From Prohibition to Permissiveness: a two waves change on morality issues in Spain

Transcription

1 1 From Prohibition to Permissiveness: a two waves change on morality issues in Spain Laura Chaqués Bonafont Research fellow, Institut Barcelona Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) Political Science Department University of Barcelona laurachaques@ub.edu Anna M. Palau Roqué Political Science Department University of Barcelona apalau@ub.edu ECPR Reykjavik, august 2011

2 2 In 2012, Spain has a one of the most permissive regulatory frameworks on morality issues in Europe. In less than three decades regulation of issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, stem-cell research or assisted reproduction techniques became increasingly permissive following two major waves. The first starts in the eighties, after democratic transition to democracy, lasting less than two terms in which the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) is governing under absolute majority, and it is limited to issues like abortion, ART and SCR. The second wave starts in the late nineties, lasting more than a decade in which two political parties alternate in power, the Partido popular (PP), governing under majority from 2000 to 2004, and later the PSOE governing under minority for the rest of period. It is in this last decade that the regulation of old issues like abortion, ART or SCR turn into increasingly permissive, and new issues like samesex marriage and euthanasia through omission get for the first time into the Spanish political agenda. These two waves of changes take place following most of the features of what Engeli et al. (2011) attribute to the religious world. Morality issues raise a highly politicized debate, mainly dominated by large political parties (PP and PSOE) that compete across different policy venues by taking highly conflicting positions. In this process, the PP adopts a quite reactive position, framing these issues following most of the principles and values of the Catholic Church, and intervenes only when liberalization is a serious threat. By the contrary, political parties on the left are the main policy entrepreneurs pushing morality issues to the political agenda, introducing new policy proposals and information, and diffusing new ways of thinking towards a more permissive regulation. By doing that, political parties on the left try to gain the political advantages and electoral rewards connected to the issues that they own (Green-Pedersen 2007, Petrocik 1996), while the Partido Popular, and regional Christian democratic political parties are aimed to divert attention by pushing moral issues out of the political agenda and to consolidate a situation of non-decision. Overall, morality issues capture more than 4% of the parliamentary bills introduced in the Spanish parliament from 1977 to present and about 1.5% of all parliamentary initiatives. But important differences exist on the level of salience and political conflict across issues. Abortion captures about 50% of the attention of morality

3 3 issues and joint to same-sex marriage, is one of the issues that generate more controversy and political conflict across political parties. By the contrary, those issues directly connected with medical advances like ART or SCR despite they generate an important and intense political debate, are less salient and controversial. These differences in issue attention and the degree of political conflict across political parties are not only explained by policy preferences but also changes on public opinion, exogenous factors related to technological change and institutional factors (Varone et al. 2003). Policy preferences and shifts in the prevailing balance of power are important sources of policy change on morality issues. Once a new political party wins elections the introduction of a new way of thinking about morality issues could be less complicated, opening a policy window for those actors willing to alter the existing regulatory model. Still, the Spanish case suggest that policy preferences alone cannot explain why the PSOE introduced a quite conservative bill aimed to the partial decriminalization of abortion in 1983, leaving aside some of its preferences as defined in the political campaign of 1982, or why the conservative party changed the regulation of ART and SCR in 2003 towards increasing permissiveness, despite these issues were never defined as a priority by the second government of José María Aznar, and the opposition of the Catholic Church. The capacity of policy actors to introduce their ideas and policy preferences is constrained by the increasing secularization of Spanish society, and institutional factors like the existence of a-priori judicial review, which was an important means of parliamentary obstruction until 1986, the type of government or /and existing policy legacies. In order to analyze the importance of morality issues in the Spanish agenda we rely on the databases created by the Spanish Policy Agendas following the methodology of the Comparative Agendas Project. We have taken into account the following indicators for the period : (1) the total references to moral issues in the party manifestos of the general elections; (2) the number of governmental and parliamentary bills introduced by each political party; (3) the number of laws finally passed, and (4) the number of oral questions introduced in plenary meeting or commissions by political party. As far as abortion is the issue that captures most of the attention, we have created an additional database taking into account the number of written questions, motions and interpellations by political party and deputy from 1977 to present. Finally, the data

