affects attitudes towards European integration and globalisation. We will discuss the factors possibly leading to this difference of opinion as a result of age, including the role of the internet and whether age affects how one feels about employment and educational prospects within Europe and the globalised world. Much literature indicates that we should expect a negative relationship between the increase in someone s age and their positivity towards European integration and globalisation. In Global Governance & Cosmopolitan Citizens, P. Norris (2000) describes two possible explanations for different attitudes towards globalisation. The first is a life-cycle effect, according to which people at different points in their lives are likely to have differing views on international issues and governance. Norris poses that younger people hold national identity and existence within a national community to be less important than their older counterparts, who find these issues increasingly important as they age. As older people have established stronger roots in their community, they are less likely to view globalisation as a positive trend and become more conservative and resistant to international influence and change as they age (Norris, 2000). The second explanation for a change in attitude towards globalisation and European integration offered by Norris is the cohort effect which finds that each generation s ideas reflect the distinctive experiences and major developments in international affairs during their formative years. While Norris research focuses mostly on the generation gap between Baby Boomers and the pre-war generations, the basic theory can still be applied to later generations; as younger PAGE 27 OF 65

28 people are now growing up with internet communication unlimited by national borders or time constraints and a 24/7 international news cycle available to them, it is unsurprising that they find a globalised world less threatening than the generations before them. Finally, Inglehart (1977) poses a theory of post-modernisation affecting attitudes as he states that the basic values held by the younger generations have been changed by pervasive structural trends. This means that while older citizens remain more nationalistic, younger people - who experience globalisation more closely as they are more likely to volunteer or work at NGOs internationally - hold more positive views towards a globalised, cosmopolitan world. Younger citizens also generally look beyond national borders for opportunities to study and seek employment, and they are more active on the internet, which plays a pivotal role in globalisation, as it arguably increased the speed and extent of it. To assess how age affects opinion towards globalisation and European integration, we compared the results of question one of the survey: To which age group do you belong? and questions sixteen: To what extent are you in favour of globalisation, seventeen: To what extent are you in favour of the European Union? and eighteen: Which of the following should we aim to achieve? (A stronger national government, a stronger European Union, or stronger global institutions). See the survey annex for more information. Figure 2.1 The first area of analysis concerns the comparison between age and attitudes towards globalisation specifically. Here, our data largely confirms our hypothesis that younger people in cities such as Amsterdam are more favourable towards globalisation, and older people more resistant. Figure 2.1 shows that as age increases, support for globalisation decreases, with those reporting as impartial remaining relatively stable (with the exception of the category PAGE 28 OF 65

29 which showed an anomalous increase in this area). 77% of year-olds are in favour of globalisation compared to 61% of those aged 65+. This trend continues in reverse, with older people being more against globalisation than younger people: Only 5.5% of year-olds are against globalisation, compared to 16.7% of those aged 65 and over. Figure 2.2 Figure 2.2 further confirms this trend, by distinguishing between those who are somewhat favourable or resistant towards globalisation and those who are strongly favourable or resistant towards it. Here, it is interesting to note that those aged 65 and over actually have the strongest percentage (55.6%) among those who are somewhat in favour of globalisation. However, this age category is also the least strongly in favour of globalisation (5.6%) and therefore when the two categories are combined to create a cumulative figure of those in favour, the trend of an increase in age being linked to a decrease in support for globalisation becomes clear. Furthermore, among the 7.7% of participants who claimed to be strongly against, 5.6% were aged 65 and over. Despite the exception of large amounts of older surveyees being somewhat in favour, the data provided by this graph seems to confirm our hypothesis that older citizens of Amsterdam tend to be less supportive of globalisation than younger people. Figure PAGE 29 OF 65

