Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order YAQING QIN 1*

Transcription

1 Economic and Political Studies Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2013, Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order YAQING QIN 1* Abstract: This paper puts forward three interrelated arguments. First, a tripartite power structure has been emerging, with the United States as the superpower, and Europe and the BRICS as major forces. Together they will shape the future world order. Second, the changed nature of security concerns from purely inter-state threats to trans-state ones provides opportunities for the three forces to cooperate, but genuine cooperation for the global commons is far from satisfying. It results in a gap between the demand for effective global governance and the supply of adequate international institutions. Hence there appears a global governance deficit. Third, the key to eliminating such a deficit is cooperation between the original major powers and the emerging ones for building a sustainable global order. If such cooperation is to be realized, emerging powers should be taken as equal partners rather than challengers in the international system. In this respect, their active participation in the reform of international institutions is of paramount significance. Keywords: power structure, security threats, international institutions, governance deficit, global order THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS hastened the emergence of a remarkable phenomenon in world politics: the migration of emerging powers toward the center of international politics and economy. The BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa as well as some others have increasingly shown strong momentum in economic development. Although the influence of these countries is still not as strong as that of the Western developed countries, they have nevertheless played indispensable roles in many areas of international concern. Western international relations theory and practices have once and again taught that emerging powers, in the midst of their rise, may disrupt or even oppose the existing international * Yaqing Qin is from the Department of English and International Studies, China Foreign Affairs University; yqqin@cfau.edu.cn.

2 90 Economic and Political Studies system and world order. This begs certain questions: Is the current situation something new in history or more of the same? Has the international system experienced a fundamental break from the past? Have the so-called emerging countries become truly global powers capable of shaping the global environment? Do emerging countries pose a challenge to the existing international system or do they provide a historic opportunity for a new multilateralism in international order? This article argues that the current situation is indeed distinct from the past. The most obvious feature is the distinct nature of security threats. In modern history, the most serious security threats have come from hostile states or coalitions thereof. This has been the case from the creation of the modern state-system in 1648 right through to the end of the Cold War, with the two World Wars and the Cold War as classic examples. Interstate threats have constituted the major form of security concern in the international system. However, in the post-cold War world, global issues have endangered the global commons and threats almost simultaneously against all nations have increased dramatically. We have found ourselves challenged by numerous problems, including civil wars, terrorist activities, economic crises, natural disasters, climate change, epidemic diseases, and poverty (Jones, Pascual, and Stedman, 2009). No country in the international system, not even the mightiest, has the ability to defeat by itself all threats to its state and citizens. To survive and prosper, all countries must cooperate with others. We are indeed facing terrible and serious challenges; but as the nature of challenges and threats is changing, states are now more open to interaction, cooperation and coordination. The 21 st century global order will depend greatly on the interaction and cooperation between countries in coping with these common challenges. I. Power Shift: the United States, the European Union, and the BRICS Countries In the post-financial crisis era, a tripartite power structure has been emerging. The United States continues to be the dominant and most powerful single country in the world, despite the weakening of both its hard and soft power in recent years; the European Union (EU) is and will continue to be both an economic giant and a normative power, although troubled recently by the Eurozone debt crisis; the BRICS have grown in power, playing an crucial role in global governance. A new world order will be built on such a configuration, together with an increasingly conspicuous force of civil society. The international power structure in the post-financial crisis era

