Continuity and Collaboration? Pacting and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Spanish and Argentine Democracies Compared.

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Continuity and Collaboration? Pacting and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Spanish and Argentine Democracies Compared."

Transcription

1 Continuity and Collaboration? Pacting and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Spanish and Argentine Democracies Compared. Bonnie N. Field

2 Department of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, California Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, September 6-8,

3 A wave of transitions from authoritarian rule toward democracy began in Portugal in 1974 and was quickly followed by transitions in Greece and Spain. Somewhat later, regime change spread to several countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. 1 Many of these countries have successfully consolidated their democracies; however, they have consolidated different types of democracy. Furthermore, these countries did not follow a unitary path from authoritarian rule. Rather, they experienced various modes of transition. In this paper, I will assess the impact of the mode of transition on the type of democracy established. More concretely, I will assess the degree to which pacted transitions produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and political party collaboration than in democracies produced by non-pacted transitions. I will conduct a comparative study of the democracies established following the Spanish (1976/77) pacted transition and the Argentine (1982/83) non-pacted transition to assess these potential effects of pacted transitions. This study encompasses the first twelve years of democratic government in both countries: Spain ( ) and Argentina ( ). I will use two indicators to measure the degree of elite continuity: (a) the continuity of legislators, particularly deputies in the lower house, and (b) the continuity of party candidates for deputy. These measures will allow me to assess the continuity of those that exercise political power and to capture variation by political party. To measure the degree of political party collaboration, I will use three indicators: (a) the success of government bills, (b) the margin of support for the legislation passed in the respective legislatures, and (c) the use of executive decree power. I will focus on the degree of political party collaboration in the legislative arena as this will allow me to concentrate on actual policy decisions. 1 See Huntington (1991) for a categorization of transitions to democracy into three historic waves. 2

4 I will demonstrate that Spain has a significantly higher level of elite continuity than Argentina. I argue that political party rules and regulations potentially hinder renovation in the Spanish case and facilitate it in the Argentine case, and that the party rules in Spain may be partially the product of the pacted nature of the transition to democracy. With respect to the degree of political party collaboration, I find evidence of elite collaboration during the early years of democracy, and a decline in collaboration over time in both cases. However, I will argue that political party collaboration in Spain went beyond minimum-winning coalitions whereas in Argentina it did not. I will also suggest that an elite norm or habit may offer a potential link between the pacted transition and continued collaboration in Spain. Overall, the results suggest that pacted transitions may indeed produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and political party collaboration than in democracies produced by non-pacted transitions. Transitions to Democracy and Modes of Transition: Following the transitions from authoritarian rule beginning in the mid-1970s, a tremendous amount of scholarly interest was focused on the causes of authoritarian decay and democratic transition. 2 Although interest in the causes of democratic transition has not dissipated, there has been a shift toward trying to understand the processes, dangers and facilitating conditions of democratic consolidation. 3 Within this second body of literature, modes of transition have become an object of scholarly interest. The literature on modes of transition has focused primarily on two issues. It 2 A place to begin a review of the transitions literature on Southern Europe and Latin America is Pridham, ed. (1984); O'Donnell, et al, eds. (1986); Przeworski (1991). 3 For a discussion of some of the issues involved in democratic consolidation, see Ethier, ed., (1990); Mainwaring, et al, eds. (1992); Gunther, et al, eds. (1995); Tulchin and Romero, eds., (1995). 3

5 examines how the mode of transition affects the likely collapse or survival of democracy, and how the mode of transition affects the type of democracy institutionalized. Terry Karl suggests that scholars studying democracy in Latin America should concentrate on: (1) clarifying how the mode of regime transition (itself conditioned by the breakdown of authoritarian rule) sets the context within which strategic interactions can take place; (2) examining how these interactions, in turn, help to determine whether political democracy will emerge and survive; and (3) analyzing what type of democracy will eventually be institutionalized. 4 As the historical institutionalist literature argues, decisions made early often create institutional rigidities and patterns of behavior that are difficult to change. Therefore, it is particularly important to study the mode of transition, as it may have a profound impact on the democracy that emerges and on who benefits. Though the literature on modes of transition has primarily focused on how the mode of transition affects the likely collapse or survival of democracy, 5 some scholars have developed hypotheses about how the mode of transition affects the type of democracy institutionalized. 6 Karl and Schmitter argue that the mode of transition may determine which type of democracy will emerge. 7 4 Karl (1990), p.8. 5 Karl (1990), Hagopian (1990), Karl and Schmitter (1991), Munch and Skalnik Leff (1997), Hartlyn (1998). 6 Karl and Schmitter (1991), Karl (1990), Munch and Skalnik Leff (1997). 7 Karl and Schmitter (1991), p

6 Karl develops four modes of transition: imposition, pact, reform, and revolution. She argues that these modes of transition will produce, respectively, conservative, corporatist, and competitive democracies, and a non-democratic category of one-party dominance. 8 Pacting and Pacted Transitions: In my research, I have focused on assessing the effects of pacted transitions. Pacted transitions are those in which political elites from the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition engage in multilateral negotiation and compromise and agree to a transition. 9 A review of the literature on transitions reveals that pacted transitions produce contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, many theorists argue that pacted transitions offer the most viable path to democracy. On the other, many hypothesize that the long term effects of pacting will be negative. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that though pacts move the polity toward democracy by undemocratic means, "where they are a feature of the transition, they are desirable - that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy." 10 Along these same lines, Karl and Schmitter argue that durable democracies tend to be produced in those cases with foundational pacts, that is, explicit (though not always public) agreements between contending elites, which define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those involved. 11 The cases generally cited to reinforce the positive role that pacts can play in the 8 Karl (1990), p Karl and Schmitter define a pacted transition as one in which elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves. (1991), p O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p Karl and Schmitter (1991), p

7 installation and durability of democracy are Venezuela (1958), Colombia (1957), Spain (1976), and Uruguay (1984). 12 However, the literature is fraught with references to the problems pacts cause. Karl argues that pacts may tend to demobilize new social forces, circumscribe the participation of certain actors in the future, and "hinder the prospects for the future democratic self-transformation of the society, economy, or polity, thereby producing a sort of frozen democracy." 13 Karl also argues that pacted transitions are likely to produce corporatist or consociational democracies in which party competition is regulated to varying degrees determined, in part, by the nature of the foundational bargain. She hypothesizes that the party system in this type of democracy would be multi-party and collusive. 14 Similarly, Przeworski argues that "the danger inherent in such substantive pacts is that they will become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute the benefits of political power among the insiders. Democracy would then turn into a private project of leaders of some political parties and corporatist associations, an oligopoly in which leaders of some organizations collude to prevent outsiders from entering." 15 Furthermore, he argues that pacts made by the political elites include an agreement to fix basic policy orientations, that is, to remove certain political issues from competitive party politics. 16 Finally, Frances Hagopian argues that comparative evidence supports the contention that democratization is often slowed or stopped in 12 O Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Karl (1990), Karl and Schmitter (1991). 13 Karl (1987), p Karl (1990), p Przeworski (1991), pp It should be noted that Przeworski distinguishes between institutional pacts and substantive pacts. However, given that pacts are often not made public, it is difficult to assess the degree to which a pact is institutional or substantive. 16 Przeworski (1991), p.90. He defines political pacts as agreements among leaders of political parties (or proto-parties) to (1) divide government offices among themselves independent of elections results, (2) fix basic policy orientations, and (3) exclude and, if need be, repress outsiders. 6

8 regimes spawned by political pacts negotiated with traditional and authoritarian elites. 17 The cases generally cited to emphasize the negative products of political pacts are Venezuela (1958), Colombia (1957), and Brazil (1974). 18 From the above, it appears that pacted transitions, relative to other modes of transition, may produce democracies in which there is 1) a greater degree of elite continuity versus renovation, 2) a greater degree of political party collaboration versus competition, 3) a greater degree of corporatist state-society relations, and 4) lower levels of societal participation in the political system. Institutional channels or patterns of behavior may develop between elites in government and civil society that facilitate elite bargaining at the expense of elite renovation, political competition, mass inclusion, and mobilization. In the following pages, I will assess the first two dependent variables, namely whether pacted transitions produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and political party collaboration. 19 Referring back to the hypothesized contradictory results of pacting, it is not difficult to see how extreme elite continuity and political party collaboration could jeopardize democracy as theorists have argued. Uncertainty, competition and access are fundamental elements of political democracy. 20 However, theorists also argue that a degree of elite continuity is a positive sign of the institutionalization of democracy, 21 and that the moderation of political conflict facilitates the 17 Hagopian (1996), p Karl (1987), Hagopian (1990), Hagopian (1996). 19 Please see Field (2001) for an exploration of political party collaboration in Spain between 1977 and Also see Encarnación (2001) for an exploration of the effects of pacting on the labor movement and mobilization in Spain. 20 Przeworski (1991), Dahl (1971). 21 The continuity of legislators, for example, has been used as a measure of parliamentary institutionalization. Polsby (1968). 7