30 The second area of analysis is the impact of age on attitudes towards European integration. We hypothesized that the relationship between age and attitude towards European integration would be largely similar to that between age and globalisation - as one s age increased, their support of European integration would decrease. However, our results were more complex than this simple correlation. In fact, as figure 2.3 indicates, the age group that cumulatively supports European integration the most is actually the 65+ age group, not the youngest category as originally hypothesized: 83.3% of those answering 65+ are in favour of European integration, compared to 81.1% of year-olds. Although a relatively small difference, this is especially notable because of the strong showing of older people in favour of European integration is markedly more than the percentage of older people in favour of globalisation (61.1%). Elderly citizens appear namely to be more supportive towards European Integration as they can recall an era that lacked a European Union (as opposed to younger generation), making their understanding for modern integration deeper. Another remarkable observation is the fall of support for European Integration from the middle aged generation. A reasonable explanation to this could be that middle aged people have been the ones who were most negatively affected by the European Crisis, as their job opportunities decreased drastically in comparison to the younger/older generations. Figure 2.4 When this information is further divided into the strength of support or resistance, the contradiction to our hypothesis continues. Figure 2.4 demonstrates that the highest percentage of respondents reporting that they are strongly for European integration belongs to the second oldest age category (43.2%) and highest percentage of respondents reporting that they are somewhat for European integration is the oldest 65+ category (44.4%). However, figure 2.4 also shows that a correlation between an increase in age and increase in rejection of European PAGE 30 OF 65

31 integration remains, as demonstrated by the correlation between an increase in age and those answering strongly against European integration. 5.6% of those aged 65+ are strongly against European integration, the largest of all age categories. As this is the only age category where a clear correlation between age and attitudes towards European integration can be found, however, we cannot claim to have found sufficient support for our hypothesis. Therefore, while our data does not conclusively contradict our original hypothesis because it still indicates a relative increase in strong resistance towards integration among older people in Amsterdam, it cannot be used to concretely support it either. Figure 2.5 As discussed, there is a clear difference between the impact of age on attitudes towards globalisation and the impact of age on attitudes towards European integration. Therefore, it is unsurprising that question eighteen of the survey which addressed which institution (national government, European Union, or global institutions) should be stronger leads to a similar difference. Figure 2.5 shows that younger participants are by far the most supportive of achieving stronger global institutions (39.6%), while middle-aged respondents (35-49) are the most in favour of a stronger European Union (46.2%) and the strongest supporters of achieving a strong national government (36.9%). Our data here supports the idea that older people are more resistant towards globalisation and increased influence from global institutions than younger people, and yet support of European integration and the need for a stronger European Union remains relatively consistent irrelevant of age. PAGE 31 OF 65

32 Figure 2.6 When this data is further analysed linearly, as in figure 2.6, trends between age and support of different institutions are even clearer. As people become older, their support for both a national government and stronger European Union actually increases in the same proportion - further disproving our original hypothesis regarding European integration. However, because support for global institutions decreases significantly as age increases in figure 2.6, our hypothesis that increase an increase in age leads to a decrease in support for globalisation still stands. The hypothesis we had put forward before gathering surveys was that there would be a negative relationship between the increase in someone s age and their positivity towards globalisation. The results provided by our study shows that elderly citizens seemed indeed to have more negative feelings towards globalisation than younger citizens; this is further confirmed by the fact that younger participants in the survey were more likely to support stronger global institutions, hinting that they seem to care more about global worldwide cooperation than their older counterparts. One thing that became apparent was the difference between strengths of opinions in the different groups on the subject of globalisation. This was especially noticeable in elderly people: the number of times they answered strongly in favour was small while the number of senior participants answering strongly against is larger than that of other age groups. People who viewed the subject in a positive manner were less extreme than their younger counterparts whereas the opinion of older people against globalisation was often more extreme. PAGE 32 OF 65

33 2.2 How does gender affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? Is there a gender gap in support of global and European integration in Amsterdam, and if so, is the proposition by Nelsen and Guth (2000), that women are less likely to trust in their international institutions and instead favour protectionism, a correct interpretation of reasons for this difference in attitudes? The paper hypothesizes that Nelsen and Guth s conclusions are correct. Gender is another demographic impact to explore. Political scientists Nelsen and Guth demonstrate in their article Exploring the Gender Gap Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European Integration (2002) that a relevant gender gap exists in public attitudes toward the European integration and is as a result for specific distinct factors. For example, they propose a link between gender and attitudes towards protectionism, which in turn affect attitudes towards European integration and economic and social globalisation. Likewise, they suggest that women tend to be more skeptical towards institutional structure as a result of lack of knowledge about these structures, and are more willing than their male counterparts to admit this, leading to a lack of support for the European Union and global institutions. The following graphs demonstrate the responses to the three general questions according to gender. In the survey we included the option for other, besides female and male ; since only 7 out of the 620 responses had selected this option, we decided that the 7 responses would not form an accurate representation of the demographic group and have therefore chosen to exclude those 7 from the following graphs. Figure PAGE 33 OF 65