4 4 about the evolution of public opinion is provided by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) 1 and the World Values Survey (WVS) 2. Spain in the religious world Contrary to most expectations, a Christian Democratic party did not emerge in the Spanish party system after transition to democracy. The failure to consolidate a Christian Democratic party in the centre-right spectrum of the Spanish party system is a surprising development given the Franco regime s connection with the Catholic Church, the power of various Catholic Action organizations, and the historical strength of several Christian Democratic groups, most of them enjoying international support (Montero et al. 2008, Gunther and Montero 2009, Matuschek 2004). But, after Francoism there is an explicit determination on the part of both, political parties and religious elites, not to politicize religion and to de-emphasize the state-church cleavage (Matuschek 2004). The Church avoided to participate in politics as it did during the second republic in 1930 s, and explicitly rejected to support a political party (Linz 1980, Gunther and Montero 2009). By the same token, Christian democrat elites avoided a institutionalized link with the Catholic Church, and only participated in national general elections in alliance with other political parties with UCD during democratic transition, and latter with Alianza Popular- Partido Democrático Popular in the eighties. There are some exceptions at the regional level, especially in the case of the PNV in the Basc Country, UDC in Catalonia, or UPN in Navarra, where Christian democratic parties gain a relevant position in the party system, Despite this, religious voting is still important to explain electoral behavior in Spain (Montero et al. 2008). The position of the Catholic Church towards some issues, especially morality issues, corresponds to the preferences and positions of a large part of the voters of the Partido Popular, which in more than 50% are practicing Catholics. As figure 1 illustrates, there is an important decline in the percentage of practicing Catholics, but this decline is especially significant in the case of political parties on the left 3. Practicing Catholics are about 40% and 22% of the electorate of the PSOE and IU respectively in the late seventies, while today only 20% and 7% of the electorate of these two political parties are practicing Catholics. By the contrary, despite the decline, practicing Catholics are always a majority among the voters of the PP (51.9% in 2008).

5 5 Overall, following Montero and Calvo (2000:134) this data suggests that voters with a traditional understanding of religiosity, whose behavior is conditioned by the moral principles defined by the Catholic Church, tend to vote for the PP, while those with a more individualistic understanding of religiosity who are not bound by the catholic moral teaching, vote for the PSOE. This link between the PP and religious beliefs is also present in the debate about moral issues, and it is quite stable from the late eighties to present, especially for the case of abortion. More than 50% of the PP electorate agrees with the recommendations of the Catholic Church on abortion, compared with only 19.2% of the PSOE voters and 7.3% of the IU voters in Religious values towards moral issues have been integrated into party politics by the Partido Popular which assumes the role of defending the positions of the Catholic Church with different intensities across time and issues. The Catholic Church has always opposed any alteration of the status quo towards a more permissive regulation of moral issues (with the exception of ART in the eighties), while the PP has adopted a more permissive attitude towards some issues like ART as a response to the demands of the medical profession and increasing secularization of the Spanish society. By the contrary, the PSOE and IU assume the role of secular parties, framing moral issues in direct opposition to religious values for the whole period. This conflict between secular and religious positions has been reinforced by the participation of other political actors, mainly the medical profession, feminist and gay movements and the Catholic Church. Still, political parties are the central actors in the policy process over morality issues, which become increasingly politicized in a context of growing secularization. The secularization of Spanish society Spain is transformed during the last decades from being a Catholic Country to a country with a catholic culture (Brasslof 1998, Requena 2005, Pérez Agote 2010). From the early nineties, most part of the Spanish citizens, especially younger people consider religion as something distant, unknown and outside the limits of the everyday. In contrast to previous decades, there is not an opposition to religious institutions or a clear anticlerical sentiment like in the first decades of the twentieth century, neither a loose of interest in something known and near like in the seventies and eighties, but an ignorance with regard to religion and the church (Pérez-Agote 2010:226). The percentage of

6 6 citizens that do not believe in God increases from 8.1 to 21% between 1978 and 2008, those who consider themselves as catholic (practicing or not) decreases from 90.6 to 73.5%, and practicing Catholics are almost reduced by half (from 59 to 28%) for the same period 5. Increasing secularization occurs in parallel of a collapse of religious homogeneity and the lost of monopoly of the Catholic Church the number of citizens that follow other religions different than Catholic religion increases from 0.6 in 1978 to 1.6 in 2008 as a consequence of the process of globalization and increasing flows of immigration 6. The decline in the religious practice has been accompanied by a major transformation in State-Church relations for the last years. Contrary to the political context of the second republic of 1931, the new constitution of 1978 and the coming to power of the socialist in 1982 did not lead to a trauma or a significant threat to the Catholic Church (Linz 1993). The PSOE did not review the existing Concordat, despite the principle of state secularism established in the Constitution; neither changed the financing of the church, or its role in education policy. With the arrival of the PP to power in 1996, the Catholic Church gains some protagonism in the political sphere and the religious framing of some issues, like ART and SCR becomes increasingly important in the policy process. For some authors (Gunther and Montero 2009) this contributes to reactivate the secular-religious cleavage in Spain, a cleavage that becomes increasingly visible once the PSOE returns to power in The governments of J.L. Rodríguez Zapatero ( ) foster three different policies that directly attempt the interest of the Catholic Church: the elimination of the teaching of religion as a compulsory course in primary and secondary education, the transformation of the financing of the Catholic church into a more restricted system, and the introduction of a new set of regulations over morality issues that directly oppose religious values. The adoption of more permissive regulations about abortion, euthanasia, ART, SCR or same-sex marriages encourage this tension in state-church relations that culminates in mass demonstrations led by the Catholic Church and other civil society organizations against the incumbent government. For the first time after consolidation of democracy, the Catholic Church (Conferencia Episcopal) called for Catholics to cast ballots against the PSOE in the 2008 general elections, alleging the destruction of democracy and the disintegration of the family, putting an end to