9 consolidation of democracy. 22 Therefore, it is important not to draw conclusions prematurely. We need to discover if pacting produces the effects hypothesized, and, if so, determine whether they have positively or negatively influenced the democracy. Case Selection: The comparison of Spain and Argentina will allow us to vary the mode of transition. The transition in Spain was negotiated by a reformist sector of the authoritarian regime, led by President Adolfo Suárez, with hardline sectors of the authoritarian regime (both military and political ) and with representatives of the democratic opposition. 23 Neither the Suárez government nor the democratic opposition had the ability to entirely impose the terms of the transition. However, the Suárez government did not lose control of the process at any time. Argentine transition actors did not engage in pacting during the transition. The transition was not planned by the military regime, and the democratic opposition did not force a transition to democracy. 24 Rather, the transition resulted from the weakening of the military regime following the Malvinas/Falkland Islands war. The debilitated military regime failed in its attempt to pact with the democratic opposition. Burton, Gunther and Higley corroborate this point arguing that Argentina had not experienced an elite settlement, similar to a pact Valenzuela (1992), p Amongst which stand out Felipe González of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and Santiago Carrillo of the Partido Comunista de España. 24 Furthermore, no single social actor was strong enough to impose its will. Ducantenzeiler (1990), p Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992), p

10 In addition to varying the mode of transition, a comparison of Spain and Argentina controls for potentially significant variables. First, the democratic opposition was not able to overthrow the authoritarian regime in either case. By controlling for this factor, we minimize the possibility that any variation in political party collaboration could be explained by the relative power of democratic opposition actors. If there is indeed a difference in the type of democracy established in Spain and Argentina, it would more likely be due to the existence, or not, of a pact, rather than to the strength of the democratic opposition. Second, both countries share important features of their electoral laws, most importantly the d Hondt method of proportional representation, closed-party electoral lists, and no term limits. This will be important in the analysis of elite continuity as all of these factors may influence the ability of political party elites to control the degree of continuity. Third, no political party enjoyed an absolute majority in their respective legislatures immediately following the transitions. This will be crucial to our understanding of the level of political party collaboration, as a degree of compromise across political parties was necessary to pass legislation in both cases. Forth, these initial periods were followed by the turnover of executive power to the main opposition party. The new governing parties enjoyed a stronger position in the legislature than did their predecessors. This will allow us to evaluate the extent to which the dynamics of collaboration or competition were dependent on the distribution of power across the various political forces. I have chosen Spain as the prototype of a pacted transition. If pacting produces the effects hypothesized, it should do so in the Spanish case. If pacting does not produce these effects, this would strongly refute the above hypotheses, despite being a single case of pacting. Furthermore, as the paradigmatic case of a pacted transition, Spain has not been discussed as a case in which the negative effects of pacting have materialized. It, therefore, provides the ideal case through which to explore 9

11 these effects. We must first determine what effects, if any, the mode of transition had on the dynamics of the new democracy, and, subsequently, determine what it was about the Spanish pacted transition that enabled it to pact its way to democracy without, apparently, jeopardizing the development of that democracy. 26 I. Pacting and Elite Continuity: In order to assess the degree of elite continuity, I will focus on the continuity of legislators, particularly deputies in the lower houses, and the continuity of party candidates for deputy. If pacted transitions indeed produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity, continuity should be higher in Spain than in Argentina. Deputy Continuity: Although both countries have bicameral legislatures, a comparison of the levels of continuity in the lower houses is more interesting politically and more justifiable methodologically. First, the lower houses enjoy a similar level of authority. The two chambers of the Argentine Congress, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, have relatively equal powers. 27 However, the powers of the two chambers of the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes, are not equal. The Spanish lower house, the Congress of Deputies, is far more powerful than the Senate. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 gave the Congress the sole power to elect the prime minister and remove the prime minister from office, as well as the 26 In a recent study, Encarnación (2001) found that the hypothesized negative effects of pacting on the labor movement did not occur in Spain. 27 Particularly important for this study is that both houses must sanction a bill in order for it to become law. 10

12 power to over-ride vetoes or amendments placed on legislation by the Senate. 28 As the Spanish Congress is clearly the more powerful chamber of the Cortes, the level of continuity is more politically significant. Second, the Spanish and Argentine electoral laws with regard to the election of deputies are very similar, which allows us to control for the potential effects of these features of the electoral laws. There are no term limits for deputies in either case. 29 In the literature on legislative careers in Spain and Argentina, one commonality stands out: the high level of deputy renovation in both cases. 30 Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two countries. Below, I analyze the Spanish parliamentary elections of 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, and 1989, and the Argentine Chamber elections held in 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, and It is clear from the results in Tables 1 and 2 that the degree of continuity in the Spanish case is much higher than in the Argentine case. Table 1: Deputy Continuity, Congress of Deputies, Spain, If the Senate vetoes a bill passed by the Congress, the Congress will debate the Senate veto, and then the initial text of the bill approved by the Congress will be submitted for a vote. The Senate veto will be lifted with the favorable vote of the absolute majority of the members of the Congress. If the initial text does not receive an absolute majority, another vote will be taken two months from the time of the Senate veto. At this time, the veto will be lifted with a simple majority of the vote. If not, the veto will stand. Senate amendments are debated and submitted to a vote in the Congress. Those that receive a simple majority of the vote are incorporated into the text. (1978 Constitution, Art. 90. Congressional Rules.) 29 Both countries elect their lower houses on the basis of the d Hondt method of proportional representation and both have a 3% minimum threshold at the district level. Furthermore, both countries adopted a system of closed-party lists. In Spain, the Congress of Deputies has 350 members directly elected from 50 multi-member districts and two single-member districts. Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish territories in northern Africa, elect only one deputy each. The electoral laws also stipulate that each province is guaranteed a minimum of two deputies (this does not include Ceuta and Melilla). Deputies serve four-year terms (or until parliamentary elections are called), and are all renewed at the same time. (Ley para Reforma Política 1/1977, Real Decreto-Ley Sobre Normas Electorales 20/1977, Art of the 1978 Constitution, and the Régimen Electoral General Ley Orgánica 5/1985. This law was later modified by Leyes Orgánicas 1/1987 and 8/1991.) In Argentina, the Chamber of Deputies has 257 deputies (254 prior to 1991) directly elected from 24 multimember districts. Similar to the Spanish case, the Argentine electoral laws provide for minimum levels of representation, namely that no district will have fewer than five deputies, and that no district will have fewer deputies than it had during the previous democratic period ( ). Deputies serve four-year terms, and half of the Chamber is renewed every two years. It should be noted that all 254 deputies were elected in 1983, half of which served two-year terms and the other half if which served full four-year terms. Jones (1997). 11

13 Election Year Proportion of Deputies Reelected Total Number of Deputies Average Reelection.54 Source: Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993), p.248. The average percentage of Spanish deputies reelected to the Congress of Deputies between 1979 and 1989 was 54%. 31 In the Argentine case, this average decreases to 20%. Spain s deputy continuity rate is 34 percentage points higher than Argentina s. 30 On Spain: Morán (1989), Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993), and López Nieto (1997). On Argentina: Saiegh (1997), Jones (1997). 31 It should also be noted that this measure only takes into consideration legislative experience during the democratic period. There were several deputies, in the Spanish case, that had been members, procuradores, of the authoritarian legislature, Las Cortes Españolas. 12

14 Table 2: Deputy Continuity, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, Election Year Proportion of Deputies Reelected Total Number of Deputies Average Reelection.20 Source: Elaborated by the author based on deputy lists provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina. The higher continuity rate in the Spanish Congress holds true regardless of which election we examine. For example, Spain experienced the lowest degree of deputy continuity in 1982 (40%) when the entire party system realigned. This election saw the dramatic electoral defeat of the governing Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD). Electoral support for the UCD declined more than 28 percentage points. This decline resulted not only in the turn over of government to the opposition Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), but also in the rise of the Alianza Popular (AP) as the largest opposition party. If we compare this to the highest Argentine deputy continuity rate in 1985 (30%), we still find that the Spanish continuity rate is 10 points higher than the Argentine rate The Argentine data include deputies elect that held a seat in the previous legislative period regardless of whether or not they were in office at the close of the prior legislative term. Though this only affects the calculations in two elections, 1989 and 1991, the inclusion of only those deputies that were sitting at the close of the prior legislative term would only slightly reduce the level of reelection. 33 This election did not coincide with a presidential election, but rather confirmed the relative popularity of the governing Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) 13