34 Figure 2.7 represents the responses divided into males and females concerning the extent to which they support globalisation. The difference between female and male responses are not striking as the percentages are spread in a similar manner, especially from impartial onwards. In strongly in favour, the male percentage was significantly higher, a 29% of males opposed to 20% of females. However, for somewhat in favour, the percentage of females was significantly higher (a 55% opposed to a 45%), perhaps demonstrating that women are more careful in the support for globalisation. Furthermore, a larger percentage of males are against globalisation in comparison to females, being approximately 7% of men. Figure 2.8 Figure 2.8 demonstrates the extent to which female and male demographic groups are in favour of the European Union. Besides the observation that both men and women are more strongly in favour of the European Union than of globalisation, somewhat in favour is still higher for females and strongly in favour is higher for males, with the difference between men and women being far less significant than on the previous graph. However, this further supports the claim that women are more careful in their support for international institutions. Furthermore, it is interesting that while no gender was strongly represented to be against globalisation, more than 16% of women are strongly against the European Union. In general, the responses counted almost 20% of women to be against the European Union, opposed to the meager 5% of men. PAGE 34 OF 65

35 Figure 2.9 The graph depicts the responses regarding which institutional level participants wanted to see become stronger, with the responses divided according to gender. The largest percentage of both genders is for a stronger European Union, with the support being greater on behalf of the male participation with 43% of males in comparison to 38% of females. Additionally, male participants have less support for both the national government and global institutions than women. Women also demonstrate a very strong support for global institutions with a 36%. However, there are no strongly significant differences between the opinions of both genders concerning national, European and global institutions. This chapter had put forward the hypothesis that women would be less likely to have trust in international institutions, as proposed by Nelsen and Guth (2000) they sustain that a modest gender gap exists in public attitudes toward European integration; with women generally being less positive than men. This is caused by multiple factors, among which are: knowledge about the subject, basic values and ideology, and economic vulnerability. More often, women admit to knowing little about the EU: they often distrust what they do not know. Women are also less likely to support international economy than men, favouring protectionism and admitting their lack of support for the European Union and other global institutions. (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004) However, our graphs have not demonstrated any striking differences in the attitudes of men and women towards globalisation and European integration, with one significant exception: the percentage of women strongly against the European Union is much higher than that of men. However, concerning globalisation, a similar observation was not established. In general, we have determined that our study shows that women have a slightly stronger preference for national governments and for global institutions, whilst men are more in favour of the European Union. In conclusion, no significant gender gaps have been identified, perhaps pointing to an outdatedness of Nelsen and Guth s theory, published in 2000; the lack of support for the PAGE 35 OF 65

36 European Union by women was the only evidence of a difference between genders in our study. This could be explained by the vast progress in minimising the gender gap that has taken place in recent years. 2.3 How does ethnicity affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? Does being part of an ethnic minority within Amsterdam give members of such communities a stronger inclination to agree with globalisation? We hypothesize that integrated minority communities are prone to support further globalisation, being themselves examples of the multicultural aspects of a globalised city like Amsterdam. In regards to European integration, minorities of European descent are in favour because that is the reason they were able to come to the Netherlands. However, minorities descending from other continents are impartial to European integration because it does not form a part of their ethnicity and therefore, do not feel inclined to have an opinion. To better understand the link between being part of an ethnic minority and views on globalisation and European integration, it is important to formulate an appropriate set of questions. The focus within ethnicity will not be the person s physical traits, but mainly their cultural background, including ancestry, regional culture and language. Several scholars have looked at the influence of identity on people's attitudes towards globalisation or European integration. People s ethnicity is a large part of this identity. National identity influences Eurosceptic movements as well Eurosceptic political parties (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Ethnicity, as part of identity, influences general public opinion, populist parties and regional integration of politics and economy. The survey questions will gather data concerning ethnic and cultural affiliation; the data can then be used to compare the difference in views of globalisation between ethnic minorities and native Dutch ethnics. A conclusion will then be drawn to determine if ethnic minorities in Amsterdam do actually support globalisation. This question is of key relevance for understanding the feelings of the Amsterdam population towards globalisation and European integration. The increased presence of large minorities in major European cities is a feature and a direct consequence of globalisation: increased transportation capacities and more open societies have allowed greater immigration towards Europe. The acceptance of these communities by natives and their successful integration is in large parts determined by an openmindedness and a drive for multiculturalism within society; as Amsterdam is regarded as a stronghold of liberal values and the success of multiculturalism, it is important to analyse what the feelings of different ethnic groups and minorities are towards globalisation. The hypothesis is PAGE 36 OF 65

