The Perception of Smart Power and Public Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China

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1 The Perception of Smart Power and Public Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China Panel: Rising Powers: Balancing and Rebalancing Strategies Panel Code: RC36 Marco Antonio Batista Martins, University of Évora, Portugal Abstract The People's Republic of China has to solve numerous internal problems, from social to economic reform as well as the need to adapt the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in terms of maintaining the political regime and economic openness as a heritage of "One China, Two Systems" of Deng Xiaoping. It should be noted that one of the most important rules on the applicability of public diplomacy is to link the dynamics of foreign policy decision making process with the impact of the choice of each player in terms of outside opinion, namely from civil society. In matters of foreign policy it s not only relevant to identify the kind of intention from an actor in the international system, but in fact how effectively it will be accomplished. In order to establish and expand China's influence as a BRICS (Brasil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the political center core has developed a new strategy that integrates the combination of the use of hard with soft power whose result takes the form of smart power and an active public diplomacy in response to present challenges that require transnational solutions such as global financial stability, climate change, the issue of energy insecurity and terrorism. In fact, it's relevant to analyze how smart power and public diplomacy are interlinked as it regards the rise of China in terms of power and influence in the search to reshape the existing world order. Keywords: China, Smart Power, Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, International Relations Introduction The People's Republic of China has to solve numerous internal problems, from social to economic reform as well as the need to adapt the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in terms of maintaining the political regime and economic openness as a heritage of One China, Two Systems of Deng Xiaoping. It should be noted that one of the most important rules on the applicability of public diplomacy is to link the dynamics of foreign policy decision making process with the impact of the choice of each player in terms of outside opinion, namely from civil society. In matters of foreign policy it s not only relevant to identify the kind of intention from an actor in the international arena, but in fact how effectively it will be accomplished. 1

2 Furthermore, public diplomacy seeks to directly or indirectly influence the central decision core of the state as an actor of international relations, exerting influence over its citizens and using key tools such as information, education and culture, where it will take place the requirement of manage central core networks regarding strategic communication, relationships and also ties in the long term perspective and exchanges, coming all within a relationship G-to-P (government to people) (Noya, 2007). The concept of public diplomacy was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, diplomat and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and has been formally adopted by the U.S. government in the 1970s to influence public external opinion, likewise, an instrument of public diplomacy consisted precisely in the United States Information Agency (USIA, 1953 to 1999) during the decades of 1980 and Currently, the use of the concept of public diplomacy is the brand perception of a country that competes with other countries in the global market such as the British cases, Rebranding Britain (Panel 2000) and Spanish under the Aznar government,proyecto Marca España and under Zapatero, Alianza de Civilizaciones (Noya, 2007: ). For China, public diplomacy is considered as a foreign concept and it is used with the term dui wai xuan or wai xuan that means external propaganda. This expression has two levels of understanding, the first one regards nei xuan (internal propaganda), and the second one, wai chuan (external propaganda) (Yiwei, 2008: 259). This kind of mixing of internal and external propaganda translates the practice of the promotion of the Chinese image by emphasizing the magnitude of minjian waijiao, people-to-people diplomacy. Chinese Perception of Soft Power, Smart Power and Public Diplomacy In the view of Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997: ), the Chinese national interest and influence, is part of the basic principle of Deng Xiaoping, One Country, Two Systems. It is assumed that China has the political and economical capacity to act in the new theatre strategy in order to project his power and expand its influence area. As it can be shown, China is located in the centre of a first sphere of influence which collides with two other areas, on one hand, Russia, on the other the United States. The second sphere consists in granting the access to the Australian area of influence, namely the barrier of Southeast Asia. This projection can be made through recourse to the use of so-called hard power or soft power through the currently smart power considered by Joseph Nye, although this new term has arisen following the invasion of Iraq in Indeed, no state may claim to become a global power without having the ability to combine hard power with soft power in order to get smart power that will allow applying in a winning strategy. Currently, this strategy is also followed by the current U.S. President Barack Obama through the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on a combination of several diplomatic, 2