7 7 three decades of partisan neutrality of the Spanish Catholic Church (Gunther and Montero 2009:190). These changes open the debate about the role of the Catholic Church in the political system in a context of increasing secularization of the Spanish society, and rising religious fragmentation related to immigration (especially Muslims). Secularization is seen by the socialist government as a new social scenario in which regulatory reforms could be put into practice with the support of most of the Spanish population and political parties, especially those on the left. Secularization is also important to explain the ambiguous position adopted by the PP in the regulation of some issues, especially ART and SCR in the early 2000, and also the increasing use of unsecular framings to refer to issues like abortion as we explain below. Despite this, the PP publicly takes a stand close to the Catholic Church, especially with regard to abortion, and same sex marriage, adopting a quite reactionary position oriented to prohibit same-sex marriage, and to foster policy change towards a more conservative regulation of abortion. Politicization of morality issues Morality issues are highly politicized, with important differences in terms of salience and degree of policy conflict. Overall, these five issues capture about 4,2% of all parliamentary bills introduced from 1977 to 2012, about 0,3% of the oral questions and 0,5% of the governmental bills. Most of the political attention measured by the total number of laws, bills and oral questions introduced by all political parties in the Congreso de los Diputados 7 is concentrated on abortion (53%) followed by ART and SCR (19%), same-sex marriage (16%) and euthanasia through omission (12%). As figure 2 illustrates, attention to same-sex marriage and euthanasia is almost inexistent before 1996; ART and SCR are especially salient in the mid eighties and the early 2000, while abortion always captures the attention of policymakers. Attention to morality issues differs quite significantly across political parties. Left parties push morality issues into the political agenda almost permanently and this is especially the case for the far-left; while the right simply neglects these issues adopting a strategy of non-decision. As table 1 illustrates, IU always makes reference to abortion in its party manifestos, and it is the only political party that refers to same-sex marriage (from 1986) and euthanasia (from the 1996 national general elections) before In

8 8 the case of the PSOE, abortion is the only issue that is always present in the party manifestos, while same-sex marriage and euthanasia though omission only gets into the party manifesto in Art and SCR are almost always mentioned in the party manifestos of IU, but defined quite vaguely, making reference to biotechnology in very general terms, with the exception of the party manifestos of 2004 where for the first time there is a clear definition of policy preferences for both IU and the PSOE. In the case of PP, some issues like same sex marriage or euthanasia are simply never mentioned in the party manifesto, while others like ART or SCR are only mentioned in general terms from 2000, and 2004 respectively. Abortion is the only moral issue that is always present in the manifestos of the PP, with a quite different framing from the eighties to present. In 1986 abortion was defined as a new type of crime, while in 2004 abortion is mentioned indirectly, making references to unwanted pregnancy and the need to give support to those women without economic resources, and linking the problem of abortion to information failures. Finally, regional political parties only make some references to ART and SCR sporadically, while issues like abortion, same-sex marriage or euthanasia are simply neglected in their general election party manifestos. A detailed analysis of parliamentary activities, including all governmental and parliamentary bills and oral questions introduced by political parties in the Congreso de los Diputados from 1977 to 2012, illustrates that there is some correspondence between policy promises and policy actions. As figure 3 illustrates, IU and the PSOE (with the grupo mixto that includes most of the deputies of the far-left) introduce most bills and oral questions related to morality issues with some interesting differences across issues. The political debate about ART and SCR is almost monopolized by the PSOE the PP only introduces 4 initiatives related to these issues, while the debate about euthanasia through omission and same-sex marriage is almost monopolized by the far-left. By the contrary, attention to abortion is more fragmented across political parties. Figures 4 gives detailed information about all interventions in the Congreso de los Diputados related to abortion from 1983 to present. IU captures most of the attention related to abortion followed by the PSOE and the PP with important differences on the type of initiatives and the strategy taken by each political party. In the case of the PP, mobilization only takes place as a reaction to the initiatives taken by other political parties. This is, the PP only pays attention to abortion once the first law of abortion is