3 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 91 shows signs of both continuity and change. The United States is still the only superpower in the international system today, possessing all the accompanying strength and influence that comes with its position, a position it will no doubt continue to hold for a long time to come. At the same time, however, there is also a general sense that America s relative strength is in decline. The War on Terror, the financial crisis and other major events have weakened American power. The process of regional integration among European countries has made significant forward progress, showing the influence of its soft power through proposing and disseminating new ideas and norms beyond the limits of traditional power politics. Thus it is in some sense a normative power in world politics, even though its economic situation has worsened recently due to the Eurozone debt crisis and the lack of dynamics in economic growth. The rapid rise of emerging economies, in particular China, India, Brazil and other emerging ones, are increasing their shares in the global distribution of power, speeding up the global trend toward multi-polarity. At the same time, non-state actors as well as the various forces in the international community also play important roles in setting the international agenda, promoting institutional reform, broadcasting norms and so on, which all demonstrate an activist attitude. These characteristics, already present before the financial crisis, have only become more apparent because of the financial crisis. Two major events have made the decline of American influence more apparent. First, the War on Terror. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, America s initial reaction was to announce the launching of a comprehensive War on Terror, giving it a meaning similar to that of the Crusades, suggesting that it was a struggle between civilizations. America s strategic goal was to use its superior military power to eliminate terrorism and at the same time to promote democratic values and political institutions. This strategy would serve not only to win the War on Terror, but promote American-style democracy in the Middle East and the rest of the world as well, strengthening America s leadership position and establishing its version of an ideal global order. Furthermore, the United States believed it could win this war on its own. Guided by this thinking, the American government committed a strategic error. The United States opted for an armed invasion and occupation of Iraq. However, the decision has not only failed to bring peace to the world, but also weakened both America s hard and soft power. Many have doubted and severely criticized the United States for its military and political activity in Iraq. These facts make it clear that even a hegemonic power with superpower capabilities is inadequate for the task of solving its problems, let alone those of the world. Moreover, in spite of the American military occupation of Iraq, al-qaeda s terror activities and religious

4 92 Economic and Political Studies sectarian violence have plagued Iraq s internal security situation. With the US withdrawal, it is more likely that Iraq s internal security situation will become increasingly convoluted. Moreover, for the United States, counterterrorism operations on the South Asian subcontinent also present an extremely difficult struggle, not only requiring huge financial and human investments, but raising the specter of a marathon war. The War on Terror has brought the more serious consequences of weakening America s soft power. In the Iraq War, the United States relied on non-existent evidence to justify its use of force. The United States had neither authorization from the United Nations Security Council nor serious consultation with other UN members who opposed a unilaterally waged war. The subsequent abuses of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and the fact that the Iraq war was started on false evidence worsened the situation for the United States. All these events together resulted in questions over the legitimacy of America s War on Terror and unilateralism. Some even see the most powerful supporter of liberalist international norms taking the lead in violating the very norms it supposedly supports (Mckeown, 2009). In this sense, the mistaken ideas and strategy behind the War on Terror have especially weakened America s soft power (Bard, 2009). The second major event is the financial crisis. Starting in the United States and quickly spreading to the entire world, the financial crisis has weakened the strength of many economies around the world, with the United States and Europe having suffered particularly serious losses. The financial crisis has shaken the status of the US dollar as world reserve currency, representing one of the most serious global recessions since World War II. Virtually all the major Western economies experienced negative economic growth in The losses in the world financial crisis in 2009 amounted to some US $4 trillion. Losses in the United States alone will reach US $2.7 trillion, while Europe is expected to lose US $1.2 trillion. In addition to heavy losses on the financial markets, the real economies of the world s major economies have also suffered serious shrinkage. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the economic output of the developed economies in 2009 was reduced by 25%. Therefore, the financial crisis has dealt the developed economies, and the world as a whole, a heavy blow indeed (International Monetary Fund, 2009). Furthermore, the financial crisis has led to a high degree of distrust toward the current US-led international financial system. What originally began within the United States as the subprime mortgage crisis quickly spread throughout the whole world. This phenomenon has brought major issues regarding the international financial and economic order to the surface. There has been growing suspicion over the current international