3 economic, military, political, legal and cultural (Armitage and Nye, 2007). According to Joseph Nye (1990: ), soft power emerged as an alternative source of power in controlling the international environment and the legitimacy of the prosecution of national interest or in defence of the national role. One of the main functions of soft power consists precisely in the achievement of determined action the state in reality will accomplish without the employ of war. For Joseph Nye (2002: 8-12) soft power allows to co-opt rather than coerce, through persuasion, since it had the ability to influence or to create a centre of attention. It should also be noted that for Sheng Lijun (2001: 53), soft power includes the combination of three characteristics: political, social and intellectual. According to this criterion, the state has to balance these three powers in parallel if it wants to make use of soft power. In this context, their combination makes these powers constitute highly cohesive instruments whose capacity to act shall be exercised or operating in either stable or unstable international arena where it will demonstrate its resilience and survival accompanied with a skilful political-economic strategic performance. In fact, since Mao Zedong external intervention by China has been characterized as the so-called diplomacy of patience and silence, forming a bridge in the use of smart power (Nossel, 2004: ) in a dynamic, constantly evolving process and accomplishing fast domestic growth. The international community, notably the United States, has been submitting China to intense pressure to change the regime and respect human rights. But CCP in order to avoid the collapse of the regime and all the military structure, since the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has a central role, is seeking to pursue this aim not immediately but as an alternative following the evolution of time (Tai, 2001: 61-90). In this circumstance, the political agenda of the Obama administration as part of smart power in the Sino-American relations is expressed by the following principles: 1) implement an offensive agenda in order to increase the presence of diplomats in both countries; 2) launch an agenda for the areas of energy and climate, creating a task force that will empower the strengthening of technological exchanges; 3) establish a new dialogue on finance and economics, through the implementation of a joint task force under the auspices of the Strategic Economic Dialogue in order to ensure greater cooperation and identifying opportunities (Cohen and Greenberg, 2009). Therefore, the use of smart power or resources to the U.S. or to China s national interests prevails in the name of global good. By the way, regarding China, it s possible to observe the growing presence and influence in Africa in the fields of health, humanitarian assistance, cooperation, academic exchanges and cultural professionals. For instance, during the year 2009, China used the following instruments of smart power in Africa: 1) in terms of energy resources it focused mainly in the oil producing countries like Sudan, Angola and Nigeria, as Africa represent about 30% in the share of oil imports of China; 2) within the framework of humanitarian assistance: a) the sending of 100 experts in agriculture, b) the establishment of 10 agricultural technology centres, 3

4 c) the construction of 30 hospitals; d) the guarantee of support of about 40 million US$ for the prevention and treatment of diseases such as malaria; e) helping peace process by sending 300 peacekeepers as volunteers; f) the construction of 100 schools; g) the training of 15,000 African professionals; h) increasing the number of scholarships to grant students (CSIS). Moreover, a sudden change might not necessarily lead to greater democratization of all political and social structure of China, as underscored by Sheng Lijun (2001: 56). China has maintained a policy around two fundamental principles: trust and prudence. Public diplomacy has been penetrating the international arena with an active attitude to become the strategic core of the Asia-Pacific region, whose main objectives are to maintain the unity and assert itself as a great power with BRICS. Precisely, in addition to China, this has a specific national determination that is being jointly shared with civil society to overcome nearly a century of humiliation ( ) and in order to regain its place as the middle kingdom (Barbé, 2011). To do this, it s evident the need to create basic conditions which will promote the integration and not exclusion of the poor, beyond the imperative character to refocus the international debate around human rights. The world is in transition to an effective change of paradigm because of states are operating simultaneously, as international relations actors, in an undeniable reality of global interdependence and unpredictability. The year 2001 in addition to symbolize the terrorist attack on U.S. territory, marks the beginning of a new economic era by the voice of Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs. Precisely, on November 30 emerged for the first time the acronym BRIC in the report "Building Better Global Economic BRIC" regarding countries as Brazil, Russia, India and China. In this context, taking into account the territorial sense of insecurity generated, it was essential to boost the economic and financial arena with international markets to avoid a global crisis. The BRIC emerged as a credible alternative and investment new market, as analyzed on the report of October 1, 2003, "Dreaming with the BRICs: the path to 2050". The answer in the search for a equilibrium of world economic policy results in providing alternatives regional centres converging on the potential of growth rates regarding the Gross Domestic Product and the number of inhabitants that bring together the four countries, although they represent political systems with contrasting cultural and social characteristics. For Jim O'Neill (2011) the International Monetary Fund and the G8 economies represent the inability to meet the challenges of the new world that is being built, particularly considering since 2011 as the BRIC markets growth, which should, in redefining the world order, become more politically astute. Note that the heterogeneity of the BRIC can generate apparently a first impression, concerning behavioural difficulties in the relationship between sovereign entities. However, Nicholas Spykman (1933) includes in the definition of international relations and relations between individuals relevant technical influence that they can stop engaging in intra-state behaviour. So, it should be noted that starting from the 4