9 9 passed (from 1985 to 1989), and just after the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero introduces a governmental bill oriented to liberalize the regulation of abortion. The PP never promotes policy change toward a more conservative regulation (that for example prohibits abortion for mental health reasons after the 22 nd ), and contrary to other political parties, most interventions are written questions (31 out of 44) aimed to get information from the socialist governments about policy implementation. By the contrary, the mobilization of IU and PSOE is almost permanent and especially high in the mid-nineties when a second governmental bill was introduced during the last legislature of Felipe Gonzalez. Most initiatives are oral questions and parliamentary group bills with no chance to be passed, just aimed to give visibility and to create debate about abortion. In short, left political parties have issue-ownership on morality issues. They led the process of policy change and engage in a highly politicized debate oriented to transform the way moral issues are framed and regulated. Contrary to conservative political parties, moral issues are almost always present in their political agenda and constitute an important priority for the PSOE governments. Finally, differences also exist on the way these political parties frame morality issues. In general terms, there is a cleavage between left political parties that always defend policy change towards an increasing permissiveness using a secular framing, and political parties on the right that defend a more conservative position in the case of ART and SCR, or a reactionary position in the case of abortion and same sex marriage. When framing these issues, the PP most of the time refers directly to the rights of the unborn, or/and the protection and inviolability of life following what Engeli et al (theory chapter in this book) refer to religious framing. By the contrary, in the case of the PSOE or IU, moral issues are framed in secular terms, focusing on legal questions and women s rights, science and progress related to new technological advances. The next sections are oriented to explain in more detail these differences across issues. Policy change across morality issues 1. Abortion The Ley Orgánica de salud sexual y reproductiva y de la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo passed in 2010 puts an end to the criminalization of abortion introducing a

10 10 period model that recognizes women reproductive rights. According to this law women have unlimited individual choice within the firsts 14 weeks of pregnancy to decide whether to terminate pregnancy without having to give special reasons. This is one of the historical vindications of the left and feminist s social movements that cannot be reached in the early eighties for institutional a priori constitutional censure and cultural reasons (Barreiro 1998). Actually, the organic law 9/1985 is a reform of one article of the penal code that keeps the definition of abortion as a crime punishable by law, but recognizes three exceptions under which a woman can terminate her pregnancy 8. This is a quite conservative model of regulation that did not respond to the policy preferences of the left whose aim was the total decriminalization of abortion neither the right whose aim was to keep abortion as a crime under any circumstances. The question is why the PSOE that was governing under majority did not respond to its electoral promises introducing a more permissive regulatory framework. According to Barreiro (1998), a priori judicial review became a weapon exercised by the main party in the opposition in the face of the socialist absolute majority to block or/and limit the scope of the political reform. At present judicial review can only take place a priori when it involves the ratification of international treaties, but until 1985, a priori constitutional censure that is, judicial review following parliamentary approval of a piece of legislation before it entered the statute book could take place for organic laws (Barreiro 1998). This institutional framework was instrumentalized by the PP which submitted to constitutional censure any of the organic laws that contradict its policy preferences, blocking policy change until the court reached a decision (Barreiro 1998:151). In the case of abortion, 11 days after the bill was passed in 1983, the Constitutional Court accepted the recurso de inconstitucionalidad introduced by the PP, spending more than a year to take a final decision 9. This institutional context not only defines the capacity of influence of policy actors, but also frames the terms of the legislative debate by ruling in and out certain policy alternatives and generating rhetorical resources for defenders of incremental, as opposed to far-reaching, policy change (Banchoff 2005:202). A more permissive regulation of abortion in Spain was not even considered in the political debate of Advocates of the pro-choice option considered that the possibilities to pass a permissive law were quite impossible after 40 years of Francoism and cultural domination of the