5 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 93 financial and economic systems, which Western countries founded and have maintained based on post-world War II liberal international norms. Before and during the crisis, the IMF did not succeed in fulfilling its duties of supervision, early warning and adjustment to the crisis. Those functions, however, are precisely what the organization is authorized to fulfill. It is also the organization to which the rest of the world turns to for guidance. The current financial crisis clearly shows that there is a high degree of interdependence between states; in the global financial system, a country s financial situation and policy are closely tied to that of other countries. Events that occur in one country depend not only on that country s policies and regulations, but also on the policies and regulations of other countries. As such, risk monitoring and early warning mechanisms on the global level are positively essential. One of the most basic functions of the IMF is to closely monitor each member s financial and economic policy as well as its implementation. However, this regulatory mechanism has not played an effective role within the developed economies, thus the subprime mortgage crisis within the American financial system was not detected with early warning and vulnerability monitoring. The 1997 Asian financial crisis in fact had already shown that the IMF was standing on the sidelines during the Asian crisis, with its unrealistic policy recommendations and response measures. Precisely because of this, East Asian countries have decided to vigorously carry out their own regional cooperation, with the result being the establishment of the 10+3 cooperation mechanism between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (Qin and Wei, 2008). To strengthen the stability and security of the international economic order, supervision of the financial activities of the developed economies must increase, but the rights of developing countries to vote and make their voices heard are also necessary (Bradford and Linn, 2007, 6-8). To this end, the international community should start long-term reform on the existing post-world War II international financial institutions, which are inadequate to incorporate a number of emerging economies in the world economic system (Krasner, 1984; Keohane, 1984). Although we have witnessed a relative decline of American power, the current power structure in the international system has not fundamentally changed. The War on Terror and the international financial crisis did not greatly alter the interstate balance of power. The relative decline of American power has not fundamentally altered America s status as global superpower, either. From the perspective of the military strength, the United States is still in the position of absolute dominance. US military spending tops the world, higher than the total of six major powers in the international system: Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia and India. Together with its military allies

6 94 Economic and Political Studies and bases, the United States has reached out almost everywhere in the world. The United States not only occupies the most dominant position within the security architecture for land, sea, air and space, it is also the world s most important country in the economic and technological realms. More than half of the world s top 300 enterprises are American. Whether among the world s top 100 or 500 enterprises, the majority is American, with the strongest decision-making power in areas of production. The United States still has the ability to dominate the supply of dollar-denominated international credit, and thus has the ability to exert decisive influence over the world monetary, credit and financial systems. The United States remains a center of scientific and technological innovation in the world today, and continues to dominate the creation and production of new knowledge. Thus, although the relative decline of US hegemonic power is a fact, the configuration of one superpower within the international system is also true. In addition, the United States is the most influential country in the existing major international institutions. Most of the post-wwii intergovernmental institutions have been led and dominated by the United States, who came out of World WarⅡ not only as the most powerful country, but also as a committed player rising to globalism. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States even more institutional power. Thus, it is reasonable to say that the United States will continue to be the most powerful in the world and the hegemonic structure will continue to exist in the years to come. At the same time, the relative decline of American power has brought two other international forces to the fore. One of these forces is Europe. For many years, European countries have been committed to communitybuilding. The EU s efforts are to build a community beyond the nationstate and have thus put some important new ideas into the practice of international relations, greatly influencing world politics and actively shaping the new world order. At the regional level, cooperation between European countries has been largely successful. It is undeniable that the road of European integration is tortuous. A most serious test since the end of the Cold War is the Eurozone debt crisis, which is still going on. Although not without suffering numerous setbacks and difficulties, European integration has continually been moving forward. It is true that the hard power of the EU is not predominant and that it is still a combination of a number of independent countries, but it is more unified than any other region in the world. Having a common president and foreign minister, Europe seems not only poised to strengthen its own development, but more importantly, the creation and dissemination of its concepts, norms and institutions will help it lead in important areas. The