5 individual, the homogeneity of the BRIC, particularly of its projection and the actual capacity of power transposed to the international system, will result in the congregation of wills of the individuals in the sphere of governing each of these countries, by other words, the political and economic elite. Without a doubt, it is evident the need to identify and analyze the aspirations and immediate needs involving the system (Kaplan, 1975). Relating to this case it is important to recall the visit of U.S. President, Barack Obama, in Brazil on 19 and 21 March 2011, whose speech emphasized the goal of achieving an equal alliance with the countries of Latin America, bringing to mind the concept of alliance for progress of former President John Kennedy. In a joint statement of President Barack Obama and President Rousseff is committed that the United States and Brazil represent a global partnership in building the world order. This kind of partnership also applies to China, given the intentions by the U.S. administration to opt for a strategic policy of rapprochement in the name of public diplomacy and the combination of smart power, that integrates the concepts of hard power and soft power to counter the growing Chinese influence in Asia-Pacific region, and also to avoid the formation of a regional military and economic region between China and Japan with implications for international security (Pelle, 2007). It should be noted that in the area of regional security in Central Asia China cooperates with Russia within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Moreover, in the American geopolitical vision India represents a natural strategic partner for being a factor of stability in South Asia with regard to Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Myanmar. On 14 April 2011 it was held the third BRIC summit, with the motto broad vision, shared prosperity in the city of Sanya, Hainan Province in the People's Republic of China, which was attended by the leaders of those powers. The agenda of the meeting addressed the following topics: (1) the strengthening of BRIC in the international arena, (2) the reform of the monetary system, (3) to trade in local currency, (4) the choice of policies on peace and conflict resolution, (5) the inclusion of South Africa in the BRIC countries, by its increasing geopolitical role, not only in southern Africa, but throughout the African continent. The fourth BRICS, with the participation of South Africa, was hosted in New Delhi, India, on 29 March 2012 under the theme BRICS partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity. The main agenda of this summit consists on considering and capturing the essence of the future marked by the instability in the euro zone, the slow pace of quota and reforms in the IMF in a complex and globalizing world in order to obtain common positions of BRICS regarding political, economic global issues as well as in a regional perspective for each country. Concerning not only the global as well as the regional challenges of the BRICS, by one hand the Delhi Declaration includes the Delhi Action Plan to boost cooperation under India s chairmanship of BRICS; by the other hand two agreements were reached and signed by the Development Banks form BRICS countries, namely Master Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in Local 5

6 Currencies and BRICS Multilateral Letter of Credit Confirmation Facility Agreement. As well as it was recognized in the third summit, it s vital to obtain peace and security in the Middle East and specifically in North Africa because not only can cause instability in international relations but also can directly generate negative consequences on citizens whose lives were substantively affected by the Arab Spring. When considering that the BRICS are an integral part of the international subsystem stand out in this case the following functions: (1) maintaining the internal structure of the state, (2) strengthening regionally and (3) expanding its activity in the external environment, (4) increasing its influence in the international system in order to maintain the balance of the global order with the other powers. However, the reconfiguration of world order around the BRICS also raises next to each society the emergence of a feeling, sometimes convergent, sometimes divergent, relative to the position of political and economic elite, which determines the degree of satisfaction from it. As regards the BRICS political system it seems to appear surprisingly strong and effective, although it s evident the urgent need of the political leadership to solve several domestic problems concerning effective democracy and respect for human rights. Although they are disparate realities, the factor identity establishes the relationship between the BRICS countries, bearing in mind the need for convergence to ensure survival in the international arena means that the notion of difference should be legitimately recognized by the other to minimize the divergence in name of a common sentiment subsequently adapted or transformed (Anderson, 2002), to be avoided disruption of external and internal environment. Moreover, the formation of alliances depend on the homogeneity (and structures similar values) or heterogeneity (different structures and values) of the system, as well as the ability to influence decision-making among other actors in international relations (Aron, 1997). Consequently, in the sphere of BRIC it s possible to identify four dimensions (Hemant, 2008), as follows: (1) cultural, in which each country has its characteristics, (2) management, which evidence the practice of different policies, (3) geography, where the allocation of the cost of transportation and communication derives from the distance between each country, (4) economic inequality because of costs, wages and access to natural resources. The BRICS eventually may fill a very important new role in redrawing the geopolitical order, and requiring the U.S. to share power with other powers in the international arena in order to avoid its transformation in an old Europe (Jain, 2006) of national states. Is it possible, however, reducing this problem to a simple, even if renewed, game of chess? We think that it s not possible; after all they are essential regulatory links, even if they differ in function of the cultural space experienced by social systems. Chinese leadership is making effective use of public diplomacy instruments in order to project a better external image of the country, for instance the policy to persuade the international community that China is taking measures and efforts regarding the promotion of human rights as well as all the aspects concerning the enormous potential 6