11 11 Catholic Church, with more than 40% of public opinion giving support to the criminalization of abortion, and a belligerent position of the main conservative political party against regulatory change. Accordingly, pro-choice defendants framed the issue of abortion not as a matter of individual choice, but as a health issue: under some circumstances abortion is necessary to avoid a major problem. The debate never focuses on whether women should have the right to decide when to terminate pregnancy, but whether abortion was necessary to protect a mother s life, or to avoid useless suffering in case the unborn child had a disease with no cure. Even conservative parties like UDC or PNV give some support to this type of framing of abortion, and only the Partido Popular, and the Catholic Church were completely against the decriminalization of abortion. Once the organic law 9/1985 is put into practice, advocates of the pro-choice option left political parties (mainly IU and PSOE), the feminist social movement and public institutions like Instituto de la mujer keep giving attention to abortion creating new information that highlights the magnitude of abortion as a social problem, and the lack of efficiency of existing regulation. In doing so, advocates of the pro-choice option try to legitimate their proposal by refereeing to the position of international institutions 10, and by changing the terms of the debate about abortion. Pro-choice defendants do not attempt to change basic beliefs about abortion, but to focus on different attributes of abortion as a problem (social inequalities, need of sexual education, legal uncertainty) in order to capture the attention of policy actors, convince public opinion, and to finally promote policy change (Baumgartner et al. 2008). Policy actors defending a more permissive legislation were focusing the debate not only as a matter of rights, but especially about what solutions were most appropriate to fight abortion as a problem using a secular framing. The question is not whether you think abortion is good or bad; but whether you think a women should go to prison in case she decides to terminate pregnancy under circumstances that are different from those defined in the penal code. This strategy is oriented to fit with the evolution of public attitudes towards abortion in Spain. In % of citizens think that abortion is never justifiable, in 1990 this percentage decreases to 30% and, from then, citizens opinion has remained relatively stable in 2008, 29.7% of the population thinks that abortion is never justifiable. A similar trend exists for the number of citizens that directly opposes the criminalization of abortion. In 1995,

12 12 51% of the population does not consider that a women or a physician should go to prison in case they practice an abortion, almost the double than a decade earlier. In 2008, 64% of the population gives support to the reform oriented to fully decriminalize abortion. This illustrates the success of the framing strategy lead by parties on the left, and also the ability of policy entrepreneurs to highlight the problems and inefficiencies of the existing regulatory framework in terms of access to public services, territorial inequalities, and dramatic increases on the number of abortions. From to 2009 the number of abortions increases from 3,9% to 13,8 for women under nineteen years (Ministerio de Sanidad, 2009). Inequalities in terms of access are also one of the main problems related to abortion. From the early nineties most abortions are carried out in private centers (97%) and in some CCAA to terminate pregnancy is almost impossible. In Navarra, Galicia and Extremadura the abortion rate is three times less than in Madrid, Baleares or Murcia. These differences are mainly explained by cultural and social factors. Navarra is one of the CCAA with stronger catholic values, where a Christian democratic party has the majority of votes (UPN), and it is also the territory in which most physicians refuse to practice abortion for reasons of conscience. Regional governments cannot formally ban access to public health services, but they have the authority to limit the financing of some health services (like the distribution of abortion pills in public health institutions), and informally to give support to disruptive types of mobilization like physicians that declare reasons of conscience for not practicing abortions. Differences across regional governments also exist in terms of public coverage: while the public health system of Andalusia finances the whole cost of abortion, in Catalonia, Valencia, or the Basque Country only about 25-35% of the total cost is covered by public institutions. Finally, the evolution of the abortion rate highlights the flexibility of the exiting regulation that the facto allows to terminate pregnancy under any circumstance and without time restriction. Actually, one of the most controversial aspects of the law of 1985 is that women can terminate pregnancy after the 22 nd week in case of serious mental and physical harm, circumstance that is banned in most countries and also in the new law of The flexibility of the existing regulation is also illustrated by the fact that, despite most abortions are formally reported under the circumstance to avoid physical or mental harm to the mother (almost 98% of the cases), when asked, most women reported that the main reasons to terminate pregnancy were the lack of economic

13 13 support; no support from the partner; or simply because it was not planned circumstances that are defined as punishable crime by law. The flexibility of the regulatory framework defined in 1985 should be understood as one important factor that fosters policy stability. The fact that any women could terminate pregnancy using this informal path discouraged mobilizations of different social groups (especially feminist movements), and also contributed to limit an initial quite belligerent position of the PSOE towards more permissiveness. Despite regulatory change on abortion was one of the electoral promises of the PSOE in 1993, the incumbent government only introduces a governmental bill some months before the general elections of 1996, as a means to give visibility to abortion in front of the electorate. The PSOE was also responding to the demands of CIU, a coalition of two catalan regional political parties Convergència Democrática de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democrática de Catalunya, (one of the regional Christian Democratic parties in Spain) that was giving support to the PSOE while governing under minority. Among many other initiatives, CIU vetoed a more permissive regulation of abortion with the support of other conservative political parties like the PP, and the Catholic Church, despite most of the Spanish population was already against the criminalization of abortion. By the same token, the flexibility of the regulation of abortion is also important to explain one of the most important weaknesses of the PP along the political debate of the new law of The PP defended a reactionary position quite connected with the Catholic Church that proved to be quite inconsistent with the evolution of abortion as a social problem. Here the question is why the PP did not use its dominant position in the legislative process while having the absolute majority of seats ( ) to change regulation and, at least, to prevent that women terminate pregnancy after the 22 nd week as in most other advanced democracies (and as the law of abortion of 2010). Despite the failures of existing regulation, the PP denied the problem and adopted a situation of non-decision about issues like abortion, whose debate could generate important electoral rewards for those political parties with issue ownership over moral issues. The law passed in 2010 situates Spain among the advanced democracies with one of the most permissive regulations of abortion. This regulatory change responds to the prevalent values and principles of the Spanish society on the twenty first century, and has the support of most political parties, with the exception of the PP that sent the