7 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 95 EU s staunchest supporters believe Europe will lead the 21 st century, with Europe s powerful force being as a force for change (Leonard, 2005, 5). The role of European soft power cannot be discounted. In terms of the dissemination of concepts and institution-building, Europe is an important force shaping the international system and future world order (Qin, 2008). Assessing Europe s role in building the future global order merely from the standpoint of hard power would be a mistake. More conspicuous in recent years are the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The rapid rise of these countries is particularly eye-catching. The financial crisis that erupted in pushed them closer to the center of the world stage, and, for the first time in history, they joined the existing powers in the Group of 20 (G20) mechanism. The road from the Group of Seven (G7) to the Group of 20 has been a very long one, but the fact itself has a significant meaning, both symbolic and substantial. This is the first time the developing countries have not only joined a major mechanism, but stood together with the developed nations in the center, playing a role in the financial and economic fields of global governance. Due to the similar levels of economic and social development of these countries, they have many problem areas of common interest. The BRICS and other emerging developing countries are on the same road, playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. It is not just in the world economy. If these countries do not participate, the transnational issues and global challenges we face today cannot and will not be resolved. Nevertheless, these countries are not as powerful as major Western countries. They are often the most populous countries, facing multiple domestic issues and bearing limited influence in global decision-making and agenda-setting. They form a class of novice global governance managers. These countries are forced to channel most of their resources to the demands of reducing poverty and pollution and promoting social development. But their strength lies in their huge growth potential, vast markets, and vitality in development. If we take the EU and BRICS into the picture of international politics, power in the world today can be seen as a tripartite structure. 21 On one hand, although America s relative strength is in decline, the United States continues to be the sole superpower in the international system: its comprehensive capabilities and global influence are the greatest. On the other hand, the other forces are growing. Europe is a main political actor in the world arena and molder of international order, especially playing 1 The American scholar Katzenstein (2005) uses the term imperium to describe America s post-war dominant position.

8 96 Economic and Political Studies an important role in terms of soft power. Emerging economies, especially the BRICS countries, have started to move toward the center of the world stage. The high growth rates of these countries are of course important factors in their rise in importance, but additionally, the role of emerging economies, their share, impact and strategies for the 21 st century world order, international multilateralism, 32 as well as the move to a more multipolar world are also too important to ignore. This is why we argue that the world has seen the emergence of a tripartite structure: the United States, the EU, and the BRICS countries, which will become the most important forces shaping the 21 st century international order. It is important to point out before we leave this part of discussion that among this power structure, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become conspicuous international actors. With the continual dispersion of power in the world, international organizations, regional organizations, international civil society and other social actors in international politics play increasingly important roles. There are thousands of NGOs in the international policy arena, actively dealing with all kinds of issues around the world. Although NGOs do not have the final decision-making power, they nevertheless serve as important pressure groups, agenda-setters and communicators of norms. Such a tripartite power structure has several notable features. First, America is still the only superpower, having more influence in the whole international system despite the fact that it may not be as dominant as before and may not be dominant in specific issue areas. Second, the number of powerful states is on the rise, developing economies in particular, furthering the process of the world s multi-polarization and diversification. Third, emerging countries are moving from the periphery toward the center to share power and responsibility in the international system. Fourth, social forces play an important role to make world politics more dynamic and more complex. II. Global Governance Deficit: Demand and Supply of International Institutions What does this type of power structure mean for world order and global 2 Recognizing the differences in interpretations of multilateralism is important. For many European countries, the EU s successful multilateralism is understood as super-government ; while for most other countries, multilateralism is more commonly understood as intergovernmentalism. As a result, sovereignty between European countries is generally not a sensitive issue, but in some other areas it is still highly sensitive.