15 This pattern remains even when we take out the consecutive nature of the reelection measure and determine the number of terms that each deputy served. Table 3: Terms in Office, Deputies, Spain ( ) and Argentina ( ) 34 1 Term 2 Terms 3 Terms 4 Terms 35 Entire Period 36 N= Spain Argentina Source: Elaborated by the author based on deputy lists provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, and the Congress of Deputies, Spain. Of all of the deputies who held a seat during this period of time, 558 or 36.3% of the Spanish deputies served only one term while the percentage rises to 69.8% of the Argentine deputies. Furthermore, 46 Spanish deputies held their seat throughout the entire period whereas this number drops to just four of the Argentine deputies. What accounts for the different levels of elite continuity? I will discuss a few of the hypotheses that have been used to account for renovation in the respective countries, and explore whether they can explain of the difference between Spain and Argentina. I will discuss party splits and defections, 34 Terms may be partial as the analysis includes all deputies elect and substitutes. These figures only include deputies prior to the 1989 elections in Spain, and prior to the 1995 elections in Argentina. 35 In Argentina, those that were deputies during the entire period could have been deputies during four terms (1983/85, 1985/89, 1989/93, 1993/97) or three (1983/87, 1987/91, 1991/95). 14

16 deputy career paths, electoral volatility, and internal party rules and regulations as explanations of the variation in deputy continuity. 37 In this section, I will focus on the first three explanations, and address the final one after evaluating the degree of candidate continuity. Party splits and defections, deputy career paths, electoral volatility do not convincingly explain the difference in continuity levels for the two countries being discussed. Cross-nationally, the above measure captures party splits and defections. For example, the Frente Renovador (FR), a break-off faction of the Argentine Partido Justicialista (PJ), presented a separate list of candidates for deputy in 1985, and the 11 deputies elected from the FR list are included in the above results and counted as repeating if they had previously attained a seat on a PJ list. 38 There may be legislators that defect to minor parties, and therefore reduce their chances of reelection. This likely occurs in both cases. However, Spain has been more affected by splits and defections particularly with regard to the UCD, AP and the Partido Comunista de España (PCE). Deputy career paths may explain a slight degree of the difference in deputy continuity. Though very little work has been done on the career paths of deputies in either country, we can shed some light on this question. Deputies that abandon their chamber careers to occupy positions in the national government may be comparatively significant. Mark P. Jones found that four of President Menem s eight ministers had previously been Chamber deputies. 39 At least at the ministerial level, this factor does not operate in the Spanish system given that deputies can be members of parliament and ministers 36 Spain: includes deputies elect (1400) and substitutes (139). I found that there were 11 substitutes in the 1977/79 legislative term, 42 during 1979/82, 42 during 1982/86, and 44 during the 1986/89 term. Argentina: includes deputies elect (892) and substitutes (119). 37 López Nieto (1997); Jones (1997); Saiegh (1997). 38 The PJ is also known as the Peronist Party. 39 As of January Jones (1997), p

17 at the same time. 40 Therefore, this factor may account for a small portion of the lower continuity rate in Argentine. It remains unclear the degree to which deputies leave to occupy other positions in the national executive. However, more Spanish deputies abandon their chamber to later occupy seats in the Senate than in Argentina. María Luz Morán found that 51 Spanish deputies (1977/79, 1979/82, 1982/86) later occupied positions in the national Senate (1979/82, 1982/86, 1986/89). 41 This represents approximately 4.5% of the deputies during that period. On the other hand, I found that Argentine deputies ( ) abandoned the chamber to later occupy seats in the Senate (prior to 1998) at a rate of 2.9%. This is despite the fact that the Argentine Senate is significantly more powerful than its Spanish counterpart. Do deputies disproportionately abandon the chamber to hold political office at the regional level? Both countries have decentralized systems of government, which may attract national deputies either to hold positions in the regional executive or in the regional legislature. Spain has 17 autonomous communities that also function as parliamentary systems with unicameral legislatures that, in turn, elect the president of their regional governments. Argentina has 23 provinces that directly elect regional legislators and a governor. 42 I found that 17 Spanish deputies ( ) later became presidents of autonomous communities. 43 This represents 1.10% of all deputies. Similarly, I found 40 Art. 70, Constitution of In fact, 40% of the ministers during the Constituent legislature (1977/79) were also deputies. In the Socialist governments between 1982 and 1993, 70% of the ministers were deputies. López Nieto (1997), p Morán (1989), p before 1990 when Tierra del Fuego became a province. 43 This includes deputies that served at any point prior to the 1989 parliamentary elections. Calculated by the author based on data provided by the governments of the autonomous communities. 16

18 that 1.09%, or 11, of the Argentine deputies ( ) were later elected governor. 44 Therefore, it is unlikely that the draw of regional office can explain the difference between the two cases. Electoral volatility can account for a large degree of within country variation in reelection rates in both cases, but to what extent can it explain the difference in continuity rates? Let us first examine the election results for the main parties in Spain and Argentina. Table 4: % of Vote by Election, Congress of Deputies, Spain UCD PSOE PCE/IU AP/PP PDC/CIU PNV Others UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático); PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); PCE/IU (Partido Comunista de España/Izquierda Unida); AP/PP (Alianza Popular/Partido Popular); PDC/CIU (Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya/Convergència i Unió); PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco). 44 This includes deputies that served at any point prior to the 1995 Chamber elections. This also includes two deputies that were not immediately elected to the office of governor: Eduardo Duhalde was a Chamber deputy between 1987 and 1989, vice-president between 1989 and 1991, and then governor of Buenos Aires beginning in Ruben Marin was governor of La Pampa from 1983 to 1987, Chamber deputy from 1987 to 1989, national senator from 1989 to 1991, and then governor of La Pampa again beginning in Calculated by the author based on data provided by the Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio de Interior. 17

19 Source: Elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Junta Electoral Central. Ministerio del Interior, Spain. Argentine electoral results, in Table 5, are presented in their most volatile light. That is, no Peronists that presented a separate list from the official PJ list are included in the electoral results. 46 Table 5 shows that the PJ sharply declined in the 1985 election, but later recovered and saw its support remain relatively constant during the rest of the period. 47 We also observe the steady decline of the UCR from a high of 48% in 1983 to 21.7% in These results illustrate that Argentina has experienced electoral volatility, but this electoral volatility does not compare to the 1982 virtual disappearance of the UCD and the dramatic rise of AP in Spain. 48 Table 5: % of Vote by Election, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina UCR PJ Others UCR (Unión Cívica Radical); PJ (Partido Justicialista). Source: Molinelli, et al, (1999), pp In 1979, Alianza Popular presented candidates in coalition as Coalición Democrática; in 1986, as Coalición Popular. In 1989, Alianza Popular was renamed Partido Popular 46 Only official party lists and coalitions are included. 47 However, this sharp decline was largely the result of a faction of the PJ presenting their own list of candidates and not the result of the electorate transferring their votes from Peronists to another political formation. In fact, most analysts will include both lists in their calculations for the PJ. 48 It should be noted that the decline of the UCR has clearly transformed Argentine politics. 49 Includes the UCR-MPC alliance which attained 2 seats in

20 A comparison of the formal levels of electoral volatility, using the Pedersen index, confirms the higher level of electoral volatility in Spain. 51 The average volatility index for elections to the Spanish Congress of Deputies during this period is 17 whereas the average for Argentine Chamber elections declines to The 4 point difference clearly demonstrates the higher level of electoral volatility in the Spanish case. If we were to predict the level of continuity solely on the basis of electoral volatility, i.e. the greater degree of electoral volatility, the lower level of continuity, we would predict that Spain would have a lower degree of continuity than Argentina. This is not the case. In order to better control for the effects of electoral volatility on deputy continuity, I have developed the following deputy continuity index (DCI). The index is calculated by multiplying the proportion of deputies reelected by the electoral volatility index expressed as a proportion. The values for this index vary between 0 and 1. Zero represents maximum renovation and 1 represents maximum continuity. For real world cases of reelection and electoral volatility, the index produces non-extreme values. 53 Deputy Continuity Index: DCI=r*v presented candidates as PJ and in coalition as the Frente Justicialista de Libertad; 1989 presented candidates in coalition as Frente Justicialista Popular. The Frente Renovador, that presented a separate list of candidates in 1985, is not included. 51 The Pedersen index of electoral volatility measures the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all parties from one election to the next. The index is derived by adding the net change in percentage of seats (or votes) gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two. An index of 15, for example, means that some parties experienced an aggregate gain of 15 percent of the seats from one election to the next while others lost a total of 15 percent. Mainwaring and Scully (1995), p Spanish volatility index was calculated using vote shares. Anduiza and Méndez (1997), p.280. Volatility indexes for Argentina were made available by Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, University of New Mexico. Also see Roberts and Wibbels (1999). 53 A hypothetical case of extreme renovation would be produced in a case where only 10% of deputies are reelected in an election in which the volatility index is 1. This case would yield a DCI index value of.001. On the other hand, an extreme 19