14 14 law to the Constitutional Court for judicial review. As in the eighties, the PP seeks the support of a conservative venue, the Constitutional Court, in order to give visibility to its policy position in front of the electorate. Actually, one of the electoral promises of the PP, for the next general elections of 2012, is to derogate this law going back to a conservative regulatory framework as defined the mid-eighties. This illustrates the existing policy conflict and the cleavage between secular-religious framings in relation to abortion, a cleavage that it is also very intense in the case of same-sex marriage, and to some extends in the case of SCR. ART and SCR: the role of technology Contrary to the case of abortion, policy change on ART or SCR did not respond to any electoral promise, never captured the attention of political parties during the political campaign; neither were directly mentioned in any of the party manifestos of the general elections of 1982 or ART gets into the agenda in the mid eighties on a wave of positive publicity and enthusiasm as a response to technological changes. Despite the uncertainty and medical risk associated to these techniques, ART is seen as a new solution to the old problem of infertility that was affecting about 15% of the Spanish population. This optimism is also present in the 2000, once success in cloning and culturing stem cells from human embryos is announced, and especially once this medical advances are related to the possibility to combat genetic diseases like diabetes or Alzheimer (Banchoff 2005: 203). In this case, the controversy created by research with embryos is overcome by the optimism and positive attitude about the benefits that research activities could generate in the future. In the eighties, regulation of ART and SCR is developed in two different laws, and this constitutes an important difference in relation to further regulations developed from 2003, that deal with both issues at the same time in a single law. Most of the debate about research activities is almost monopolized by the law 42/1988 de donación y utilización de embriones y fetos humanos o de sus células, tejidos u órganos which regulates the donation of human organs, cells, and fetus; while all questions related to ART are regulated by the law 35/1988 of 22 November about Assisted Reproduction Techniques. These laws introduce a quite permissive model of regulation according to which any woman can access to any of the allowed assisted reproduction techniques independently of whether she is sterile, married or older than a certain age. Besides, a

15 15 wide range of the so called basic techniques are allowed artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and egg and embryo donation with the exception of cloning or surrogacy, which are completely forbidden, and pre-implantation diagnosis, which is simply nonregulated 12. The political debate about ART and SCR is not so controversial than the case of abortion, and despite the important role of political parties, it is mostly dominated by the medical profession. Both cases illustrate how policy change is more a result of a gradual accumulation of knowledge and the generation of policy proposals by specialist that are gradually diffused among policy makers (Kingdon 1995:17). The medical profession invested many resources bringing their conception of assisted reproduction techniques to policy makers, trying to convince them that their view of the problem was the best option in terms of technical feasibility, efficiency and fairness, and did not contradict basic principles or values of the Spanish society. In this view, any doubts and fears about ART should be regarded as irrational. Regulation is needed in order to guarantee social progress and to promote the expansion of scientific developments within the boundaries of acceptable human research, avoiding any conflict with human rights or the dignity of the human being. Political parties played a key role channelizing these demands and ways of thinking into policy actions, adopting a secular framing with some exceptions, basically the most conservative branches of the PP. Several factors contribute to the adoption of this secular framing of ART and SCR (Dubouchet and Klöti 2004: 112): first, political elites dealing with these problems had a medical background, and most of the questions and debates held in the Spanish Parliament were formulated in medical terms. This limited the possibilities of entry of alternative framings, mainly those related to the principles and values of the Catholic Church. Despite this, the conservative party (called by then Alianza Popular) opposed to the SCR regulation and sent the law for judicial review to the Constitutional Court as in the case of abortion. Second, the medical community had the capacity to make clear its policy position participating directly in the process of decision making, as scientific experts in a parliamentary commission, or later, as a full member in special committees like the Comisión Nacional de Reproducción Humana Asistida functioning the Comité de Bioética 13. Third, despite their predominant role in the process of decision-making, the medical community was