37 that the results will show that minorities are more likely to support globalisation than their native counterparts, as their presence and integration is dependent on globalisation. The following graphs show the opinions towards globalisation and European integration according to ethnicity. Having gathered data from the surveys, we will be analysing responses of Dutch natives, people from other European countries, and people from other continents. For the graph analysis, ethnicities that were neither Dutch native nor other Europeans have been regrouped under Others, even though the original survey offered a more detailed choice of ethnicity for participants. This is because different minority groups from other continents were not numerous enough in taking the survey to enable specific representation. Also, the focus of the study is in part on European integration, so there is no need to fully take into account the large number of small ethnic minorities. Before interpreting the graphs, it should also be noted that during the analysis of the data we added mixed to the set of groups we are taking into account. This was done after the observation of survey responses, since a significant part of the surveyees indicated to be of more than one ethnic background. Figure 2.10 This graph represents the feelings of different ethnicities towards globalisation. Dutch natives and other Europeans gave similar answers; their opinions are ordered in the following way: most were somewhat in favour, then there were about the same amounts that were either strongly in favour or impartial, and very few were against. Ethnicities classed as others were more strongly in favour, while mixed ethnicities were the strongest group feeling impartial towards globalisation. Overall, very few participants claimed to be somewhat or strongly against globalisation. PAGE 37 OF 65

38 Figure 2.11 For what concerns the European integration, people from European countries, including Dutch natives result to be mostly in favour while a strong majority of ethnicities who identified as others and mixed, result to be impartial towards this thematic. Although this significant impartiality of opinion, the remaining part of this group appears to be in favour of the European Integration, similarly to Europeans. Very few appear to be against the European Integration. Figure 2.12 Figure 2.12 shows that Dutch natives opinions on what aims need to be achieved are fairly well distributed. Meanwhile, other Europeans show a clear preference to a stronger EU, although a significant 20% also chooses stronger global institutions and another 20% would like a stronger national government. Furthermore, more than half of the surveyees with other ethnic backgrounds show a preference for stronger global institutions. However, the other aims were also chosen in a significant number of more than 20% each. For mixed ethnicities, the graph shows a relatively equal distribution of choice between presented aims, although it does show a slight preference for a stronger national government. PAGE 38 OF 65

39 We use the information provided by the graphs to answer the question that has been presented before, namely: Does being part of an ethnic minority within Amsterdam give members of such communities a stronger inclination to agree with globalisation and European integration? Our discussed hypothesis implied that minorities would be in favour of globalisation, due to their very presence being a consequence of it. It also entailed that European minorities would most likely be in favour of European integration, and non-european minorities would presumably be impartial. For what concerns globalisation, the minorities classified as non-europeans actually result to be the most strongly in favour, overcoming the opinion of Dutch natives and other Europeans who result being always in favour but not as strong in their feelings as the minorities. In the third graph, we also observe that non-european minorities are more likely to aim for stronger global institutions, thus hinting at their favourable position towards globalisation. These findings support our hypothesis. Regarding the European integration, a significant percentage of the non-european minorities claimed to be impartial as well as favourable in their position towards European integration. This supports our hypothesis to some extent, but mostly adds to it. With regards to European minorities, they are generally in favour of European integration. The last graphs also confirms this, showing that they want a stronger EU. This fully supports our hypothesis on European minorities being in favour of European integration. PAGE 39 OF 65