21 r=proportion of deputies reelected v=electoral volatility index (votes), Pedersen Index, expressed as a proportion renovation 0<DCI>1 continuity Table 6: Deputy Continuity Index, Congress of Deputies, Spain, r v DCI Source: Calculated by the author using reelection data published by Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993), p.248, and volatility indexes published by Anduiza and Méndez (1997), p.280. Table 7: Deputy Continuity Index, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, r v DCI continuity value would be produced in a situation in which 100% of deputies are reelected despite an electoral volatility level of 99. This case would yield a DCI index value of

22 Source: Calculated by the author using reelection data elaborated by the author, and volatility indexes made available by Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, University of New Mexico. Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that the deputy continuity index for Spain (.09) is three times as high as the Argentine value (.03). Therefore, electoral volatility clearly cannot account for the crossnational variation. We should note that the deputy continuity index in the Argentine case has remained extremely constant throughout the period studied. Though reelection has been consistently low, it appears that variation in reelection rates in Argentina has been due to electoral volatility. Also, the 1982 election in Spain ironically produced the highest level of continuity according to this index. This means that despite the dramatic realignment of the party system and the collapse of the governing UCD, a surprising number of deputies managed to hold on to their seats either as candidates for the party lists on which they were elected in 1979 or for a new party. Overall, it does not appear that the above factors can account for a large degree of the crossnational difference in continuity rates. Next, I will assess the degree to which political parties influence the level of elite continuity. I will provide an empirical analysis of the continuity of candidates for deputy in both cases to determine whether the degree of continuity in Spain remains higher than in Argentina. I will then explore whether political parties themselves influence the level of 21

23 continuity, particularly whether internal political party rules and regulations facilitate or hinder continuity. I will also explore whether, in the Spanish case, the pacted nature of the transition to democracy influenced the content of party rules and regulations. Candidate Continuity: A measure of candidate continuity will permit us to assess the roll of political parties more directly. As pacting is an elite activity, we want to assess the degree to which the party elites influence the degree of continuity, and eliminate, to the degree possible, the effects of voters. The electoral laws in both countries stipulate the use of closed-party lists for elections to the lower house, which means that the political parties control which candidates appear on the election ballot and the order in which they appear. The voter cannot designate whether her vote goes for a particular candidate, alter the order of the list or cross out any candidates. The voter must vote for the entire list as presented by the party. Closed-list systems give parties the greatest degree of control over candidates and, in turn, encourage party discipline. 54 For our purposes, closed-lists allow parties a great deal of influence over the level of deputy and candidate continuity Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), pp For each election studied below, the candidates are presented by electoral district, and then within each electoral district by political party or electoral coalition. Each political party presents their candidates and alternates in the order in which the seats will be distributed. I have only included those candidates on the list that equal the number of seats available in that district, i.e. alternates are not included. For the parties analyzed, I included the party-list itself or any list presented by a formal electoral coalition in which the party under study took part. Independents that are included on the party-list are also included in the analysis. 22

24 This analysis was conducted by political party, and, at each point in time, I included the two main political parties. 56 During the period studied, both countries produced party systems in which two parties dominated. The 1977 parliamentary elections in Spain produced two main political parties, the UCD and the PSOE. In the 1977 and 1979 elections, these two parties captured an average of 82% of the seats in Congress. Following the 1982 elections, the two largest political parties changed with the AP replacing the UCD. However, the combined Congressional representation of the PSOE and AP increased. In the 1982 and 1986 elections, they captured 85% of the seats. In Argentina, the two largest parties were the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). These two parties attained a combined maximum of 94.5% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and a minimum of 74.6%. 57 Below, I present the proportion of candidates re-nominated. 58 In addition to this measure, I have developed an index that controls for the electoral success of the political parties under analysis. Less successful political parties will likely have lower levels of continuity due to the greater difficulty of election. Controlling for this factor will allow us to compare political parties more accurately. The index is calculated by subtracting the proportion of seats the party attained in the previous election from the proportion of candidates for deputy re-nominated for the election under scrutiny. 56 In order to accurately capture the degree of continuity or renovation, the two largest parties were determined by looking at the two largest parties (% of seats) in the previous election, i.e. for the 1982 parliamentary election average in Spain, I included the two largest parties from the 1979 parliamentary elections. 57 Molinelli, et al. (1999), p There is not a directly comparable measure of candidate continuity in both cases. All Spanish deputies are elected when parliamentary elections are called. However, Argentine deputies are elected for a four-year term, and half of the Chamber is renewed every two years (Except in 1983 when the entire Chamber was elected, half of the Chamber served for 2 years and the other half for 4 years). This means that if a candidate is not elected on the list presented in 1985, he can be placed on the list again in 1987, and again in Therefore, we cannot simply compare candidate lists that are four years apart because we would miss those that reappear in between. I have, therefore, compared the proportion of Spanish candidates on the list under scrutiny that were also candidates in the previous election to the proportion of Argentine candidates that 23

25 Candidate Continuity Index: CCI = R-p R = proportion of candidates re-nominated on list (r/s t ) r = number of candidates on list under scrutiny that were also candidates in the previous election (in either of the previous two elections in Argentina). S t = seats available in election under scrutiny p = party strength in last election; = ps/s t-1 ps = party list seats attained in previous election S t-1 = seats available in previous election Values for this index vary between (renovation) 1 and 1 (continuity). An index of 0 would effectively mean that the parties are re-nominating successful candidates, positive numbers mean that they are renominating even previously unsuccessful candidates, and negative numbers mean that they are not renominating some successful candidates. renovation 1<CCI>1 continuity Table 8: Candidate Continuity, , Two Largest Parties, 59 Congress of Deputies, Spain (Proportion of Candidates Re-nominated in the Following Election) R p CCI were candidates in either of the previous two elections. Though this measure is not directly comparable, it represents a more difficult test of whether pacting produces democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity (UCD and PSOE), 1982 (UCD and PSOE), 1986 (PSOE and AP), 1989 (PSOE and PP). 24

26 Average Average Average Average Average Source: Elaborated by the author based on party-lists published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado. 60 Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of our analysis of candidates for deputy. First, Tables 8 and 9 show that the principal Spanish parties re-nominate almost twice as many candidates as the principal Argentine parties, 30% versus 16%. This continues the pattern of higher levels of elite continuity in the Spanish case. Second, the CCI index shows that previously successful candidates are not consistently re-nominated in either case, though this is more accentuated in the Argentine case. Looking at the CCI, the main Spanish parties renew 12% of successful candidates, whereas the Argentine ones renew 26% of successful candidates. Table 9: Candidate Continuity, , Two Largest Parties, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina (Proportion of Candidates Re-nominated in Either of the Following Two Elections) 60 Candidate lists are published in the government bulletin, Boletín Oficial del Estado. 15 June 1977 Elections: Candidate lists were published 20 May 1977, and corrections were published May 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, and June 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, and March 1979 Elections: Candidate lists and corrections were reproduced in Esteban and Lopez-Guerra (1979). 28 October 1982 Elections: Candidate lists were published 2 October 1982, and corrections were published October 9, 14, 16, 27 and June 1986 Elections: Candidate lists were published 21 May 1986, and corrections were published May 27, 28, 29, 30, and June 3, 6, 14, 20 and October 1989 Elections: Candidate lists were published 30 September 1989, and corrections were published October 7, 14, 21,

27 R* p CCI Average Average Average Average Average Average Average Source: Elaborated by the author based on party-lists collected from the Departamento de Estadísticas, Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior, Argentina Moreover, continuity in Spain is under-stated in these results. This measure does not take into account individuals that left one of the main parties to become a candidate for another political party. For example, the AP absorbed several candidates that had previously appeared on UCD candidate lists. I found that, in 1982, AP incorporated 15 candidates that had been candidates for the UCD in 1979, and in 1986 incorporated 13 candidates from the 1982 UCD lists. Though candidates in Argentina may defect from one political party to join another, they are unlikely to switch from the PJ to the UCR or vice versa given the strong personal and historical connection that many of these deputies have to their party. 61 Therefore, the gap between the two cases is probably even larger than the above results indicate. 61 Jones (2000), p