7 about Chinese culture, painting, literature, technology, martial arts, traditional medicine (Hooghe, 2005: 88), the campaign to win the 2008 Olympic Games, the Shanghai World Expo in 2010 in order to create a external positive image or the spreading out Confucius Institute around the world to reaffirm Chinese tradition and culture. There is a difference between target countries and target groups, for example, the China s Peaceful Rise message is aimed at a regional level whereas in an public diplomacy point of view mainly targets United States and EU. In terms of target groups, the government is focusing substantially on overseas Chinese communities that have a key role in promoting China s culture and political interests, and of course create a pro- China community across the world endowed with a global network (Hooghe, 2005: 95-96). The importance of media, newspapers, internet, education, events and publications had promoted the contact and the use of international media by Chinese people in order to make a more effective use of the possibilities of conveying the message domestically and abroad. Another major players or instruments of public diplomacy that is possible to identify is Voice of China, the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, the Foreign Publicity Office and the China s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This kind of instruments allows reaching out a wide audience and sharing the information that the government wants to dictate by increasing its visibility in the world. In developing China s public diplomacy activities, the State Council Information Office, established in January 1991, has a primary role to promote the country with a positive image that is working on to reduce poverty and to intensify the process of economic and political reforms. On 19 March 2004, the Division for Public Diplomacy was established under the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking into consideration public diplomacy as an important field in relation to diplomatic work to sustain foreign policies with the support of civil society (Yiwei, 2008: 260). The work in public diplomacy is accomplished in the following structures: International Communication Bureau of the Department of Publicity of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; the International Communication Office of the National People s Congress; the Chinese People s Political Consultative Conference; the Bureau of External Cultural Relations of the Ministry of Culture; the news Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Yiwei, 2008: 260). For example, one of the most sensitive subjects for Chinese government is focused on the case of Tibet. To this issue, the government had developed a plan of action that consists on selecting the target group/country and then creating a specific message to a specific audience, using all the instruments that can make possible to get the message across. The Chinese diplomacy has clearly defined objectives in relation to security and expansion of its influence in the region (Whiting, 1997: 42). This expansion, regionally, is also obtained with the approach to the Association of South East Asian Nations 7

8 (ASEAN). The main instability and expanding areas of influence in Southeast Asia are: 1) the first factor relates to the Mischief Reef and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, which have been followed by ASEAN in order to prevent instability; 2) another factor is the competition from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and China concerning Spratly and Natuna islands because of natural oil and gas reserves; 3) there is another concern regarding Taiwan in Southeast Asia, which is the security. As regards the bilateral relations between Japan and the United States, the security interests have prevailed over the economic. This position is aimed to reduce the threat of use of force or tension between Chinese and Taiwanese governments to maintain a favourable climate for investment and trade in the region (Hughes, 1997: 46-69). Clearly, the demonstration by China s military capacity is only one set of interests and threats to remember that has not abandoned the policy of one China, regarding it as their domestic sphere. In case of invasion, China would compromise his position not only regionally, but also towards the international community and given the current circumstances, both political and economic, it would not be favourable (Yahuda, 2002: ). It should be noted that in terms of foreign policy according to Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross (1997: 123) the imposition of greater importance is personified in the leader himself, in this case holds that Hu Jintao, along with the current Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, who took over the portfolio on 27 April 2007, have the ability and the strategic vision to lead China in the external environment. The choice of Yang Jiechi, who graduated from Shanghai Foreign Language School, also attended the University of Bath and London School of Economics in United Kingdom ( ), came from the need to continue to hold a diplomat ahead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with extensive knowledge of U.S. policy with regard to the formulation and decision-making of foreign policy, having been Ambassador of China in the U.S. from 2001 to 2005, in addition to have a deep knowledge on the subject of the regional area of Latin America, which in the BRICS context becomes a competitive advantage in the international arena (Lu, 1997: ). In this circumstance, the Chinese diplomacy is the result not only of interactions as well of convergences concerning nationalist sentiment and internal globalization that China has been subjected over the centuries. This strategic culture (Scobell, 2002) acquired in this context, leads to the development and to the definition of a sui generis foreign policy that unlike other states, believes that the use of force should be restricted, benefiting from the use of smart power as they were playing a chess game. Concerning to public diplomacy, China is continuously building its ability to gain abroad the necessary positive image in order to influence international relations. Huang Youyi (2011), member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), confirms that the major difficulty that China is facing is the understanding of overseas culture as well as societies. 8