40 2.4 How does religion affect attitudes towards globalisation/european integration? Increasing secularisation, a widening divide between the religious people and fundamentalism in religious organisations and differences in culture between these groups are key features of the modernisation of religion. Do these established changes in the sociology of religion impact people s attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? We expect to find that the fundamentalism of someone s belief negatively impacts their opinion towards integration and that the divide between secular and religious beliefs translates into a similar divide between positive and negative attitudes towards European integration. The increased secularisation means that people can now make the choice between belief and non-belief as never before. For the majority of people, this means that religions play less of a role in their life. A post-secularism phase can, however also be seen in modern societies. Where religions retake (some) of its place in the public sphere. It takes many forms but sometimes provides fertile ground for a rise in fundamentalism (Roudometof V., 2004). Is this modernisation and reform in peoples attitudes towards religion having an impact on people s attitudes towards European integration and globalisation in Amsterdam? Before providing descriptions of the graphs, it is important to mention that whilst the responses fairly evenly represent the different groups of religiosity levels, the strongly religious are underrepresented in our data, being only 30 on the total number, whereas the other groups consist of approximately 150 responses each. Figure 2.13 The analysis of this graph provides us with the following insights on the opinions of the residents of Amsterdam on globalisation, according to their religiosity. Firstly, there seems to be only a slight difference in the opinions of the moderately religious, the agnostic and the moderately PAGE 40 OF 65

41 atheists, as all three of these groups were evenly distributed between the following opinions: strongly and somewhat in favour, impartial and somewhat against. However, it can be noted that there was only one group of participants who acknowledged that they were strongly against globalisation: the strongly atheists and secularists. 10% of the population that identifies with this category is against globalisation. Strongly religious people, the smallest group of participants, tended to be slightly in favor of globalisation, with most of them (43%) being impartial. Figure 2.14 The following graph demonstrates the extent to which the inhabitants are in favour of the European Union, with the residents divided into their status on religion. Within the strongly religious, the largest percentage by far is impartial when it comes to the EU, as they were with globalisation, following a decreasing trend in the extent to which they are in favour with the same percentage of 43%. The largest percentage of moderately religious are somewhat in favour. The atheists and secularists are in favour of the EU with 50% of strongly atheists and secularists being strongly in favour. Overall, it is the strongly religious that are the most against and least supportive of the European Union. Figure PAGE 41 OF 65

42 Figure 2.15 demonstrates the percentage of each group according to their identification with religion regarding which institution they believe we should aim to achieve. Of the strongly religious, the largest percentage is for a stronger national government, despite there being a relatively even spread amongst the three options. More distinct are the moderately religious and the moderately atheist/secular in being most supportive of a stronger European Union. Additionally, the strongly atheist/secular share this view, with 44% aiming for this. What is interesting, is that only a small percentage of this group is in support of a stronger national government. Furthermore, the agnostics were the only group to have the largest percentage being in favour of stronger global institutions. The hypothesis to the question of how religion affects attitudes towards globalisation and European integration was that both extreme ends - strongly religious and strongly atheist/secular - would negatively impact one s attitudes towards integration. The findings show that overall there was not necessarily a negative view. However, the majority of the strongly religious was impartial to the European Union and to globalisation. In correspondence to this, the largest group supporting the aim of achieving a stronger national government were indeed the strongly religious. The hypothesis is furthermore supported by the strongly atheists/secularists having the strongest presence in being against globalisation with 10% of their group. However, the hypothesis falls short with only 16% of strong atheists being for a stronger national government and more than 50% being in favour of the European Union, demonstrating notable support towards integration. In conclusion, whilst the strongly religious are the most impartial towards integration, strong atheists and secularists are far more in favour of integration than the hypothesis suggests. Conclusion After collecting data and analysing it, we were able to look back at our hypotheses and see whether or not these have been confirmed. For our first sub-question about age, the hypothesis was that there would be a negative correlation between a higher age and feelings towards both European integration and globalisation. Participants were divided into age groups and, to some extent, we were able to confirm this hypothesis. On the issue of globalisation, older people clearly expressed more negative opinions; but a similar trend was not obvious in their attitudes towards European Integration. It was clear that feelings by elderly citizens were mixed about European Integration, but their feelings towards globalisation tended to be negative, with very few of them supporting stronger global institutions. PAGE 42 OF 65

43 On questions about the effects of gender on people s attitudes expectations were to find a slight gender gap, with women being more likely to have protectionist views than men. Therefore we expected women to be less likely to hold favourable opinions on globalisation and European integration. However, our findings did not support this theory strongly; women did not show any striking differences from men in regards to their views on globalisation and European integration, though we were able to show a slight preference for national governments and global institutions by women whilst men preferred the European Union. Our hypothesis on whether or not being part of an ethnic minority within Amsterdam would give members of these communities a stronger inclination to agree with globalisation and European integration, was that minorities would be more in favour of globalisation, as their presence in Amsterdam is part of this very phenomenon. In much the same way, we expected European minorities to have positive views of the European Union as well as European integration. On the subject of globalisation non-european minorities indeed showed themselves to be most strongly in favour of globalisation. The views of European minorities being in favor of European integration and a stronger European government also supports our hypothesis. Expectations about surveyees with more extreme ideas of religion having more negative views towards globalisation have proven to be incorrect. Strongly religious people have not shown to be more negative in their answers, they did, however, prefer a stronger national government over a stronger European Union and stronger global institutions. Strong atheist showed more support for European integration that the hypothesis suggested. PAGE 43 OF 65