9 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 97 governance? It means that the success of global governance depends very much on the cooperation among the three major forces, which all have important responsibility for the global commons and at the same time have different priorities in their different stages of development. How they interact will, to a large extent, decide the future world order. One significant fact may bring them together: the emergence of global issues and the changed nature of security threats in today s world. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced significant changes. The essence of the challenges and threats has differed from those of the past and global issues have become a nightmare for many, making the world more interdependent and creating both a complexly chaotic situation and an optimistic opportunity for cooperation among major actors in the world. Such cooperation should be most significantly reflected by committed joint efforts among the three forces to work out effective institutions for governing the global commons. The fact that global governance needs rules and regimes indicates the importance of international institutions in today s world. The problem, however, is that there is a growing demand for global governance in a much more interdependent and complex world while there is a conspicuous inadequate supply of international institutions both in quality and quantity. This is what I term global governance deficit, which has been caused, to a large extent, by the failed cooperation among the three forces in the tripartite international power structure. 1. The Changing Nature of Security Threats If speaking mainly of the so-called high politics field of world politics and interstate warfare, the post-cold War era has witnessed a decrease in the possibility of war between great powers, while the global challenges besetting countries have increased significantly. The transformation from the threat between nation-states to threats to all states, in other words, the existence of common threats now represents the major change. At present, non-traditional security threats are already just as formidable as those of traditional ones. The changes of this nature are not difficult to understand. For the United States, the most severe security crisis since the end of the Cold War was the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In China, the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake claimed many innocent lives. Then, think about the Tsunami in Indonesia, the earthquake and the nuclear power plant accident in Japan, the financial crisis in the United States, and the debt crisis still going on in Europe. The list is endless. Some analysts pointed out that within the new global environment, poverty, climate change, nuclear proliferation, biological insecurity, social riots, as well as regional

10 98 Economic and Political Studies conflicts, international terrorism and economic crisis are all major threats to international peace and prosperity (Jones, Pascual and Stedman, 2009). Non-traditional threats have a transnational character, which means that the source of the threat may be in any corner of the world, possibly affecting the security of other countries. Taking al-qaeda as an example, members of this organization are spreading widely around the world, committing acts of terror against the United States, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Al-Qaeda have launched a series of terrorist attacks and bombing campaigns, taking innocent lives, from which actually no part of the world was spared. Thus, terrorist organizations do not merely threaten a small minority of countries, but pose a threat to the entire international community. Another example is poverty. An argument goes that poverty appears as part of the internal policies of certain countries and is mainly related to those countries concerned. It is biased, however. Poverty has its structural causes at the international and global level. In fact, these structural origins of poverty may also be the root of many other security threats. This has affected the lives of great numbers of people and led to a variety of diseases. More seriously, it results in disappointment, despair, and even hatred. The high correlations between poverty and violence, poverty and environmental degradation as well as poverty and state failure are more than just coincidences. When the gap between the rich and the poor is growing in any society, acts of violence become more prevalent. If the international community still does not take effective action, poverty in some countries will create severe problems, which all countries will have no choice but to face. Climate change also shows why the new threat knows no borders. Greenhouse gases, regardless of their origin, spread almost all over the world; and global warming will affect every country, regardless of a country s position or status. Each country must pay a price for greenhouse gas emissions. Global warming has already caused sea level rise, extreme weather, and natural disasters such as drought and heavy rains, not only affecting the daily lives of small island states and developing countries, but those of developed countries as well. Any one in any country cannot escape the effect of climate change. This is the changing nature of security threats. Common threats that endanger every nation in the world mean that traditional approaches to governance in the world need serious reform and traditional ways in international relations need revolution in both ideas and practices. 2. The Inadequacy of International Institutions for Governance Governance is imperative in any human group including international

11 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 99 society. From 1648 onward, Europe acted as the center of the international system, gradually forming a series of international institutions, which covered different areas of politics, security, economy and so on. With the extension of the international system, these institutions also expanded. For a relatively long period of time, the basic threat within the international system was the threat between states, so international institutions were designed primarily to deal with interstate relations and security. As discussed above, the challenges and threats have already experienced or are currently experiencing a fundamental change in nature, obviously since the end of the Cold War. As a result, the existing institutions for managing transnational challenges and security issues are seriously inadequate. One of the important reasons is that institutions designed to manage interstate relations of the international system are not adequate to address global and transnational issues, which are new to the whole international community. These represent both challenges and opportunities to the international community, and especially to the great powers and emerging countries. In contrast, the opportunity for cooperation outweighs the severity of the challenges, because no country can solve these problems alone. The security and prosperity of any country depends on cooperation between countries, which has become a fact of life in today s international politics. In other words, global challenges have undergone fundamental change since the end of the Cold War, but the construction and evolution of the international institutions have not been able to keep pace with this change. It has thus left the world with a serious governance deficit, which became most apparent during the financial crisis. Take the IMF and World Bank as examples. They are the major institutional protectors of global economic security, constituting part and parcel of the post-wwii power structure and governing arrangements. The voting right and representative power of memberstates within the two structures is proportional to their contributions, wherein the major developed countries hold a dominant position. In the era when the G7 dominated the world economy, these two structures could function fairly well within that context. But in the post-cold War era, especially as developing economies have become important stakeholders and are assuming a greater share of international economic governance, the existing institutions cannot reflect the new distribution of economic power in time and demonstrate ineffectiveness in managing global economic issues. The G20, in fact, was created to perform a stronger role of such governance. The demand from the international community for structural reform has become louder and louder, demanding that these structures become more representative in terms of voting rights, personnel, and members qualifications (Bradford and Linn, 2007, 6-8).