16 16 able to give the impression that it was not primarily promoting its own interest, but was acting as truly neutral and independent. The degree of policy conflict is much more intense at the end of the nineties, when medical advances open new possibilities to develop stem-cells research. The lack of regulation of some of these techniques creates a situation of legal uncertainty that is seen by some physicians as an opportunity to go further in the development of research activities. This is the case of private clinics that use frozen eggs for reproductive uses, a technique that the law 35/1988 only prohibits in case that technological advances are not efficient and secure. Besides, at the end of the nineties there are more than embryos frozen, and most of them are not suitable for human reproduction ends, which opens a new controversial debate about the use of embryos for research and development activities. The law 35/1988 permits cryopreservation of sperm and embryos (and eggs with important exceptions) but does not define clearly what should be done with the frozen sperm and embryos after 5 years of conservation. For some policy actors like the Catholic Church, this lack of regulation involved too much risk, allowing for example, to fully develop techniques related to preimplantation diagnosis like born to cure babies. The Catholic Church, and some of the members of the PP, consider that the manipulation of pre-embryos is simply a means to manipulate nature, completely against the will of God, and thus should be forbidden under all circumstances. By the contrary, most political parties and public opinion give support to the scientific community to exercise its right to free investigation within the boundaries of acceptable human research, with some limitations related to the protection of citizens from technological change, and the prohibition of some techniques like cloning and hybrid and chimera research. Despite this, the majority government of the PP introduced a governmental bill (passed into law in 2003) oriented to limit the capacity of the medical profession to develop research and development activities. This law 45/2003 is a one-article law that modifies two articles of the existing law of First, it limits up to three the number of embryos that should be created and implanted to a woman in each treatment of fertilization. The implantation of more than three embryos was considered an strategy to artificially create embryos that at the mid-run are not going to fit the conditions for reproduction ends, (thus enlarging the stock of embryos suitable for research). Second, it establish that embryonic stem-cells research can only be put into practice with those

17 17 embryos created between 1988 and 2003, but all embryos created from 2004 will not be suitable for research purposes. Accordingly, research with embryos will arrive to an end at the mid-run once all frozen embryos are used for research purposes. The adoption of this regulatory change implicitly takes into account some of the demands of the Catholic Church in relation to SCR, but with some important limitations. Actually, the PP never introduces the possibility to ban SCR, and even allows pre-implantation diagnosis with many restrictions like the prohibition to carry out born to cure babies, which is one of the most controversial issues in the debate about SCR and ART from the late nineties (Atienza 2008). But the put into practice of this regulatory framework was quite difficult to sustain in moral terms and thus condemned to fail. The PP adopted a religious framing to justify the prohibition of the use of embryos for research purposes, but at the same time it allowed the manipulation of embryos created before The purpose of the PP was to respond to some of the demands of both the medical profession and the Catholic Church, but at the end, the contradictions of this framework constitute the bases for a regulatory reform lead by the PSOE three years later. The law 14/2006 sobre técnicas de reproducción humana asistida introduces a quite permissive model of regulation that allows pre-implantation diagnosis and born to cure babies, and eliminates most of the restrictions introduced by the PP, related to the use of frozen embryos. As in the eighties, policy change was a response of the demands of the medical profession, which always had a predominant position on the regulation of these issues. This is reinforced by the fact that ART and SCR are complex issues, and most part of the population does not have a formed opinion about them. Only 60% of the Spanish population knew something about SCR in 2008, and less than 12% knew that this type of research involves the destruction of the embryos, a percentage similar to Denmark and The Netherlands (BBVA 2008). Despite this, most Spaniards have a quite positive attitude towards the use of ART. At the end of the eighties 61% of citizens are favorable to the use of ART, a percentage that increases to 72% in Similarly, in % of citizens are in favor of limiting technologic and scientific research in ART, while in 2008 this percentage represents only 9.7% of the Spanish population. Complexity also makes it more complicated for the PP and the Catholic Church to present an alternative framing more connected with religious values. In a context of

18 18 positive attitude and optimism about the rewards of medical advances it was difficult to sustain the need to limit research with embryos. Besides, there is some fragmentation inside the PP, which increases the complexity to articulate a belligerent position against regulatory change using a religious framing as in the case of abortion. Still, the case of ART and SCR also illustrates the confrontation between different policy positions, one articulated in medical-secular terms by the medical profession and channelized by political parties on the left, and the other connected with religious values and channelized by the PP. Same sex marriage and euthanasia Same-sex marriage and euthanasia through omission get into the agenda a decade later than other moral issues like abortion, ART or SCR. Euthanasia by omission is regulated for the first time in 2002 by the law 41/2002 reguladora de la autonomía del paciente y de derechos y obligaciones en materia de información y documentación clínica. According to this law a patient can take the decision to end his/ her life in a dignified, peaceful manner, if suffering from a grave illness which will irrevocably lead to death or entail permanent, unbearable suffering. Such decisions were traditionally taken by doctors in most hospitals according to deontological codes of good medical practices with the consent and knowledge of the patient or/and his/her family. In this sense, the law 41/2002 goes beyond deontological codes and defines under which circumstances it is justified to limit, suspend or not undertake medical treatment, even though this may lead to the patient's eventual death. It also gives to the patient the capacity to express his/ her free will previously by completing a living will. Euthanasia through omission is the moral issue that generates more agreement among political parties, the medical profession, and public opinion. In fact, regulatory change occurs as a result of a parliamentary bill introduced by the senate, endorsed by all political parties, and passed in 2002 with the general agreement of the Spanish Parliament. Despite this, only minority political parties like IU pay attention to this issue before Conservative parties never pay much attention to this issue, and the PSOE only pays attention to this issue from 2004, introducing in 2011 a new governmental bill anteproyecto de ley reguladora de los derechos de la persona ante el proceso final de la vida aimed to put into a single law the existing principles, values and conditions under which a patient can put an end to his/her life.