44 c. The impact of subjective identity on public opinion towards European integration and globalisation. This thematic chapter focuses on the European and national identification and defining the correlation between European identification or national identification and opinion towards globalisation and European integration. The first question evaluates whether citizens identify themselves with their national or European identity, or both. We thus have investigated to what extent people identify with their own nation, and to what extent that feeling affects the way they feel towards European integration. The second question asks citizens to what extent they, as individuals, feel they benefit from the European Union. For some, supporting the EU could be understood as an investment; this is what we refer to as benefits. Naturally, if there is a gap between what people expected to gain from supporting the EU and what they actually receive, their trust towards the European policies (particularly integration) will fluctuate downwards and vice versa. The third question within the ideology section of the survey focuses on political trust; how much people trust their own national government as well how much they trust the European Union and how this correlates (or not) with to them being support for the European Union and globalisation. This thematic identity subgroup focused on finding various correlations. The main findings are presented and organised in the following order: 3.1 How does subjective personal national and European identification affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 3.2 How does political affiliation in national governments and the European Union affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? 3.3 How does trust in national government and a feeling of benefiting from the European Union affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? PAGE 44 OF 65

45 3.1 How does subjective personal national and European identification affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? The first question within the identity subcategory intends to evaluate how people identify themselves. Surveyees were asked to pick whether they identify with: Europe (as Europeans), their own nationality, or both. The debate is with regards to whether citizens can have dual identities from both their state and from Europe in general or whether people will always feel more strongly toward either of those. We aimed to determine the opinion of people residing in Amsterdam with regards the importance of their national identity, in order to reach a general understanding of what it is people in cosmopolitan cities such as this one feel identified with. We thus investigated to what extent people identify with their own nation, and to what extent that feeling affects the way they feel towards European integration. Through the data we have collected with the surveys, we found, as figure 3.1 shows, that the plurality of people who took the survey identified themselves with either their national identity (37%) or both (37%). A smaller percentage of people identify only with the European identity. We assume that there is a smaller part of people identifying only with the European identity because the concept of Europe is not clearly defined yet, as it is a supranational organisation and a more abstract entity to identify with. What is important to remark here is that our research, and thus our findings have limitations because our data does not provide a complete representation of the inhabitants of Amsterdam. Concerning one s identification and opinion towards European Union and globalisation we found that it is true that national identity interferes with attitudes towards European integration and globalisation. That is because, as figures 3.2 and 3.3 show, those who place themselves on the scale as 9 or 10 (strong national identity) tend to be somewhat or strongly in favour towards globalisation and European integration (approximately 38% of both). Furthermore, those who identify themselves to their nationality less strongly (3 or 4 on the scale) are usually, 50-65% of them, strongly or somewhat in favour of globalisation and the European Union. Before leading the survey, our hypothesis stated that the more someone identifies with a European identity, the more they would support globalisation and, as figure 3.4 shows, the data confirms our hypothesis. In addition to this, our results also indicate that even the people who don t identify as strongly with the European identity are also in majority somewhat in favour. However, we expected more people would be strongly in favour of the globalisation. Instead, somewhat in favour is the most popular answer across all European identity scale answers. Before leading the survey we expected that the more that people identified themselves with a European identity, the more they would be likely to support the European Union. The results confirmed our hypothesis, as shown by figure 3.5, most of the people who ranked their PAGE 45 OF 65

46 European identity somewhere between a 7 and a 10 (highly) expressed to also be strongly in favour of the EU (roughly 60% in both categories). Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Figure PAGE 46 OF 65