12 100 Economic and Political Studies As the most important institutional arrangement at the global level, the United Nations was also built according to the distribution of power and security concerns of the immediate post-wwii era. For example, the UN Security Council was precisely organized to deal with the most crucial security affairs of the international system, with collective security as its basic principle and the balance of power as the mechanism to ensure its effectiveness. At present, facing new security challenges, the UN is also trying to explore effective ways to deal with new global issues and transnational threats and human security, which was not even thought about when the Council was established. It is thus clear that the international governing institutions are inadequate, and the demand for more adequate and effective global governance has been growing because of the changing nature of world politics. 3. Global Threats and Cooperation among Major Powers Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes that the governance deficit, or the gap between the growing needs of global governance and the inadequate supply of the international system, is the major problem facing the international community. As a result, in the coming 20 years, the international community will continue to seek to reform, restructure and improve the international institutions in order to resolve the problem of governance deficit. The changed nature of security threats provides a good opportunity for international cooperation, but so far such a need for cooperation among the three major forces is far from satisfied, failing to reduce the governance deficit. Current security threats are transnational in nature: one country s security is intimately tied to the security of others. Countries, regardless of their sizes and neighbors, cannot face these threats alone. Therefore, the global consensus on implementing effective international structures now includes great and rising powers. The new power structure discussed means first of all the sense of responsibility for cooperation among the three major forces the United States, the EU, and the BRICS. It is essentially important that these actors work together for building a world order that will maintain, protect, and improve the global commons. This has already become the most promising field for potential cooperation in the international system. In fact, the future world order depends largely on whether this type of institutionbuilding can succeed. The G20 is more representative, focusing more on the role of rising economies. The group s construction was both necessary and meaningful, but the achievements have been limited. The problem that cooperation is difficult even though it is desirable is

13 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 101 largely attributable to the differences among the three major forces in the tripartite structure of the international system. The most marked point is that, despite the general acknowledgment of the severity of new security threats, they nevertheless prioritize these threats differently since each state operates according to its own development standard and with its own national interest in mind. Terrorism, poverty, environmental degradation, the AIDS epidemic, and nuclear proliferation occupy different positions of importance in a country s development agenda. For example, the three types of actors that form the tripartite power structure collectively understand climate change as a serious threat facing all countries; at the same time, however, there are different interpretations on how much responsibility each should bear for solving the problem. The EU member states want to see the swiftest progress on the issue; the United States seems not nearly as eager as Europe. The BRICS countries adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and decline to sacrifice the interests of national development. The climate change conference in Copenhagen is a good example, which amply shows that, although countries are aware of the seriousness of the problem of climate change, there are differences over exactly what action should be taken. In other areas of global security such as poverty, nuclear proliferation and energy security, there are also similar differences. III. The BRICS: Opportunity for Global Governance For the insufficient cooperation to deal with transnational threats there is indeed much blame on emerging countries, but this paper argues that emerging powers create opportunities for the world as a whole and for building a sustainable international order. Despite the continued existence of geopolitical competition, survival in the international system is no longer the first concern of many states, especially the major powers. Security threats are no longer the same as those prior to the Cold War. Rising powers in various fields now play an important role in promoting world peace and prosperity. When we say that the world has changed, a significant new feature is the emergence of rising economies, especially the emergence of the BRICS countries. Although history may remind us that the rise of great powers usually leads to a challenge against the prevailing international system and world order, the current situation is fundamentally different. The nature of security threats has changed, which means that neither the great powers nor emerging countries can successfully deal with the new security threats on their own; they must cooperate in order to coexist and prosper, which