28 The higher level of candidate continuity in Spain is further illustrated if we break down the results by political party. As can be seen in Table 10, all of the Spanish parties studied had higher levels of continuity than the Argentine parties. The Spanish AP/PP had the highest level of candidate continuity, followed by the PSOE and UCD, and then by the Argentine parties. Table 10: Candidate Continuity Index by Political Party renovation 1<CCI>1 continuity Party Dates R CCI AP/PP PSOE UCD UCR PJ Source: Elaborated by the author. Continuity and the Role of Political Parties. Internal Rules and Regulations: Can party rules and regulations explain, at least partially, the variation in continuity rates? Despite the fact that the electoral laws in both countries stipulate the use of closed party-lists for the election of deputies, this does not determine the means by which the parties will choose those candidates. Therefore, we must determine how the parties themselves choose their candidates for deputy. The different levels of continuity may, in fact, be the result of internal party rules and regulations that are voluntarily adopted by the political parties themselves. I will argue that the party 27

29 rules and regulations established by the PJ and the UCR in Argentina facilitate renovation to a greater extent than do those of the Spanish parties. I will also explore the possibility that the pacted nature of the transition in Spain conditioned the internal rules and regulations adopted by the Spanish parties, particularly the main party of the left, the PSOE. Though I will not be able to thoroughly develop the argument here, I will demonstrate that this hypothesis merits further research. In Argentina, the party rules and regulations established by the PJ and the UCR facilitate renovation through the use of party primaries and the representation of minority factions. Party primaries may be used to determine the candidates when the political party cannot agree on a common list, either because there is disagreement between the provincial and national party organizations or because the provincial party organization cannot agree on a single list. 62 Furthermore, sitting UCR deputies, competing in internal primaries, must attain 2/3 of the vote in these internal primaries in order to be, again, presented on the party list. 63 Finally, the Argentine parties incorporate the representation of minority party factions for both party offices and candidacies for public office. 64 In internal elections, both the PJ and the UCR provide for the representation of minority party factions that attain 25% of the vote. These rules clearly facilitate renovation. The internal party regulations established by the Spanish political parties, on the other hand, do not appear to facilitate renovation to the same extent. During the transition in Spain, neither of the main political parties established a system of primaries to choose their candidates. Rank-and-file party 62 Jones (1997), pp Art. 31. Unión Cívica Radical. 1985, 1989, 1993 and Carta Orgánica Nacional. The list on which the candidate appears must receive 2/3 of the vote in the primary. If the list does not receive the required 2/3, then the sitting deputy is replaced by the next person on the list. I thank Mark P. Jones for his clarification of this matter. 64 Art. 31. UCR. Carta Orgánica. Art. 44. Partido Justicialista. Carta Orgánica Nacional. Aprobada según las modificaciones introducidas en el Congreso Nacional Partidario, realizado el 20 de Septiembre de

The California Primary and Redistricting

The California Primary and Redistricting The California Primary and Redistricting This study analyzes what is the important impact of changes in the primary voting rules after a Congressional and Legislative Redistricting. Under a citizen s committee,

More information

CHILE S GENDER QUOTA: WILL IT WORK?

CHILE S GENDER QUOTA: WILL IT WORK? JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY CHILE S GENDER QUOTA: WILL IT WORK? BY LESLIE SCHWINDT-BAYER, PH.D. RICE FACULTY SCHOLAR JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE

More information

Hungary. Basic facts The development of the quality of democracy in Hungary. The overall quality of democracy

Hungary. Basic facts The development of the quality of democracy in Hungary. The overall quality of democracy Hungary Basic facts 2007 Population 10 055 780 GDP p.c. (US$) 13 713 Human development rank 43 Age of democracy in years (Polity) 17 Type of democracy Electoral system Party system Parliamentary Mixed:

More information

Volatile and tripolar: The new Italian party system

Volatile and tripolar: The new Italian party system Volatile and tripolar: The new Italian party system Alessandro Chiaramonte and Vincenzo Emanuele February 27, 2013 The extraordinary success of Grillo and the electoral collapse of the PdL and the PD deeply

More information

A statistical model to transform election poll proportions into representatives: The Spanish case

A statistical model to transform election poll proportions into representatives: The Spanish case A statistical model to transform election poll proportions into representatives: The Spanish case Elections and Public Opinion Research Group Universitat de Valencia 13-15 September 2013, Lancaster University

More information

Different Measures of the Ideological Positions of Political Parties: a Research Note from the Spanish Case

Different Measures of the Ideological Positions of Political Parties: a Research Note from the Spanish Case Different Measures of the Ideological Positions of Political Parties: a Research Note from the Spanish Case Luis Ramiro Fernández Researcher. Social and Political Sciences Department. European University

More information

THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: POSSIBLE CHANGES TO ITS ELECTORAL SYSTEM

THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: POSSIBLE CHANGES TO ITS ELECTORAL SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: POSSIBLE CHANGES TO ITS ELECTORAL SYSTEM BY JENNI NEWTON-FARRELLY INFORMATION PAPER 17 2000, Parliamentary Library of

More information

connect the people to the government. These institutions include: elections, political parties, interest groups, and the media.

connect the people to the government. These institutions include: elections, political parties, interest groups, and the media. Overriding Questions 1. How has the decline of political parties influenced elections and campaigning? 2. How do political parties positively influence campaigns and elections and how do they negatively

More information

4 INTRODUCTION Argentina, for example, democratization was connected to the growth of a human rights movement that insisted on democratic politics and

4 INTRODUCTION Argentina, for example, democratization was connected to the growth of a human rights movement that insisted on democratic politics and INTRODUCTION This is a book about democracy in Latin America and democratic theory. It tells a story about democratization in three Latin American countries Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico during the recent,

More information

Chapter 6 Democratic Regimes. Copyright 2015 W.W. Norton, Inc.

Chapter 6 Democratic Regimes. Copyright 2015 W.W. Norton, Inc. Chapter 6 Democratic Regimes 1. Democracy Clicker question: A state with should be defined as a nondemocracy. A.a hereditary monarch B.an official, state-sanctioned religion C.a legislative body that is

More information

Democratization Introduction and waves

Democratization Introduction and waves Democratization Introduction and University College Dublin 18 January 2011 Outline Democracies over time Period Democracy Collapse 1828-1926 33 0 1922-1942 0 22 1943-1962 40 0 1958-1975 0 22 1974-1990

More information

Unit 1 Introduction to Comparative Politics Test Multiple Choice 2 pts each

Unit 1 Introduction to Comparative Politics Test Multiple Choice 2 pts each Unit 1 Introduction to Comparative Politics Test Multiple Choice 2 pts each 1. Which of the following is NOT considered to be an aspect of globalization? A. Increased speed and magnitude of cross-border

More information

Iowa Voting Series, Paper 4: An Examination of Iowa Turnout Statistics Since 2000 by Party and Age Group

Iowa Voting Series, Paper 4: An Examination of Iowa Turnout Statistics Since 2000 by Party and Age Group Department of Political Science Publications 3-1-2014 Iowa Voting Series, Paper 4: An Examination of Iowa Turnout Statistics Since 2000 by Party and Age Group Timothy M. Hagle University of Iowa 2014 Timothy

More information

WorldCourtsTM I. SUMMARY

WorldCourtsTM I. SUMMARY WorldCourtsTM Institution: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights File Number(s): Report No. 132/99; Case 12.135 Session: Hundred and Fifth Special Session (19 21 November 1999) Title/Style of Cause:

More information

Electoral Systems and Judicial Review in Developing Countries*

Electoral Systems and Judicial Review in Developing Countries* Electoral Systems and Judicial Review in Developing Countries* Ernani Carvalho Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Brazil Leon Victor de Queiroz Barbosa Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, Brazil (Yadav,

More information

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps

More information

Julie Lenggenhager. The "Ideal" Female Candidate

Julie Lenggenhager. The Ideal Female Candidate Julie Lenggenhager The "Ideal" Female Candidate Why are there so few women elected to positions in both gubernatorial and senatorial contests? Since the ratification of the nineteenth amendment in 1920

More information

REPORT Nº 103/01* CASE MARÍA MERCIADRI DE MORINI ARGENTINA October 11, 2001

REPORT Nº 103/01* CASE MARÍA MERCIADRI DE MORINI ARGENTINA October 11, 2001 REPORT Nº 103/01* CASE 11.307 MARÍA MERCIADRI DE MORINI ARGENTINA October 11, 2001 I. SUMMARY 1. On June 15, 1994, María Merciadri de Morini (hereinafter the petitioner ) filed a petition before the Inter

More information

Candidate nomination is one of the most important functions of political. BACK ROOMS OR BALLOT BOXES? Candidate Nomination in Argentina