9 In reality China has a lack of qualified translators that are able to carry out understandable messages overseas. For that reason, universities are setting up specific master s degree programs on international communication to guarantee that Chinese international communicators are going to be able to understand other cultures and above all to exchange effectively ideas or information with citizens from different countries and societies. In the opinion of Huang Youyi (2011) the traditional idea of harmonious yet different best expresses the accurate spirit of Chinese culture. For China the principal challenge in the name of public diplomacy is transforming international propaganda into effective professional communications in the age of internet accompanied with a more interactive society. Zheng Yannong (2011), deputy director of China International Public Relations Association, believed that for China building veritable national images is one of important ways to develop soft power as President Hu Jintao (2007) in his speech in the 17 th National Party Congress emphasized: We must keep to the orientation of advanced socialist culture, bring about a new upsurge in socialist cultural development, stimulate the cultural creativity of the whole nation, and enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests, enrich the cultural life in Chinese society and inspire the enthusiasm of the people for progress. Conclusion: obstacles and challenges In foreign policy terms, it is clear that the Three Worlds Theory of Mao Zedong presented in 1946 consisting in the First World, the superpowers, the Second World, the superpowers' allies and the Third World, the nations of the Non-Aligned Movement cannot be contemplated at present, derived not only from the independence of African, the Latin American and Asian countries but for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union collapse. China from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao has been adapting to the world stage, especially in the environment after 9/11. Taking into account that the Beijing authorities to foreign policy is seen as a corollary of domestic politics, geostrategic vision fits within the international community to demonstrate that the system remains strong as in Mao's time, and that is necessary to contain the hegemonic power of the United States, increasing the role of the United Nations as well designing an appropriate approach in multilateral diplomacy as a powerful instrument in order to push out cooperation with multilateral institutions in strategic areas that would serve China s national interest accompanied with a concrete policy behaviour. In fact, the use of smart power by China has intensified in multilateral terms, in order to enhance its international status. Recall that in the past followed the Soviet departure 9

10 from the Marxist line, in tends to establish itself as a future regional force with the potential to reach a global projection capability, if it can maintain political stability and economic and above all hold an important role along BRICS as emerging economies. Anyway, the fact that there is only an apparent weakening of the state, because of the loss of political sovereignty of weaker units, is reinforced by the moves of the "global civil society" as the Wall Street occupy movement, actually illustrate the deterioration of a feeling of instability of world order, but probably what is happening is a new design of the world order that will require the consent, not just of a superpower or a hegemonic power, like the United States, but with a block called the BRICS powers that have been changing the behaviour of the international system, particularly through the projection of China at the global level with a Europe increasingly fragmented (Friedman, 2012). Precisely in its ascent, the role of the Chinese elite, with the rise of a new generation of technocrats or red capitalists, has become of paramount importance, considering that the CCP is to recruit people and train them in reputable universities both at home and abroad, preferably in the United States and EU. This process reveals the changes from the time that Mao s political elite in the CCP were graduated from former Soviet Union universities. In this particular case, we consider that in some way is a throwback to the past, the first half of the twentieth century, whose academic and political elite came mostly from abroad universities. Consequently one of the main elements which characterizes the third and fourth generation leaders respect to their training, not only in management, administration and engineering, but also in the field of humanities, political and social sciences. Nevertheless, in the era of information, instant communication as gain much more influence than in the past. So, for China it is crucial to concentrate and develop a dynamic public diplomacy by increasing the perception that naturally tend to focus on the general public opinion worldwide by promoting its image not only on a cultural basis by sustaining language programs abroad with the Confucius Institute or other kind of similar activities inherent to artistic, technological and scientific but also on democracy, transparency and respect of Human Rights. It s a reality that China has many unsolved internal problems, from social, political reform to Human Rights however one China, two systems seems to continue to be the role model in terms of maintenance of the ideological system and economic openness, facing the dynamism in the use of smart power, creating a Chinese international image and also promoting a domestic image as a national strategy to accomplish the transition and the perception of propaganda to public diplomacy. It should be noted that one of the most important rules on the applicability of public diplomacy is to link the process and mechanisms on carrying out a foreign policy that includes the impact of the decision of each international actor in terms of outside opinion, civil society, and the observation of the reality vis-à-vis the difference between intentions and effective actions. So, the Chinese government plays a crucial role on promoting public diplomacy in order to establish a new strategic vision that will improve the use of smart power in the 10

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