14 102 Economic and Political Studies offers a gorgeous opportunity for the building of a new international order. Cooperation between the original great powers and emerging powers on global issues will, in a sense, determine the future of global order. The BRICS, as an important force in the tripartite power structure, have already become influential countries in the international system. According to traditional international relations theory, rising powers in the midst of their rise are bound to challenge the existing international system and international order, even leading to a war for hegemony or systemic war, because on the one hand, hegemonic powers seek to maintain their hegemonic position, while on the other hand, the rising powers have ambitions to revise the system according to their interests. For example, as a result of China s sustained rapid development, a question has come to linger: can China s rise be peaceful? Even if the international community generally agrees that since 1979 China s rise has been peaceful, concerns, or at least a sense of uncertainty, still exist over China s peaceful rise. Realists believe that, sooner or later, a rising power will challenge the hegemonic power and the prevailing international order, with the very high possibility of a violent systemic war (Mearsheimer, 2001; Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979; Organski and Kugler, 1980). Liberals worry about China s political system and ideology. Although they believe that the ideas and norms of liberalism, as the basic matter of the international regimes, will to a large extent pull China in and constrain its behavior, the international system is nevertheless anarchic (Ikenberry, 2008) and greatly limited, to say nothing of China s internal political and socio-economic processes which will greatly determine whether China s peaceful rise can continue. The rapid development of the BRICS countries has promoted the overall growth of the world economy. Since the 1980s, China has maintained an average annual growth of around 10%. Even in 2009, as the financial crisis hit the world and almost all Western countries suffered negative growth rates, China held strong with a growth rate of 8%. India and Brazil similarly made remarkable economic progress. From 1998 onward, Russia s economy has turned for the better. South Africa has also become an economic power, especially on the African continent where it plays a pivotal role. The economic achievements of these countries have increased their share in the world economy, while their performance in the global economic crisis has further strengthened their important role in global economic recovery. Looking back on the years , we can find that the great powers and emerging economies worked together to help the world out of crisis. In addition, emerging countries hold especially large quantities of foreign exchange and liquid financial assets. These foreign exchange and financial

15 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 103 assets are important tools to protect domestic financial markets and the national economy, but at the same time, the rational use of these assets will also contribute to the overall stability of the world economy. In the field of security, the BRIC countries act as stabilizing forces in the global and regional orders. Since the end of the Cold War, the world hasn t had to face a major interstate confrontation or worry about a systemic war, in large part thanks to the non-confrontational position taken by the emerging powers. Additionally, the emerging powers bear important influence on regional affairs. For example, China in East Asia, Russia in Central Asia, India in South Asia, all of which use their indispensable power to manage regional crises. If they play an active role in their respective regions, these regions may realize a relatively high level of stability. Otherwise, the regions in the world would become troubled waters. On the political level, the BRICS countries, sharing similar levels of development, have broad common interests. All are in the process of modernization, endeavoring to achieve industrialization and improve their people s living standards, thus making development the top priority in their overall strategy. But the BRICS are not allies and cannot form a stable alliance. Competition and conflicts of interests exist between them, as in the case of Sino-Indian relations. But these countries have many common interests in international affairs and can form a coalition of interests on many global issues, with the climate conference in Copenhagen as a good example. As mentioned above, a major problem in the world today is the gap between the demand for global governance and the inadequacy of the international institutions for global governance. If reform, transformation and construction of an international system of governance is an important area of cooperation for great powers, then the most critical step is to stimulate and promote cooperation between the original great powers and emerging ones. On one hand, these two groups have broad common interests and face common security threats; on the other hand, they are in different stages of development and have different definitions of national interests. These two points are basic objective facts, and thus the two groups naturally have different views on how to reform and transform the international system to achieve more effective global governance. It is natural. What is crucial is how to accommodate such differences. The future world order largely depends on whether the major developed and emerging countries are able to cooperate effectively. Therefore, cooperation between existing and emerging countries is positively essential. This paper does not mean to deny all the criticism of emerging economies