19 19 Agreement is possible because the patient law regulates the existing deontological codes, without introducing important changes on ongoing medical practices. The patient law is not seen as a threat by religious groups or the general population but as a means to respond to some problems generated by medical advances, mainly the capacity to be kept alive using assisted life. Besides, it responds to changing public attitudes towards euthanasia: at the end of the nineties most Spaniards increasingly thinks that euthanasia should be a right recognized to citizens in the future 14, and only 19% of citizens in 2008 think that euthanasia is never justifiable versus 94% in The regulation of same-sex marriage is also connected with changing public opinion, but it takes place following a quite different process characterized by an intense political conflict. The law 13/2005 por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio passed by the socialist government reforms articles 68 to 70 of the Civil Code and amends the existing definition of marriage allowing same sex marriage. In order to be a married couple, both partners have to live together, keep fidelity and help each other, share domestic responsibilities and take care of ancestors and descendants, but sexual orientation is not taken into account for the definition of marriage and both homosexual and heterosexual couples are considered to have equal rights. Law 13/2005 also recognizes adoption rights to same sex couples, what makes this legislation one of the most liberal in Europe. The enactment of this legislation represents the culmination of a series of demands based on a long struggle performed by left parties and different social organizations that since the end of Francoism fought for the recognition of homosexual rights (Calvo 2004). After transition to democracy, the socialist government passed different measures oriented to abolish homosexual discrimination in Spain 15, leaving aside the debate about same-sex marriage until the mid nineties. IU is the only political party that deals with the issue in its party manifestos since 1986, but never presents oral questions neither parliamentary bills in the Parliament until The PSOE only deals with this issue from , once the PP gains elections, addressing the issue indirectly, as a question of rights of unmarried couples, what constitutes an important difference with other political parties and social organizations. Both IU and the PSOE claim for the recognition of homosexual rights using a secular frame centered on the defense of equal rights and non-discrimination regardless

20 20 of their sexual orientation, but they follow different strategies. The goal of IU is to transform the definition of marriage including all types of unions regardless sexual orientation, while the proposal of the PSOE was to give equal rights to married and unmarried people, without referring to these unions as marriages. By the contrary, the PP strongly opposes same sex marriage using an unsecular frame quite connected to the values of the Catholic Church. Same sex marriage completely opposes the idea of a traditional family promoted by the Catholic Church, and is understood as a source of social instability, and an attempt to break Spanish society (Platero 2007). In doing so the PP do not directly refers to God s will or the Bible, but to the need to preserve the institution of marriage and fundamental values of the Spanish society, mainly the traditional family. Several factors contribute to the entry of same-sex marriage into the political agenda (Calvo 2004). First, in the early 2000 a historical internal conflict within the main organization defending homosexuals rights, the Federación Estatal de Lesbianas y Gays (FELG), arrives to an end, which facilitates the adoption of a strong and cohesive strategy around the defense of the same sex marriage by the homosexual community. Second, the PSOE changed its strategy focusing on same-sex marriage and not equal rights for unmarried couples, as a consequence of two different factors: the role of homosexual activists that took the lead and became increasingly involved in party politics making the defense of homosexual rights central to their political careers, and the expected electoral rewards of this regulatory change that was quite close to public opinion (Platero 2007) 17. When the 2004 reform is passed, 67.7% of Spaniards thinks that homosexual couples must have the same rights and obligations than heterosexual couples, 66.6% think that homosexuals have the right to be married, and 79% thinks that homosexual option is as respectable as heterosexual 18. Despite changing attitudes towards homosexuality, policy change generated a high degree of social and political confrontation in which catholic values and religion are always present. Besides the parliamentary arena, political conflict was channelized in other different venues. A social mobilization led by catholic associations with the support of the Catholic Church (Conferencia Episcopal) against same-sex marriage called the Family Forum, was articulated to prevent regulatory change. Several political parties gave support to this mobilization, especially the PP and regional Christian democratic parties like Unió Democrática de Catalunya which completely