Candidate nomination is one of the most important functions of political. BACK ROOMS OR BALLOT BOXES? Candidate Nomination in Argentina COMPARATIVE De Luca et al. / CANDIDATE POLITICALNOMINATION STUDIES / May IN2002 ARGENTINA How political parties select their candidates for public office profoundly affects the types of people who are

More information

Amy Tenhouse. Incumbency Surge: Examining the 1996 Margin of Victory for U.S. House Incumbents

Amy Tenhouse. Incumbency Surge: Examining the 1996 Margin of Victory for U.S. House Incumbents Amy Tenhouse Incumbency Surge: Examining the 1996 Margin of Victory for U.S. House Incumbents In 1996, the American public reelected 357 members to the United States House of Representatives; of those

More information

Canadian and American Governance: A Comparative Look

Canadian and American Governance: A Comparative Look Canadian and American Governance: A Comparative Look DEMOCRACY The United States of America was formed between 1776-1783 during the War of Independence. Canada was created July 1, 1867 following passage

More information

The Effect of Ballot Order: Evidence from the Spanish Senate

The Effect of Ballot Order: Evidence from the Spanish Senate The Effect of Ballot Order: Evidence from the Spanish Senate Manuel Bagues Berta Esteve-Volart November 20, 2011 PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE Abstract This paper analyzes the relevance of ballot order in

More information

From Consensual to Complex Multi-level Democracy: The Contours of Contestation and Collaboration in Spain

From Consensual to Complex Multi-level Democracy: The Contours of Contestation and Collaboration in Spain Comillas Journal of International Relations nº 01 041-052 [2014] [ISSN 2386-5776] 41 DOI: cir.i01.y2014.004 From Consensual to Complex Multi-level Democracy: The Contours of Contestation and Collaboration

More information

Info Pack Mexico s Elections

Info Pack Mexico s Elections Info Pack Mexico s Elections Prepared by Alonso Álvarez Info Pack Mexico s Elections Prepared by Alonso Álvarez TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PREPARED BY Alonso ÁLVAREZ PUBLISHER TRT WORLD

More information

DEMOCRACY. United States of America formed between during the War of Independence.

DEMOCRACY. United States of America formed between during the War of Independence. CANADIAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE LOOK DEMOCRACY United States of America formed between 1776-83 during the War of Independence. Canada formed in 1867 following negotiations by the British

More information

Follow this and additional works at: Part of the American Politics Commons

Follow this and additional works at:  Part of the American Politics Commons Marquette University e-publications@marquette Ronald E. McNair Scholars Program 2013 Ronald E. McNair Scholars Program 7-1-2013 Rafael Torres, Jr. - Does the United States Supreme Court decision in the

More information

Mexico s 2018 Congressional elections

Mexico s 2018 Congressional elections Mexico s 2018 Congressional elections Incremental change no more Eric Magar ITAM Mexico Institute, Wilson Center June 25 th, 2018 General election July 1 st : all seats of the bicameral Congress contested

More information

Maintaining Control. Putin s Strategy for Holding Power Past 2008

Maintaining Control. Putin s Strategy for Holding Power Past 2008 Maintaining Control Putin s Strategy for Holding Power Past 2008 PONARS Policy Memo No. 397 Regina Smyth Pennsylvania State University December 2005 There is little question that Vladimir Putin s Kremlin

More information

TYPES OF GOVERNMENTS

TYPES OF GOVERNMENTS Governance and Democracy TYPES OF GOVERNMENTS Characteristics of regimes Pluralism Ideology Popular mobilization Leadership Source: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and

More information

Where does Macron s success come from? A look at electoral shifts with an eye on the legislative elections

Where does Macron s success come from? A look at electoral shifts with an eye on the legislative elections Where does Macron s success come from? A look at electoral shifts with an eye on the legislative elections Aldo Paparo May 24, 2017 Emmanuel Macron is therefore the new French President. The result of

More information

Partisan Advantage and Competitiveness in Illinois Redistricting

Partisan Advantage and Competitiveness in Illinois Redistricting Partisan Advantage and Competitiveness in Illinois Redistricting An Updated and Expanded Look By: Cynthia Canary & Kent Redfield June 2015 Using data from the 2014 legislative elections and digging deeper

More information

Women s. Political Representation & Electoral Systems. Key Recommendations. Federal Context. September 2016

Women s. Political Representation & Electoral Systems. Key Recommendations. Federal Context. September 2016 Women s Political Representation & Electoral Systems September 2016 Federal Context Parity has been achieved in federal cabinet, but women remain under-represented in Parliament. Canada ranks 62nd Internationally

More information

Mariano Rajoy s People s Party emerges strengthened after the parliamentary elections in Spain.

Mariano Rajoy s People s Party emerges strengthened after the parliamentary elections in Spain. parliamentary elections in spain European Elections monitor SUMMARY 1) Analysis : Page 01 2) Résults : Page 03 Mariano Rajoy s People s Party emerges strengthened after the parliamentary elections in Spain.

More information

Tzu-chiao Su Chinese Culture University, Taiwan

Tzu-chiao Su Chinese Culture University, Taiwan The Effect of Electoral System and Election Timing on Party System and Government Type: a Cross-Country Study of Presidential and Semi-presidential Democracies Tzu-chiao Su Chinese Culture University,

More information

The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014 Update to the Gerrymandering or Geography Debate

The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014 Update to the Gerrymandering or Geography Debate The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014 Update to the Gerrymandering or Geography Debate Nicholas Goedert Lafayette College goedertn@lafayette.edu May, 2015 ABSTRACT: This note observes that the pro-republican

More information

Part Three (continued): Electoral Systems & Linkage Institutions

Part Three (continued): Electoral Systems & Linkage Institutions Part Three (continued): Electoral Systems & Linkage Institutions Our political institutions work remarkably well. They are designed to clang against each other. The noise is democracy at work. -- Michael

More information

AP US GOVERNMENT: CHAPER 7: POLITICAL PARTIES: ESSENTIAL TO DEMOCRACY

AP US GOVERNMENT: CHAPER 7: POLITICAL PARTIES: ESSENTIAL TO DEMOCRACY AP US GOVERNMENT: CHAPER 7: POLITICAL PARTIES: ESSENTIAL TO DEMOCRACY Before political parties, candidates were listed alphabetically, and those whose names began with the letters A to F did better than

More information

THE CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT) BILL (No. XXII of 2018) Explanatory Memorandum

THE CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT) BILL (No. XXII of 2018) Explanatory Memorandum THE CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT) BILL (No. XXII of 2018) Explanatory Memorandum The main object of this Bill is to reform certain aspects of the electoral system of Mauritius. 2. The Bill, accordingly, amends

More information

Available online: 24 Jun 2011

Available online: 24 Jun 2011 This article was downloaded by: [University of Barcelona] On: 14 July 2011, At: 06:18 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer

More information

Transitions to Democracy

Transitions to Democracy Transitions to Democracy OUTLINE INTRODUCTION when an authoritarian regime breaks down and democracy appears on the political agenda, one of five outcomes is possible: The structure of conflicts is such

More information

CHAPTER 9: Political Parties

CHAPTER 9: Political Parties CHAPTER 9: Political Parties Reading Questions 1. The Founders and George Washington in particular thought of political parties as a. the primary means of communication between voters and representatives.

More information

CHAPTER 9. A New Iron Law of Argentine Politics? Ernesto Calvo and María Victoria Murillo *

CHAPTER 9. A New Iron Law of Argentine Politics? Ernesto Calvo and María Victoria Murillo * CHAPTER 9 A New Iron Law of Argentine Politics? Ernesto Calvo and María Victoria Murillo * * We are thankful for the comments of Javier Corrales, Jorge Domínguez, Tulia Faletti, Anna Gryzmala- Busse, Frances

More information

CAN FAIR VOTING SYSTEMS REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

CAN FAIR VOTING SYSTEMS REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? CAN FAIR VOTING SYSTEMS REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? Facts and figures from Arend Lijphart s landmark study: Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries Prepared by: Fair

More information

Executive Summary. 1 Page

Executive Summary. 1 Page ANALYSIS FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) by Dr Irfan Nooruddin, Professor, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 17 December 2017 Executive Summary The dramatic vote swing

More information

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights SPAIN. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 9 March OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights SPAIN. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 9 March OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights SPAIN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 9 March 2008 OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report Warsaw 28 August 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...1

More information

Chapter Four: Chamber Competitiveness, Political Polarization, and Political Parties

Chapter Four: Chamber Competitiveness, Political Polarization, and Political Parties Chapter Four: Chamber Competitiveness, Political Polarization, and Political Parties Building off of the previous chapter in this dissertation, this chapter investigates the involvement of political parties