16 104 Economic and Political Studies as irrational and irresponsible. But the existing international system for governance does need reform. The mentality and strategy of the original powers, democracy and tolerance in international relations, opening up and reform of the international institutions are also important conditions for cooperation. In fact, only under the following three conditions can cooperation be achieved: First, emerging countries should be encouraged to participate in the decision-making process of the international system. The financial crisis has revealed the fact that emerging countries are both willing and able to participate in reform over a vast range. The G20 is one example: through the Group of 20, almost all emerging economies participate in international financial governance and management. If the crisis should come to an end and these countries should be marginalized, it would produce a mutual sense of alienation. If the international system is merely a tool used to fulfill Western interests, it would be difficult for emerging countries to participate in cooperation. Of course, cooperation relates to power-sharing and shared responsibility. In the process of addressing poverty, environmental degradation, transnational threats such as epidemics, terrorist attacks and economic turmoil, etc., cooperation with and from emerging countries is indispensable. To make these countries commit to sharing responsibilities, it is necessary to allow them to share power in international institutional reform. Reform or innovation of the international institutions to date has not fully solicited the views of emerging countries, which thus makes it difficult to earn their support. Second, legitimate demands and interests of emerging countries should be understood and respected. Emerging countries often have a dual nature: on the one hand, they are experiencing rapid development; on the other hand, they are still in the process of development, and their domestic processes have not yet reached the levels of developed countries. Therefore, in virtually all the fields of transnational security, every country has recognized the severity of the threat, but nevertheless has its own priorities to consider. European countries may be already quite post-modern whose living standards and environmental requirements are the highest among regions in the world. Meanwhile, emerging countries are heading toward modernization. For example, China and India must take into account problems of massive populations and the large number of their people under the poverty line. It is natural that they have different priorities and urgent concerns of their own, which should be respected during the process of building the global commons. Third, there is the issue of sharing responsibility through equal consultations

17 Power Shift, Governance Deficit and a Sustainable Global Order 105 in different issue areas. The views of the big powers and emerging countries on many global issues are different, mainly because they are in different stages of development and their definitions of national interests are therefore different. On one hand, emerging countries should assume greater responsibility and endeavor to achieve sustainable development. However, they must do it without substantially sacrificing their development. We often hear people in developing countries appeal to the world to listen to our voices. In order to earn global legitimacy, negotiation is crucial, and imposition counterproductive. Whether in terms of procedural or substantive issues, equality and consultation is the key. IV. Conclusion We are in an era of opportunity, challenge and change. Overall, the present era is full of hope. The possibility of the outbreak of systemic war is very unlikely, while the possibility for cooperation among the tripartite powers within the international system is fairly high. The international structure is still a very important factor, but hostility and confrontations are no longer the only option between poles and the only characteristic of the international system. America, Europe and the BRICS countries are the important forces for building the future world order, and the space for mutual cooperation is vast. The key question is how cooperation between the three forces will develop. In the contemporary world, the traditional meaning of security threats has largely changed. Only through the active cooperation of the three forces can there be an effective response to threats the world as a whole faces. Reform, transformation and innovation of the international system represent the greatest potential for cooperation. The key is whether the great powers and rising countries can cooperate successfully in the field of governance. If they treat each other with respect as partners, work together to build the 21 st century global order, and jointly face down security threats, the world will have a bright future; if zero-sum thinking prevails and confrontation is reciprocal, the world will sink into another dark age. There are both challenges and opportunities. Emerging countries are acting as stakeholders and participating in the international decision-making process, and they should be treated as equal partners in negotiations to reach a responsible consensus. Such measures are essential. This is the only way to protect the global commons, achieve effective global governance, and build a more sustainable world order.

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