47 Figure 3.4 Figure PAGE 47 OF 65

48 3.2 How does political affiliation in national governments and the European Union affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? In this section of the chapter we try to determine whether there exists a correlation between one s place on the political spectrum and one s opinion towards globalisation and European integration. We had hypothesised that since definitions are unclear and continuously being debated, people will place themselves on the spectrum according to the issues they prioritise. We take these answers with a grain of salt, following the extensive research on the disaffiliation of people and their political ideologies. In order to find the correlation between political trust and the surveyees political affiliations, we asked them to place themselves on the political left/right spectrum. We offered a spectrum of options ranging from: I do not affiliate, far left, left, centre left, centre, centre right, right, far right. We were specific in our wording because we aimed to find out if there is there a correlation between certain political affiliations and positive/negative opinions about European Union and globalisation. As Azmanova (2011) states, little attention, has been given to the way public perceptions of the social impact of globalisation are affecting citizens ideological orientation and political choice. Our expectations were that people who placed themselves on the far right or far left of the spectrum will be less in favour of the European Union and globalisation respectively. The outdated dogmas that have been defining the far left/right political associations expect those who identify with the far right to support nationalism and protectionism, and it expects left-leaning people to be more in favour of European integration, associating with ideals of integration and globalisation - assuming equal chances and means more opportunities for all. As Mair states, in his article Left-Right Orientations, meanings are no longer shared and the implications of political stances on the left or on the right become almost unreadable (2007b). Thus, from the start of the project, we believed it is important to keep our reservations about the outcome of this survey questions. For the sake of the survey numeration, we compared questions 13 with 16 and 17 respectively. PAGE 48 OF 65

49 Figure 3.6 By analysing the data we found that, when asked about globalisation, those on the left and on the centre-left were the most somewhat in favour, correspondingly 58.3% and 56.4%, followed by those who chose I do not affiliate, 45.1%. Furthermore, we found that those who identified as centre-right were around just as in favour of globalisation as those in the centre. Barely any were found to be strongly against globalisation, overall just 2% of those who took the survey felt strongly against globalization. A few in the right, around 16% were somewhat against. All in all, the somewhat in favour was the predominantly popular option, 38-50% across all political affiliation options while somewhat against and strongly against were chosen a noticeably smaller amount of times. Regarding the exact survey question, people had to put their answer down as a number on a scale 1-10 while we later converted those numbers into 5 categories varying from strongly in favour to strongly against. Answers 1-2 were grouped into strongly against, 3-4 into somewhat against, 5-6 were put into impartial while answers 7-8 belong to somewhat in favour and 9-10 to strongly in favour. Figure PAGE 49 OF 65

50 Looking at the collected data for this question, we can conclude that the choice of answer that contains strongly was chosen a higher amount of times than a similar answer across all other questions. The choice of feeling strongly about the European Union was the most popular answer from the far left to the right, 57-51%. Only in the centre and the centre-right were people more somewhat in favour (around 45%) of the EU than strongly in favour. As to the exact survey question, people had to put their answer down as a number on a scale 1-10 while we later converted those numbers into the same 5 categories as we did for the previous graph, regarding globalisation. Having analysed the last two particular graphs we noticed that our findings align with Hooghe et al. s (2002) cleavage theory. They state that the cleavage theory is about the interaction of cleavages rather than the replacement of one alignment by another. That way, instead of conceiving party system change as a process of realignment in which a new dimension of conflict comes to supersede a prior dimension, cleavage theory asks how the continued existence of one division affects the party-political expression of a subsequent one. In party systems that make the outcome highly possible against new parties, a new cleavage can be expected to produce strong frictions within parties. In low-barrier multiparty systems, by contrast, a new cleavage can be expected to produce new challenging parties that exist alongside, without replacing, parties formed on prior cleavages. 3.3 How does trust in national government and a feeling of benefiting from the European Union affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration? To what extent does the amount of trust people hold in their own national government and the European Union correlate with the extent to which they are in favour of the European Union and of globalisation? The thematic identity subgroup focused on finding various correlations, among them a correlation between the extent to which people trust their own national government and the extent of their support towards the European Union, as well as their support for globalisation. The findings look at the survey results for questions 14 and 15 - the questions dealing with trust in their own national government, and trust in the European Union. We had originally asked people to rank themselves on a scale from 1 to 10 in terms of how much they felt they trusted the aforementioned institutions, but when making the graphs we grouped them into blocks, making the results more concrete. We grouped the answers into blocks ranging from 1-2 titled low trust, 3-4 titled somewhat low trust, 5-6 titled PAGE 50 OF 65