More information

Philips Vermonte CSIS December The 2014 Election and Democracy in Indonesia

Philips Vermonte CSIS December The 2014 Election and Democracy in Indonesia Philips Vermonte CSIS December 2014 The 2014 Election and Democracy in Indonesia Political Reform Competitive electoral democracy Economic Reform Growth Recovery Decentralization Fiscal and Public Service

More information

Name: Class: Date: ID: A

Name: Class: Date: ID: A Class: Date: Chapter 5 Test Matching IDENTIFYING KEY TERMS Match each item with the correct statement below. You will not use all the terms. Some terms may be used more than once. a. coalition b. political

More information

Chapter 5: Political Parties Ms. Nguyen American Government Bell Ringer: 1. What is this chapter s EQ? 2. Interpret the quote below: No America

Chapter 5: Political Parties Ms. Nguyen American Government Bell Ringer: 1. What is this chapter s EQ? 2. Interpret the quote below: No America Chapter 5: Political Parties Ms. Nguyen American Government Bell Ringer: 1. What is this chapter s EQ? 2. Interpret the quote below: No America without democracy, no democracy without politics, no politics

More information

Candidate Selection in Venezuela (and Its Impact on Legislator Behavior)

Candidate Selection in Venezuela (and Its Impact on Legislator Behavior) Candidate Selection in Venezuela (and Its Impact on Legislator Behavior) Brian F. Crisp University of Arizona Not for attribution without the author s explicit consent. Paper prepared for the Latin American

More information

Author(s) Title Date Dataset(s) Abstract

Author(s) Title Date Dataset(s) Abstract Author(s): Traugott, Michael Title: Memo to Pilot Study Committee: Understanding Campaign Effects on Candidate Recall and Recognition Date: February 22, 1990 Dataset(s): 1988 National Election Study, 1989

More information

The gargantuan literature on the US Congress provides a detailed

The gargantuan literature on the US Congress provides a detailed 656 MARK P. JONES, SEBASTIÁN SAIEGH, PABLO T. SPILLER, AND MARIANO TOMMASI Amateur Legislators Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System Mark P. Jones

More information

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE. JOAN RUSSOW and THE GREEN PARTY OF CANADA. - and -

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE. JOAN RUSSOW and THE GREEN PARTY OF CANADA. - and - ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE File No.: B E T W E E N: JOAN RUSSOW and THE GREEN PARTY OF CANADA Applicants - and - THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER OF CANADA and HER MAJESTY

More information

COMPARATIVE TURNOUT LEVELS IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE Paper Presented at the 21st World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, Chile, July 2009

COMPARATIVE TURNOUT LEVELS IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE Paper Presented at the 21st World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, Chile, July 2009 COMPARATIVE TURNOUT LEVELS IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE 1990 Paper Presented at the 21st World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, Chile, July 2009 MAY 2009 DRAFT Alan Siaroff Department of Political Science

More information

Introduction What are political parties, and how do they function in our two-party system? Encourage good behavior among members

Introduction What are political parties, and how do they function in our two-party system? Encourage good behavior among members Chapter 5: Political Parties Section 1 Objectives Define a political party. Describe the major functions of political parties. Identify the reasons why the United States has a two-party system. Understand

More information

Efficiency as a descriptive variable of autonomous electoral systems in Spain

Efficiency as a descriptive variable of autonomous electoral systems in Spain ISSN: 2036-5438 Efficiency as a descriptive variable of autonomous electoral systems in Spain by Jaume Magre Ferran Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 4, issue 1, 2012 Except where otherwise noted content

More information

Designing Weighted Voting Games to Proportionality

Designing Weighted Voting Games to Proportionality Designing Weighted Voting Games to Proportionality In the analysis of weighted voting a scheme may be constructed which apportions at least one vote, per-representative units. The numbers of weighted votes

More information

Political party major parties Republican Democratic

Political party major parties Republican Democratic Political Parties American political parties are election-oriented. Political party - a group of persons who seek to control government by winning elections and holding office. The two major parties in

More information

Sunday s Presidential Election: Where Will Chile Go? Anders Beal, Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Sunday s Presidential Election: Where Will Chile Go? Anders Beal, Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Sunday s Presidential Election: Where Will Chile Go? Anders Beal, Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars November 17, 2017 A SECOND TERM LIKELY FOR SEBASTIÁN PIÑERA Chileans

More information

This journal is published by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

This journal is published by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved. Article: National Conditions, Strategic Politicians, and U.S. Congressional Elections: Using the Generic Vote to Forecast the 2006 House and Senate Elections Author: Alan I. Abramowitz Issue: October 2006

More information

How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain

How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain Elena Llaudet Harvard University APSA Conference August 29, 2013 Incumbency Advantage Incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage

More information

parliamentary transparency

parliamentary transparency REGIONAL INDEX OF P A R L I A M E N T A R Y TRANSPARENCY Regional Index of parliamentary transparency Regional Index of p a r l i a m e n t a r y t r a n s p a r e n c y August 2008, Chile Regional Index

More information

Electoral Reform Proposal

Electoral Reform Proposal Electoral Reform Proposal By Daniel Grice, JD, U of Manitoba 2013. Co-Author of Establishing a Legal Framework for E-voting 1, with Dr. Bryan Schwartz of the University of Manitoba and published by Elections

More information

SPAIN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 14 March 2004

SPAIN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 14 March 2004 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights SPAIN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 14 March 2004 OSCE/ODIHR ASSESSMENT REPORT Warsaw 27 April 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...1 II. BACKGROUND

More information

ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS: TOWARDS A HANDBOOK AND RELATED MATERIAL. Summary of CONCEPT PAPER DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED BY

ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS: TOWARDS A HANDBOOK AND RELATED MATERIAL. Summary of CONCEPT PAPER DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED BY ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS: TOWARDS A HANDBOOK AND RELATED MATERIAL Summary of CONCEPT PAPER DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED BY OROZCO HENRÍQUEZ AND DR RAUL AVILA TO EDR EXPERT GROUP WORKSHOP HELD IN

More information

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

COMPARATIVE POLITICS Contact joseramon.montero@uam.es COMPARATIVE POLITICS Professor: JOSE RAMON MONTERO GIBERT E-Mail: jrmontero@faculty.ie.edu Education Law degree, University of Granada, 1970; Ph.D. in Law, University of

More information

CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS DATA ARCHIVE INTRODUCTION

CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS DATA ARCHIVE INTRODUCTION CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS DATA ARCHIVE INTRODUCTION The California Elections Data Archive (CEDA) is a joint project of the Center for California Studies and the Institute for Social Research, both of California

More information

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS WITH PARTISANSHIP

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS WITH PARTISANSHIP The Increasing Correlation of WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS WITH PARTISANSHIP A Statistical Analysis BY CHARLES FRANKLIN Whatever the technically nonpartisan nature of the elections, has the structure

More information

Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service,

Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service, Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service, 1789-2017 Matthew Eric Glassman Analyst on the Congress Amber Hope Wilhelm Graphics Specialist January 3, 2017 Congressional Research

More information

Inter-Branch Crises in Latin America (ICLA) Dataset, Codebook (Updated: August 17, 2016)

Inter-Branch Crises in Latin America (ICLA) Dataset, Codebook (Updated: August 17, 2016) Inter-Branch Crises in Latin America (ICLA) Dataset, 1985-2008 Codebook (Updated: August 17, 2016) Gretchen Helmke The ICLA dataset defines an inter-branch crisis as an episode in which one branch of government

More information

Party Influence in a Bicameral Setting: U.S. Appropriations from

Party Influence in a Bicameral Setting: U.S. Appropriations from Party Influence in a Bicameral Setting: U.S. Appropriations from 1880-1947 June 24 2013 Mark Owens Bicameralism & Policy Outcomes 1. How valuable is bicameralism to the lawmaking process? 2. How different

More information

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems Martin Okolikj School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRe) University College Dublin 02 November 2016 1990s Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems Scholars

More information

Video: The Big Picture IA_1/polisci/presidency/Edwards_Ch11_Congress_Seg1_v 2.

Video: The Big Picture IA_1/polisci/presidency/Edwards_Ch11_Congress_Seg1_v 2. Congress 11 Video: The Big Picture 11 http://media.pearsoncmg.com/ph/hss/ssa_shared_med IA_1/polisci/presidency/Edwards_Ch11_Congress_Seg1_v 2.html Learning Objectives 11 11.1 11.2 Characterize the backgrounds

More information

2017 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT

2017 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT 2017 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT PRINCIPAL AUTHORS: LONNA RAE ATKESON PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DIRECTOR CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF VOTING, ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY, AND DIRECTOR INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH,

More information

PARTISANSHIP AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL ELECTIONS

PARTISANSHIP AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL ELECTIONS Number of Representatives October 2012 PARTISANSHIP AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL ELECTIONS ANALYZING THE 2010 ELECTIONS TO THE U.S. HOUSE FairVote grounds its analysis of congressional elections in district partisanship.

