Economic Crisis, Blame and Policy Preferences: Experimental Evidence from Spain

Transcription

1 Economic Crisis, Blame and Policy Preferences: Experimental Evidence from Spain José Fernández-Albertos 1 Alexander Kuo 2 Laia Balcells 3 1 Institute for Politics and Public Goods, Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) 2 Juan March Institute, Madrid 3 Institute for Economic Analysis, Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) Central European University, Budapest / January 30, 2012

2 Research Questions Who do citizens blame for the global economic crisis? To what extent are such views and preferences affected by partisan bias and information? and how does partisan biases mediate the impact of narratives of the crisis on blame? What is the effect of these narratives of the crisis on policy preferences?

3 Theoretical Debates Context of the Great Recession Who do people blame / exonerate? What do people think went wrong? Will protectionism return? What type of policy preferences will be affected by the crisis? Recent economic voting literature emphasizes the role that economic internationalization might play in limiting government responsibility for bad economic outcomes Blame should also be subjected to biases that we know of (partisan cues, information), and might also have an effect on policy preferences

4 Initial hypotheses Blame should also be affected by specific framings of the economic crisis. In particular, when globalization aspects of the crisis are made more salient, citizens will tend to blame the government less When domestic and labor market aspects of the crisis are made salient, citizens will be more likely to blame the government

5 Initial hypotheses Globalization narratives of the crisis will be linked to different policy responses. Globalization backlash (protectionism, opposition to globalization) when globalization aspects of the crisis are made more salient Domestic policy reform when domestic and labor market aspects of the crisis are made salient

6 Spain as an illustrative case

7 Spain as an illustrative case Hard hit by recession; a number of factors made salient in debating causes, extent of, and responses to the crisis: euro, rigidity of labor market, globalization, foreign banks, etc. Can exploit complex nature of crisis to test the mediating effect of partisan bias on narratives of the crisis: Globalization and domestic factors (i.e. labor market rigidity) of the crisis can be associated with two main parties

8 Research design Randomly assign citizens to receive different cues about the crisis Respondents read a short statement about the economic crisis that blames globalization-based or domestic-based factors for the extent/length of the crisis The source of the information can be: Non-partisan Partisan (socialist party, PSOE) Partisan (conservative party, PP)

9 Research design Treatment text We would like to present to you some conclusions that have been made about the current economic crisis. According to a report made by an institution linked to the Popular Party (PP) / Socialist Party (PSOE) / non- partisan experts, a series of international factors related to globalization / regulations in the Spanish labor market have played a major role in the development of the economic crisis that Spain is undergoing now

10 Research design Experimental Group Information Treatment Partisan Treatment Prob of Receiving Treatment Control Group None None.4 Group 2 Globalization Non-partisan.1 Group 3 Globalization PSOE endorsed.1 Group 4 Globalization PP endorsed.1 Group 5 Domestic Non-partisan.1 Group 6 Domestic PSOE endorsed.1 Group 7 Domestic PP endorsed.1

11 Who is to Blame for the Crisis? (Top-3, control group) Percent Domestic banks Foreign investors Government EU governments Labor regulations PSOE partisan PP partisans All Respondents Eurozone

12 Experimental Results: rank-ordered estimations

13 Experimental Results: rank-ordered estimations

14 Experimental Results: PSOE partisans exonerate the govt PSOE/glob treat Control group PP/glob treat Control group PSOE Partisans PP partisans

15 Experimental Results: PSOE partisans blame Euro govts PSOE/glob treat Control group PP/glob treat Control group PSOE Partisans PP partisans

16 Conclusions on blame Blame for who is responsible for the economic crisis is greatly affected by partisanship; Making globalization salient (as a cause of the crisis) makes co-partisans of the incumbent to exonerate the government; Making domestic issues salient makes opponents of the incumbent more likely to blame the government (less robust); Who conveys the information is important: Effect (2) only occurs when the incumbent party presents the information; effect (3) also when the incumbent presents the information (less robust)

17 Expectations on Policy Preferences H1 Preferences are more malleable in previously non-politicized issues. Greater effects of partisan cues in globalization preferences H2 The effect of narratives is conditional on party discourses. Greater effect of cues on domestic (politicized) issues Economic crisis drives globalization backlash

18 Experimental Results: Anti-euro Control 15 Glob treatment PP PSOE Ind

19 Experimental Results: Pro-labor market reform Control LM treatment PP PSOE Ind

20 Experimental Results: Anti-globalization Control Glob treatment PP PSOE Ind

21 Experimental Results: Anti-immigration (high-skilled) Percent PSOE/glob treat Control group PP/glob treat Control group PSOE Par9sans PP par9sans

22 Experimental Results: Anti-immigration (low-skilled) Percent PSOE/lab market treat Control group PP/labor market treat Control group PSOE Par?sans PP par?sans

23 Conclusions on policy preferences (very preliminary) No clear globalization backlash (Unexpected) Immigration result No evidence of parties being more able to influence their voters over global issues than over domestic ones Responses to experimental treatments in line with previous partisan discourses