51 confident, 7-8 titled high trust, and 9-10 titled complete trust. We then created a graph comparing questions 14 and 15 to questions 16 and 17 the questions dealing with being in favour or against the European Union as well as globalisation. The identity subgroup had hypothesised that those who felt within the confident to the high trust range towards the somewhat to strongly in favour of the European Union. We also hypothesised that those who felt within the confident to the high trust range towards their own national governments would rank somewhat to strongly in favour of globalisation. We assumed that those who trust their own national governments and the EU trust institutions in general, leading them to have more of a positive view on globalisation and unions in general, i.e. the European Union. The results were the following: Figure 3.8 Among those who consider having an high trust in their own national government, 60% have a somewhat high trust in the EU meaning that the majority of people who have have greater trust in their national government also have greater trust in the EU. Moreover, we can notice a surprising trend among the people who have a low trust in their national government: 40% are still highly trusting of the EU. The explanation could be that their are skeptical towards their national government and prefer to deal with larger unions. The findings are in line with what we had hypothesised, those who trust or fully trust are majoritarily trusting the EU. We hypothesise that this is because they assume national governments are held accountable for their actions by being a part of larger unions. We then are able to look at the graphs in which we compare questions 14 (trust in one s own national governments) and 15 (trust in the EU) with 16 (in favour of globalisation), as well as 17 (in favour of the EU). We observed the following: PAGE 51 OF 65

52 Figure 3.9 Figure 3.9 compares question 14 and question 16, to find that 53% of those who had somewhat high trust in their own national governments were somewhat in favour of globalisation. Also, we found that the 47% of those with low trust were still somewhat in favour of globalisation. Overall, our findings do not indicate that trust in one s own national government strongly relates to being in favour of globalisation. When looking at trust in the EU (question 15) and globalisation (question 16), we observed the following: Figure PAGE 52 OF 65

53 Approximately 50% of those who found themselves completely trusting and 31% of those having high trust in the EU were strongly in favour of globalisation. These findings were in accordance with our hypothesis. When comparing the graphs of question 15 (trust in the EU), along with question 17 (the extent to which you are in favour of the EU), we observed the following: Figure 3.11 We found that those with complete trust in the EU were about 80% strongly in favour of the EU, while those with low trust in the institution were 50% impartial, not even of these people 5% were strongly in favour. Those confident in their national government were found somewhat in favour of the EU (to an extent of 50%). In general, more people found themselves in favour of the of the EU, and those with somewhat low trust were the ones with the most prominent strongly against the EU, although it was a minimal amount only reaching 20%. Another interesting result was that none of those who stated they completely trusted their government chose strongly or somewhat against the EU. This is in line with our hypothesis, which stated that if one has low trust in their own national government, they will largely favour the EU--assuming it would hold their government accountable. Further, comparing the extent to which people think that they benefit from the European Union (question 12) and the extent to which they trust it as an institution (question 15) allows us to test our hypothesis that the more people believe they benefit from the EU, the more they will trust it. We formulated the hypothesis because we thought that being a EU citizen would imply both costs and benefits, being a trade between the institutions and its citizens. Thus, if people consider themselves winners of the trade, they will trust the EU more as a responsive institution. The PAGE 53 OF 65

54 graph below shows the correlation mentioned above and whether our hypothesis is right and to what extent. Figure 3.12 Among the people who think that they strongly benefit from the European Union, about 38% highly trust the European Union. Then, among the people who believe that the European Union is somewhat harmful, roughly 50% have confidence in the institution. However, among the people who think that the European Union is strongly harmful, we noticed that almost 40% still have a high trust and about 23% even have a çomplete trust towards the institution. This finding surprised us, because we expected the citizens who view the EU as strongly harmful to be prone to have a low trust in the institution. Only 10% overall, however, have a low trust in the institution.. Conclusion As described in the introduction, we led a survey in Amsterdam in order to observe to what extent subjective identification has an impact on public opinion towards European integration and globalization. By analysing the collected data, we found three main relationships between how people identify themselves and their vision towards European Union and globalisation. The first relationship that we established was between the extent to which one identifies with his national and/or European identity and their opinion towards globalisation and the EU. Thus, we came up with the following conclusion: the more you identify with a European identity or at least accept it as second identity, the more likely you will be in favor of the European integration and globalisation. PAGE 54 OF 65