More information

5/5/2015. AP GOPO Late Start Review Session. Top 21 Most Tested Concepts. 1. The Articles of Confederation. 2. The Federalist Papers

5/5/2015. AP GOPO Late Start Review Session. Top 21 Most Tested Concepts. 1. The Articles of Confederation. 2. The Federalist Papers AP GOPO Late Start Review Session May 5, 2015 Top 21 Most Tested Concepts 1. The Articles of Confederation Established a decentralized system of government with a weak central government that had limited

More information

Campaigning in General Elections (HAA)

Campaigning in General Elections (HAA) Campaigning in General Elections (HAA) Once the primary season ends, the candidates who have won their party s nomination shift gears to campaign in the general election. Although the Constitution calls

More information

In Defense of Majoritarianism

In Defense of Majoritarianism Carleton University, Ottawa March 2-4, 2017 In Defense of Majoritarianism Stanley L. Winer, Carleton University Conference Sponsor(s): Faculty of Public Affairs Partners: Presenting sponsor: Version /

More information

A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO DATASETS

A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO DATASETS A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO DATASETS Bachelor Thesis by S.F. Simmelink s1143611 sophiesimmelink@live.nl Internationale Betrekkingen en Organisaties Universiteit Leiden 9 June 2016 Prof. dr. G.A. Irwin Word

More information

Poznan July The vulnerability of the European Elite System under a prolonged crisis

Poznan July The vulnerability of the European Elite System under a prolonged crisis Very Very Preliminary Draft IPSA 24 th World Congress of Political Science Poznan 23-28 July 2016 The vulnerability of the European Elite System under a prolonged crisis Maurizio Cotta (CIRCaP- University

More information

PO 325 POLITICS IN SPAIN: PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS IES Abroad Barcelona

PO 325 POLITICS IN SPAIN: PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS IES Abroad Barcelona PO 325 POLITICS IN SPAIN: PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS IES Abroad Barcelona DESCRIPTION: Spain in the last hundred years has been a scenario for virtually every single form of government possible: it transformed

More information

What Went Wrong? Regional Electoral Politics and Impediments to State Centralization in Russia,

What Went Wrong? Regional Electoral Politics and Impediments to State Centralization in Russia, What Went Wrong? Regional Electoral Politics and Impediments to State Centralization in Russia, 2003-2004 PONARS Policy Memo 337 Grigorii V. Golosov European University at St. Petersburg November 2004

More information

The Belgian Electoral System: Open list system, political parties and individual candidates

The Belgian Electoral System: Open list system, political parties and individual candidates The Belgian Electoral System: Open list system, political parties and individual candidates by Frédéric BOUHON Lecturer (chargé de cours) at the University of Liège (Belgium) Paper presented on the 21

More information

Winning in New Democracies: Why Some Parties Are More Victorious Than Others in Foundational Elections

Winning in New Democracies: Why Some Parties Are More Victorious Than Others in Foundational Elections Winning in New Democracies: Why Some Parties Are More Victorious Than Others in Foundational Elections Josue Gomez: McNair Scholar Ross Burkhart, Allen Hicken, Mike Touchton, Jill Witrock: Mentors Political

More information

Electoral Reform: Key Federal Policy Recommendations. Researched and written by CFUW National Office & CFUW Leaside East York and Etobicoke JULY 2016

Electoral Reform: Key Federal Policy Recommendations. Researched and written by CFUW National Office & CFUW Leaside East York and Etobicoke JULY 2016 Electoral Reform: Key Federal Policy Recommendations Researched and written by CFUW National Office & CFUW Leaside East York and Etobicoke JULY 2016 Page 1 About CFUW CFUW is a non-partisan, voluntary,

More information

Membership change in the Dutch Tweede Kamer i By Athanassios Gouglas and Bart Maddens, KU Leuven Public Governance Institute

Membership change in the Dutch Tweede Kamer i By Athanassios Gouglas and Bart Maddens, KU Leuven Public Governance Institute Membership change in the Dutch Tweede Kamer 1946-2012 i By Athanassios Gouglas and Bart Maddens, KU Leuven Public Governance Institute The proportion of parliamentary membership change from election to

More information

Journal of Politics in Latin America

Journal of Politics in Latin America Journal of Politics in Latin America Kikuchi, Hirokazu, and Germán Lodola (2014), The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case, in: Journal

More information

2011 National Opinion Poll: Canadian Views on Asia

2011 National Opinion Poll: Canadian Views on Asia 2011 National Opinion Poll: Canadian Views on Asia Table of Contents Methodology Key Findings Section 1: Canadians Mental Maps Section 2: Views of Canada-Asia Economic Relations Section 3: Perceptions

More information

Carolina R. Tchintian

Carolina R. Tchintian Department of Political Science, Rice University 6100 Main St. MS 24, Houston, TX (77005) Phone: (832) 480 0732 E-Mail: Carolina.R.Tchintian@Rice.edu EDUCATION 2013-2017 PhD in Political Science, Department

More information

#1 State Constitutions

#1 State Constitutions #1 State Constitutions The American Revolution began the process of creating a new nation in a number of different ways. On May 10, 1776, the Continental Congress directed the colonies to suppress royal

More information

Elections in Southern Europe in times of crisis. Paolo Segatti, Gema García, Alberto Sanz, and José Ramón Montero

Elections in Southern Europe in times of crisis. Paolo Segatti, Gema García, Alberto Sanz, and José Ramón Montero Elections in Southern Europe in times of crisis Paolo Segatti, Gema García, Alberto Sanz, and José Ramón Montero Elections in Southern Europe n Portugal June 2 n Spain November 2 n Greece May 22 June 22

More information

What Is A Political Party?

What Is A Political Party? What Is A Political Party? A group of office holders, candidates, activists, and voters who identify with a group label and seek to elect to public office individuals who run under that label. Consist

More information

INFORMATION SHEETS: 2

INFORMATION SHEETS: 2 INFORMATION SHEETS: 2 EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON WOMEN S REPRESENTATION For the National Association of Women and the Law For the National Roundtable on Women and Politics 2003 March 22 nd ~ 23 rd,

More information

Strengthening Protection of Labor Rights through Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)

Strengthening Protection of Labor Rights through Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) Strengthening Protection of Labor Rights through Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) Moonhawk Kim moonhawk@gmail.com Executive Summary Analysts have argued that the United States attempts to strengthen

More information

PEI COALITION FOR WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT. Submission to the Special Committee on Democratic Renewal for the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island

PEI COALITION FOR WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT. Submission to the Special Committee on Democratic Renewal for the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island PEI COALITION FOR WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT Submission to the Special Committee on Democratic Renewal for the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island PEI Coalition for Women in Government 10/21/2015 PEI

More information

Runoff Elections and the Number of Presidential Candidates A Regression Discontinuity Design Using Brazilian Municipalities

Runoff Elections and the Number of Presidential Candidates A Regression Discontinuity Design Using Brazilian Municipalities Runoff Elections and the Number of Presidential Candidates A Regression Discontinuity Design Using Brazilian Municipalities Timothy J. Power University of Oxford Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira University of

More information

Redistricting Reform in the South

Redistricting Reform in the South REDI ST RI CT I NG R EF ORM I NT HES OUT H F ebr uar y0 0Car r ol l ve,s ui t e0 T ak omapar k,md0 f ai r vot e. or g i nf o@f ai r vot e. or g Redistricting Reform in the South Redistricting Reform in

More information

Impact of Legislative Gender Quotas on Gender Violence Legislation in Latin America

Impact of Legislative Gender Quotas on Gender Violence Legislation in Latin America University of Vermont ScholarWorks @ UVM UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses Undergraduate Theses 2015 Impact of Legislative Gender Quotas on Gender Violence Legislation in Latin America

More information

2016 State Elections

2016 State Elections 2016 State Elections By Tim Storey and Dan Diorio Voters left the overall partisan landscape in state legislatures relatively unchanged in 2016, despite a tumultuous campaign for the presidency. The GOP

More information

LSE Global South Unit Policy Brief Series

LSE Global South Unit Policy Brief Series ISSN 2396-765X LSE Policy Brief Series Policy Brief No.1/2018. The discrete role of Latin America in the globalization process. By Iliana Olivié and Manuel Gracia. INTRODUCTION. The global presence of

More information